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INTRODUCTION 
COLIN FILER 
For Policy that Works 
This book, unlike many others of its kind, does not contain the proceedings of an 
academic conference, but represents one part of the outcome of a long and rather 
tortuous series of conversations and negotiations between the editor, the 
contributors, the sponsors, and a considerable number of other people who may 
be counted as 'intellectual stakeholders' in PNG's forest policy process. This 
introduction will therefore trace the history of these conversations and 
negotiations in order to reveal the logic which lies behind the form and content of 
this particular collection of essays, and also the 'missing links' in this chain of 
reasoning which (we hope) will soon be filled by other publications. 
In September 1994, the International Institute for Environment and 
Development (liED) proposed a comparative study of forest policy to be funded 
by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UK Overseas 
Development Administration. The project was entitled 'Policy That Works for 
Forests and People', and its overall goal, as formulated in consultation with the 
funding agencies, was 'to improve understanding and practice of policy 
processes, so that they improve the sustainability of forest management and 
optimise stakeholder benefits' (liED 1995b:2). It was understood from the outset 
that this project would involve a number of 'collaborative country case studies', 
but a further process of consultation was required in order to identify the 
countries to be chosen for this purpose. In early November, the liED made its 
first approaches to research institutions in Papua New Guinea (PNG), including 
the National Research Institute (NRI), in order to assess their willingness and 
ability to be involved in such a study, and received a generally favourable 
response. 
When I joined the NRI in January 1995, it was still not clear whether PNG 
would be one of the countries selected for a case study, even though we knew 
that the liED was keen to make this choice because of its previous involvement 
in the country's National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme 
(NAFCAP). 1 Since this programme had absorbed a great deal of intellectual 
effort over the previous five years, as well as a substantial amount of financial 
support from the donor community, the time was ripe for the NRI to make its 
own input to the assessment of that programme in its capacity as the 
government's 'think tank' on matters of social and economic policy. One of my 
1 The liED had provided one of the consultants who participated in PNG's Tropical Forestry 
Action Plan Review in 1989 (see Sargent 1989; World Bank 1989), and subsequently provided 
counterpart support to the NGO Specialist in the four-person Technical Support Team which 
assisted in the implementation of the Action Programme (see Mayers and Peutalo 1995). 
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new colleagues, Tahereh Nadarajah, had been making her own contribution to 
this assessment in a series of NRI discussion papers (Nadarajah 1993a, 1993b, 
1994 ), and other NRI staff had also been engaged in the study of specific projects 
or issues in the forestry sector (see Fernando and Nen 1991; Temu, Gumoi and 
Kanari 1994 ), but the Institute had not produced a monograph on the subject of 
forestry or forest conservation since 1982, when it had been the moving force 
behind a conference on the contemporary relevance of traditional conservation 
practices (Morauta, Pernetta and Heaney 1982). We therefore decided to seek 
expressions of interest from potential contributors to a monograph whose 
provisional title was The Sociology and Politics of Forestry in Papua New 
Guinea. 
We discussed this proposal with James Mayers of the liED when he visited 
PNG in April 1995, and in light of these discussions, we decided to amend the 
title to The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea. At 
this stage, it seemed almost certain that PNG would indeed be one of the 
countries selected for a case study of 'Policy that Works for Forests and People', 
and we therefore tried to address the contents of the monograph to the liED's 
own draft guidelines for the production of such case studies. We therefore 
planned to divide our monograph into three parts: 
1. The National Forest Management Policy Process. 
2. The Negotiation and Impact of Large-Scale Logging Projects. 
3. Local Conservation and Sustainable Development Initiatives. 
The first part was intended to deal with the recent history of forest industry and 
forest conservation policy at the national level, and thus represent a further 
reflection on the lessons learnt from the NAFCAP.2 The second part was meant 
to supplement the very small volume of existing literature dealing with 
relationships between rural communities and logging contractors,3 while the 
third was meant to reflect on the experiences of staff and consultants engaged in 
the design and implementation of several 'integrated conservation and 
development' (ICAD) projects in PNG.4 
2 The NAFCAP had been reviewed by a team of four consultants at the end of 1994 (Taylor et al. 
1994 ), but their work had been completed in some haste, and had not been officially published by 
the United Nations Development Programme. 
3 At this time the only substantial published accounts of such relationships by social scientists 
were Colin De'Ath's study of the Gogol timber project (De'Ath 1979, 1980) and Daniela Renner's 
study of the Kumil timber project (Renner 1990), both of which are located in Madang Province. 
Some additional material was available in shorter publications by Waiko (1977), Mitio (1984), 
Deklin (1992), and Sagir (1994), and these have since been supplemented by those of Kaspou 
( 1996), Lotu ( 1996), and Wood ( 1996a, 1996b ). 
4 A meeting of ICAD project personnel took place at the Christensen Research Institute in 
Madang towards the end of April 1995 (see James 1996). 
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By June 1995, staff of the liED's Forestry and Land Use Programme had 
completed the literature review which constituted the first phase of their project 
on 'Policy that Works for Forests and People' (liED 1995a), and were ready to 
host a workshop to plan the case studies of forest policy in six countries- Costa 
Rica, Ghana, Zimbabwe, India, Pakistan and PNG. The PNG 'delegation' to this 
workshop comprised myself, Nikhil Sekhran and Brian Brunton. Nikhil was the 
Resource Economist attached to the Biodiversity Conservation and Resource 
Management Programme in the Department of Environment and Conservation, 
while Brian had a long record of involvement in the national forest policy 
process, both as a lawyer and an activist in some of PNG's more radical non-
government organisations (NGOs ). 5 In our own contributions to the workshop, 
we painted a rather gloomy picture of past and present attempts to reconcile the 
aspirations ofPNG's people with the conservation ofPNG's forests. Despite the 
money, time, and effort which had been poured into the NAFCAP since its 
inception in 1990, the capacity of _the national government and the international 
community to achieve the goal of 'sustainable forest management' was limited, 
both by the dynamics of PNG's political system and by the crucial fact that 99 
percent of all forested land is owned and controlled by communities of 
customary landowners, whose attitudes and behaviour are not normally amenable 
to any form of centralised control. Nor could we reasonably claim that any 
further addition to the small mountain of documents which the NAFCAP had 
already deposited in the middle of this forest would have any significant impact 
on its real guardians in a country where very few people read anything except the 
Bible and the daily newspaper. 
These considerations weighed heavily on our minds when we came to 
reconsider the organisation of the PNG country study after our return from 
Britain, especially because our sponsors in the liED were clearly concerned that 
we should try to secure a high level of 'participation' on the part of local policy 
makers. We therefore made a number of changes in the form and content of our 
proposed monograph to take account of the relationship between customary land 
tenure, the distribution of academic expertise, and the nature of the national 
policy process. The tripartite division of the study was rearranged as follows: 
1. The Negotiation and Impact of Large-Scale Logging Projects. 
2. Conservation and Sustainable Development Initiatives. 
3. The National Forest Management Policy Process. 
This revision was intended to reflect the fact that local project negotiations in 
PNG are generally not the outcome or reflection of decisions taken at the national 
5 Brian had produced a 'Critique of the World Bank's Tropical Forestry Action Plan Review for 
Papua New Guinea' (Brunton 1990) when he was still Chairman of the PNG Law Reform 
Commission, but had since spent some time in Australia before returning to help found an NGO 
called the Individual Community Rights and Advocacy Forum (ICRAF), which combined legal aid 
with public awareness campaigns. 
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level, but rather that the national policy process represents a contradictory (and 
often a seemingly hypocritical) balancing act between the politics of the 
Melanesian village, on the one hand, and the politics of the global economy and 
international community of aid donors, on the other. The study would therefore 
proceed by considering: 
• first, the way that different stakeholders have contributed to the negotiation, 
operation, and impact of specific local logging projects in the period since the 
final report of the Barnett lnquiry6 and the Tropical Forestry Action Plan 
(TF AP) review process of 1989; 
• second, the design and implementation of specific (local and national) 
'alternatives' to the destructive logging practices which seem to be sustained 
by the balance of interests previously described; and 
• third, the actual and potential relevance and coherence of a distinctively 
'national' policy process which seeks to encompass and transform the general 
relationship between PNG's people and their forests. 
At the same time, we were still wondering how to deal with the aftermath of 
the whole TFAP/NAFCAP process, in which substantial funding from PNG's 
traditional aid donors had so palpably enhanced the weight of expert expatriate 
opinion in the formation of national forest policy, even if, at the end of the day, 
the impact of their fleeting presence was diminishing quite rapidly. We therefore 
aimed to amend the study format in ways which would expand the number and 
variety of participants beyond the range of those who had the time and 
inclination to write a chaptP" for an academic monograph. We could see two 
ways to achieve this goal: 
• If the first two sections of the monograph were still to contain a number of 
substantial written contributions by individuals with detailed inside 
knowledge of specific local or national projects, these writings might be 
supplemented by shorter criticisms or commentaries by other individuals who 
had an equally detailed knowledge of these projects, but viewed them from a 
different perspective, and some whole 'chapters' might even consist of a 
series of short sections written by different authors. 
• The appearance of 'dialogue' (and unfinished argument) might then be 
amplified in the third section, dealing with the national policy process, where 
6 In April 1987, the PNG government appointed an Australian member of the local judiciary, 
Justice Thomas ('Tos') Barnett, to conduct a Commission of Inquiry into allegations of impropriety 
against the executives of the Forest Industries Council, and to assess the respective roles of the 
Council, the Minister, and the Department of Forests in the marketing of timber. Over the course of 
the next two years, the Commission produced seven interim reports and one final report, whose 
revelations of malpractice were instrumental in forcing the government to initiate a major process 
of policy reform. Barnett ( 1992) has provided an excellent summary of his own findings and 
recommendations. 
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the bulk of the material would consist of transcribed interview sessions with 
those 'key players' in the policy process who were unlikely to produce written 
contributions of their own. 
This meant, in effect, that four different roles would be made available for 
individuals to participate in the study process: 'contributors' (or primary authors) 
would write substantial pieces for the monograph; 'commentators' (or secondary 
authors) would write shorter pieces, including responses to those written by the 
primary authors; 'interviewers' would be engaged to design and put questions to 
key players in the national policy process; and 'respondents' would be those key 
players who agreed to participate in such interviews. 
By this time, we had also come to realise that the proposed monograph and 
the country study required by the liED would probably not be the same 
document, that the former would be considerably longer than the latter, and that 
these two products would be designed for different audiences. Nevertheless, we 
were still working on the assumption that the country study would most probably 
consist of edited extracts from the monograph or summaries of some of its 
findings. 
At this point, the organisation of the study became the collective 
responsibility of a 'Core Group' which comprised myself, Nikhil Sekhran, Brian 
Brunton, and a fourth member, Basil Peutalo, who had previously worked as the 
NGO Specialist in the UNDP-funded NAFCAP Technical Support Team, but 
who was now employed by the World Wildlife Fund. The main task of the Core 
Group was to establish a timetable of activities and a division of labour which 
would lead to the completion of both monograph and country study in the latter 
part of 1996. Specific provision had to be made for: 
• the design of a 'framework of analysis' for circulation to the main 
contributors to the first two parts of the monograph; 
• the organisation of a local planning workshop, whose participants would 
frame the questions, and identify the potential respondents to be interviewed, 
on matters of forest policy; 
• the approval of a budget which the liED would make available for various 
aspects of this work. 
In practice, I was the only member of the group whose own terms of employment 
created the time required to make a substantial input into the organisation of the 
study, and this state of affairs was recognised in the NRI's assumption of 
responsibility for the overall administration of the project. Nevertheless, a 
process of consultation with other group members was put in place, and this was 
periodically reinforced when James Mayers made one of his occasional visits 
from London. 
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The Framework of Analysis 
Nikhil Sekhran and I met to discuss a draft framework of analysis for the first 
two parts of the monograph towards the end of August 1995, on the 
understanding that I would take the main burden of responsibility for soliciting 
and coordinating contributions to Part One ('The Negotiation and Impact of 
Large-Scale Logging Projects'), while he would assume an equivalent 
responsibility for Part Two ('Conservation and Sustainable Development 
Initiatives'). This framework of analysis was incorporated into different versions 
of a project document which were circulated to potential contributors and other 
interested parties between October 1995 and February 1996. 
The framework of analysis for Part One began with a discussion of the gap 
in the existing body of literature which this monograph was partly intended to 
fill. 
Despite the physical extent of logging, the political influence of the 
timber industry, and its contribution to national exports and revenues, 
much less is known about the political history and social impact of 
individual logging projects than is known about the political history and 
social impact of mining and petroleum projects in PNG. This 
discrepancy is partly due to the difference in the levels of investigation 
required by statute and government regulation, partly to differences in 
the 'public relations' strategies of the major companies involved in 
these industries, and partly to differences in the amount of interest 
which these two types of development have aroused in academic 
circles. As a result, it is difficult to make an assessment of the relative 
significance of the national policy process and a multitude of local 
'policy processes' in the forestry sector on anything but an anecdotal 
basis, or by making generalisations from the few case studies which 
have been undertaken, some of which are now seriously outdated. 
The aim was to remedy this deficiency by assembling a number of case studies 
from different parts of the country, each of which would be designed to produce 
data which would be both contemporaneous and mutually comparable. 
In order to achieve this kind of comparability, contributors to this part of the 
monograph were asked to consider the following questions: 
1. What have been the main turning points or crucial decisions which have 
affected the 'development' of this project (or set of projects) and thus 
constitute its policy process? 
2. Who are the main stake holders (both groups and individuals) who have either 
contributed to, or been affected by, these decisions, and what can be said 
about their respective interests, policies, plans, strategies, or motives? 
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3. What have the various 'local' stakeholders gained or lost from this process in 
(a) wealth, (b) power, and (c) knowledge (including their perception of 
'development' itself and of other people's interests and motives)? 
4. To what extent, and in what ways, has the local policy process surrounding 
this project (or set of projects) influenced the national policy process, and 
vice versc;t? 
Our aim was to secure at least six chapters altogether, with at least two projects 
from each of the three coastal regions of PNG. An examination of the eight 
chapters which are now included in Part One of the present volume shows that 
we have accomplished this goal (see Map 1.1 ), though we cannot claim that these 
case studies represent the full range of local stakeholder relationships throughout 
the forestry sector. 7 
Our framework of analysis for what was then to be Part Two of the 
monograph originated in some ofthe 'unfinished business' which remained after 
completion of the Papua New Guinea Country Study on Biological Diversity 
(Sekhran and Miller 1994 ), which had been prepared by the Department of 
Environment and Conservation ·for the first Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity. Despite the wealth of PNG's biodiversity 
heritage, and the importance of its contribution to the subsistence base of the 
rural population, this endowment is currently under threat from various 
unsustainable forms of land use, for which a number of separate causes can be 
identified: 
• the dislocation of forest-edge communities from traditional culture, and their 
purposeful or forced absorption into a cash economy in which they are not 
well equipped to participate, which then serves as an incentive to sell their 
forest resource to the highest bidder; 
• the 'dependency syndrome' that afflicts many rural communities, which 
partly originates in the 'development determinism' of both colonial and post-
colonial administrations, and which reduces the capacity for self-reliance; 
• economic factors, such as high interest rates and the lack of resource pricing, 
which serve as disincentives for sound resource stewardship; 
• corruption in political circles, both at local and national levels, and the 
existence of patron-client relationships that have to be serviced through 
largesse; 
• the opportunistic behaviour of many developers, fuelled by rent-seeking 
opportunities and the limited effectiveness of state regulation; 
7 Given the fact that West New Britain Province currently accounts for approximately half of all 
the logs exported from PNG, we were very keen to secure an additional case study from this 
province in order to supplement Gary Simpson' s more general account, but this did not eventuate. 
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Introduction 9 
• population growth, beyond the 'carrying capacity' of some local 
environments, and a consequent increase in the intensity of resource 
utilisation; and 
• the introduction of new technologies, such as firearms, which adversely affect 
natural systems. 
Although the earlier country study investigated some of these pressures, we 
thought that further attention should now be given to some of the practical 
questions which arise in the pursuit of conservation values in PNG. Such 
questions are addressed in five of the chapters now contained in Part Three of the 
present volume. 
It may be noted here that the design of this discussion had already departed 
from our original intention to focus attention on a number of local 'conservation 
and sustainable development initiatives' within PNG, for only one of the chapters 
in Part Three of the present volume (by Arlyne Johnson) has a local focus (see 
Map 1.1), while four others are concerned with PNG as a whole, and one (by 
John Leedom) illustrates the difference between the practical pursuit of 
conservation values in PNG and its next-door neighbour, Irian Jaya.8 Although 
we still believe in the desirability of a comparative evaluation of the efforts being 
made by government and non-governmental organisations to establish and 
manage ICAD projects in different parts of PNG, it is still too early to assess the 
success and the sustainability of some of these initiatives, so we hope to revisit 
this subject in a separate monograph to be published at a later date. 
The second part of the present volume does not contain the dialogue on 
national forest policy which we had hoped, in our earlier scheme, to construct out 
of transcribed interview sessions with 'key players' in the policy process. 
Instead, it consists of a number of chapters, written from widely different 
perspectives, on the political economy of the forest industry, which fill some of 
the gaps left by our initial distinction between a series of local case studies of 
'forest exploitation' and a series of chapters on various aspects of the national 
'conservation industry'. Even in the original framework of analysis for Part One, 
it was recognised that additional chapters on the logging industry as a whole 
might be included, where these would throw useful light on the analysis of 
specific projects. For example, my own collection of statistical information on 
the log export industry (Chapter 1 0) was originally canvassed as a method of 
supplying relevant facts and figures to the authors of the local case studies. 
Discussion with Yoichi Kuroda of the Japan Tropical Forest Action Network in 
September 1995 led us to recognise that some attention should ideally be paid to 
the political economy of tropical timber consumption in the major markets for 
8 The Core Group felt that this chapter would provide an important counterpoint to the rest of the 
study, precisely because the physical and traditional cultural similarities between the two parts of 
New Guinea are offset by such stark differences in property rights and the power of the state to 
determine the use of natural resources. 
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PNG's timber exports, and hence to our eventual request for Anja Light's 
contribution to the present volume. And another 'chance' meeting with Rod 
Taylor in November 1995 afforded us the opportunity to solicit a discussion of 
the legal framework of the forest industry from one of the key players in the 
recent process of legal and institutional reform in the forestry sector (see Chapter 
11.). At the same time, it should be noted that this part of the monograph omits 
any detailed discussion of at least three issues on which we had originally hoped 
to include separate chapters - the production of national and provincial forest 
plans, the costs and benefits of 'downstream processing', and the barely visible 
question of gender equity in the forestry sector. 
The final shape of Part Two has thus developed in an incremental, and 
sometimes accidental, fashion, even as we were sometimes tempted to revert to 
our original distinction between studies of 'exploitation' and 'conservation' -
whether at local, national, or regional levels - or even to use the distinction 
between these three levels of analysis as the basis for an alternative tripartite 
division.9 The division we have chosen must remain, to some extent, an 
arbitrary one. This is especially true of the line which we have drawn between 
the second and third parts of the monograph, where chapters such as those by 
Anja Light, Ron Martin, John Millett, Hartmut Holzknecht and Bas Louman can 
obviously be construed as discussions of both the 'forest industry' and the 
practical achievement of 'conservation values' or 'sustainable development'. 
The final division between these two parts has thus been motivated primarily by 
our conception of the mutual relationship between the chapters which each one 
contains. 
Unfinished Business 
Although the monograph in its present form presents a broad spectrum of 
evidence and opinion on the political economy of forest management in PNG, 
written from a combination of academic and non-academic perspectives, it 
clearly fails to embody that appearance of participation and dialogue which we 
had sought to achieve by conducting interviews with 'key players' in the national 
policy process and appending written commentaries on some or all of the 
chapters which it contains. I should therefore briefly explain how we have tried, 
9 The distinction between forest exploitation and forest conservation would have reflected the 
bureaucratic division between the PNG Forest Authority (formerly Department of Forests) and the 
Department of Environment and Conservation, and between their respective interests and projects 
within the NAFCAP, but would have distorted the conceptions of forest management held by other 
major stakeholders - most notably the customary owners of the forest. A tripartite division 
between local, national, and regional studies would have left us with an unbalanced collection of 
papers, in which the regional context of forest management in PNG would not seem to have 
received the attention which it deserved. Some might argue that this is indeed one of the 
deficiencies in the volume as it stands, but it needs to be remembered that our sponsors in the liED 
were primarily concerned that we should produce the basis for a 'country study' which focussed on 
the linkages between local and national dimensions ofthe policy process. 
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and are still trying, to achieve this goal, and the manner in which we now 
propose to complete this task outside the framework of this monograph. 
In January 1996, a two-day Planning Workshop was held to finalise the 
design of the interview programme which was expected to produce the material 
for what was then to be the third and final part of the monograph. Participants 
were drawn from a range of occupations and institutions, on the understanding 
that this was not an exercise in the formulation of forest policy, but an attempt to 
determine the most cost-effective way of canvassing the full range of local 
knowledge and opinion about the workings of the PNG forest policy process-
both the nature of the decision-making process which affects the use of forest 
resources, and the factors, motives, and values that influence the decisions which 
are made.IO Workshop participants defined six major groups of 'stakeholders' in 
the policy process - politicians, public servants, industry, NGOs, donors, and 
lo9al landowners (or resource owners}, and then designed a number of key 
questions to be put to representative members of each category. It was 
recognised that interview techniques would only be appropriate for members of 
the first five stakeholder groups, and that a different approach would have to be 
adopted in order to canvass the diverse range of 'grassroots' community or 
landowner opinion in PNG. The participants therefore decided that this latter 
task would need to be undertaken indirectly, by designing a survey instrument 
which would be distributed to a stratified sample of social scientists and 
university students who should be able to describe the views held in those rural 
communities with which they are especially familiar.11 
For each of the first five stakeholder groups, workshop participants made a 
provisional listing of approximately one dozen 'key players' whose perceptions 
and opinions would represent the diversity of experience and influence within 
that group. Some attention was also paid to the problem of recruiting 
interviewers who would have the interest and ability to capture these perceptions 
and opinions on tape. Since then, several attempts have been made to organise 
and implement an effective interview strategy, but progress has been very slow, 
primarily because we decided that the politicians would have to be the first group 
10 Apart from James Mayers and members of the Core group, the workshop was attended by some 
of the other contributors to the present volume (Arlyne Johnson, Bas Louman, Fadzilah Majid 
Cooke, John Millett, Michael Wood), and also by: Joe Gabut (private lawyer), John Geno and 
Bruce Jefferies (Department of Environment and Conservation), Ngen Isana (Institute of Public 
Administration), Joe Ka'au (Greenpeace), Dike Kari (National Forest Service), Norlie Miskaram 
and Vincent Warakai (University of PNG), Carol! Poyep (Conservation Melanesia), and Hans-
Martin Schoell (Melanesian Institute). 
11 This approach was previously used in Marilyn Strathern's study of local variation in the 
classification and punishment of sexual offences. In 1973, she circulated a questionnaire on this 
subject to 197 social scientists, mostly social anthropologists, who had conducted or were still 
conducting field research in Papua New Guinea. Her ( 1975) report on the results of this survey 
includes a discussion of the drawbacks and advantages of this method of study, as well as the text 
of the survey instrument itself. 
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to be interviewed. This decision was based on our recognition of the likelihood 
that politicians would become increasingly inaccessible with the approach of the 
next national election (scheduled for June 1997), and also on the assumption that 
their 'real' perceptions and opinions might be difficult to disentangle from those 
which are normally offered for public cons.umption on the floor of Parliament or 
through the local media. 
More progress has been made in our efforts to canvass the range of 
'landowner' perceptions and opinions through the design and distribution of a 
'Rural Community Survey Form' which contains a number of open-ended 
questions on various 'forest management issues'. This survey instrument ~as 
designed in April 1996, and then despatched to a sample of one hundred social 
scientists (mostly anthropologists) who had spent a substantial period of time in a 
specific rural community, and whose research interests were known to have some 
bearing on questions of forest management. 12 Multiple copies were also 
distributed to university teachers offering courses which dealt with questions of 
'environment and development' in general, or with questions of forest 
management in particular, and whose students might therefore be encouraged to 
provide information relating to their own communities.13 Some additional 
copies have been circulated to field staff of the Summer Institute of 
Linguistics. 14 Although we have had an encouraging response from all three 
sources, it has long since been apparent that we should not have the time or space 
to include an analysis of this material within the pages of the present monograph, 
and so we now hope to produce a separate publication on this subject at a later 
date. 
It took slightly longer for us to reach the same conclusion in respect of the 
interviews with 'key players' in our other five stakeholder groups. Although we 
were soon obliged to abandon the prospect of completing the full set of 
interviews envisaged in the January planning workshop by the end of 1996, we 
thought at one stage that the present volume might still incorporate a certain 
amount of the material obtained in this way, within a general historical account 
of the evolution of forest policy under the last three national governments- the 
Namaliu government (1988-92), the Wingti government (1992-94), and the Chan 
government (from 1994). Such an account would certainly have taken up several 
chapters within the framework of the present volume, but it would make more 
sense to complete it after the national election of June 1997, which will constitute 
12 We stratified this sample by attempting to select equal numbers of respondents from each of the 
thirty 'biogeographic districts' distinguished in the Papua New Guinea Conservation Needs 
Assessment (Alcorn and Beehler 1993). 
13 David Mowbray was kind enough to incorporate the survey exercise into the teaching of the 
Environmental Science programme at the University ofPNG. 
14 This was done at the suggestion of one of our anthropological 'informants', Pat Townsend, who 
had previously worked for both the Summer Institute of Linguistics and for the NRI. Thanks are 
due to David Troolin for facilitating the distribution of these survey forms. 
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an obvious hiatus in the national policy process. And by that time, the conduct of 
additional stakeholder interviews will hopefully provide the basis for a more 
rounded account of decisions which have been made, and values which have 
been pursued, under all three regimes. 
Meanwhile, most of the contributors to the present volume have clearly 
made use of information which they have gleaned from interviews with 'key 
players' in specific project areas or policy domains, and have likewise adapted 
their findings in light of the comments made by these other stakeholders. The 
absence of the shorter commentaries which we would have liked to append to 
some or all of the chapters, Is or to each of the three main parts of this 
monograph, should not be taken to indicate our reluctance to represent the 
diversity of viewpoints within the forest policy process, but rather to reflect the 
time which it has taken to assemble all the material which is presented here, and 
the belief that this material should be offered as a contribution to further public 
debate before it loses its contemporary relevance. 
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PART ONE 
THE LOCAL POLITICS 
OF LARGE-SCALE 
LOGGING PROJECTS 

CHAPTER2 
'GET WHAT YOU CAN WHILE YOU CAN': 
THE LANDOWNER-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP 
IN WEST NEW BRITAIN 
GARY SIMPSON 
Introduction 
This paper presents a case study of the interaction which took place between 
landowner companies, the government of Papua New Guinea (PNG), and foreign 
logging contractors in West New Britain Province, over the implementation of 
the Forestry Act and the government's Revenue Guidelines in 1993 and 1994. 
The role of international aid donors and their technical advisers in supporting the 
implementation of the Act is also examined. The conclusion is that the national 
government and landowner companies lost over A$1 00 million in export 
revenue to foreign logging contractors because they were unable to resolve 
equity issues associated with the distribution of forest revenues. This situation 
arose because the participation and equity imperatives of the Forestry Act were 
unachievable and unenforceable in the West New Britain context, and prevented 
the landowners and the government from reaching agreement on the distribution 
of logging revenues. 
The Project Area 
In 1982, West New Britain was estimated to contain about 25 percent of PNG's 
commercial timber reserves, with most of this being located in the Kandrian and 
Gloucester districts. There were only two logging companies operating in the 
province at that time - the Japanese-owned Stettin Bay Lumber Company 
(SBLC) and a Korean company, Nam Yang. Both companies held timber 
permits over areas in which the government had acquired the timber rights from 
local landowners through a Timber Rights Purchase (TRP), and then, by way of 
international tender, had sold these rights to a logging contractor in return for a 
resource rent and a package of social, economic, and infrastructural benefits. 
The agreement with SBLC had a profound influence on the landowners and 
provincial politicians of West New Britain. Under the terms of its timber 
permit, SBLC cleared land and established roads, bridges, schools, markets, and 
housing facilities in the Bialla and Hoskins districts. This infrastructure 
attracted another foreign investor (Harrison and Crossfield) to establish an oil 
palm industry in a joint venture with the national government. This project 
increased income and employment opportunities for local landowners and 
settlers, contributed to provincial revenues through royalty payments, and 
18 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
provided the national government with a major source of foreign exchange from 
the export of palm oil. 
The early success of the Bialla and Hoskins oil palm schemes stimulated 
interest throughout the province in utilising the local forest resource as the basis 
for agricultural and infrastructural development. 1 Nowhere was there more 
enthusiasm for this approach than among the rural population of the Kandrian 
and Gloucester districts. These districts had few all-weather roads, limited 
shipping services, poorly maintained airstrips, dilapidated schools and aidposts, 
poor water supplies, and few opportunities to market their produce. Rural 
people suffered from poor health, and had lower educational qualifications than 
people in other parts of the province. 
In response to community and political pressure, the West New Britain 
Provincial Government put forward a proposal to the national government in 
1988 to replicate the Bialla and Hoskins experience in the Kandrian and 
Gloucester districts. The proposal was for a A$44 million investment 
programme to develop agricultural (mainly cocoa) estates and associated 
infrastructure throughout both districts. Investment funds were to be raised 
through the acquisition and allocation of new TRP areas, thus ensuring that the 
government would have a significant measure of control over the collection and 
distribution of the revenues. 
Landowner Companies and Local Forest Agreements 
At the same time as the province was finalising its development strategy for the 
Kandrian and Gloucester districts, the national Minister for Forests (Karl Stack) 
began to allow groups of landowners to make logging agreements independently 
of the state under the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act. These dealings between 
landowners and logging contractors were framed within Local Forest Area 
(LFA) agreements. The LFA mechanism allowed landowners to form a 
landowner company and negotiate a Logging and Marketing Agreement (LMA) 
directly with a logging contractor. The LF A simply required the approval of the 
Minister.2 
I Since the late 1980s, the Bialla and Hoskins schemes have become the focus of increasing social 
unrest between local landowners and resettlement block-holders from other provinces. 
2 Under Section 4 of the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, the Minister's declaration of a Local 
Forest Area allowed the customary owners to sell or dispose of timber and related rights to any 
person, including non-citizens, but an agreement for the sale of timber was of no force or effect 
until it too had received the Minister's assent. Once it had received this assent, a landowner 
company or its contractor could carry out forestry operations in that area without having to obtain a 
Timber Permit under the Forestry Act. 
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The decision by the Minister to allow logging under LF A agreements 
proved to be exceptionally popular with landowners and logging contractors. It 
allowed them to expedite logging operations and avoid government scrutiny of 
their LMAs. Landowner groups in the Kandrian and Gloucester districts, with 
the active support of logging contractors, were quick to seize the initiative and 
pr.essure the Minister into declaring LFAs (see Map 2.1 ). 
The decision by the Minister to declare LF As effectively derailed the 
provincial government's strategy of financing a development programme 
through the use of TRP revenues. At the political level within the province, 
there was little concern over the Minister's actions. Most provincial politicians 
were also landowners, and were actively involved in setting up their own 
landowner companies and negotiating with the Minister for LFAs. 
Provincial public servants, on the other hand, were extremely dissatisfied. 
Whereas the TRP mechanism empowered government officers in the decision-
making and resource allocation process, the LF A mechanism marginalised them. 
Under an LFA, the landowner companies were given control over forest 
revenues, and hence the power to direct investment strategies. The enthusiasm 
for landowner company and LF A arrangements on the part of landowners was 
also fuelled- by their mistrust of, and continual frustration with, the government. 
Dependency on, and control by, successive colonial, national, and provincial 
governments had stripped rural populations of their identity and traditional 
power base. Landowner companies were seen by many rural people as a 
mechanism for establishing control over local social and economic issues and 
promoting a truly self-reliant community. 
In sum, the willingness of the national Minister for Forests to facilitate 
LFAs led to a fundamental shift in the balance of power between government 
and community groups in the Kandrian and Gloucester districts of West New 
Britain. The LF As empowered landowner companies to negotiate directly with 
logging contractors and to develop LMAs which had the potential to deliver 
significant benefits to the landowner company and its members. 
Landowner Company Structures and Contracts 
By 1989, four landowner companies had been established in the Kandrian and 
Gloucester districts. Although landowner companies were emerging as the 
dominant expression of community activity, it soon became apparent that there 
was considerable variation in their structure and representation. The basic 
model used in forming landowner companies was an adaptation of the practice 
used by the Department of Forests in framing TRPs. For the proposed timber 
area, customary landowner groups were defined, members recorded, and 
landowner representatives selected. Following these procedures, landowning 
groups would incorporate within a company structure. 
In practice, landowner companies were formed without adequate attention 
to the recording of landowner groups or to the election of landowner 
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representatives. Landowner company directors were for the most part self-
appointed, and most had no previous experience in company management or 
procedures. 
The lack of a representative structure, community consultation, and basic 
skills in business management severely limited the capacity of landowner 
companies to negotiate favourable LMAs with logging contractors. The LMA 
specified the responsibilities of the landowner company and the logging 
contractor. It also determined the nature and extent of logging operations, 
allocated responsibility for compliance, and established the formulae for the 
distribution of proceeds from the sale of the logs. 
In 1989, a review was undertaken of the LMAs of the four landowner 
companies which were operating in the Kandrian and Gloucester districts 
(personal communication, Gordon McNeil, 1990).3 This review revealed that 
the LMAs, for the most part, significantly disadvantaged landowner companies 
in their share of logging revenues as against forest management and service 
provision responsibilities. 
The figures shown in Table 2.1 reflect the typical logging margins 
negotiated by landowner companies under the LMAs during this period. Based 
on an average annual cut of 70,000 cubic metres per LF A, the net return to the 
logging contractor was estimated at A$1.064 million, with the landowner 
company receiving A$336 000. 
Table 2.1: Typical logging margins negotiated by West New Britain landowner 
companies in 1989 (in Australian dollars). 
Item 
Gross Revenue at $100/m3 f.o.b. 
Export tax 
Royalties to landowners 
Provincial government levy 
LOC agricultural fund 
LOC commercial dev't fund 
Operating costs 
Total expenses 
Net income 
Landowner 
Company 
28.0 
15.0 
6.6 
0.6 
1.0 
23.2 
4.8 
Source: Personal communication, Gordon McNeil, 1993. 
Logging 
Contractor 
72.0 
2.6 
1.2 
53.0 
56.8 
15.2 
The review also revealed that landowner companies were substantially in 
debt to logging contractors for start-up costs involving unspecified payments to 
3 The review was part of a prefeasibility study conducted by the Australian International 
Development Assistance Bureau (AIDAB) which formed the basis for the Kandrian-Gloucester 
Integrated Rural Development Project (KGIDP). 
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individuals and landowner groups. The deduction of these costs considerably 
reduced the overall viability of the landowner company and its development 
funds. Each of the four landowner companies had signed agreements in which 
the landowner company, and not the logging contractor, was responsible for 
meeting the forest management guidelines of the Department of Forests. Hence, 
any breach of regulations by the logging contractor was legally the responsibility 
of the landowner corn pany. 
Similarly, in the case of infrastructure and service provision, two of the four 
landowner companies had signed agreements in which basic infrastructure 
development such as roads, bridges, wharves, and education and health services 
were the responsibility of the landowner company. Subsequent investigation 
revealed that few landowner company directors had ever sighted the contents of 
the agreements they had signed. 
From the review findings, it was clear that landowner companies were 
unable to negotiate meaningful and equitable LMAs with logging contractors, 
and were unable to supervise their operations. While landowners were 
benefiting from royalty payments from the sale of their timber, and some 
landowner companies were accumulating funds in their business and agricultural 
trust accounts, their relative share of logging revenues was minimal. 
The original intention of landowner company directors had been to engage 
the logging contractor under the management structure of the landowner 
company. However, the reality was that landowner companies were being 
directed by the logging contractor, particularly in the performance of the LMA, 
and especially on financial matters. 
National Government Intervention 
The largesse of the Minister for Forests in declaring LF As was not restricted to 
West New Britain. LFAs had become the hallmark of the forest industry 
throughout PNG in the mid to late 1980s. However, the inequity in the 
agreements, and the loss of substantial revenue to landowners and the state, 
prompted the national government to initiate an inquiry into the forest industry. 
The report of the Barnett Inquiry (Barnett 1989c) detailed a I itany of corruption, 
malpractice, environmental degradation, and inefficiency. Barnett noted that, if 
these problems were allowed to remain unchecked, they would lead to the 
irreversible depletion of PNG's forest resources, with consequent environmental 
and social problems and lost economic opportunity. 
The Barnett Inquiry, and the high profile which rainforest management 
issues were accorded among PNG's principal aid donors, prompted the national 
government to seek assistance with review and development of its forest policy. 
Several donors, notably the World Bank and Australia, pledged support to PNG 
under the National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme.4 This 
4 The name was changed from the original National Forestry Action Plan in 1991. 
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programme sought to provide a framework for the national government and 
donors to formulate an economically viable and ecologically sustainable forest 
management programme. 
One of the first outcomes of this programme was the passage of a new 
Forestry Act in 1991, which sought to re-establish national government control 
over the forest industry and landowner company operations in the form of 
revised forest agreements.s The Act provided for the establishment of a PNG 
Forest Authority managed by a National Forest Board with a range of industry, 
landowner, and government representatives (see Taylor, this volume). Technical 
committees were to be established to advise the board. The Act effectively 
recentralised control of the forest industry under a unified National Forest 
Service. 
In addition to restructuring the forestry administration, the Act sought to 
revise the approach to the issuing of timber permits. A series of procedures were 
developed which required a study of forest development options, the 
establishment of operational guidelines as the basis for future evaluation of 
forestry activities, the establishment of a formal tendering process, the appraisal 
of proposals, and the negotiation and approval of a Forest Management 
Agreement. 
The new Act made the recording of customary land tenure a key 
prerequisite for the issue of a logging permit. As already noted, a major 
weakness in the designation of LF As was that landowner companies frequently 
failed to document their constituent members and hence their entitlements. The 
legitimacy of the landowner company and its directors was, therefore, constantly 
being contested by disaffected individuals and clan groups. Under the new Act, 
before a Forest Management Agreement could be entered into, the title of the 
customary owners to the land had to be vested in one or more registered land 
groups. 
The new Act was hailed by the government and its donor supporters as a 
significant improvement. It provided for more rational management of PNG's 
forest resource, scope for increased community participation and representation 
through incorporated land groups, and greater control over foreign investors. 
Political support for the new Act was further enhanced by a change of 
government in 1992 and the appointment of a new Forests Minister (Tim 
Neville) who was a strong supporter of forestry reform. 
Donor Support through Technical Assistance 
The introduction of the new Act, supported by a sympathetic Forests Minister, 
had the effect of encouraging donors to support the National Forestry and 
Conservation Action Programme and other forest management initiatives. 
5 The new Act was introduced by Jack Genia, who had replaced Karl Stack as Minister for 
Forests. 
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Among the projects being considered was a proposal by the PNG and Australian 
governments to assist the West New Britain Provincial Government to revise 
and implement its proposal for a programme of social and economic 
development based around logging operations in the Kandrian and Gloucester 
districts. Both governments gave approval for the Kandrian-Gloucester 
Integrated Development Project (KGIDP), and Australian and Papua New 
Guinean technical advisers were appointed in April 1993. 
The KGIDP found that the situation in the Kandrian and Gloucester districts 
in 1993 had changed markedly since 1989. In 1989, there were only four 
landowner companies operating in the two districts; by 1993, there were thirteen, 
and logging was proceeding along the entire north and south coasts. In 1993, log 
exports from West New Britain accounted for 35 percent of PNG's total log 
exports, with an estimated value of A$244 million. At the time, the bulk of this 
revenue (72 percent) was being appropriated by logging contractors to cover 
their operating costs and return on investments. The national government 
received 15 percent from log export taxes. The remaining 13 percent was 
distributed between landowner companies and customary resource owners 
(Carter 1995). 
The KGIDP noted that commercial forestry operations in the Kandrian and 
Gloucester districts were the driving force of social and economic change. 
Logging had brought increased income and employment opportunities, and had 
upgraded rural infrastructure in many dispersed areas through the provision of 
roads, shipping services, and airstrips. This infrastructure had been built by the 
logging contractors, either as part of their LMAs or to support their own 
operations. While there were obvious social, economic, and environmental costs 
associated with logging operations, most landowners were prepared to put up 
with, or else ignore, these costs in anticipation of improved living standards. 
However, the KGIDP advisers noted that, if the rate and nature of forest 
exploitation was to continue, most of West New Britain's commercial timber 
resources would be logged out by the year 2000. 
The KGIDP also observed that virtually no progress had been made in 
implementing the new Forestry Act. The problems associated with landowner 
company representation, their inequitable relationship with logging contractors, 
and the issues of sustainable forest management remained unresolved. 
There was a mixed response to the KGIDP findings by West New Britain 
Provincial Government members. As already noted, most provincial politicians 
had interests in landowner companies, and many held executive positions within 
these companies. Generally speaking, politicians did not want any interference 
in the established structure of landowner companies, but were prepared to 
consider proposals which would increase landowner company and landowner 
revenues. Forest management issues were largely viewed with indifference 
unless they provided scope for improving the bargaining position of landowner 
companies when seeking to increase their revenue share. 
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To further complicate matters, the KGIDP found that the Department of 
West New Britain, which in 1989 had sought to play a central role in the 
management of forest revenues for rural development purposes, had become 
marginalised and ineffective. Politicians and landowner companies had 
bypassed the provincial public service for advice and technical support. This 
situation, coupled with the lack of budgetary support from the provincial 
government and internal bureaucratic management inefficiencies, had 
demoralised many senior public servants and their field officers. 
Development Strategies and the Policy Imperative 
In formulating a strategy for the KGIDP, technical advisers had to address a 
range of conflicting interests. At the national level, there was strong resolve 
from the Minister for Forests to pursue the provisions of the Forestry Act. While 
the ·Act had not been fully implemented, progress was being made in securing 
the necessary staff and resources for the National Forest Service. There 
appeared to be sufficient political support from within the Wingti government 
for its eventual implementation. The Minister's resolve was heavily backed by 
bilateral and multilateral donors and some international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). The NGOs were running a strong agenda directed 
towards supporting rational reform of the forest industry within the framework 
of popular participation, equity, and ecologically sustainable development. The 
KGIDP was viewed by all concerned as an important project for piloting the 
provisions of the Forestry Act and the agendas of aid donors and NGOs. 
At the provincial level, however, it was business as usual. Logging 
contractors and landowner companies continued to flaunt the Forestry Act, and 
were antagonistic towards any strategy which required restructuring landowner 
companies. 
In considering the interests of the various stakeholders, the KGIDP was 
faced with the dilemma of finding sufficient common ground between the 
stakeholders while, at the same time, promoting the Forestry Act and revenue 
guidelines which were unpopular with landowner companies, logging 
contractors, and most provincial politicians. 
From the consultations with community groups, landowner companies, and 
government officials, it appeared that the common ground between all parties 
lay in their collective view that forest resources should be used to generate 
revenue to improve rural social and economic welfare. The sticking point, 
however, was disagreement over whether the state or landowner companies 
should determine how forest resources should be managed and the revenues 
distributed. 
On this issue, the government was standing firm -the forest industry would 
be reorganised around the provisions of the Forestry Act. The government had 
too much to lose. Unless sustainable forest management practices were initiated, 
and forest revenue agreements revised, PNG's forest resources would be rapidly 
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depleted, the government and landowners would lose hundreds of millions of 
kina in revenue to logging contractors, and the practices of unscrupulous 
landowner company directors would continue to divide rural communities and 
deprive them of an equitable share of forest. revenue. 
The Political Stalemate 
Landowner company directors and their logging contractors also felt they had 
much to lose. They mounted a major political campaign against the provisions 
of the Act and, in particular, the proposed revenue guidelines. Under the Act 
and the revenue guidelines, the logging and marketing practices of contractors 
would be more tightly controlled and their revenue share reduced. Landowner 
companies were to have their revenue entitlements put in trust if they failed to 
demonstrate that they were representative of the constituencies they claimed to 
serve. Self-interest fostered a strong alliance between landowner company 
directors and logging contractors. 
In September 1993, in an effort to break this alliance, the national 
government offered to increase the landowner share of logging revenues from 13 
to 44 percent. Based on projected log exports from West New Britain, this 
would have meant that some A$31 0 million would have been paid out to 
landowner companies and landowners in the five years from 1993 to 1998 
(Carter 1995). However, the West New Britain Forest Resource Owners 
Association (WNBFROA), acting on behalf of landowner companies in the 
province, rejected the offer on the basis that it was still conditional on 
restructuring landowner companies. Other Forest Resource Owner Associations 
throughout PNG followed suit. 
In March 1994, in response to the rejection of the forest revenue guidelines, 
the national government increased excise duties on log exports from 17 to 30 
percent in order to prevent further loss of logging revenue to the economy. The 
end result was that the revenue base of logging contractors was significantly 
reduced, while landowner companies lost a major opportunity to secure 
additional revenue. 
In August 1994, the Wingti government was toppled by the Chan coalition. 
The new ministry included a Forests Minister (Andrew Posai) from the Kandrian 
District in West New Britain who had direct linkages with the WNBFROA, 
extensive interests in logging activities, and strong connections with overseas 
logging contractors. The WNBFROA lobbied the Minister to reverse the 
national government's decision on forest revenue arrangements. However, the 
national economy was in deep financial crisis, and needed all the available 
revenue it could get, so the Minister was unable to assist. 
On the issue of landowner company reform, the Minister shared the 
WNBFROA view that the government had no right to intervene in the affairs of 
landowner companies. The Minister's view, coupled with the fact that the Forest 
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Authority had virtually no resources to implement the Act, meant that the 
operations of landowner companies continued as before. 
The Role of the KGIDP 
The economic and political events of 1993 and 1994 severely limited the 
effectiveness of the KGIDP operations. In the absence of National Forest 
Service personnel and resources,6 it was always understood that the KGIDP 
would play an initial role in generating awareness of the provisions of the 
Forestry Act and monitoring and reporting on compliance. However, the 
intention was that, as the National Forest Service became more organised and 
better resourced, it would progressively take over KGIDP functions. 
In 1993, KGIDP officers vigorously promoted the provisions of the 
Forestry Act and the revenue guidelines. Landowner companies were alerted to 
their obligations, and a widespread programme of community awareness was 
initiated. The awareness programme fostered widespread community discussion 
and debate over forestry issues. A number of landowner splinter groups were 
formed to challenge the authority and practices of some landowner companies. 
However, while the KGIDP's actions resulted in heightened awareness of the 
forestry issues, it had no authority to resolve them. The promised back-up from 
the National Forest Service did not eventuate because of the financial and 
political constraints at the national level. This left the technical advisers of the 
KGIDP exposed to the criticism, from both the splinter groups and established 
landowner company directors, that they had encouraged division within the 
community without providing any meaningful solution to the issues at hand. 
The KGIDP's foray into landowner company affairs on behalf of the 
national government effectively alienated the project from the very people with 
whom it was trying to negotiate. The mistrust closed off access to most 
landowner company directors and company accounts. By the end of 1994, it 
became apparent that the KGIDP, without substantial support from the National 
Forest Service, would have no influence over the management or distribution of 
forest revenues by landowner companies. Technical support for direct 
intervention in forest revenue and landowner company affairs was withdrawn 
following a joint review of the KGIDP by the governments of Australia and 
PNG in June 1995.7 
6 In 1993, there was only one forestry officer serving the Kandrian and Gloucester districts. 
7 The decision to reduce support for landowner company interventions did not herald the end of 
donor support to the people of the Kandrian and Gloucester districts. The joint government review 
resulted in a restructuring of the project which sought to encourage a more productive partnership 
between technical advisers, landowner companies, and the provincial government in the 
development of extension services and the provision of infrastructure support. On the other hand, 
the KGIDP was no longer seeking to play a proactive role in landowner company management and 
investment decisions. 
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The Case of the Kapuluk TRP 
The KGIDP's relationship with landowner companies contrasted sharply with its 
dealings with landowners involved in TRP arrangements. While the affairs of 
landowner companies under LF A arrangements dominated the efforts of the 
KGlDP, a group of landowners from the Kapuluk TRP area, which was under 
the management of the Korean company, Nam Yang, sought assistance in re-
negotiating the terms and conditions of the agreement between the state and the 
logging contractor. The Kapuluk landowners were especially concerned to 
secure an increased share of timber revenues through this process of 
renegotiation. 
Because of the preoccupation of the national government with mobilising 
the National Forest Service, the representations of the Kapuluk landowners went 
unheeded. Frustrated by government inaction, the landowners sought assistance 
from the KGIDP to develop a strategy to bring the state and Nam Yang to the 
negotiating table. The KGIDP responded by initiating a series of landowner 
meetings in order to determine if there was general support for the negotiations. 
The KGIDP brokered a role as technical adviser to the landowners, who then 
entered into a series of lengthy negotiations with the state and Nam Yang. The 
end result was a substantially revised agreement, in which landowners increased 
their royalties and levies from A$4.67 per cubic metre to A$13 .67 (personal 
communication, Tom Vigus, 1995). This increase translated into an additional 
A$1 million per annum for Kapuluk landowners. 
Under the TRP arrangement, the KGIDP was able to play the role of 
technical adviser to both the Kapuluk landowners and the national government 
in its negotiations with Nam Yang. In the case of Kapuluk, this was made easier 
by the fact that the original TRP arrangements had largely excluded landowners 
from any participation in the agreement, and there were no significant vested 
interest groups, such as those associated with landowner companies, who would 
oppose access by the wider community. 
While not performing the role of negotiator or mediator in a strictly legal 
sense, the KGIDP was able to facilitate these processes by keeping the lines of 
communication open between Kapuluk landowners and the Forest Authority, 
and supplying both parties with critical technical information. The end result 
was that the state negotiated a substantial increase in royalties for landowners 
which, in part, satisfied its new forest policy requirements. In the Kapuluk 
negotiations, the KGIDP avoided being tagged as the agent of the national 
government. Instead, the KGIDP was seen as the source of independent advice 
which allowed landowner representatives access to up-to-date information on 
government forest policy, the activities of the logging contractor, and a range of 
negotiating options. 
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The Question of Compromise 
If the KGIDP had more flexibility to play the role of negotiator, would it have 
been able to assist in brokering a more acceptable outcome between the 
government and the landowner companies? Despite their public stance through 
the WNBFROA, many landowner company officials made private representation 
to the KGIDP on the scope for restructuring their companies, renegotiating their 
agreements, and securing technical advice for their investment strategies. They 
acknowledged the inequities in their LMAs, the internal feuding over the 
distribution of forest revenue, the mismanagement of trust accounts, and the 
rapid depletion of their forest resources. However, their private expressions of 
concern and pleas for assistance were not for public consumption. 
Many landowner company officials wanted a way out of the situation in 
which they found themselves, but were not prepared to lose face and power by 
publicly acknowledging their position. Some were totally compromised through 
their own corrupt actions or those of the logging contractor. Although they had 
sought personal gain, their power base rested on being able to deliver the goods 
and services which they had promised their constituents through their LMAs. 
Any public admission of weakness or uncertainty by landowner company 
directors would have automatically opened the door to other aspiring big men, 
and their fame and fortune would have been short-lived. 
On many occasions, the KGIDP had the opportunity to negotiate with 
landowner company directors, but in a private capacity. While most directors 
were wary of advice to introduce participatory management practices which 
would empower other landowners to challenge their authority, they were keen to 
develop strategies for increasing landowner company revenue, and to collaborate 
with government on the use of landowner company investment funds for 
improving social and economic welfare. In development terms, the objectives of 
the landowner company directors were similar to those espoused under the 
Forestry Act, the exception being that the directors thought they should have the 
right to determine landowner company structure, leadership, and mechanisms for 
distributing forest revenue without government intervention. 
Had the government accepted this position, the coalition between the 
landowner companies and the logging contractors would almost certainly have 
been broken. Under its revised (March 1994) revenue arrangements, the 
government was offering much more than the logging contractors could 
concede. However, entering into negotiations with landowner companies on this 
basis would have required an about-face by the government and its donor 
supporters. It would have meant collaborating with the very people whom the 
Forestry Act was seeking to weed out. The government position was based on 
two assumptions: 
• that many landowner company directors had secured their positions without 
recourse to proper elections, and had been corrupted by logging contractors 
and their own greed; and 
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• that, given the right opportunity and support, the community could be 
mobilised to replace these directors with democratically elected 
representatives of the people. 
In the Kandrian and Gloucester districts, there was sufficient evidence to support 
the first assumption, but not the second. Most challenges to established 
landowner company authority came from splinter groups, usually opposing 
clans, the leaders of which simply wanted to replace the existing directors with 
their own people, preferably themselves. In the KGIDP experience, there is little 
evidence to suggest that splinter groups which succeeded in deposing the 
established landowner company hierarchy were any more democratic than those 
which they had replaced. 
Thus, while the Forest Authority could claim the high moral ground on the 
actions of some landowner companies, it had absolutely no control over social 
organisation and dispute resolution at the landowner level. Rural communities 
in the Kandrian and Gloucester districts, as elsewhere in PNG, were governed by 
a set of social relations which do not fit into conventional Western notions of 
popular participation and democracy. In commenting on social organisation in 
the two districts, Hide (1990) noted that: 
Kandrian-Gloucester communities are still largely small-scale, kin 
based and demonstrate strong continuities with the past. Decision 
making occurs at levels associated with small-scale settlements such as 
hamlets and groups centred on men's houses. Social organisation at 
this level implies constant political manoeuvring by leaders, aspiring 
leaders and their followers. Factionalism, dispute and division are 
common features. 
Landowner companies represent a new order or scale of organisation 
that has not previously been seen in the region. The areas of forest 
involved, and the numbers of people claiming rights in the resource 
areas, are both large. There is no traditional precedent for lasting, 
decision-making structures with authoritative power over such large 
primary resource areas. Significant problems of organisation and 
communication are already apparent. 
In sum, while the Forest Authority's first assumption was correct and based on 
empirical evidence, the second was out of character with the political realities of 
rural PNG. 
While the vagaries of popular participation at the community level in PNG 
have been well documented (see Filer 1991 b), the lessons were largely ignored 
by the national government, aid donors, and the KGIDP in seeking to implement 
the Forestry Act. The primary reason for this was that, at the time of 
formulating the National Forest Policy and the KGIDP strategy, all of these 
parties judged their common position to be righteous and enforceable. 
Righteous it may have been, but enforceable it was not. 
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Finally, in economic terms, both the national government and landowner 
companies paid a heavy price for their ongoing debate over participation and 
equity. Failure to agree on mechanisms for implementing the government's 
revised forest revenue guidelines on log shipments from West New Britain 
resulted in a loss of some A$106 million in export taxes in 1993.8 
The First Lesson for Government 
Policy should be negotiated and incremental if government lacks the resources 
and political will to enforce its provisions. 
At no stage in the formulation of the National Forest Policy did the 
government seek to enter into any significant negotiations with the forest 
industry or landowner groups. While briefings were held with these groups, in 
the period during the formulation of the Act, there was no systematic attempt on 
the part of government to assess the position of landowner companies and what 
appositional strategy they might invoke. Equally important, there was no 
assessment by the government as to its own capability to enforce the Act, and 
the likely outcome if it could not. In short, the government was singularly 
focussed on enforcing the content of the Act within an unrealistic time-frame, 
and without due consideration of the processes which could have been used to 
delineate common ground between the parties. 
The common ground for both parties was the desire to maximise their 
respective share of logging revenues. Once the revenue base had been secured, 
the government could have then reintroduced the issues of landowner company 
management and equity, and pushed for incremental changes to the way 
landowner companies operated. Indeed, given the scale of the returns which 
would have accrued to landowner companies, it would have been relatively easy 
for the government to focus public attention on management and equity issues. 
As it was, the only beneficiaries from the deadlock were the logging contractors, 
who increased the volume of log exports throughout the dispute, and at a time 
when international log prices were at record levels. 
The Second Lesson for Government 
Greater recognition must be given to the problems of achieving popular 
participation and equity in rural P NG. 
As a result of colonial and post-independence policy, rural society in PNG 
has become increasingly divided by the uneven distribution of education, access 
to social services, and economic opportunity. This inequality places significant 
pressure on those communities with access to natural resources to develop them 
8 This figure has been derived by subtracting the actual rent paid by logging contractors operating 
in West New Britain from the available rent which the government could have collected if it had 
been able to reach agreement with landowner companies on the implementation of the 1993 forest 
revenue guidelines (personal communication, Rod Taylor, 1995). 
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as quickly as possible and, in the words of one landowner company director, to 
'get what you can while you can'. 
Government policy rhetoric continually seeks to reaffirm the nation's 
commitment to social democratic process, and plays down the real problems 
wliich rural communities have in dealing with participation and equity issues. 
Had the government made public acknowledgement, when formulating the 
National Forest Policy, that it was unlikely to be successful in achieving its 
objectives of fostering equity and participation in the short term, the Act and 
forest revenue guidelines could have been modified to reflect an incremental 
position on these issues. However, such a statement would have been unlikely 
to endear the national government to the aid donors, who were looking for bold 
political statements to justify their expenditure and to placate vocal interest 
groups in their own countries. 
In sum, the issues of equity and participation in PNG are unlikely to be 
resolved any more quickly than they are in other developing countries. In the 
case of forestry agreements, the problems are made more complex when 
offshore investors seek to take advantage of a transitional society in which 
government and rural communities have limited experience in negotiating their 
differences. 
The ferocity with which overseas logging contractors set about exporting 
logs between 1993 and 1994 meant that landowner companies and government 
had to reach a rapid agreement if they were to stem the flow of revenue offshore. 
Unfortunately, the questions of participation and equity on which they sought to 
commence their negotiations proved to be thoroughly intractable in the short 
term. With hindsight, the government would have achieved more by adopting a 
strategy which sought to work from the common ground - maximising 
landowner company and government revenue shares - and then progressively 
addressed the issues of participation and equity. 
The Lessons for Donors and Their Technical Advisers 
In the case of the KGIDP, donors and their technical advisers would have been 
better advised to play the role of 'honest broker' and facilitate the process of 
negotiation between landowner companies and the government. 
In supporting the negotiation and mediation process in the Kapuluk TRP, 
the KGIDP was able to play a more useful and acceptable role than it did as the 
implementing and monitoring agent for unpopular and unenforceable provisions 
under the Forestry Act. 
Donors gave themselves little opportunity to consider the negotiation 
option. The World Bank, and the Australian, New Zealand, and German 
governments, were all enthusiastic proponents of forestry reform in PNG, and 
committed extensive resources to its development from the outset. The KGIDP 
was a direct outcome of this enthusiasm. Had donors and their technical 
advisers given more consideration to the difficulties of implementing the Act, 
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and to the appositional stance of landowner companies, the prospect of 
providing support for facilitating the negotiation process may have been more 
attractive. 
It is, of course, questionable whether donors would have opted to support 
the negotiation process, particularly if it meant some short-term acceptance of 
the status quo in landowner company and community power relationships. As 
already noted, donor responses were influenced by the attitudes of international 
and local NGOs, whose philosophical foundations were deeply rooted in 
promoting community participation and social equity. Any turnaround on these 
issues would have been strongly and publicly contested by these groups - a 
situation which all donors were keen to avoid. 
Finally, donor flexibility is ultimately constrained by bilateral and 
multilateral aid agreements which dictate that donors give priority to the 
government agenda. In the case of the Forestry Act and revenue guidelines, the 
government agenda ran counter to the adoption of a more flexible approach to 
negotiating with landowner companies. From the perspective of both protocol 
and approach, aid donors were both locked into, and strongly supportive of, the 
government's position. 
The Lessons for Landowners 
Landowners who enter into development agreements with unresolved land and 
resource disputes have little chance of maintaining group solidarity in the face 
of conflict with resource developers. 
Most landowner companies were formed without due consideration for the 
membership of the land groups which they claimed to represent, or for the actual 
ownership of resources. Had land groups been able to reach agreement between 
themselves over ownership of the forest resource, and establish common 
development objectives, their power to negotiate with logging contractors would 
have been vastly increased. Instead, the relationship between many landowner 
groups was typified by mistrust and conflict, some of which had its origins in 
traditional clan allegiances and rivalries. Logging contractors, aided willingly or 
unknowingly by landowner company directors, were able to exploit divisions 
within and between these groups to secure maximum advantage. 
It could be argued that, far from being the flagships of the new social order 
which many rural people had hoped for, landowner companies effectively 
disempowered their members by making them too dependent on the logging 
contractor. By the time this was realised, it was too late for landowners to play 
their trump card - namely the fact that, as traditional landowners, they had the 
undisputed right to determine who should have access to their forest resources, 
and at what price. 
Finally, while it may have been better for the government and landowner 
companies to have focussed on securing a greater share of forest revenue in the 
first instance, the increased revenue generated would have inevitably heightened 
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landowner tensions over resource ownership and revenue distribution. Such 
tensions, as demonstrated in Bougainville (Dorney 1990), could have a severe 
impact on provincial and national political stability. Hence, the government 
could not have afforded to adopt a strategy which simply sought to maximise 
revenue and ignored the more fundamental questions of participation and equity. 
CHAPTER3 
'PRIVATE DEALINGS': 
A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE HAW AIN LOCAL FOREST AREA, 
EAST SEPIK PROVINCE 
JOHN M. LEEDOM 
Introduction 
In January 1993, a ship under contract to a Malaysian logging company 
appeared off the coast of Wewak, a small town on the northwest coast of Papua 
New Guinea (PNG). The ship was transporting about K4 million worth of new 
bulldozers, tractors, trucks, and chainsaws to a new logging project that was 
supposed to begin operations that year in the Prince Alexander Mountains. The 
project location was known as the Hawain Local Forest Area (LFA), named after 
the largest river within its boundaries. 
The arrival of the ship seemingly marked the successful culmination of 
several years of effort, on the part of a group of local politicians and clan 
leaders, to initiate a large-scale logging project as a means of bringing 
'development' to their home villages. They had formed a local landowner 
company, 'WongWong' Logging, and successfully lobbied the Minister for 
Forests, Jack Genia, for a logging permit at a time when there was an official 
moratorium on the issue of new permits. They had also negotiated a contract 
with a company named Sovereign Hill, a wholly owned subsidiary of the giant 
Malaysian timber firm, Rimbunan Hijau. But as soon as the ship unloaded its 
cargo on Worn Beach, conflicts began between customary landowners, 
WongWong Logging, and Sovereign Hill. 
In this chapter, I provide a case study of the troubled history of the Hawain 
logging project. I examine the shifting nature of relationships between 
customary landowners, politicians, forestry officials, and the management of 
Sovereign Hill during the development of the project. My aim, in particular, is 
to examine how Sovereign Hill gained and lost access to forest resources, both at 
the national and local level. In brief, I will show that, while politicians and 
government officials used their authority to officially push the project ahead, this 
did not provide Sovereign Hill with unfettered access to the forests of the 
Hawain LF A. Instead, the advance of bulldozers and chainsaws was repeatedly 
blocked by various forms of conflict within the local community of customary 
landowners. As we shall see, the outcome of these processes has been 
unsatisfactory both for the majority of local people and for Sovereign Hill. 
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Map 3.1: The Hawain Local Forest Area and its environs. 
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The Project Area and Its Customary Owners 
When the Minister for Forests declared the Hawain LFA in April 1992, it 
encompassed some 400 square kilometres of lowland rainforest on the slopes of 
the Prince Alexander Mountains west of Wewak (see Map 3.1 ). This mountain 
range, despite its limited extent and relatively low elevations, is surprisingly 
rugged. The range is composed of a deeply dissected complex of razor-back 
ridges, steep escarpments, and upland benches. The range begins near the mouth 
of the Sepik River, follows a west-northwest trend that culminates in the summit 
of Mount Turu (1, 178 metres), and then abuts the Torricelli Mountains in the 
west (Reiner and Mabbutt 1968:22). The northern escarpment is drained by a 
series of steep and narrow canyons which empty into a swampy coastal plain 
east of the Hawain River. The southern escarpment, meanwhile, drains into a 
series of rivers (the Mindjim and Nagam being the most important) which flow 
in a southeasterly, then southerly, direction to meander through grassy foothills 
and plains before joining up with the mighty Sepik River. 
The forests of the Prince Alexander Mountains are composed of a wide 
variety of trees, shrubs, ferns, herbs, fan palms, climbers, and epiphytes. At the 
lower elevations, the forest is especially complex, due to variable soil 
conditions, human disturbance, and relatively dry conditions. There are, for 
example, over sixty species of trees that have been recorded for the upper 
canopy layer alone (Saunders 1968:131 ). At the higher elevations, where 
rainfall is generally greater and human activities more restricted, the forests are 
not as floristically complex, but are composed of denser concentrations of large 
trees. Finally, in the coastal plain, forests are restricted to areas that have 
relatively well-drained soils, which means that they form isolated stands of 
timber in the midst of larger sago and nipa palm swamps. In all three of these 
types of forest, the most commonly occurring species of economic value are 
Taun (Pometia pinnata), Celtis (Celtis phillippensis), Erima (Octomeles 
sumatrana), Kwila (Instia bijuga), Talis (Terminalia spp.), and Walnut 
(Dractontomelum spp. ), among others (Robbins 1968; Saunders 1968; ESP 
1987). 
By national law, the forests of the Hawain LF A are the property of an 
undocumented number of Boiken-speaking descent groups called klan in Tok 
Pisin. While I will translate this word as 'clan', it should nonetheless be noted 
that local usage departs somewhat from standard anthropological definitions. 
The word klan is indeed used in a normative sense to refer to corporate descent 
groups whose members are believed to be descended from a single ancestor 
through patrilineal links. But in practice, a klan is more importantly a proper 
name which connects specific corporate groups to particular 'spaces' or 'slots' 
on the landscape. When I asked Boiken men, for example, how to translate klan 
into Boiken, they often responded with perplexity and confusion. Most men 
denied that klan could be translated into their vernacular, and asserted instead 
that they always used the proper name of a clan to refer to a specific spatial and 
temporal group. These proper names, they told me, were functionally equivalent 
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to an address in English, such as one would use to locate a person. 1 This shows 
that there is a close relationship between land and social identity in 
contemporary Boiken culture. The local landscape is compartmentalised into 
named subterritories, each of which has its own resident trickster spirits (Tok 
Pisin, masalai; Boiken, wari) and history. Knowledge of the histories of these 
subterritories - in terms of knowing the names of spirits and the ancestors who 
inhabited, used, or fought for the land - forms the fundamental basis for staking 
claims of landownership. 
The stated rules regarding the inheritance of land rights are relatively 
straightforward. All Boiken will claim that rights over land, particularly 
decisions regarding its use and distribution to others, are transferred from father 
to eldest son. Thus, while he is still alive, the father shows his eldest son the 
boundaries of their land and teaches him its history. The eldest son then 
acquires the authority to decide how land is to be shared among his family 
members, and how it is to be used when his father dies or is incapacitated. In 
practice, however, the land tenure system is often accommodated to the 
demographic fortunes of specific clans. As is common throughout the Sepik 
culture area, the relationship between mother's brother (wawa) and sister's son 
(rawa) is very important, both in customary exchange and in property relations. 
It is not uncommon, for example, for mother's brothers to grant sisters' sons 
rights over land with the intention of eventually incorporating them into their 
clan. 
In 1990, the Boiken-speaking population living in close proximity to the 
Hawain LFA numbered about 5,600 (PNGNSO 1993). This population was 
residing in thirty-one hinterland villages and three peri-urban settlements on the 
outskirts of Wewak. These villages and settlements are concentrated in three 
locations: 
• along the North Coast Road that travels from Wewak to Dagua; 
• along the southern ridges of the Prince Alexander Mountains near the Sepik 
Highway; and 
• along the ridges adjacent to the Hawain and Rambumba valleys (see Map 
3.1 ). 
Contemporary Boiken settlements are agglomerations of semi-autonomous 
hamlets separated by gardens and secondary regrowth. Hamlets are mainly 
occupied by the members of a single patrilineage or joint fraternal group, but 
they sometimes also include married sisters, their husbands, and their children. 
Prior to missionisation, men usually slept apart from their wives and children; 
today, however, households are often composed of nuclear families. The houses 
1 Some men, however, did suggest that klan could be translated by the Boiken word wango, 
which they said literally meant 'family'. Interestingly, wango has two other associations. First, it 
is used to refer to holes in the ground or in Ficus trees from which apical ancestors emerged. 
Secondly, it also used to refer to the 'space' or 'room' that a particular clan occupies. 
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belonging to the nuclear families of a larger descent group are arranged around a 
central courtyard that is cleared of all vegetation. 
The component clans of a larger settlement generally unite to defend their 
common territory from the people of neighbouring settlements, but they also 
have complex relationships of alliance and enmity with clans living elsewhere. 
A regional moiety system or dual organisation, for example, once encompassed 
the local-level organisation of clans, and regulated marriage and male initiation 
on a regional basis. Although it has faded from most aspects of contemporary 
social practice, the moiety system created some fluidity and instability in socio-
political relationships within and between settlements. Furthermore, customary 
exchange practices, such as brideprice, child payments, and mortuary payments, 
establish a network of ongoing obligations between avuncular and affinal 
relatives in different settlements. 
The customary landowners of the Hawain LF A speak at least three dialects 
of Boiken, a non-Austronesian language of the Ndu family of the Sepik-Ramu 
phylum (Laycock 1965; Freudenberg 1976).2 While the people who speak these 
dialects are collectively known as the 'Boiken', after a coastal village where 
Catholic missionaries first established a mission station near the turn of the 
century, no one I know refers to themselves as such (see Roscoe 1991). Boiken-
speakers do not, in other words, have an overarching conception themselves as 
an ethnic group. Nor, in the pre-colonial epoch, were they ever united into a 
single polity. Instead, social identities are based on people's village of origin 
and its geographical provenance ('mountains', 'coast', 'Hawain River', and so 
forth). Dialect differences also figure prominently in the construction of 
regional social identities. Village and regional affiliations have played a central 
role in landowner politics during the development of the logging project. 
The present logging operation is neither the first to have been planned nor 
the first to be carried out in the area. Between 1962 and 1982, a significant area 
of the alluvium forest immediately west of Wewak was commercially logged by 
a company called Sepik Timbers. The company had expatriate (Australian) 
managers but employed local men. The logs were processed in a small sawmill 
in Wewak and sold on the domestic market. In 1982, Sepik Timbers closed 
down their Wewak sawmill because the production of timber from a sister 
sawmill in Madang was already outstripping local demand (Fleetwood 1983:73; 
see also Sagir, this volume). 
In the mid-1980s, the East Sepik Provincial Government and the provincial 
Division of Forests revived interest in exploiting the timber resources of the 
Prince Alexander Mountains. The Division of Forests carried out a survey of the 
2 These dialects formerly corresponded to geographical and ecological subregions in the Boiken-
speaking area. The 'Coastal' dialect was spoken by residents of the coastal plains and the islands 
of Muscu, Walis, and Tarawai, to the west of Wewak; the 'Nagam' dialect was spoken by residents 
of villages along the southern escarpment of the Prince Alexander Mountains, near the Nagam 
River valley; and the 'Central' dialect was spoken by residents of villages in the eastern shadow of 
Mount Turu. 
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timber resource and queried local landowners about their interest in a future 
logging project. The Division concluded that, while not extensive, the forest 
resources could nonetheless support a viable timber industry. Divisional staff 
also noted that 'the landowners of the area have differing views about 
developing the timber resources there ... [but] to break up the resource in that 
area to suit each individual group's wishes would not be economically viable' 
(ESP 1987:4). Nonetheless, they concluded by proposing a 50,000 hectare area 
(called the 'West Coast Timber Area') for further consideration. It was bounded 
by the coastline to the north and the peaks of the Prince Alexander Mountains to 
the south. 
Whatever plans the provincial government was making to develop a timber 
industry in the Prince Alexander Mountains were interrupted in 1990, when it 
was suspended by the national government for misappropriation of funds and 
political corruption.3 Instead, the impetus for exploiting the timber resources of 
the West Coast Timber Area was taken over by a coalition of Boiken-speaking 
migrants who lived in peri-urban settlements along the North Coast Road. To 
understand what motivated them to take this initiative, it is necessary to describe 
briefly the way in which colonial policy and practice fostered an uneven process 
of social and economic change in this region. 
The 'Uneven Development' of the Boiken Landscape, 1884-1990 
The last one hundred years have been a period of dramatic events and rapid 
change in the Wewak area, which have greatly altered its social and natural 
landscape. On the eve of Germany's annexation of the northern half of New 
Guinea in 1884, Wewak was simply a small, Austronesian-speaking village 
surrounded by generally hostile Boiken groups (Fieetwood 1984:7). Since 1884, 
through successive periods of German, Australian, Japanese, and then again 
Australian rule, Wewak has emerged as the administrative and commercial 
centre of the whole Sepik region, and has become the fourth largest town in PNG 
(PNGNSO 1994). 
The Germans first established a trading station and government post at 
Seleo (near Aitape) in 1894. Over the next thirty years, they built up a small 
network of coconut plantations, Catholic missions, and patrol posts, first along 
the coast and on the islands, and later at Marienberg and Angoram on the Sepik 
River. While thus expanding the trade networks that reached into hinterland 
villages, the Germans also started to recruit men, sometimes forcibly, to work as 
labourers on plantations in what are now Madang, New Britain, and New Ireland 
provinces. The influence of the Catholic church also began to spread gradually 
along the coast (see May 1990: 176). Then, with the outbreak of the First World 
War, the Australian army took over the framework of German administration. 
Thereafter, the pace of labour recruitment continued to increase, additional 
patrol posts were established, and the Society of the Divine Word extended its 
missionary activities into the hinterlands of the Prince Alexander Mountains. 
3 The deposed Premier responded by burning down the provincial government offices. 
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In the first half of the twentieth century, then, many Boiken converted to 
Catholicism, abandoned practices associated with the haus tambaran (cult 
houses) and male initiation, and worked on copra plantations in other parts of the 
Territory of New Guinea. They also learned, and helped to create, a new 
language- 'pidgin English' (henceforth referred to as Tok Pisin). In 1933, the 
Australian colonial administration moved the headquarters of the Sepik District 
from Aitape to Wewak, thus cementing the substantial shift which was already 
under way in the regional political economy. 
In 1942, 2,000 Japanese soldiers invaded Wewak, driving out the Australian 
colonial administration. In early 1944, about 30,000 additional soldiers, 
representing the remnants of the Japanese army on the New Guinea mainland, 
retreated overland from Madang to Wewak. Cut off from their supply lines, they 
fanned out into the mountains as far west as Maprik, where they hunted and 
foraged for food, raided native gardens and sago stands, and began to clear forest 
for gardens of their own (Long 1963 ). They also armed local men with rifles, 
and ·gave them cartridges to hunt game on their behalf. 
The Japanese were eventually driven out by Australian armed forces in 
1945, but not before the war had made a major impact on the indigenous people. 
Perhaps 15 percent of the population died during the three-year occupation.4 In 
addition, large game animals in the forest were depleted (Gerstner 1952), 
gardens, coconut groves, and sago stands in coastal areas were destroyed, and 
many villages were abandoned. 5 
Prior to the Japanese occupation of Wewak, little economic development 
had taken place in the Sepik region. The district generated a small amount of 
income from gold mining around Maprik, from trade in crocodile skins along the 
Sepik River, and from a limited volume of copra production in the coastal areas 
and offshore islands (Curtain and May 1979; May 1990). With the re-
establishment of the Australian administration after the war, however, things 
began to change. The colonial administration made systematic attempts to 
introduce cash crops such as coffee, rice, and peanuts into village agriculture. 
Meanwhile, returning ex-servicemen, such as Pita Simogun and Yauwiga 
Wangonalo, challenged traditional forms of leadership and mobilised a large 
proportion of the coastal population into what Ron May has called 'a loosely 
coordinated, development oriented, generally pro-administration movement 
which promoted cash-cropping (especially rice and cacao) and other forms of 
business (notably, around Wewak, transport), road building and education' 
(ibid: 177). Their achievements, in organising Rural Progress Societies, 
mobilising labour for the construction of an all-weather road between Wewak 
and Dagua, and promoting the planting of cash crops, were considerable. 
4 See 'Wewak Patrol Report No. 4, 1946/47' (R.G. Maclntyre). 
5 See 'Wewak Patrol Report No. 3, 1947/48' (A.J. Zweck) and 'Wewak Patrol Report No. 5, 
1948/49' (L.R. Foster). 
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In the post-war period, the population of Wewak was steadily increasing. 
The expansion of government in the 1950s increased the size of the expatriate 
community, which created an impetus for the growth of service industries, such 
as small-scale construction, transport, and retail stores, most of which were 
owned by ethnic ·Chinese residents. The growth in the service industry helped to 
provide increasing opportunities for local 'native' employment. Two large-scale 
projects undertaken in the early 1960s, the construction of Wewak General 
Hospital on Boram peninsula and the army barracks on Moem Peninsula, also 
stimulated employment and population growth in Wewak (Curtain and May 
1979:56). In 1966, the total population of Wewak town was about 9,000; by 
1971, it had increased to 15,000 (Lea 1976:356). The construction of the Sepik 
Highway during this period also made the town more accessible to the hinterland 
populations of the Prince Alexander Mountains and the Sepik River. 
Before the war, the swamplands and forests of the coastal plain west of 
Wewak had been sparsely inhabited. Once the war was over, however, families 
from hinterland villages in the Prince Alexander mountains began to migrate to 
the outskirts of Wewak. In 1958, Patrol Officer Mater explained that isolation 
from the burgeoning cash economy of Wewak was one of the main motives for 
migration: 
Lack of communication (i.e. transport) in the more remote inland 
villages has been the major factor in these people's migration to the 
coast to plant cash crops and the local landowners have realised the 
advantages of allowing them to settle to supplement the sparse 
population for cash cropping, road construction and similar efforts. 
The opportunity of acquiring an income from casual labour around 
Wewak has also contributed to the desire to migrate.6 
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the migrants opened up ~he swampy and 
forested lands which had formerly served the relatively small population of 
customary owners (from Worn, Mingar, Saure, and Yarapos) as reserves for 
sago, hunting, gathering, and fishing. They converted them to subsistence and 
market gardens, coconut and cocoa groves, and even cattle pastures. By 1963, 
patrol officers reported that there were about eighteen new settlements, with a 
combined population of about 1 ,350, along the recently completed Wewak-
Dagua road. 7 By 1990, the population had increased to about 3,000. 
For our purposes, the most important settlements that were founded in this 
period (in about 1952) are Tangara, Nunguma, and Yarabi. These settlements 
were composed mainly of families from villages in the southern foothills of the 
Prince Alexander Mountains, including Handara, Nungori, Kweruro, Puara, 
Huarigen, Musuwagen, and Sassanumbogu. They are also the home of a 
significant number of people from the Rambumba Valley villages of Penjen, 
6 'Wewak Patrol Report No. 4, 1957/58' (J.H. Mater). 
7 
'Wewak Patrol Report No. 19, 1962/63' (D.L.Emery and B.A. Hull). 
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Numienguai, and Jambarampa (see Map 3.1 ). Individuals from these settlements 
have played significant roles in the development of the logging project. 
As the settlements on the outskirts of Wewak have grown in size, due to 
natural increase and continued internal migration, so too has socio-economic 
differentiation increased between peri-urban 'settlers' and the rural 'locals' still 
living in their traditional homelands. The permanent residents of the peri-urban 
settlements tend to have completed more years of education, are more likely to 
be employed in town or to be self-made entrepreneurs, and are more active in 
provincial and national politics, than their counterparts in the hinterland.8 
Along the North Coast Road, contemporary Boiken-speakers distinguish 
between 'outsiders' (yanduo, or in Tok Pisin, kamman), and 'locals ' (wianduo, 
or man bilong pies). The latter group's perception of the increasing economic 
inequality between wianduo and yanduo has also led to increasing tensions 
between the two. 
By the late 1980s, however, many (if not most) of the Boiken-speaking 
settlers in Tangara, Nunguma, and Yarabi were wanting to return to their home 
territories to live. There are a number of social and material factors that explain 
why, for many of them at least, 'going home' has become both increasingly 
desirable and necessary. First of all, many still have insecure tenure over the 
land they occupy and use, since it remains under the customary ownership of 
patrilineages in the neighbouring villages of Mingar, Worn, Saure, and Yarapos. 
As early as 1958, the colonial administration endeavoured 'to stabilise this 
vexed question of migrants and their land problems', primarily by negotiating 
long-term leases with the customary owners.9 However, these efforts were 
largely unsuccessful, as the customary owners preferred to maintain an informal 
host-guest relationship in which the settlers, to whom they were connected by 
kinship and marriage, would remain perpetually in their debt. Yet when 
relationships between settlers and locals break down, there is nothing legally 
preventing the latter from demanding that the former 'get off their land', as 
happened to the K weruro settlers resident at Yarabi in 1990. 
Secondly, the economic opportunities open to settlers are increasingly 
limited in scope and number. Since they do not occupy their own land, 
expanding their holdings of perennial cash crops such as coconut, cocoa, and 
betelnut carries the risk that they may be repossessed by customary landowners 
who become envious of their tenants' economic achievements. Nor has the 
8 This is not surprising, since most settlers state that the main reason why they migrated closer to 
town was so that their children would have easier access to schools, while they themselves hoped 
to find employment in town or start businesses, such as running trade stores or public motor 
vehicles (PMVs). 
9 
'Wewak Patrol Report No. 1, 1958/59' (J.H. Mater). 
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urban job market in Wewak grown fast enough to absorb the growing migrant 
propulation of working age.IO 
Finally, the amount of arable land available for gardens and the number of 
productive sago stands have both in proportion to the demographic growth of the 
squatter settlements. A comparison of aerial photographs taken in 1973 and 
1994 shows an increase in the proportion of the coastal plain which has 
succeeded to climax grassland. Anecdotal evidence from interviews also 
suggests that the settlers have shortened their fallow cycles, while yields from 
their gardens are decreasing. 
All of these factors have inclined the settlers to believe that they face an 
increasingly uncertain future in the settlements. They believe that, if they could 
return to their homelands, they would have a wider range of economic options. 
But they have been reluctant to return to their villages because of the lack of 
roads connecting them to the urban market and the absence of basic health and 
educational services. The logging project, then, was conceived as a means of 
resolving their problematic status. As a WongWong executive once explained to 
me: 
Basically the whole idea behind our starting this project was to cut 
down on the migration problem. Our people have been migrating 
down to Tangara for some sixty to seventy years. They started to move 
right after World War Two. We believed that, if we remained here, we 
would not have a very bright future. The only reason why we are 
living here is so that we can be near to town, to enjoy the benefits that 
come from living in a town. Otherwise, if we had a good 
infrastructural base back in our homeland, we would go back and come 
to town just when we needed to. We would move.... We sold our 
forests for a road. We felt that we would wait a long time if we waited 
for the government to do it for us. Other provinces have already 
progressed, but we, in the East Sepik Province, are way behind the 
others. We produced the first Prime Minister of the country. But in 
terms of development, we haven't experienced any. 
Such ideas were commonplace amongst the people of the LF A area. Indeed, 
when I asked local people why they supported the logging project, the most 
common response I received was: 'Rot tasol!' ('Just for a road'). They did not 
believe that the government would ever be able to construct the roads which they 
desired. They hoped, instead, to cultivate a relationship with an overseas 
company with sufficient capital and machinery to build the roads for them. It 
was for roads, above all other reasons, that many customary landowners, in the 
migrant settlements and hinterland villages alike, were prepared to 'sacrifice' 
their forests. 
10 East Sepik remains a province of net outmigration to other urban areas in PNG (PNG National 
Statistical Office 1990). 
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Negotiating the Local Forest Area Permit, 1990-1993 
In the accounts of local people, the idea of selling their timber resources to an 
overseas logging company originated in the Seventh Day Adventist enclave at 
Tangara settlement. A group of elders in the church, among whom Robert Passu 
was the most important, took the initiative in organising a landowner company, 
petitioning the Minister for Forests to issue a logging permit, and negotiating a 
contract with an overseas company. 
Robert Passu was a second-generation resident of the settlement, but was 
also a senior member of one of the six landholding clans in Numienguai, a 
hinterland village located near the headwaters of the Rambumba River, some 
two to three hours' walk from the nearest road. Passu held the position of local 
government councillor in Numienguai, had been employed as a 'second 
secretary' in the national Department of Justice, and was also an active member 
of the Melanesian Alliance Party. In 1992, he was acting as election campaign 
manager for the national Member of Parliament, Bernard Narokobi, having put 
aside his own dreams of becoming an MP in order to serve as chairman of the 
new landowner company. 
Between 1990 and 1992, Passu and his group of close associates held 
numerous meetings with customary landowners in the Wewak Local, Numbo, 
and But-Boiken provincial electorates. They urged the landowners to commit 
their forests to a logging project in order to open up the hinterlands, and thus 
resolve the problematic status of the settlers along the North Coast Road. Men 
who were interested in the idea provided the names of their clans and of the 
lands which they controlled, signed 'Clan Land Usage Agreement' forms, and 
paid K30 to become (as they thought) shareholders in a landowner company. At 
some point in 1991, men representing about sixty clans from sixteen villages met 
at Tangara to organise the company itself. They formally appointed Passu to the 
position of executive chairman, seconded the nomination of a secretary, a 
treasurer, and a project manager, and then elected twelve men to sit on the 
company's board of directors. Passu named the company 'WongWong' 
Logging, after the word in the Central Boiken dialect for the King Bird-of-
Paradise, Cicinnurus regius. 
According to documents on file with the Investment Promotion Authority in 
Port Moresby, Passu first registered WongWong Logging as a proprietary 
company in September 1991. Passu and a lawyer based in Port Moresby, Luke 
Nalo, were listed as the company's two sole directors and shareholders. The 
company's Memorandum of Understanding stated that its main objective was 'to 
harvest timber for the purpose of exporting or to be used within Papua New 
Guinea.' Its Articles of Association declared that 'the rights of the members to 
transfer shares in the company is restricted in that the Board of Directors may at 
any time in its absolute discretion decline to register any transfer of shares.' 
WongWong, in other words, was registered as a private company with whom 
customary landowners were registering their lands, rather than a corporate 
organisation with broad landowner participation. 
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While the landowner company was being formed, its executives were also 
busy searching for an overseas company to invest in the project. The first 
company with whom they began serious negotiations was Groomes Pacific, a 
company based in New Zealand. Groomes, they said, performed a careful 
inventory of the forest resources of the Prince Alexander Mountains, and 
ulti.mately expressed an interest in signing a Logging and Marketing Agreement 
with WongWong. Negotiations broke down, however, when the executives of 
WongWong discovered that Groomes would only pay landowners a flat royalty 
of K4 per cubic metre, and that Groomes also intended to finance the project 
through bank loans. It was possible, although it is not documented, that the 
landowner company would have shared the liability for these loans. 
When negotiations with Groomes were terminated, the WongWong 
executives then turned to the national Department of Forests for assistance in 
locating a suitable contractor. Their contact in the Department referred them to 
a 'reputable' Malaysian company, Niugini Lumber Merchants. The WongWong 
executives were suitably impressed by the financial and technical capabilities of 
this company, and were especially reassured by a map displaying more than a 
dozen logging projects in PNG in which it was already actively involved. 
Niugini Lumber Merchants proposed to establish a subsidiary company, 
Sovereign Hill, which would actually log the concession, while the parent 
company would retain the right to market the timber overseas. 
During the last six months of 1991, Niugini Lumber Merchants paid for 
WongWong's executives, directors, and other landowners to make a series of 
trips to Port Moresby. During their visits, these men lobbied the Minister for 
Forests and other national parliamentarians to grant WongWong a timber permit 
under the terms of the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act. 
This Act, which was originally enacted in 1971 and amended in 1979, 
granted the Minister for Forests the sole authority to declare a 'Local Forest 
Area' upon 'application by any interested person and on payment of the 
prescribed fee', as long as he was satisfied that such a declaration was 'in the 
interests ofthe owners by custom ofthe timber', 'the national interests', and 'the 
prospects for the economic exploitation of the timber'. In the 1980s, this Act 
proved extremely popular with overseas logging companies and local landowner 
companies alike. In effect, as the name of the Act implied, it empowered the 
customary owners of timber resources to enter into private, contractual 
relationships with overseas companies outside of government scrutiny and 
planning. In theory, landowner companies were to be formed following the 
model which the Department of Forests used in the case of Timber Rights 
Purchase agreements. The customary owners were to be identified through 
genealogical investigation, their land boundaries delimited, representatives 
selected, and the mechanism for distributing royalty payments for timber 
extracted from the land defined in advance. In other parts of PNG, however, 
landowner companies frequently failed to adequately delimit customary groups 
and land boundaries. The executives and directors were often not representative 
of the range of customary groups or their interests, and they often lacked the 
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business skills and knowledge necessary to negotiate favourable Logging and 
Marketing Agreements with logging contractors (see Simpson, this volume). 11 
In 1989, the Barnett Inquiry had recommended that the Forestry (Private 
Dealings) Act should be repealed because it opened the door to all sorts of 
unscrupulous dealings, and because landowner companies were often 'mere 
puppets created to enable the foreign timber companies to gain access to the 
resource' (Barnett 1989c, Vol.1: 120). In 1990, the Minister for Forests, Karl 
Stack, announced a two-year moratorium on the issue of new timber permits, 
with the aim of creating an interim period in which new forestry legislation 
could be drafted and institutions capable of implementing and enforcing the 
regulations established. However, over the course of the following year, Stack 
continued to issue permits under both the old Forestry Act and the Private 
Dealings Act (see Filer 1991b). 
When Jack Genia took over the Ministry of Forests in April 1991, he too 
continued to lobby Cabinet for exemptions to the moratorium while the 
provisions of the new Forestry Act were being finalised. 12 On 12 December, 
while Prime Minister Namaliu (who was publicly opposed to any breach of the 
moratorium) was making an 'official visit' to New Zealand, Cabinet granted 
exemptions for five new projects. The Hawain LFA was one of them. In 
justifying his submission to Cabinet, Genia wrote: 'I am reluctant to recommend 
these to the NEC [Cabinet] but pressure from landowners, provincial 
governments and members of Parliament are such that I am compelled to make 
this submission' (Times of PNG, 21 November 1991 ).13 
Four months later, on 8 April 1992, Genia proceeded to declare the Hawain 
Local Forest Area. He appointed the Acting Assistant Secretary for the East 
Sepik Division of Forests, Alimel Bellet, to certify WongWong as the corporate 
vehicle for all of the customary landowners of the Hawain LFA. According to a 
copy of the Dealings Agreement between WongWong and the LFA landowners 
that was circulating in Wewak in 1995, Bellet certified that sixty-eight men 
acting as the representatives of sixty-seven clans from fourteen villages had the 
right, by custom, to dispose of the timber resources of the 40,000 hectare 
11 According to the provisions of the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, the responsibility for 
authenticating the claims of ownership over timber resources lay with a 'prescribed authority' to be 
nominated by the Minister for Forests. At the same time, the Act exempted both the state and the 
prescribed authority from being liable in civil proceedings for the facticity of the certification. 
Thus, if the parties to a timber sale under this act avoided government scrutiny of their contractual 
relations, the government also washed its hands clean of any responsibility for policing this 
relationship. 
12 See the reports in the Post-Courier, 8 May 1991, and the Times of PNG, 21 November 1991. 
13 It may be noted that the NEC simultaneously voted to extend the moratorium on new timber 
permits until July 1993. 
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concession.1 4 The boundaries of the Hawain LFA, as declared in the 
government gazette, were essentially the same as those which had been 
delimited for the 'Wewak-West Coast Timber Area' by the Division of Forests 
in 1987 (ESP 1987:2). In its report, the Division of Forests had estimated that 
the population of customary landowning clans could number some 5,000 
individuals resident in seventy villages. WongWong itself, in its Environmental 
Plan, stated that Block 1 of the Hawain LF A covered thirty-one villages with a 
population of some 4,876 (WongWong Logging 1992:34-36). Clearly, then, the 
sixty-eight men who signed the Dealings Agreement with WongWong 
represented but a small fraction of those men who would, by either custom.ary 
right or capitalist self-interest, claim ownership over forests in the Hawain 
LFA. 15 
On 1 May 1992, WongWong signed a Logging and Marketing Agreement 
with Sovereign Hill, which was now a wholly owned subsidiary of Rimbunan 
Hijau.16 The margins which WongWong negotiated with Sovereign Hill for the 
payment oftimber from the LFA are shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Local revenues under the 1992 Logging and Marketing Agreement 
for the Hawain LF A. 
Description 
Non-premium hardwoods 
Prem i urn hard woods 
Super premium hardwoods 
Timber for poles and piles 
Landowner company premium 
Reforestation levy 
Agricultural development levy 
Infrastructure levy 
Provincial government levy 
Source: WongWong Logging 1992. 
Kina/m3 
4.50 
5.50 
7.00 
2.00 
5.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.50 
14 The villages which were represented were: Suwambukao (4), Mandigen {1), Jambarampa (5), 
Penjen ( 4 ), Perringa (9), Rainimbo ( 1 ), Harigen (2), Hurahura (1 ), Sassanumbogu ( 4 ), 
Muscuwagen (13), Puara (11) Kweruro (9), Numienguai (3), and Worn ( 1 ). 
15 In 1995, many of the men whose names appeared on the Dealings Agreement were publicly 
denying that they had ever seen or signed the document. 
16 Documents filed with the Investment Promotion Authority show that Sovereign Hill was 
originally registered as a stockbroking company, Rokwana Pty Ltd, by two Port Moresby lawyers 
in 1986. In 1989, the name was changed to Sovereign Hill, new directors were appointed, and the 
nominal share capital was increased to K 1 million. In August 1992, 999,998 shares were allotted 
to Rimbunan Hijau, while the remaining 2 shares were alloted to Tiong Ik King of Singapore. 
Sovereign Hill is also the vehicle through which Rimbunan Hijau holds its 50 percent stake in 
Niugini Lumber Merchants (see Filer, this volume). 
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The day before the Minister for Forests gazetted the declaration of the 
Hawain LFA, the Acting Minister for Forests, Michael Singan, signed 
documents necessary for the gazettal of the new Forestry Act during a campaign 
rally which the Prime Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, was staging in the Duke of 
York Islands (Post-Courier, 7 April 1992). The Act was to be formally made 
into law on 15 April. While Genia had publicly supported the passage of the 
new Forestry Act, he now combined with the Secretary of the Department of 
Forests to block its gazettal until 25 June, at the end of the national elections. 
They claimed that neither an appropriate institutional structure nor an operating 
budget was in place that would permit the implementation of the Act. Later, 
Genia added that delaying the gazettal of the act was necessary to ensure that '19 
timber permits and licences due to expire this year are renewed and extended 
prior to the enforcing of the new act' (Post-Courier, 22 April 1992). 
Because of his breaches of the moratorium and his delay of the 
implementation of the new act, Genia came under increasing fire from officials 
in the Department of Forests, the opposition, and non-governmental 
organisations. The Forestry Transitional Management Council, which was 
overseeing the amalgamation of the Forest Industries Council and the 
Department of Forests into the PNG Forest Authority, under the provisions of 
the new Act, was especially outraged. In late April, its chairman released a press 
briefing which claimed that the majority of logging permits which Genia had 
issued during his tenure as Minister for Forests had been awarded to Rimbunan 
Hijau or its subsidiaries, giving them control over about 66 percent of the total 
area of logging concessions in PNG (Post-Courier, 28 April and 21 May 1992). 
There were also allegations that Rimbunan Hijau was lavishly funding the 
campaigns of Pangu Party candidates for the upcoming elections, a charge that 
Genia vigorously denied (Post-Courier 19 June 1992). Meanwhile, the 
opposition, led by Paias Wingti and Sir Julius Chan, were calling for a new 
inquiry into the forestry sector. All this meant that the government's handling of 
forestry legislation and the issuance of new timber permits between 1990 and 
1992 was turned into an issue for the June elections. 
In the aftermath of the elections, Namaliu lost the position of Prime 
Minister to Paias Wingti by one vote in the national parliament. Wingti then 
appointed Tim Neville to replace Genia as the Minister for Forests. Once 
ensconced in office, Neville announced his intention to review all of the timber 
permits which had been issued after the writs of election had been filed, and 
proceeded to step up the speed of reform in the forestry sector. As a result, by 
the beginning of 1993, the legal status and future development of the Hawain 
LFA appeared to be in question. 
However, the landowner company executives who had been the 
beneficiaries of permits awarded or extended during during Stack's and Genia's 
terms of office wasted no time in organising themselves to protect their 
positions. Before the elections were over, they organised the PNG Forest 
Resource Owners Association (PNGFROA) and began to campaign against the 
implementation of the 1991 Forestry Act. Robert Passu, the chairman of 
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WongWong Logging, was nominated as the 'representative' of the Momase 
region. 
The PNGFROA attacked the Act as constituting illegitimate government 
interference with the rights of resource owners to determine how their forests 
wen~ to be used. They vigorously opposed Neville's proposals to scrutinise the 
composition of landowner companies and to channel the 'premiums' which they 
received from log exports directly into government-controlled accounts to fund 
infrastructural projects. Instead, they put their weight behind a Private 
Member's Bill, introduced by Daniel Tulapi in 1993, which would have severely 
weakened the capacity of the government to regulate logging projects by re-
establishing some of the provisions of the now repealed Private Dealings Act. 17 
Tulapi's bill was eventually defeated in Parliament, but the backlash from 
the PNGFROA had enough political clout to delay implementation of the 1991 
Forestry Act while it went under yet another review (see Post-Courier, 4 March 
1994). The review was not complete in late August 1994, when the Wingti 
government was toppled and a new government, headed by Sir Julius Chan, 
appointed Andrew Posai as the new Minister for Forests. Posai hailed from the 
Kandrian-Gioucester District in West New Britain and had links with the 
PNGFROA (see Simpson, this volume). The Minister shared the PNGFROA's 
view that the government had no right to intervene in landowner company 
affairs. The government decided to postpone further scrutiny of the composition 
and financial affairs of local landowner companies until the timber permits that 
were issued during the moratorium came up for review and renewal. 
While the PNGFROA partially succeeded in winning the political battle 
against the implementation of the new Forestry Act in Port Moresby, 
WongWong and Sovereign Hill were losing support among the customary 
landowners in Wewak. Somewhat incongruously, while the chairman of 
WongWong was making frequent trips to Port Moresby to campaign against the 
Act in the name of the sacrosanct property rights of customary landowners, in 
Wewak he was confronted with a series of profound crises among the 
landowners whom he claimed to represent. First, landowners outside of his own 
immediate constituency prevented the logging company from gaining access to 
their land. Then land disputes tied up significant areas of forest, and thus 
prevented them from being logged. Finally, the coalition of settlers who had 
initially placed him in the position of broker broke up into mutually hostile 
groups. The next section describes how this infighting among landowners led to 
a halt in logging activities in April 1994, which Sovereign Hill temporarily 
overcame by directly intervening in landowner company affairs. 
17 See, for example, a letter from the PNGFROA that was published in the Post-Courier, I March 
1994. 
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Landowner-Contractor Negotiations, 1993-1995 
Because the permit was granted in a hurry, many communities in the LF A were 
poorly informed about, and ill-prepared for, the start-up of the logging project in 
1993. While some clans in some villages had committed their forests to the 
project, many others had not yet done so. As a result, Sovereign Hill resorted to 
negotiating access to specific stands of timber as its men and machinery 
advanced into the forests. 
At first, WongWong acted as a middle-man between Sovereign Hill and the 
local landowners. On the one hand, the executives were able to draw on local 
kinship connections and exchange obligations to smooth the advance of the 
project. On the other hand, they tried, at times, to exert some real control over 
Sovereign Hill for the benefit of their constituency. Yet ultimately, WongWong 
was unable to resolve land disputes, meet compensation demands, or account to 
local landowners for the funds which it was (purportedly) accumulating. As a 
result, WongWong lost credibility, not only with the landowners, but also with 
Sovereign Hill. Sovereign Hill therefore began, from late 1994, to intervene 
directly in landowner company affairs, and to negotiate agreements directly with 
individual landowners. In this way, WongWong became irrelevant as a socio-
political organisation representing the interests of landowners in the LFA. 
The Plan for Logging and Development 
In August 1992, WongWong submitted an environmental plan to the PNG 
Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC) for approvaf.I8 Since this 
is the most complete and 'official' five-year plan to which I have had access, it 
is worth summarising its contents briefly here. This is because the way in which 
logging activities actually unfolded between 1993 and 1995 turned out to deviate 
considerably from the plan. 
The Environmental Plan (EP) estimated that, out of the 40,000 hectares 
which fell within the official boundaries of the LFA, only some 28,263 hectares 
contained forests of sufficient timber density, on gentle enough terrain, to be 
commercially viable and practically operable. The operable forest area was then 
divided into five roughly equivalent areas (or 'coupes') which were to be logged 
successively over the following five years (see Table 3.2). The first coupe 
encompassed the remaining alluvial forests of the coastal plain and the hill 
forests blanketing the western portion of the northern escarpment between the 
Hawain and Wariman Rivers. The remaining four coupes then revolved 
clockwise from the forests of the southern escarpment to the ranges south and 
north of the Hawain River (see Map 3.1 ). In delimiting the boundaries of these 
areas, the EP took into account neither village nor clan land boundaries. In 
addition, the forests belonging to the men who were most enthusiastic about the 
project lay for the most part in Coupe 3, which was not scheduled to be logged 
until the third year of the project- 1995. 
IS The plan was approved by the Minister on 20 September 1992. 
52 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
Table 3.2: Five-year harvest plan for the Hawain LFA. 
Coupe Hectares Timber volumes in cubic metres 
Est. harvest Max. export Sawmill 
1 5,863 152,438 150,000 nil 
2 6,080 158,080 147,000 3,000 
3 6,070 157,820 145,000 5,000 
4 5,850 152,100 152,100 10,000 
5 4,400 114,400 114,800 10,000 
TOTAL 28,263 734,838 708,900 28,000 
Source: WongWong Logging 1992. 
The enthusiasm of the coalition of settlers was dependent on their obtaining 
what they had long desired - roads that would enable them to go home. Indeed, 
the EP proposed that the first logging camp and transhipment point for timber 
extracted from the LFA should be located at a site on Worn Peninsula. 19 From 
here, it was proposed that Sovereign Hill would reclaim a section of the swamp 
to construct an access road through Tangara into Coupe 1. The logging 
company would then build all-weather roads, surfaced with gravel, linking 
Penjen to Perringa, Perringa to both Numienguai and Jambarampa, Numienguai 
to the base log camp along the banks of the Nagam River, and then on to 
Musuwagen. There was also a plan to construct a road from Surumba to 
Majuom, which brought the total length of the proposed road network up to 132 
kilometres. 'The logging road and network,' the plan stated, 'would eventually 
improve the accessibility and enhance the development of agricultural areas in 
interior lands and western villages in the LFA.' For this reason, and perhaps 
only for this reason, the plan could then go on to confidently assert that 'the 
timber project is perceived by the people to be a major breakthrough in 
promoting balanced social development and community prosperity'. Everyone 
wanted a road. 
The EP also listed a wide range of socio-economic benefits which the 
villagers would obtain from participating in the project. WongWong and/or 
Sovereign Hill would: 
• upgrade the existing roads and bridges that linked certain villages to the 
coastal highway; 
• establish a portable sawmill to supply timber for local use; 
• upgrade the classrooms and teachers' residences in the LFA schools, and 
provide them with furniture and water supply systems; 
• construct a health centre to cater for the needs of LFA communities; 
I9 Worn was the site of the Japanese surrender to Allied forces in 1945, home to a small 
community of Austronesian-speakers (with whom the settlers had some ties of intermarriage), and 
also the site of one PNG's few National Parks. 
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• help to maintain and repair local churches by providing them with building 
materials; 
• help villagers to install water tanks or other water supply systems; 
• establish a base camp near the Nagam River, complete with workers' 
housing, a workshop, an aid post, a police station, a store, and a market place 
for local produce; 
• implement a training and localisation programme to help local workers 
enhance their skills and expertise; 
• take measures to protect special cultural, historical, and archaeological sites 
in the LF A; and 
• encourage environmental awareness and participatory planning among the 
local people. 
It was, in brief, a comprehensive plan which contained a long list of promises. 
Conflicts and Confrontations over Logging 
There were problems, however, as soon as Sovereign Hill unloaded its fleet of 
new bulldozers and other heavy machinery on Wom Beach in January 1993. 
Three crises developed and intensified over the course of the following year, 
which ultimately led to Robert Passu's downfall as chairman of WongWong 
Logging, and the temporary suspension of the project. 
The first crisis that confronted the project involved the location of the wharf 
and base camp at Worn Point. While one landowner from Wom had signed an 
agreement with WongWong, many others opposed the construction of a wharf, 
base camp, and road on Worn Peninsula. The Times of PNG reported that Worn 
landowners had threatened to block the company's access because they feared 
'disruption to their community activities, damage to their fishing grounds and 
pollution of their environment' .20 They wrote to the DEC, requesting an 
immediate inquiry into the possible environmental consequences of the proposed 
development so that they could make an informed decision. On 4 March, 
another report in the Times featured the testimony and photograph of Cathy 
Tuhak and her grandchildren. She was quoted as follows: 
These companies are going to destroy my forests, my land and my seas. 
I am old and I am going to die soon. I do not want to see my children 
and my grandchildren suffer as a result of the destruction to my forests, 
my land, and my seas. 
In response to the landowners' complaints, the DEC suspended the 
development of a base camp and wharf at Worn pending the completion of a 
comprehensive environmental impact assessment by WongWong and Sovereign 
20 Times ofPNG, 18 February 1993; see also Wantok, 18 February 1993. 
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Hill (personal communication, John Douglas, 1993). However, the assessment 
was never carried out because Sovereign Hill decided to abandon the original 
development proposa1.2I 
The EP also proposed that Cape Kholang could be developed as an 
alternative location for the wharf. Thus, when Wom was ruled out, the 
executives of WongWong turned their attention to the landowners of Kholang. 
At this stage, however, the latter had not been informed of the impending 
project. One of these landowners, who later came to sit on WongWong's board 
of directors, told me that: 
when the company arrived in Wewak, I had no idea that they were 
going to come here... (One day] they came in a boat, picked me up, 
and we went over to Muscu Island. There we all sat down together and 
discussed how we could reach an agreement for the company to come 
and use Kholang. 
Whereas he and his family had been living at Kholang for several years, 
subsisting off their gardens, the adjacent mangroves, and the sea, he was now 
offered the possibility of an increased cash income and permanent house, 
complete with a water supply system. He therefore agreed to allow Sovereign 
Hill to establish a log pond and wharf at Kholang. In exchange, he was to 
receive K400 a month in rent, K3,000 as compensation for damage to a garden 
which would be uprooted during construction of the log pond, and a permanent 
house for himself and his family. Once the agreement was signed, in March 
1993, Sovereign Hill quickly established a small base camp and wharf. 22 
Having secured a foothold on Cape Kholang, WongWong then turned its 
attention to resolving two additional problems. The first involved the choice of 
a location for the temporary, but large, base camp which was required for 
Sovereign Hill's equipment and employees until such time as they reached the 
Nagam River. This problem was solved when customary landowners from 
Suwambukao readily agreed to allow the company to construct a temporary base 
camp on their land. The second problem was that Wongwong had yet to 
negotiate access to the forests that lay beyond Cape Kholang, and this proved 
more intractable. 
Although, on paper, Coupe 1 extended down to the alluvium forests east of 
the Hawain River, most of the customary landowners from the villages of Parom 
and Rainimbo were initially inclined to deny access to their land, because they 
regarded the largely intact alluvium forest as their 'store' - a place where they 
21 The project manager apparently believed that it would be too impractical and expensive to 
construct a road through the mangrove swamps. Villagers recall him saying (in Tok Pisin) 
'Dispela tais bai ki/im indai olgeta masin bilong mi!' ('This swamp will swallow up all of my 
machinery!'). 
22 Unfortunately. after the agreement was made, his relatives from Muscu Island disputed his 
claim to exclusive ownership of Kholang. As a result, the rental payments have been paid into a 
trust account pending the result of a court decision on the issue. 
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could freely hunt game, gather forest produce, and catch fish. They feared that 
logging and road-building through the heart of this forest would foreclose this 
option. In addition, they distrusted WongWong's motives because it had been 
formed by people from the hinterland villages: '/no kampani bilong mipela!' 
('It's not our company!'), they said. 
In late February and early March, executives from WongWong held four 
successive meetings with the leaders of Parom and Rainimbo clans in an attempt 
to negotiate a right of way for the road. They pleaded that the hinterland people 
were desperate for a link between their villages and the North Coast Road. The 
leaders of the Parom and Rainimbo clans ultimately found it difficult, if not 
impossible, to oppose the desires of their inland kin.23 They demanded, 
however, that they be duly compensated for any damage caused by the 
construction of the road, and they continued to withhold approval for their their 
forests to be logged. WongWong was thus compelled to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding which specified that about K80,000 would be paid to them, in a 
series of instalments, once log exports began. 
By June 1993, Sovereign Hill had cleared a track from Cape Kholang up 
into the foothills, to the place where they were also completing construction of 
the provisional base camp, a few kilometres directly west of Suwambukao. 
However, although the work on the road was largely complete, the customary 
landowners of Parom and Rainimbo had received only a small proportion of the 
promised compensation payment.24 By the end of July, they grew increasingly 
impatient at the delay, and during the first week of August, a landowner from 
Rainimbo made a public demand for immediate compensation on Radio East 
Sepik's weekly current affairs programme 'What's Happening' (' Wanem 
Samting i Kamap '). Meanwhile, other landowners from Rainimbo and Parom 
were plotting to erect a roadblock on the main logging road until their demands 
for full and immediate payment of the promised compensation were met. 
WongWong reacted swiftly to these threats. On the morning of 9 August, 
they borrowed large dump trucks from Sovereign Hill and used them to transport 
a gang of youths from the settlements to fight with the dissident landowners. 
One man suffered minor injuries as a result of the attack. During the next week, 
the Premier of East Sepik Province arranged a meeting between the executives 
of WongWong and the dissident landowners from Rainimbo and Parom, and it 
seems that he sided with WongWong, because the logging project went ahead 
without any further compensation being paid to the Rainimbo and Parom clans. 
23 One of the leaders present at the meeting recalled: 'I watched how [the chairman of 
WongWong] was crying and I felt sorry for him. So I said: "Okay! We must arrive at an 
agreement with you. If you build this road through our forest to continue with your work inland, 
then you must pay us for all the damage that you cause to our land."' 
24 Informants vary in their claims about the amount which had been paid - from K5,000 to 
K24,000. 
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About a month later, on 7 September, the East Sepik Division of Forests 
gave Sovereign Hill written approval to begin felling logs in three small areas of 
Coupe 1. But no sooner had logging begun in these areas when clans from 
Rainimbo and Suwambukao disputed the ownership of some trees included in 
the three set-ups, thus causing further delay. 
Land disputes constituted the second crisis which threatened the progress of 
the project. By law, unless the parties to a dispute agree otherwise, logging 
cannot proceed in forests whose ownership is under dispute. If the parties to a 
dispute do agree that logging should go ahead, the royalties payable on timber 
taken from the disputed area are paid into a trust account until the dispute is 
resolved. From the perspective of the disputants who choose this path, the role 
of the court is to hear the genealogical and historical claims of both sides, and 
then to declare a 'winner'. 
As mentioned previously, the composition of land groups and their 
boundaries had not been formalised before the logging project started. Instead, 
the men who were interested in the project signed Clan Land Usage Agreement 
forms, while WongWong urged those others who were in the immediate path of 
Sovereign Hill's bulldozers to do the same. This ad hoc procedure led to 
enormous competition over forested land in Coupes 1 and 2 during the first year 
of the project. Clans from Suwambukao and Rainimbo disputed the ownership 
of forests adjacent to the main logging road. Clans from Yarapos and 
Suwambukao debated the ownership of an area to the west of Suwambukao. 
Kweruro and Suwambukao disputed the ownership of forests in the vicinity of 
the Siting Creek. Pambanyeng clans challenged Mandigen's claims to 
ownership of the forests around Mount Pambang. In addition, long-standing 
land disputes between clans within some villages, including Rainimbo, 
Suwambukao, and Nionguanja, flared up into bitter conflicts. In many, though 
not all, cases, the disputants were also divided into supporters and opponents of 
the logging project. 
Provincial lands officers were reluctant to get involved in resolving land 
disputes once the project had started. They felt alienated by WongWong 
because the company had not sought out their assistance in the first place. 
Nonetheless, in July 1993, the head of the provincial Division of District Affairs 
wrote a letter to WongWong, stating that he would assign five officers to the 
project if WongWong would give them the use of a four-wheel drive vehicle and 
pay their overtime and camping allowances. When WongWong failed to 
respond, the Division assigned volunteer land mediators to hear the disputes. 
None of the twelve disputes which were brought to the attention of government 
officials between 1993 and 1995, as a result of the logging project, have been 
resolved. 
The third crisis that confronted WongWong and Sovereign Hill was the 
breakdown of the coalition of landowners which had initially supported the 
project and their fragmentation into mutually hostile factions. This crisis was 
provoked, in large part, by the leadership style of WongWong's executive 
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chairman, which was authoritarian, conspiratorial, and highly secretive. Just 
three days before the logging operation was opened by three national MPs, 25 a 
core group of landowners who had been instrumental in supporting the project 
convened an impromptu meeting in Tangara, where they confronted the 
WongWong executives with a long series of grievances. They wanted to be 
informed about the company's working plan, the contents of the contract 
between Sovereign Hill and WongWong, the financial status of WongWong, the 
powers of its directors, and its employment procedures. The executives 
responded by largely ignoring the requests for clarification and information 
about the project. Instead, they insisted that the real motive for the meeting was 
jealousy between landowners over project employment, and their impatience to 
receive royalty payments, roads, and 'services'. They defended their selection 
process and threatened to resign from their positions. 
Needless to say, the meeting failed to resolve the brewing conflicts between 
WongWong and the local landowners, who now felt too intimidated to speak up 
for themselves in public. Instead, they began 'talking behind the backs' (tok 
beksait) of the executives and spreading rumours of embezzlement and special 
treatment by Sovereign Hill. The seriousness of these rumours, and the general 
atmosphere of .distrust; only increased as the felling of trees proceeded, the first 
log shipments went out, and royalty payments were made. By January 1994, 
Sovereign Hill had logged ·out a number of areas adjacent to Perringa, 
Suwambukao, Nionguanja, Mandigen, and Saure. They had shipped 16,454 
cubic metres of logs, while WongWong had paid out K65,907.79 in royalties to 
the resource owners. 
After the June meeting, then, a faction of landowners began to withdraw 
their support from WongWong and to organise opposition to its chairman and 
executives in the North Coast settlements. On 16 January 1994, more than one 
hundred men from nine villages in the Coupe 1 and 2 areas attended a meeting 
initiated by this opposition group. The participants compiled a twenty-one point 
petition demanding that the chairman should respond to questions about the 
working plans, shareholding structure, and financial status of the company, and 
should state whether Sovereign Hill intended to pay them compensation for 
damage to crops and other resources (see Times of PNG, 24 March 1994). 
A week later, a second meeting was attended by a lawyer from Port 
Moresby, whom the impromptu opposition committee had hired to investigate 
the shareholding structure and financial dealings of WongWong. When he 
announced that, 'up until Friday at 5 o'clock p.m.', WongWong was not 
included on the official list of registered companies in Port Moresby, the crowd 
grew tense and anxious. Feelings of betrayal and indignation were widely 
expressed. 
25 The entourage included Jack Genia, Bernard Narokobi, and Sir Pita Lus - all members of the 
opposition during Wingti's coalition government. 
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Even at this meeting, however, the customary landowners took two sides. 
One side wanted to take immediate action to stop Sovereign Hill's operations. 
They proposed setting up roadblocks, burning down access bridges, and 
obtaining a court injunction. The other side asked the lawyer to help them work 
out a separate and exclusive agreement with Sovereign Hill, removing 
WongWong from its intermediary role. 
During the month which followed, meetings of the opposition continued. 
Two documents from the Registrar of Companies were circulated at these 
meetings, and then widely dispersed among the settlements along the North 
Coast Road. The first document, which bore a stamp dated 19 September 1991, 
showed that WongWong had been registered as a proprietary company with two 
sole directors and shareholders: Robert Passu and Luke Nalo. Most landowners 
took this as legal confirmation that WongWong was not a landowner company at 
all, but the private business venture of two men. They had been tricked. The 
second document, which was dated 19 September 1991 but stamped by the 
Registrar of Companies on 8 February 1994, showed that Nalo had resigned as a 
director and transferred his share to Paul Porei. Other documents, dated 31 
January and 2 February 1994, listed an additional fourteen directors and eleven 
shareholders in WongWong Logging Company, but some of the men whose 
names appeared on this list denied that they were either shareholders or directors 
when I asked them. 
On 27 February, Robert Passu convened a meeting at Tangara which was 
attended by the general manager of Niugini Lumber Merchants, George Yong, 
and a crowd of several hundred local landowners. The goal of the meeting was 
to overcome the rumours which had been circulating about WongWong, and 
reign in the ranks of the opposition so that the project could go ahead. Passu 
reviewed the history of the project, insisting that everything was legal and in 
order. Luke Nalo announced that he had resigned from WongWong two years 
previously, and was neither a director nor a shareholder. He threatened to sue 
any men who continued to spread rumours about him for defamation of 
character. George Yong pleaded with the crowd to support WongWong and the 
logging project, and to cease their incessant demands for compensation in the 
interests of promoting development in East Sepik Province. He also suggested 
that, if they were unhappy with Passu's leadership as chairman of WongWong, 
they could always elect a new man to take his place. Passu, for his part, 
attempted to reassert his control over the landowner company, and to shore up 
support among the landowners of Coupes 2 and 3. By the end of the meeting, it 
appeared that landowners from several hinterland villages, such as Kweruro and 
Puara, were behind him. Most, however, were not. 
The meeting did not succeed in giving new life to the logging project. 
Instead, the Times reported that 'the landowners' were now 'against the 
developers of the Hawain LFA' and Wantok reported that 'WongWong no 
longer has the support of landowners. ' 26 Sovereign Hill seems to have agreed 
26 See Times of PNG and Wantok, 3 March 1994 and 24 March 1994. 
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with these statements. By the beginning of May, the company transferred most 
of its heavy machinery and expatriate employees to other project areas in PNG, 
and laid off all of its local workforce. The logging project had come to a 
standstill. 
A Turning Point 
The events of the first half of 1994 marked a turning point in the relationship 
between the management of WongWong and Sovereign Hill. At first, Sovereign 
Hill had largely been content to remain in the background as the disputes 
between WongWong and local landowners evolved. Sovereign Hill responded 
to conflicts amongst the landowners, when they got out of hand, by simply 
threatening to pull out of the LF A altogether. 
In the initial stages, this strategy seemed to work. It mobilised support for 
the WongWong executives in such a way that it became difficult for dissident 
landowners to publicly maintain their opposition. In the first months of 1994, 
however, rumours about the financial improprieties of WongWong, and 
disappointment over the size of royalty payments and delays in compensation 
payments and provision of services, were so severe that the threat of a 'pull-out' 
no longer had the intended effect. There were now too many landowners who 
would be happy to see the downfall of the landowner company and the 
withdrawal of the contractor. 
From Sovereign Hill's point of view, WongWong had failed in its primary 
purpose: to act as a broker between themselves and the local people, and thus to 
ensure that Sovereign Hill would continue to have untroubled access to the forest 
resources of the LF A. Thus, in the latter half of 1994 and the first few months of 
1995, Sovereign Hill modified its approach to the local landowners. While the 
operation was temporarily suspended, Sovereign Hill withdrew its support from 
WongWong's current chairman and executives, planning to replace them with a 
new team. At the same time, the logging company planned to negotiate access 
with small groups of landowners on its own account. 
On 24 August, Robert Passu convened a general meeting of LF A 
landowners, where he presented a verbal report on WongWong's financial 
status, announced his resignation, and set a date for the election of new directors 
and executives. On 28 August, at a meeting which was mainly attended by the 
old directors and executives, the mantle of chairmanship was passed to Martin 
Simbuk, a landowner from Parom. Shortly thereafter, two young men, one from 
Kweruro and one from Penjen, succeeded to the positions of deputy chairman 
and secretary. This core group was then charged with the responsibility for 
restarting the project. 
The Revival ofthe Project in 1995 
Although it took several months to develop, this move breathed new life into the 
stalled logging project. On 4 March 1995, George Yong flew out to Wewak to 
meet with WongWong's new team of directors and executives, and expressed 
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Sovereign Hill's desire to re-enter the areas of Coupe 1 which had not yet been 
logged - the alluvial forests belonging to Parom, and the forests in the foothills 
behind Suwambukao and Nionguanja - and resolve the problems which had 
developed in the Coupe 1 area over the previous year. Unfortunately, however, 
WongWong continued to draw its greatest support from villages in the 
hinterland, such as Puara, Kweruro, and Penjen, whose forests were in Coupes 2 
and 3. Thus, to achieve its aim of 'finishing up' in Coupe 1, Sovereign Hill still 
had a long road of negotiations ahead. 
Sovereign Hill first focussed on negotiating with the customary landowners 
at Parom. In early March, its management tried to persuade them to sign some 
new agreements in the Wewak courthouse, but the landowners unanimously 
refused to do this. An anonymous source, who was present at this meeting, told 
me that: 
there was a general fear among the people that, if they went up to the 
courthouse and signed a new agreement, and the courthouse then put 
its stamp on it, then later it wouldn't matter how much the forest was 
damaged, they wouldn't be able to demand compensation or anything 
else. 
Indeed, a long-standing grievance of the Parom landowners was that they had 
never received full payment of the compensation which had been promised to 
them by WongWong back in 1993. But in February and March, WongWong and 
Sovereign Hill tried to persuade them that Sovereign Hill would only be able to 
pay off their compensation demand if they were able to log their forests. 
As a result of this argument, Parom clan leaders began to change their mind 
about the merits of collaborating with Sovereign Hill. They were envious of the 
royalties which the clans in Coupe 1 had already received. Their attitude 
towards their forest was also changing. Whereas, before, they held to the 
conception of their forest as a storehouse of game, they were now starting to 
view it as an area in which to expand their settlements, gardens, and cash crops. 
As one Parom man explained it to me: 
Its not good when we just clear forest for starting a garden. The trees 
just fall down and rot. We want the company to come and take a few 
of our trees [in areas where we will establish gardens] and then, instead 
of their rotting, we will have a little bit of pocket money too. 
Thus, the anticipation of receiving compensation payments ana royalties, 
combined with a revised conception of land use in this alluvial area, began to 
sway the minds of many Parom clan leaders. 
On 11 April, George Yong once again flew out to Wewak from Port 
Moresby to meet with the Parom landowners. At a meeting in Parom village, 
Yong offered a K500 bonus to each of the landowners who would come forward 
and sign an agreement granting Sovereign Hill access to their forests. Most of 
the Parom landowners stepped forward, signed the agreement, and received their 
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K500 gift. In this way, Sovereign Hill gained access to the last significant area 
of operable forest in the coastal plain. 
While Sovereign Hill set about logging this area, it was also engaged in 
serious negotiations with landowners from other parts of Coupe I. The company 
was intent on returning to the forested areas, in the foothills of this coupe, which 
had not been logged in 1993 and 1994, and also had a practical need to retain 
control of the land on which their logging camp was situated. In early 1995, 
however, the owners of these areas - from Saure, Nionguanja, Suwambukao, 
Mandigen, and Perringa- were, for the most part, thoroughly disillusioned with 
both WongWong and Sovereign Hill. They were angry that they had not been 
paid compensation for economically valuable crops which had been uprooted 
and destroyed during the logging activities of 1993 and 1994. They were also 
concerned that they had not received any benefit from the agricultural and 
infrastructural levies which had been deducted from the export price of their 
timber. In this respect, they were certain that WongWong and/or Sovereign Hill 
had abrogated the terms of both the Dealings Agreement and the Logging and 
Marketing Agreement.27 Thus, in early 1995, they started organising 
themselves into a coherent group in order to take both companies to court for 
breaches of contract. 
Sovereign Hill and the Coupe I landowners initially adopted a hard line in 
their mutual negotiations in a number of meetings that took place between April 
and July 1995. The landowners from the five villages demanded that they be 
paid K5 million kina in compensation before they would grant Sovereign Hill 
access to the logging camp and their forests. They asserted that they had many 
justifications for making this demand. Sovereign Hill had cut down many trees 
in their forest which it then left to rot; many roads had been built without the 
permission of the landowners, fouling their waterways and killing off their 
sources of fish, eels, and crustaceans; logging activities had likewise scared 
away much of the wildlife in their forests; and the company had uprooted many 
of their cash and food crops, including their cacao, coffee, betel nut, sago, and 
tulip. 
Sovereign Hill's project manager regarded the landowners' demand for K5 
million as completely unreasonable, and suggested that he would not entertain 
an amount of more than K30,000. Similarly, he responded to their complaints 
about the agricultural levy by saying that it amounted to a mere K24,000, 'just 
like chicken feed' which 'cannot do anything yet'. As in the case of the Parom 
landowners, Sovereign Hill thus attempted to persuade the landowners from 
these five villages that their hopes for higher incomes and more infrastructural 
and agricultural development could only be realised by providing Sovereign Hill 
with further access to their forests. 
27 They were still unable to secure copies of these agreements, despite the fact that some of them 
had actually signed the Dealings Agreement. 
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Nevertheless, from May to July, the landowners largely stuck to their 
demands. They strongly believed that there had been many 'improper dealings' 
in the award of the logging permit, and they hoped that their threats of publicly 
revealing these illegalities, in the media and in court, would pressure Sovereign 
Hill into reaching an out-of-court settlement with them. But Sovereign Hill's 
general manager was ultimately able to undermine the solidarity of the group by 
making opportune financial gifts to a few important individuals who were 
leading the effort, and by privately negotiating small compensation payments 
with individual landowners. In September, he also finally paid the landowners 
the K24,000 in cash which represented their share of the agricultural levy. 
While some landowners were satisfied with these amounts, and seemed poised to 
grant Sovereign Hill access to the remaining forests on their land, others were 
not. Instead, the latter began to file lawsuits (a total of five by November 1995) 
against WongWong and Sovereign Hill, seeking compensation for illegal 
tre~pass and environmental damage. 
Finally, in the latter half of 1995, WongWong was faced with a serious 
challenge to its legitimacy as an organisation which represented the LFA 
landowners. A faction within the group of settlers who had participated in the 
formation of the 'opposition' in 1994 were taking steps to register a new 
landowner company under the terms of the 1991 Forestry Act. They named the 
competing landowner company 'Numbosawa', joining the Boiken words for 
'mountains' and 'beach'. This was symbolic of what they hoped would be a 
practical and political alliance between coastal and mountain Boiken, both to 
wrest the logging permit from the hands of WongWong and to nullify the 
Logging and Marketing Agreement with Sovereign Hill. They familiarised 
themselves with the procedures to be followed under the terms of the new Act to 
register customary land groups, they began some genealogical investigations, 
and they lobbied the Forests Minister for the"' transfer of the permit. 
While many landowners appeared ready to join this new group, and thus 
participate in the campaign against WongWong, I found it very difficult to gauge 
the true level of support which existed for either faction. The comment of a man 
from Kweruro, who lives on the North Coast Road, was typical: 
There are two companies operating amongst us now- WongWong and 
Numbosawa. Those of us who are living in this settlement are just 
going to sit back and wait and see what happens. We go back and forth 
from one to the other as we consider: Who is respectable enough to 
perform truly honest work and help us? 
By the end of October 1995, Sovereign Hill had succeeded in logging out 
Parom 's alluvial forest. The company had not succeeded, however, in winning 
back the support of the Coupe 1 landowners, nor in preventing large-scale 
defections to the side of Numbosawa. It appeared that many landowners in the 
LFA would continue to refuse to grant Sovereign Hill access to their forests. 
Thus, after a month of attempting to move into new parts of Coupe 1, Sovereign 
Hill once again suspended its operations. 
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Outcomes for Local Stakeholders 
As a result of the ongoing crises in the Hawain LF A, the total area of forest that 
was logged between March 1993 and December 1995 was not very large. 
According to provisional estimates, based on data from existing topographic 
maps and maps of logging roads compiled with a global positioning system 
(GPS) device, the logged-over area in Coupe 1 stood at about 2,200 hectares, 
some 3,600 hectares short of the total area in which the company had intended to 
operate (see Table 3 .2). 
In the forests on the slopes of the Prince Alexander Mountains, the 
combination of land disputes, local opposition to the logging project, and the 
steep and difficult terrain caused Sovereign Hill to practise 'corridor logging', in 
which most of the logs were extracted from within 50-100 metres of the 70 
kilometres of logging roads. The forests of the alluvial plain were more 
extensively logged because of the flat terrain, accounting for only 19 percent of 
the logged-over area but 27 percent of total log exports. 
The log harvest in this period was also much lower than the projections 
made in the Environmental Plan. Sovereign Hill exported only about 38,403 
cubic metres of logs from Coupe 1, which had been estimated to contain 152,438 
cubic metres of merchantable timber. 
Table 3.3 summarises the volume and distribution of income from the 
export of logs from the Hawain LF A between March 1993 and October 1995. 
This shows that the landowners received royalties worth just over 4 percent of 
the export price of these logs. In Suwambukao and Nionguanja, this royalty 
income was very unevenly distributed: out of fifteen patrilines, three received 
about 7 5 percent of the total. 
Table 3.3: Export volumes and income from the Hawain LFA, 1993-1995. 
Period: 
Estimated logged area 
Volume (cubic metres) 
F.O.B. sale price 
Landowner royalties 
Landowner company premiums 
Levies 
Government export duty 
Sources: PNG Forest Authority; 
October 1995. 
1993-1994 
1,777 ha. 
23,534.9 
K3,830,688.65 
K 128,520.19 
K164,744.34 
K82,372.18 
K663,954.50 
1995 (11 months) 
n.a. 
8,867.00 
K1,049,124.00 
est. K66,502.50 
est. K62, 100.00 
K26,601.00 
n.a. 
Total 
n.a. 
32,402.9 
K4,879,812.65 
K 195,022.69 
K226,844.34 
K 108,973.18 
n.a. 
interview with chairman of landowner company, 
Despite the reduced area in which the company operated, there was a great 
deal of ecological disturbance in Coupe 1. The network of logging roads mainly 
followed the mountain ridges which form the watershed of three major rivers -
the Yangumba, the Rambumba, and the Jarumba. The clearance of forest along 
the length of these ridges promoted rapid soil erosion, and hence the siltation of 
the creeks and streams below them. As a result, there has been a significant 
decline in the quantities of fish and crustaceans which were formerly consumed 
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by the residents ofNionguanja, Suwambukao, Rainimbo, and Parom. The forest 
fauna was also severely impacted, as villagers report that the noise of bulldozers 
and chainsaws caused large game animals, such as wild pigs and cassowaries, to 
flee the area. Bulldozers destroyed the ground nests of brush turkeys, while 
clearance of the ridge-top forests made it more difficult to trap flying foxes, 
since local hunting methods require small clearings in an otherwise intact forest. 
Finally, expatriate and local employees of the logging company also hunted the 
fauna displaced by the felling of trees. 
For the customary landowners whose forests were logged, the financial 
benefits of royalty payments proved to be disappointing and short-lived. While 
they invested some of their income in used motor vehicles, trade store 
inventories, or savings accounts, most of it was used to meet customary 
exchange obligations, dealt out to close kin in small quantities ranging from K50 
to K250, spent on sponsoring beer parties, or otherwise spent on consumer 
goods, such as mattresses or stereo cassette radios. The following comment 
from a landowner in Suwambukao typifies the disenchantment of many others: 
Before, when we still had some royalty money left, we were happy. If 
there was something one of us wanted to buy, we just bought it. When 
we made trips into town, we could buy lots of things. But now that the 
money is gone, it is just like it was before... We are finding life hard 
once again. 
Nor did the logging project provide much employment for local men and 
women. According to my census materials, during the peak of its operations, 
Sovereign Hill employed between fifty and sixty of them, mostly as assistants to 
expatriate surveyors, as bulldozer drivers, or as chainsaw operators, and they 
earned between K45 and K60 a fortnight. Women's weekly returns from 
marketing garden produce and betel nut in town often exceed such amounts. 
The landowner company had also promised that they would provide 
services to landowners who participated in the project. Such services included 
roads to home territories, assistance in establishing cash crops such as cacao and 
coffee, building materials, and assistance in the provision of village water 
supplies. While Sovereign Hill did establish roads into the home territories of 
some clans, only the clans in Parom were able to take advantage of them. The 
majority of roads (especially those in the foothills) quickly deteriorated under 
the combined effect of erosion and regrowth. Few individuals in the LFA 
possessed sufficiently sturdy four-wheel drive vehicles to navigate these roads. 
In the short term, however, the logging roads did open up new areas for 
garden cultivation. Villagers took advantage of the clearings on the roads ides to 
plant bumper crops of sweet potatoes, squash, and bananas. They were also able 
to travel more easily by foot to make gardens further from their villages, in areas 
that were formerly densely forested. 
Most of the other services which were promised to participating landowners 
never eventuated. While Sovereign Hill donated funds to the Catholic women's 
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group in the Hawain parish, and supplied the church with some building 
materials, landowners did not receive any agricultural assistance nor any water 
supply systems. Instead, the logging company uprooted large numbers of their 
cash crops, while the quality of water in local streams and rivers declined. As 
previously explained, it was only after bitter struggles with Sovereign Hill that 
landowners in Coupe 1 received some compensation for their lost cash crops and 
tlie funds which had been paid to WongWong as agricultural levies. 
Lessons Learned by Local Stakeholders 
What, then, did the local landowners learn as a result of their experience? First 
of all, they learned that landowners who collaborated with Sovereign Hill were 
temporarily empowered in their relationships with other villagers. Since the 
logging contractor was obliged to recognise their land claims when they were 
granting access to their forests, they acquired a greater capacity to decide how 
land was to be used. They found that it was easier to put land into the logging 
project than it was to withhold it, yet they eventually lost status and wealth as 
their kinsmen contested the legitimacy of their land claims, demanded a share of 
their logging incomes, and spread rumours about them cutting 'private deals' 
with Sovereign Hill. Similarly, while collaboration with Sovereign Hill initially 
empowered the executives and directors of WongWong, they ultimately lost 
authority, and became increasingly alienated from their constituents and 
kinsmen, amidst the accusations and rumours that they had been 'bought off' by 
Sovereign Hill. 
At the same time, the material interest which many landowners had in the 
outcome of the logging operation involved many of them in a quest for increased 
literacy and knowledge of the law. On the other hand, other powerful actors, 
from WongWong executives to forestry officials, put up many obstacles to their 
quest for an understanding of their legal rights and the various contracts which 
they had purportedly signed. Despite these handicaps, I believe that knowledge 
about forestry and corporate law, the conduct of business, and the behaviour of 
overseas companies has increased as a result of their experience. One can only 
hope that this gain in knowledge will put them in a better position, in the future, 
to negotiate more favourable outcomes for themselves and for the health of the 
forest. 
Conclusion: National Policy, Local Practice 
In this chapter, I have tried to document two aspects of the national and local 
policy process in the case of the Hawain LFA. First, I argued that national 
forestry policy was itself in a state of crisis during this period. Second, in the 
absence of national policy and state regulation, the actual advance of Sovereign 
Hill into the forests of the LFA was shaped by a multitude of local-level 
conflicts between landowners, the landowner company, and the logging 
contractor. Forestry policies debated and formulated in Port Moresby were 
ultimately of little relevance to resolving the specifically local problems of the 
LF A. Instead, logging proceeded as a function of the temporary balance of 
66 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
allegiances between the jumbled 'class' of customary landowners and Sovereign 
Hill. The former, as we have seen, easily divided themselves into factions which 
took up temporary positions in either facilitating or blocking Sovereign Hill's 
access to local forests, depending on their contingent political alliances. 
Where then, does this leave us, the outside observers who are called upon to 
make policy recommendations? In my view, the most important arena for future 
action in the practice of forestry management in PNG is not to be found in the 
formulation of additional policies, laws, and institutions at the national level. 
Instead, the challenge ahead is to foster forms of social organisation and political 
culture, at the local level, which can more effectively safeguard the interests of 
local communities, rather than just advancing the agendas of aspiring politicians 
or big men. The point here is that the forces of regionalism and nationalism are 
both weak in PNG. One of the most important consequences of this weakness is 
that foreigners with capital can (whether intentionally or not) easily manipulate 
struggles between local factions for their own benefit. These local-level power 
struggles then result in a multitude of negative social, economic, and 
environmental consequences. Meanwhile, the lion's share of the benefits 
derived from log exports accrues to the national government and foreign capital, 
while local actors merely fight over the patronage offered by overseas logging 
companies in return for their political loyalty. 
The Assistant Secretary of the East Sepik Division of Forests, Alimel 
Bellet, once provided me with the following thoughtful reflection, which might 
be taken as the theme of this chapter: 'We Sepiks are our own worst enemies.' 
A starting point for further action is to raise public awareness of this 
predicament, and pose the question of how all Sepiks (and all Papua New 
Guineans) ultimately lose as a result. 
Introduction 
CHAPTER4 
THE INVISIBLE DEVELOPER: 
THE DISSIDENTS' DILEMMA IN THE 
BUHEM-MONGITRPAREA 
THOMASNEN 
In the Fourth Interim Report of his Commission of Inquiry into Papua New 
Guinea's (PNG's) forest industry, Judge Barnett (1989a) described the logging 
ofNew Ireland Province in the following terms: 
It would be fair to say, of some of the companies, that they are roaming 
the countryside with the self-assurance of robber barons; bribing 
politicians and leaders, creating social disharmony and ignoring laws to 
gain access to, rip out, and export the last remnants of the province's 
valuable timber. 
These companies are fooling the landowners and making use of corrupt 
gullible, and unthinking politicians. It downgrades Papua New 
Guinea's sovereign status that such rapacious foreign exploitation has 
been allowed to continue with such devastating effects to the social and 
physical environment, and with so few positive benefits. 
In this chapter, I shall question the extent to which this situation has changed as 
a result of reforms to forest policy and forestry legislation, by examining the 
recent history of the Buhem-Mongi Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) in Morobe 
Province. 
For this purpose, I shall describe the interactions between different 
stakeholders involved in the establishment of PNG's first helicopter logging 
project, and the legal entanglements which have developed around these 
relationships since the 'heli-logging' venture came to grief in 1992. The 
stakeholders have included the landowners and 'their' landowner company, 
provincial and national forestry officers, local, provincial, and national 
politicians, two sets of 'developers', and several sets of lawyers. In telling the 
story of their mutual relationship, I shall lay particular emphasis on the 
dilemmas faced by those landowners who wanted to achieve and to participate in 
the kind of sustainable development which was originally promised by the 
proponents of heli-logging, but which seems to have been abandoned by their 
successors, with the apparent connivance of government agencies responsible for 
encouraging this kind of achievement and participation. 
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Map 4.1: The Buhem-Mongi Timber Rights Purchase. 
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The Buhem-Mongi TRP 
The Buhem-Mongi TRP area is located some 50 kilometres northeast of the city 
of Lae in Moro be Province. The TRP covers 3 8, 190 hectares of land between 
the Buhem and Mongi rivers, and is in fact an amalgam of two separate 
concessions - the Buhem-Bugeng and Bugeng-Mongi areas (see Map 4.1 ). 1 
The area is bounded, on the south, by a thirty-kilometre stretch of the Huon Gulf 
coastline, and on the north, by ridges which lie some fourteen kilometres from 
the coast. 
Environmental Conditions 
The area has abundant rainfall. The wet season normally runs from April to 
October, and the dry season from November to March. 
There are four distinct types of vegetation in the Buhem-Mongi TRP: the 
highland mountain Podocarp forest, the medium lowland hill forest, the lowland 
riverine forest, and the combination of grassland and gardens (Low Impact 
Logging 1995). 
The highland mountain zone consists of hills and mountains up to 750 
metres in height, with a mixture of Podocarp species and some medium lowland 
species. The medium lowland hill forest has the richest forest flora, with a dense 
shrub layer and sparse herb growth. Major species of commercial value in this 
zone are Pometia, Calophyllum, and Terminalia (ibid.). In the lowland 
riverine zone, the major species of commercial importance are Endospermum 
and Pometia. The last zone contains land currently used by villagers for gardens 
and plantations, and these two forms of land use have been responsible for the 
creation of grass lands in the coastal zone of the TRP. 
Human Settlement 
There are twelve census units located within the TRP area, with a total 
population of 3,687 in 1990 (see Table 4.1 ). 2 Three of these- A wadi, Mundala, 
and Ukilim- are offshoots of the older settlement of Bukaua, and are commonly 
subsumed under the latter's name.3 This means that the area contains a total of 
nine village communities, of which Bukaua (including its satellite settlements) is 
by far the largest. Four of these communities- Bukaua, Buengim, Ulugidu, and 
Yambo - are currently in favour of logging, while the other five - the 
'dissidents'- are opposed to it. 
1 The Bugeng is one of three main rivers between the Buhem and the Mongi, the others being the 
Busa and the Bukang. 
2 The official spelling of village names is retained throughout this chapter, even though it is 
sometimes at variance with local pronunciation. 
3 A fourth offshoot of Bukaua has recently appeared as a result of the impact of the logging 
project. 
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Table 4.1: Population of villages in the Buhem-Mongi TRP area, 1990. 
Census Units Households Females Males Total 
A wadi 17 56 71 127 
Bua 50 155 149 304 
Buengim 76 193 236 429 
Bugang 48 140 137 277 
Bukaua 48 137 141 278 
E'e (Busong) 59 164 178 342 
Mundala 57 180 204 384 
Tamigidu 73 261 210 471 
Ukilim 25 78 76 154 
Ulugidu 34 100 112 212 
Wideru 65 180 180 360 
Yambo 61 163 186 349 
TOTAL 613 1807 1880 3687 
Source: PNG National Population Census 1990. 
All the people of this area, except those of Tamigidu village, speak the 
Bukaua language, which is an Austronesian language of the Siassi family. 
Following the arrival of German Lutheran missionaries, the people also learnt to 
use the Y abem language as a lingua franca. Intermarriage is quite common 
between village communities, and has served to strengthen traditional social 
relationships throughout the concession area. 
Local Infrastructure 
The TRP area has a relatively low level of infrastructural development. There is 
a road from Lae up to Bukaua, which was built by South Pacific Timbers when 
the company was logging in the Buhem area during the 1970s. There is no 
airstrip, and no harbours or jetties in the TRP area. The village people use small 
dinghies with outboard motors to travel to Lae for shopping, and to conduct 
government and private business. The journey takes an hour or two. 
There are four community schools in the TRP area: one at Tamigidu which 
serves Tamigidu and Ulugidu villages; one at Bua which serves Bua and Bugang 
villages; one at Busong which serves Busong, Buengim, and Wideru villages; 
and one at Hopoi which serves Yambo and Bukaua villages. 
The Awateng Health Centre, located at Bua village, provides health services 
to all the villages in the TRP, and there is also a small aid post at Bukaua village. 
The health centre treats about 450 patients a month and has a staff of five 
national health workers. Financial support for the running of the health centre is 
provided by the Morobe Provincial Government (Low Impact Logging 1991 ). 
The most commonly treated diseases are malaria, upper respiratory tract 
infections, and some cases of tuberculosis. Serious cases are referred to the 
main hospital in Lae. 
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Most of the people in the are Lutherans. There are two major churches at 
Tamigidu and Bukaua, but nearly all the other villages have their own small 
churches. 
The Formation of the Landowner Company 
The rights over the two concession areas- Buhem-Bugeng and Bugeng-Mongi-
were respectively acquired by the Australian colonial administration on 7 and 23 
November 1973, for a period of twenty years. The administration subsequently 
issued a permit to a logging company called South Pacific Timbers Pty Ltd, but 
this company only operated in the area around the Buhem River, and apparently 
ceased all operations in the late 1970s. 
The local landowner company, Deinzehil Investments, was incorporated in 
Lae on 23 August 1988, with seven original subscribers to the company's 
Memorandum of Association: Bingmalo Iga (from Wideru village), Ania Kaiwa 
(from Busong), Kiong Masang (from Buengim), Paul ltama (from Bugang), 
Kaisom Goy (from Bua), John Aladu (from Tamigidu), and Labo Aladu (from 
Ulugidu). The stated objectives of the company were: 
• to bring together the various people, clans or landowners of each village 
community for the economic and social development of the area; 
• to be involved in agricultural development activities in the area; 
• to carry on business in logging, harvesting, treating, and exporting of timber 
and timber products, and to carry on business in sawmilling for production of 
sawn timber and other timber products for use in PNG; 
• to establish, conduct, and carry on the business of transportation, including 
carriage of passengers and freight by motor and other road vehicles of all 
kinds, ships, and canoes, and to function as wharf owners, stevedores, and 
warehouse operators. 
According to one of the original directors, Paul ltama, who is now the 
interim chairman of the dissident landowner group, representatives of the 
Bukaua community were able to gain control of the company within a year of its 
establishment. This happened on 8 August 1989, when a man from Bukaua 
village, Jonah Tisam, filed a Form 44 with the Registrar of Companies, listing a 
new set of seven shareholders. Five of the new shareholders, including Tisam, 
were members of the Bukaua community, one was from Yambo village, and 
Paul ltama was the only one who had also been a member of the original board.4 
This sudden change in the ownership and control of the landowner company 
led many local people to question its integrity. Claims have since been made 
that the landowner company has served the interest of the logging companies 
4 It is interesting to note here that Bukaua and Yambo were the two communities which had 
apparently not been represented on the original board. 
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operating in the area rather than that of the landowners. Most landowners are 
unclear about the identities and shareholdings of the individuals who control the 
company's affairs, and their suspicions have made them reluctant to participate 
in the 'development' of their resources. As in other parts of PNG, where 
landowner companies play a vital role in the negotiation of resource 
development, suspicions have been aroused when the directors have not been 
available to answer local people's requests for information, or when they have 
stayed away from the site of the development project for a considerable period 
of time. 
The Visible Developer 
The directors of Dienzehil Investments exerted some pressure on the national 
government to secure the development of a new logging project in the Buhem-
Mongi TRP area. In March 1990, the Department of Forests placed 
advertisements in the local newspapers asking for expressions of interest in the 
development of the TRP. Although Cabinet imposed a moratorium on the issue 
of new log export permits in July 1991, the Buhem-Mongi project was one of 
several which the Forests Minister, Karl Stack, later said would not even need to 
be exempted from this moratorium because they were 'either ready for allocation 
or had been allocated for some time, are extensions to existing operations or 
defunct projects being revived' (Post-Courier, 2 January 1991; see Filer 1991 b). 
The Buhem-Mongi project was evidently considered as one which fitted one or 
both of these criteria, because the national Department of Forests subsequently 
granted a five-year Timber Permit (TP 13-31 ), commencing on 3 October 1991 
and expiring on 2 October 1996, to a company called Low Impact Logging Pty 
Ltd. 
Records held at the Investment Promotion Authority's office in Port 
Moresby reveal that the ownership of Low Impact Logging Pty Ltd was 
originally divided between Tuckman Holdings Pty Ltd of New Zealand (25 
percent) and a company called Malan Investment Pty Ltd (75 percent). Malan 
Investment represented the interests of two expatriates, Mal Smith and Alan 
Shannon, the first of whom was already managing one of the main helicopter 
companies operating in PNG. The timber permit was granted specifically for the 
purpose of selective logging using helicopters to transfer logs from the logging 
sites to the log ponds for export. This was in accordance with the expressed 
wishes of the landowners for a sustainable form of development. 
The Development Proposal 
Low Impact Logging engaged a team of forestry experts who carried out both an 
aerial and a ground survey of the area. They divided the gross area of 38,300 
hectares into three parts: 9,800 hectares of 'non-productive forest', 2,900 
hectares of 'inoperable forest', and a 'net productive area' of 25,500 hectares, 
from which it was thought that an average annual cut of approximately 320,000 
cubic metres of timber could be harvested over a period of fifteen years. Up-
front capital costs were estimated at K14 million, comprising K12 million for 
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machinery (which would need to be replaced after eight years), K1.5 million for 
mobilisation and establishment, and the rest as working capital. The logging 
operation was expected to generate about K97 million in total revenue to the 
country over its projected fifteen-year life span, most of which would be divided 
(in order of relative importance) between export duties paid to the national 
government, wages paid to local workers, and royalties and levies paid to the 
provincial government and local landowners. 
The economic benefits to members of the local community were supposed 
to include: 
• the development of local infrastructure through the construction of new 
access road and wharves (see Map 4.2); 
• the employment of up to eighty local people in camp construction and other 
start-up operations; 
• the continuing employment of a smaller workforce during the course of 
routine logging operations; 
• the monthly distribution of royalty payments immediately after the start of 
the operations; and 
• various 'spin-off benefits', such as the development of a sawmilling business, 
the establishment of tree nurseries, and contracts for coastal shipping and the 
transportation of workers to and from work. 
Meanwhile, the national government and the country as a whole would not only 
secure direct financial benefits from the payment of taxes and royalties, but 
would also learn about the benefits of a new method of harvesting logs. 
Helicopter Operations 
The company's K14 million development proposal emphasised the reduction in 
damage and destruction of residual trees entailed in PNG's first 'heli-logging' 
venture. The proposal claimed that the operation would be of a truly selective 
nature, since only those trees of definite commercial value would be felled and 
removed. This was because the usual bulldozers and skidders would be replaced 
by helicopters capable of lifting a five-tonne payload, thus eliminating the need 
for roads and skid tracks into the forest area. By this method, there would be no 
benefit in removing lower-value species, which are normally cut by conventional 
logging practices just because they have been rendered accessible by a road or 
track. 
Given the combination of technical, economic, and environmental factors 
involved in heli-logging, the TRP area was divided into five zones, each of 
which was to contain a wharf and a sawmill (see Map 4.2). Flight distances 
would range from 200 metres to 1,500 metres, and the average flying time from 
the coast to the interior of the TRP would be about 2.05 minutes. An estimated 
average payload of 2.5 cubic metres yielded daily production rates between 700 
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and 900 cubic metres for ten hours of flying time, depending on flight paths and 
climatic conditions (Low Impact Logging 1991 ). 
Map 4.2: Proposed infrastructure development for the Buhem-Mongi TRP area 
(after Low Impact Logging 1991). 
'M~L WHARF· HUON GULF 
The development proposal laid considerable emphasis on the reduction of 
those kinds of environmental damage (such as soil compaction or damage to 
residual trees) which result from standard logging practices. In approving the 
company's environmental plan, the former Minister for Environment and 
Conservation, Michael Singan, stated that his department recognised that the 
type of logging to be carried out in the Buhem-Mongi TRP would have less of a 
negative impact on the environment than conventional logging practices. The 
approval was effectively conditional on the logging company's capacity to 
demonstrate a combination of economic viability with a reduced level of 
physical impact (Post Courier, 2 January 1992). 5 
Operations Curtailed 
Low Impact Logging began logging activities in the area towards the end of 
1991, following the approval of its environmental plan. Although there was still 
some disagreement amongst them, most landowners cooperated with the 
company because it was accepted that this form of logging would cause less 
environmental damage than conventional methods. 
5 In a paper presented to the 20th Waigani Seminar, Tony Power (1996) applauded the heli-
logging techniques as the best way to avoid the damage caused by conventional 'selective' logging 
methods, which, by his estimate, damage between 50 percent and 80 percent of non-harvested 
species. 
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The total volume cut by Low Impact Logging during its first and only year 
of heli-logging operations was 40,129 cubic metres, of which the total volume 
actually exported was 35,599 cubic metres. Export earnings amounted to 
K2,937,700, from which landowners received a total of K143,597 in royalty 
payments. Under the original proposal, direct landowner benefits had been set at 
K5.03 per cubic metre, comprising K3.31 in royalties and Kl.72 in development 
levies. The levies were actually used to install new water supplies in Yambo 
village and to construct an aid post in Ulugidu village. 
The operation continued until 10 September 1992, when one of the giant 
Russian helicopters on hire to the logging company crashed (Post-Courier, 11 
September 1992). Seven people died in the accident, including four landowners 
from villages in the TRP area. Officials from the Department of Civil Aviation 
conducted an investigation immediately following the crash, found that there had 
been gross negligence on the part of the operator, and imposed at) indefinite 
suspension on the flying licence for all rotor-wing aircraft operating in the area. 
This action naturally resulted in the cessation of all heli-logging operations in 
the TRP area. 
Soon after the crash had occurred, a group of local landowners lobbied the 
newly established PNG Forest Authority not to renew the TRP agreement, which 
was due to expire in November 1993, but instead to allow the landowners to 
negotiate a Forest Management Agreement under the terms of the new Forestry 
Act. The landowners also wanted to put an end to logging operations at this 
stage, and were demanding that the company pay compensation for the death of 
their relatives in the accident.6 Paul Itama, one of the original directors of the 
landowner company, Dienzehil Investments, was elected as the interim chairman 
of a committee representing this group. He and his fellow committee members 
were hoping to secure the timber permit themselves, and thus exercise direct 
control over any future logging operations in the area in order to achieve the 
twin goals of sustainable development and downstream processing. 
Enter the Invisible Developer 
Following the closure of the heli-logging operation, Malaysian loggers have 
made two separate attempts to resume the export of logs from the Buhem-Mongi 
TRP using standard logging techniques. It seems that Messrs Smith and 
Shannon sold their interest in Low Impact Logging to one of the companies in 
the 'Monarch group', which is effectively managed by Mr Hii Yii Ann, but 
which is also closely associated with Rimbunan Hijau, the largest of the Sino-
Malaysian logging companies operating in PNG (see Filer, this volume). This 
sale was apparently accomplished before the expiry of the original TRP 
agreement in November 1993. However, the dissidents claim that this transfer 
of ownership and control took place without their knowledge and consent, and 
6 Local informants claim that no compensation has ever been paid to the relatives of the 
landowners who were killed in the crash. 
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have subsequently been engaged in a series of frustrating battles to remove the 
'invisible developer' from their land. 
The First Appearance 
On 1 October 1993, the Post-Courier newspaper carried a story by one of its 
staff reporters, Wesley Bunpalau, under the title: 'Province uncovers secret 
logging plot: Moro be authorities impound shipload of logging equipment'. This 
story was apparently based on an interview with the Forest Authority's Acting 
Provincial Manager, Mrs Agatha Pokatou. According to Mrs Pokatou, Low 
Impact Logging had been officially asked on 24 July to show cause, within a 
period of fourteen days, why its timber permit should not be cancelled, and since 
the company had failed to respond within the stated period, her office was 
operating on the assumption that no new permit would be granted until the 
Buhem-Mongi area had been placed under a Forest Management Agreement in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Forestry Act. However, on Monday 
27 September: 
a Malaysian believed to be an agent of the logging company and sent 
by a Mr Hii An based in Port Moresby, called at the provincial forestry 
headquarters to meet with Mrs Pokatou and one of her officers. By a 
slip of the tongue, the expatriate mentioned that a vessel loaded with 
logging equipment destined for Oligudu [sic] was due to arrive in Lae 
on Tuesday. But as they were meeting, the vessel was being cleared by 
Muruks Customs Agency to sail to Oligudu the same afternoon. 
When Mrs Pokatou sought to delay the process of clearance, she was told that it 
had already been granted, and the ship had set sail for Ulugidu. She therefore 
went out in person, with two other forestry officials, two policemen, and a 
customs officer, and ordered the vessel to take its cargo back to Lae while she 
sought to clarify the status of the timber permit with Forest Authority 
headquarters in Port Moresby. 
She was also upset that the landowner company of the Buhem/Mongi, 
Deinzahill [sic] Investment Pty Ltd had not informed her office of any 
dealings it had or had engaged in, let alone complaints of 
environmental damages and benefits that were later channelled to her 
office. 
Four days later, on 5 October, the Post-Courier carried another story by the 
same journalist, which reported that 
while she and her officers were carrying out their duty to safeguard the 
people's resources and environment, an instruction was faxed to a Mr 
Hii Eean [sic] of Magnum Resources Pty Ltd based in Port Moresby, to 
inform his agent in Lae to land the logging equipment outside the TRP 
area. 
The instructions were from Mr Kanawi Poru [sic], who is the divisional 
manager of operations with the Forest Authority. 
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Mrs Pokatou maintained yesterday that there was no approval granted 
to any new company to move into the TRP, although she said it seemed 
a company had been given approval by 'someone in authority'. 
She said she would battle on to establish who gave approval and to 
which company. The equipment had been landed at Oligudu. But she 
would not allow the company to begin logging operations until the 
uncertainties had been removed, adding that she wanted the equipment 
removed. 
On the same day, the Post-Courier published a full-page advertisement, 
authorised by the chairman of Deinzehil Investments, which refuted some of the 
points made in the earlier article by making the following claims: 
• that Low Impact Logging had received its show cause notice on 14 July and 
had given a written response to the Forest Authority on 22 July, so the timber 
permit was still valid; 
• that Mrs Pokatou had herself been a witness to an agreement between Low 
Impact Logging and Deinzehil Investments, executed on 30 July 1991, which 
had facilitated the subsequent issue of the timber permit; 
• that representatives of the logging company, the landowner company, and the 
Department of Forests had met again in August 1991, and agreed that the 
period of the TRP agreement should be extended to 1996, so that a five-year 
timber permit could be issued; 
• that the logging company had submitted a revised Forest Working Plan to the 
Forest Authority in June 1993, though it had not received any response; 
• that a meeting of landowners and landowner company directors, in July 1993, 
had agreed that the logging company should now use conventional logging 
methods, and that the Minister for Environment and Conservation had also 
approved the use of such methods on condition that the logging company 
prepare a new submission on its environmental plan by February 1994; and 
• that the landowner company was 'totally satisfied with the way and manner 
in which Low Impact Logging is carrying out its functions and duties and 
obligations in accordance with the Agreement reached with it and in 
accordance with the guidelines and requirements of the Forestry 
Department'. 
Three days later, on 8 October, Wesley Bunpalau produced another story in 
which it was claimed that landowners in the Buhem area, especially members of 
the Musam Buatu clan under the leadership of one Dobin Dally, had 'dissociated 
themselves from any dealings by the landowner company' and 'reaffirmed their 
decision not to allow logging operations to restart until outstanding payments are 
made for logs now rotting away and compensation to relatives killed in accidents 
during the heli-logging operation'. This decision had apparently been 
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communicated in writing to Nawae MP Amos Yamandi in July 1993, and to 
Deinzehil's chairman the following month. 
The Second Appearance 
The press did not carry any further stories about the Buhem-Mongi TRP until 23 
June 1995, when the Post-Courier reported that local landowners were once 
again complaining about the importation of logging equipment, this time bearing 
the name of Low Impact Logging, but still under the control of Mr Hii and his 
employees. It appears that local forestry officials were still in the dark, since a 
'forestry registration officer', Maria Kelva, reportedly denied that Mr Hii or his 
company had been authorised to harvest logs in the area. 
Spokesman for the people of Bukawa area Paul ltana [sic] explained 
that the expiry date of the old Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) had 
lapsed, and the landowners wanted a new investor to be brought in 
under the new forestry guidelines as legislated for in 1991 under 
former Forest Minister Tim Neville. 
Mr Itana said the villagers of Bukawa, Buingim, Yambo, Widiry, Eec, 
Bugahang, Boac, Tamigudu and Uligudu will only allow logging in 
their are[ a] if the concession comes under the new Forestry Act.. ... 
He added: 'We will burn Mr Hii's equipment if he intends to use the 
divide-and-rule tactic on our people.' 
Despite these reported threats, the Malaysians had begun to construct new 
buildings at the Dumadum campsite, near Oligudu village, by the end of 
September 1995, and had already moved various pieces of equipment onto the 
site in preparation for a further round of logging operations. 
By this time, the dissident landowners had been able to establish that Mr 
Hii had previously been responsible for the operations of Putput Logging, a 
company contracted to exploit the timber resources of Umboi Island, off the 
north coast of Morobe Province, that the Umboi timber permit had been 
cancelled because of the contractor's failure to comply with certain conditions 
set by the government, and Putput Logging had been sold to Rimbunan Hijau 
shortly after the permit had been re-negotiated and reissued. From this 
knowledge they inferred that a similar sequence of dealings must have taken 
place over the Buhem-Mongi timber permit. 
Extension of the TRP Agreement 
During the course of 1994, leaders of the dissident landowner group began to 
suspect that the new Malaysian owners of Low Impact Logging were attempting 
to negotiate a new agreement with representatives of the 'landowner company', 
Deinzehil Investments, but they were unable to obtain access to the latter's 
records of income and expenditure, or the current distribution of its 
shareholdings. These concerns were raised in a number of letters sent to senior 
officers of the Forest Authority in Port Moresby, in which the dissidents sought 
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some assurance that .such negotiations would not proceed without their 
participation. As a result, they claim to have received an assurance from the 
Managing Director, Jean Kekedo, that their own desire to negotiate a new 
agreement with a new developer was perfectly consistent with national 
government policy. · 
A landowner liaison officer from the National Forest Service, Muyang 
Basenke, was assigned to consult with local landowners over the question of 
extending the duration of the TRP agreement. He reported that the landowners 
were divided on the issue, and recommended against any continuation of logging 
activities until these divisions had been overcome, at which time any new timber 
permit would need to be put out to tender under the terms of the 1991 Forestry 
Act. 
At some point in 1994, however, the State Solicitor drafted a form of 
agreement for extension of the Buhem-Mongi TRP for a period of five years 
from November 1993 to November 1998. The schedule attached to this form of 
agreement listed the names of twelve clan agents from six villages in the TRP 
area- E'e, Buengim, Bugang, Bua, Tamigidu, and Ulugidu. It appears that this 
agreement was signed, on behalf of the state, by the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister for Finance and Planning, Chris Haiveta, on 29 July 1995. 
The dissident landowners say that the majority of local people had not been 
consulted over the terms of the agreement, and did not become aware of its 
existence until some time after it had been signed. Nor can they understand how 
the agreement came to be drawn up by the Department of the Attorney-General, 
and signed by the Minister for Finance and Planning, without the involvement of 
the Forest Authority.? 
On 23 September 1995, the dissident leaders convened a general meeting of 
landowners at Busong (E'e) village to discuss the extension of the TRP 
agreement and the timber permit previously issued to Low Impact Logging. 
This meeting unanimously resolved: 
• to seek the deregistration of the landowner company, Deinzehil Investments 
Pty Ltd, on the grounds that it had been used by a minority of landowners for 
making agreements with the state after unwarranted changes to the 
membership of its board of directors; 
• to support the formation of an interim committee to represent the landowner 
interest in preventing any company from conducting logging operations in 
the TRP area, unless it was under the ownership or control of a representative 
landowner body; 
7 According to a former member of the National Forest Board, the matter did come before the 
Board, and the Board accepted the validity of the extension on the grounds that the state had 
acquired the right to extract a certain volume of timber under the terms of the original TRP 
agreement, and this volume would not have been extracted by the end of 1993 (personal 
communication, Jim Belford, 1996). 
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• to ask the courts to declare the purported extension of the TRP agreement 
null and void; and 
• to negotiate an entirely new agreement with the Forest Authority, whereby 
landowners would themselves become the permit holders and seek to 
establish a sustainable forestry project with a downstream processing 
component, rather than simply harvesting logs for export. 
The interim chairman of the dissident landowner committee, Paul Itama, 
consequently wrote to the managing director of the Forest Authority, arguing 
that the extension of the TRP and the continuation of logging activities under 
Timber Permit 13-31 were both illegal, and pointing out that four of the nine 
landowning villages in the TRP area had flatly refused to give their consent to 
any extension of the TRP agreement. In his view, this meant that there had been 
no process of consultation of the kind required under Sections 115 and 116 of 
the newly-gazetted Organic Law on Provincial Government and Local-Level 
Governments. 8 He also argued that conventional logging practices violated the 
conditions of the original permit, because the original Forest Working Plan and 
Environmental Plan had both been based on the assumption that helicopters 
would be used to extract the logs. He therefore appealed to the managing 
director and the Minister for Forests to revoke the extension of the TRP 
agreement and proceed instead with arrangements for a new Forest Management 
Agreement. 
The landowners were informed by Forest Authority officers based in Lae 
and Port Moresby that no new permit had been issued. This meant that the only 
permit which currently existed, despite the expiry of the TRP agreement, was the 
one which had been granted to Low Impact Logging in 1991, and which was due 
to expire in October 1996. On the other hand, it was conceded that the 
developers had now voluntarily submitted a new Environmental Plan for 
consideration by the Minister for Environment and Conservation, which implied 
some recognition on the part of the developers and the government that the TRP 
was no longer being 'developed' in the way that had been foreseen in 1991.9 
8 Section 115 requires all three levels of government to 'liaise fully with the landowners in 
relation to the development of [their] natural resources', while Section 116 requires the national 
government to make provision for the establishment of 'natural resource development forums' or 
other institutions through which this consultation can take place. 
9 According to the new Environmental Plan (Low Impact Logging 1995), the development of the 
Buhem-Mongi TRP was to be managed on a sustained yield basis through a combination of 
selective logging and plantation forestry. An official of the Department of Environment and 
Conservation advised the author that his department had not responded to the submission of this 
document because of the conflict that was known to exist between the Forest Authority, the 
developer and the landowners (personal communication, James Sabi, 1996). 
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Going to Court 
Since the relevant government authorities were apparently unwilling or unable to 
assist the dissidents in their efforts to renegotiate the conditions of resource 
development, advice was sought from a national law firm. The lawyers noted 
that Section 137 of the new Forestry Act had allowed for the continued validity 
of all TRP agreements signed, and timber permits issued, before the passage of 
the Act, but while the Act had made some allowance for the subsequent 
extension of timber permits, no such allowance had been made for the extension 
of TRP agreements. The lawyers therefore took the view that the state had no 
right to grant a timber permit for a period which outlasted the expiry of the 
original TRP agreement, especially considering that the purported extension of 
that agreement had not been authorised until after the original expiry date, and 
well after the gazettal of the new legislation. The dissident landowners sought a 
local land court injunction in Lae to prevent Low Impact Logging from 
conducting any further logging operations in the TRP area until the validity of 
the extension made to the TRP agreement could be determined. 
In their originating summons (No. 561 of 1995), the dissidents asked the 
court to declare: 
• that the two TRP agreements between the landowners of the Buhem-Mongi 
area and the State were only valid for a period of twenty years, from 
November 1973 to November 1993; 
• that, as ofNovember 1993, these agreements between the landowners and the 
State had ended; 
• that the award of a timber permit by the State (the second respondent) to Low 
Impact Logging Pty Ltd (the first respondent) in 1991, for a period of five 
years, was illegal; 
• that the purported extension of the TRP Agreement between the landowners 
and the State in July 1995 was illegal; 
• that the activities of Low Impact Logging Pty Ltd in recommencing logging 
operations were illegal; and 
• that Low Impact Logging Pty Ltd and any associates should be restrained 
from pursuing any further logging operations within the TRP area in 
question. 
On 11 January 1996, the court duly ordered that Low Impact Logging should 
cease all logging operations within the concession area, that any merchantable 
timber which had already been logged was to be seized and sold by the Forest 
Authority, and that monies received from the sale were to be held in a trust 
account pending completion of the proceedings. 
However, lawyers representing the logging company proceeded to 
challenge these restraining orders in the National Court, and on 8 February 1996, 
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the landowners' case was dismissed, apparently on the technicality that it had 
been based on an 'originating summons' rather than a 'writ of summons'. The 
dissident landowners then engaged the services of another law firm - the third 
from which they have so far sought assistance in their costly legal battle with the 
logging company- in order to pursue their case. 10 
Whilst the whole matter is still before the court, the company continues its 
logging operations in the area. As a result, the level of tension and frustration is 
constantly mounting amongst the dissident landowners, especially the younger 
men who are now threatening to take the law into their own hands. Dissident 
leaders like Paul ltama believe that the court system still provides an avenue 
through which the company's activities can be stopped in a peaceful manner, but 
the failure of previous attempts to achieve this goal, for 'technical' reasons 
beyond the understanding of local people, is making it harder for them to keep 
their followers under control. 
Conclusion: Whose Sustainability? 
On 2 October 1996, the Minister for Forests granted a further extension of 
Timber Permit 13-31 to Low Impact Logging for another period of three years, 
so that it would now expire on 2 October 1999 - almost one year after the expiry 
of the extended TRP agreement. This extension of the timber permit was 
apparently warranted by the Minister's powers under Section 78 of the Forestry 
Act. But, if this is the case, his action would seem to imply that old TRP 
agreements and the timber permits issued over TRP areas can both be extended 
indefinitely, at ministerial discretion, without being overtaken by the new 
resource allocation procedures specified in the 1991 Forestry Act. 11 
The recent history of the Buhem-Mongi TRP presents a clear example of 
some of the problems which the Barnett Inquiry identified in the mutual 
relationships of landowners, developers, and government in the forestry sector. 
Despite the recent reforms in policy and legislation, these problems continue to 
exist. The internal divisions and outward hostility of landowning communities 
both stem from an ongoing failure of communication, which leaves the majority 
of rural villagers in the role of passive bystanders who can exercise no control 
over the exploitation of their resources. 
Current development policies in the PNG forestry sector still fall well short 
of achieving the full participation of resource owners in the process of resource 
development (see Holzknecht, this volume). The result is an escalation of social 
unrest which exacerbates the 'law and order' issue, and which may create more 
l 0 Legal action had already cost the dissident landowners almost K20,000 before the end of 1996. 
11 Jim Belford (personal communication, 1996) maintains that the National Forest Board advised 
the Minister that this further extension would not be consistent with the provisions of the Forestry 
Act, and the Minister accepted this advice. However, at the time of writing, the dissident 
landowners had not yet heard anything about the Minister's change of heart. 
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employment for lawyers, but also requires the government to spend more of its 
own funds on the business of dispute settlement (Nadarajah 1993a). 
In this particular case, it is reasonable to ask whose interests are actually 
being represented by the national government. This is certainly the question 
which the dissident landowners of the Buhem-Mongi TRP have been asking 
since 1993. Since that year, the members of several landowning villages have 
been trying in vain to persuade the authorities to prevent any conventional 
logging operations from taking place on their land - not because they are 
opposed to logging as such, but because they agree with the government's own 
stated policies in favour of sustainable development and sound environmental 
management. Having been persuaded to accept a developer who also seemed to 
espouse these policies, they now find themselves being forced to accept another 
developer whose understanding of 'sustainable development' does not accord 
with their own. 
CHAPTERS 
THE MAKAP A TIMBER RIGHTS PURCHASE: 
A STUDY IN PROJECT FAILURE IN THE POST-BARNETT ERA 
MICHAEL WOOD 
Introduction 
The Makapa Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) area, located in the Western 
province of Papua New Guinea (PNG), has been the subject of a lengthy process 
of negotiation in which no party or interest group has been able to exercise 
sufficient power over the other players to successfully impose their own 
definition of the TRP on those other actors. This is a case in which the various 
stakeholders have failed to achieve a level of cooperation which would impose a 
workable order on their divergent understandings of the Makapa TRP itself. 
What has happened instead is that conflicts over the definition of the Makapa 
TRP have so transformed and diluted this 'project' that it has yet to be scaled up 
from the micro-world of proposals, maps, ideas, letters of intent and project 
agreements to the macro-world of actual project development. 
This paper outlines some of these transformations in the definition of the 
Makapa TRP, and also analyses the reasons for this failure to quickly implement 
a logging project. A crucial factor was the questionable validity of the project's 
'pre-reform' legal basis, which meant that the project's definition was open to 
challenge by rival logging companies and by what I will call 'pro-reformist' 
sections of the state forestry bureaucracy. 1 On the other hand, the PNG Forest 
Authority itself has been unable to control the definition of the project -
alternative proposals with different boundaries have proliferated, and they have 
sometimes been linked to quite different procedures for project evaluation (for 
example,. whether a project should be processed by the Forest Authority or by 
Cabinet). These disputes are crucially about policy making, in the sense that 
they are about the legitimate (and illegitimate) powers and capacities of the 
I The 'reformers' are those people who broadly shared the goal of bringing the PNG logging 
sector under new forms of state regulation which aimed to ensure that PNG 's exploitation of its 
forest was placed on a sustainable basis. The reforms were a direct response to the revelations of 
the Barnett Inquiry and a follow-up report by the World Bank (1989), and are detailed in 
Holzknecht (1994a), Nadarajah (1993b, 1994), Power (1994), and Holzknecht (ed. 1995). The 
reforms have been subject to continual attack, as exemplified in 1993 by the introduction into 
Parliament of the Forestry Act Amendment Bill that sought to weaken the new Forest Authority 
and transfer control of resource decisions to the Minister and the forest industry (Holzknecht 
1994:28). This bill lapsed in 1994, but in early 1996 attempts were again being made to amend 
the Forestry Act to grant the Minister much greater power to make resource allocation decisions. 
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agents involved to define events - to issue a 'permit', for example, or sign a 
letter of 'intent' to allow logging- in such a way that other actors are obliged to 
accept those definitions.2 In the case of Makapa, the Forest Authority's 
capacities to impose reformist policies were weakened by the national political 
elite's general concern to limit the reform process so that it did not radically 
alter their own capacity to enter into relationships with loggers. Moreover, the 
Authority, 'fragmented' (see Jones 1994)3 and overloaded by its difficulties 
with the national political elite, failed to significantly transform the nature of 
landowner dependence on the competing logging companies involved in 
Makapa. Under pressure from the political elite, from various logging 
companies, and from landowners - all with their own views on the project's 
definition - the Authority was unable to quickly formulate a single robust 
definition of the project. Consequently, the Authority was unable to effectively 
link its own vision of project development to those entertained by the 
landowners. The result was that sections of the political elite, competing 
logging companies, and the Forest Authority negotiated various definitions of 
the Makapa TRP with virtually no input from landowners. 
This is not to say that landowners lacked effective influence on the overall 
process. I shall show that landowners have competed quite intensively to 
support specific logging companies which they favoured. This competition, 
largely induced by the logging companies themselves, played a role in 
destabilising the Forest Authority's ability to effectively implement the project, 
since it was no longer sure whether the various competing landowners could be 
thought of as 'representative' of the wider community. From the perspective of 
those landowners able to access the resources of the competing logging 
companies, the result was commonly one of temporary empowerment. But from 
the perspective of most landowners, the Makapa TRP represents the failure of 
the post-Barnett reform process to deliver equitable and prompt access to the 
benefits of 'developing' their forest resources. 
Innovision and the State: Trying to Fix a Definition of the Makapa 
TRP 
In 1987, the Department of Forests surveyed the forest resources in the Makapa 
timber area, and found that its 301,949 hectares contained 7.9 million cubic 
metres gross volume of timber. The TRP area contains no permanent villages. 
The 1990 National Census showed that the non-Gogodala population with an 
interest in this area numbered only around 2,500, but there were roughly 17,000 
Gogodala living along the Aramia River system, a large number of whom would 
be profoundly affected by any large-scale logging in the TRP area. The 
Gogodala are heavily reliant on the Aramia for drinking water, fishing, and 
2 This formulation, and my general sense of the Makapa TRP as a site of conflicting 
understandings, owes quite a lot to Fujimura (1992), Law (1992, 1994), and Star and Griesemer 
( 1989). 
3 I am indebted to Chris Ballard for providing a copy of this excellent thesis. 
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processing sago, and development of the TRP would involve logging much of 
the land around its tributaries and headwaters. A number of Gogodala clans also 
have interests in land in the TRP area.4 Map 5.1 provides a simplified summary 
of the location of the major language groups in and around the TRP area. 
Around the time of the survey, the state purchased the rights to the timber 
in the Makapa TRP area. Landowners signed or marked a document that was 
equivalent to a contract to sell their timber to the state. On signing, landowners 
were paid two kina each. A very large number of Gogodala signed the 
document, and it is not clear whether all the signatories had legitimate rights to 
the land at issue. Equally, there have been allegations of incomplete coverage of 
all right holders, and of highly literate people apparently signing the document 
by making a mark.5 In 1994, Forest Authority staff attempted to bring this 
process under the ambit of the 1991 Forestry Act by incorporating land groups 
who would then have the power to sign a Forest Management Agreement with 
the state. I have not yet seen the results of this more recent process. 
In 1989, Wawoi-Guavi Timber Company, developers of the adjacent 
473,000 hectare Wawoi-Guavi timber area, registered an interest in the Makapa 
forest resource. In mid-1989, Rimbunan Hijau, through its subsidiary Niugini 
Lumber, bought the Wawoi-Guavi Timber Company. Niugini Lumber staff then 
set about very actively seeking control of the Makapa TRP. 
In the early 1990s, they came to face serious competition from Innoprise 
Corporation Sedirian Berhad (ICSB) of Sabah, Malaysia. On 10 April 1991, 
ICSB incorporated a wholly owned subsidiary company, Innovision (PNG), 
through which they pursued their interest in acquiring the Makapa timber area. 
In early 1991, Innovision submitted Forest Development Proposals for Makapa 
to both the Fly River Provincial Government and to the national Department of 
Forests. This was despite the fact that the Department's own negotiations with 
landowners were not formally concluded until December 1991, when the TRP 
Agreement was signed between the landowners and the state. Innovision also 
secured endorsement from the provincial government that it be given first right 
of refusal for the Makapa TRP. 
4 A group known as Wawoi-Ridge has tried to represent Gogodala interests in the Makapa TRP. 
It was strongly supported by some educated Gogodala people based in Port Moresby, and 
represented as a potential umbrella organisation for all development in the Gogodala region. It 
was also supported by some important figures in the vicinity of Balimo. Since my own research 
has focussed on non-Gogodala groups, my understanding of Wawoi-Ridge is rather limited and I 
shall not discuss it any further in this chapter. 
5 My own perusal of the document revealed a certain homogeneity in the marks made by many 
landowners. It is also clear that some people were multiple signatories due to misunderstanding, 
so the clan called Kuyala, for example, gets represented in a number of ways, and therefore tends 
to proliferate throughout the document. 
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Map 5.1: The Makapa Timber Rights Purchase and related concession areas. 
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A significant barrier to gaining control of the Makapa resource was the fact 
that the Makapa timber area was subject to a moratorium on the allocation of 
new timber areas imposed by the government in July 1990. So both would-be 
developers had to ensure that government policy was transformed with reference 
to Makapa. This change in policy was seemingly relatively easily achieved 
since, once the TRP agreement was signed by the landowners in December 
1991, the government exempted the Makapa timber area (together with five 
other areas) from the moratorium. At the same time, the government initiated a 
tender process for the Makapa TRP which culminated in May 1992, when three 
companies - Innovision, Niugini Lumber, and a Korean company called Kuk 
Dong Construction- submitted Forest Development Proposals. On 3 June 1992, 
the National Executive Committee (NEC) selected Innovision. 
On 15 June, Innovision pointed out to the government that the new forest 
legislation was coming into force on 25 June 1992. In their view, it would take 
some time to negotiate a project agreement. In a brilliant move, they proposed 
'that a Timber Permit be first issued with negotiation and execution of a project 
agreement as a condition precedent'. They sent a draft permit, containing this 
condition, to the Department of Forests. 
On 22 June, the State Solicitor's office commented that 'the draft permit is 
legally in order', and on 24 June, Timber Permit 1-9 was issued over the 
Makapa timber area. On the same day that the Makapa permit was issued, the 
then Minister for Forests, Jack Genia, issued sixteen other timber permits. The 
mass issue of permits took place one day before the new Forestry Act was due to 
come into effect and supposedly prevent such ministerial abuses (Henderson 
1996a). This perhaps represented one of the high points of Innovision's 
influence, in that it was able to get the project defined in the way it wanted, even 
where that definition was in direct conflict with the overt policy intentions of the 
government. But the questionable manner by which the permit was issued, and 
the specific terms of the permit, meant that the project was vulnerable to 
disabling challenges from its very inception. 
The issue of the permit immediately triggered a violent response from 
landowners who supported Niugini Lumber. On the day when they learnt that 
the agreement was being formalised, some men went to the Department of 
Forests headquarters and, according to the victims, assaulted some landowners 
who were supporters of Innovision. In the process, they also attacked the 
Provincial Minister for Forests, Mr Biaguna, who from that day on was widely 
understood to be highly opposed to any bid by Niugini Lumber to gain control 
of the Makapa TRP or any other concessions in the Western Province. 
This attack also had important implications for project implementation, in 
that it led the State Solicitor's office to qualify its support for the issue of the 
permit to Innovision. Officials from this office argued that, even though the 
permit was legal, it should not be granted to Innovision until the dispute among 
the landowners was resolved. In this sense, the use of violence to influence 
policy does seem to have been successful. 
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On 7 July 1992, in a further move aimed at destabilising Innovision's 
access to the resource, Niugini Lumber took out an injunction restraining the 
state from issuing the permit, preventing any logging or marketing agreement 
from being approved, and preventing any actual logging. The injunction was 
gr(!nted, but lapsed in late August, and Niugini Lumber's case was dismissed. 
Nonetheless, it had the effect of creating the impression that something was 
'wrong' with the project generally, and with the way the permit had been issued. 
A related problem for Innovision was that the permit required that 
negotiation of a project agreement be concluded within six months of the permit 
being issued. This was a condition 'precedent' to the operation of the permit. 
But, on 3 July 1992, the then Secretary of the Department of Forests advised 
Innovision that 50 percent local processing would be required. This was quite 
different to Innovision' s initial proposal to only process about 15 percent of 
annual log production into sawn timber - that is, 50,000 cubic metres out of a 
total cut of 320,000 cubic metres (see Innovision 1992:5). Given these 
divergent positions, the government and Innovision had to engage in quite 
complex negotiations before a project agreement could be signed. 
The injunction, and the obvious disagreement with the Department of 
Forests, gave Innovision grounds to seek an extension of six months for 
negotiations. In late August 1992, it sought an extension under clauses which 
allowed the permit holder an extension of time to perform obligations for reason 
of force majeure (delays by the state). Simultaneously, Innovision mobilised 
political support for the project. This was exemplified by the then Premier of 
the Fly River Provincial Government, Isidore Kaseng, who wrote on 11 August 
to Tim Neville, the recently appointed national Minister for Forests, strongly 
backing Innovision. 
Despite such expressions of local support, the negotiations took time. On 
17 December 1992, the government extended the time available for negotiation 
to 24 June 1993. But as this date approached, Innovision noted that negotiations 
still had not taken place, because of the preparations being made for the 
Department of Forests to become the PNG Forest Authority with the gazettal of 
the new Forestry Act. In June 1993, Innovision 's lawyers asked for an urgent 
extension and threatened a writ of mandamus against the state. An extension 
was granted on 30 June 1993, and Innovision then refrained from taking the 
state to court. Innovision submitted a revised proposal, but, in late November, it 
asked for yet another extension until 24 June 1994. It appears that the 
government did not respond to this request, and Innovision then took the state to 
court for breach of contract. 
What this sequence of events reveals is that Innovision could not force the 
state to negotiate with it in a way that it saw as appropriate. Indeed, from 
Innovision's point of view, the Department seemed at best indifferent, and at 
times actively hostile. Part of the conflict between the Department and 
Innovision derived from the ideas about 'sustainable development' that were 
beginning to circulate within the restructured forestry bureaucracy. By August 
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1993, reforms were beginning to focus on the issue of sustainability, and the 
new Forest Auhority began to redefine the Makapa TRP as a 'sustainable 
project'. The most crucial part of this redefinition involved reducing 
Innovision's preferred annual rate of cut of 320,000 cubic metres down to 
150,000 cubic metres (with eventual agreement on 170,000 cubic metres). This 
was thought to ensure 'sustainability' if a forty-year cutting cycle was assumed. 
However, the Makapa permit was to operate only for twenty years. Hence, 
some Authority staff thought Innovision should be offered long-term access to 
the resource. At that time, it was thought that domestic processing should 
involve 85 percent of the allowable cut, and that approval to export logs should 
be based on the company's processing performance. Staff also argued that new 
conditions had to be imposed on Innovision. They argued that treating the 
Makapa TRP as legitimately based on commitments made prior to the new 
Forestry Act would send the wrong signal to other loggers who were opposed to 
any review or renegotiation of project agreements made under the old 
legislation. 
Responding to these pressures, Innovision submitted revised conceptual 
proposals in October 1993, and again in November 1994. It is clear that, during 
1994, the negotiations between the Forest Authority and Innovision were 
difficult. Indeed, there are indications that some staff in the Authority started to 
represent Innovision's permit as already being terminated. In records of the 
Batanapi Landowner Company - which at that time was representing many 
landowners associated with the Makapa TRP - there is an account of a meeting 
in Port Moresby (on 5 May 1994), where forestry officers informed members of 
Batanapi that the permit given to Innovision PNG had been cancelled. Late in 
the next month, Batanapi was told that, due to a fire which burnt down a key 
building at the Forest Authority's headquarters, copies of the letter cancelling 
the permit were not available. Whatever the status of this apparent, potentially 
quite destabilising, 'cancellation' of the permit, it is clear that, during 1994, staff 
of the Authority were thinking that they would be able re-tender the Makapa 
concession. 
Aware of these possibilities in its November 1994 revisions, Innovision 
agreed to several new conditions: 
• to reduce the annual cut to only 200,000 cubic metres, if the project's 'life' 
was extended to thirty-two years; 
• to engage in domestic processing, over the total life of the project, of nearly 
56 percent of total log production volume; 
• to offer the landowners shares in the project, up to a maximum of 20 percent 
(where no such equity had been mentioned in the initial proposal); and 
• to use 'reduced impact logging' techniques that had been pioneered by its 
parent company in Sabah. 
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However, even this movement towards the Forest Authority's position did 
not meet with automatic approval. By this time, Andrew Posai had replaced 
Tim Neville as national Forests Minister, and Posai was widely understood to be 
a strong supporter of Niugini Lumber. The following letter, written in early 
1995, indicates that he was strongly opposed to Innovision: 
Having had Forestry Authority staff evaluate the revised proposal, I 
consider that the proposal is still unsatisfactory for the needs of the 
Papua New Guinea forestry industry ..... I consider it an insult to Papua 
New Guinea, that the proposal states that your company is committed 
to the objective of sustained yield forest management and that it 
operates on a 60 year rotation in Malaysia, yet the company first 
proposed logging in PNG on a 15 year rotation and later, when pushed, 
revised this to a thirty year rotation. Consequently, I intend to re-
advertise the Makapa TRP area for the submission of development 
proposals. 
In addition to these political attempts to radically redefine the Makapa TRP 
as belonging to no-one, by 1994 there were legal opinions circulating in the 
Authority which argued that the Makapa permit had lapsed, and that the permit 
was, in any case, never a binding or effective contract. These legal opinions 
threatened Innovision's access to the entire resource, and, if accepted, would 
have led to the Makapa TRP being re-tendered under the reformist Forestry Act 
of 1991. It would have converted the Makapa TRP to a Forest Management 
Agreement which would have been authorised by the National Forest Board. 
Re-tendering would have led to a Forest Development Options Study, more 
stringent environmental and social impact analysis, and detailed evaluation of 
the tendered proposals. Not only would this have delayed the project, but there 
was no guarantee that Innovision would be successful if it were to re-tender. 
In August 1994, staff members of the Authority argued, with forceful 
clarity, that there was actually no power to extend the time limit for 
negotiations, because the clauses that addressed such an issue were only relevant 
after the 'condition precedent' (namely that negotiations were completed within 
six months) had been satisfied. An extension could be granted only if there was 
an agreement actually made between the parties. The permit could not come 
into operation until that condition was satisfied, and, until that happened, it was 
not a valid contract. 
This kind of argument acknowledged that the old Forestry Act did give the 
Minister discretionary power to issue permits subject to terms and conditions 
agreed by the Minister. But it was pointed out that the initial Makapa permit did 
not specify details of things essential to the definition of a 'permit', such as 
details concerning processing and export volumes. Moreover, it was a matter of 
fact that Innovision and the Forest Authority had failed to make any agreement 
on major issues, such as the annual cut and the amount of local processing. 
Since more than six months had passed without these matters being settled, it 
was argued that the permit itself had lapsed. If accepted, this advice would have 
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radically transformed the Makapa TRP, and Innovision would have lost control 
of assets worth around K850 million.6 
The advice was endorsed by some senior officials of the Forest Authority. 
In September 1994, the Managing Director, Jean Kekedo, wrote to the Batanapi 
Corporation and confirmed that 'as a result of their failure to satisfy the 
condition precedent to the permit namely, finalise a project agreement, the 
Innovision permit has lapsed'. A letter written to Batanapi on 10 April 1995 
shows that she was then still of the view that the Makapa TRP would be re-
tendered. 
Innovision responded by repeating and pursuing its earlier threat to sue the 
state for breach of contract, and apparently sought damages of K250 million- at 
a time when the state was suffering an acute fiscal crisis. The State Solicitor, 
while aware of the argument about the potential invalidity of the Makapa permit, 
advised, in April 1995, that the matter should be settled out of court, without any 
admission of liability, and that no costs be awarded against the state. At the 
same time, it was argued that any project agreement with Innovision should be 
undertaken in terms ofthe new Forestry Guidelines (see PNGMOF 1993b). 
During this period, a further problem for Innovision emerged when Mrs 
Suliyato Henderson took out an injunction against the project proceeding on the 
grounds that the permit was invalid. Mrs Henderson had close ties with a 
landowner company, the Makapa Timber Development Company, which was 
supportive of Sir Danny Leahy's increasing interest in the Makapa area (to 
which I shall return). However, Mrs Henderson lost the initial round, in that she 
failed to gain any order from the court restraining the state from executing an 
agreement with Innovision.7 
Despite this action by some landowners, finalisation of the project was 
under way by mid-1995, even though Innovision had not formally withdrawn its 
own action against the state for breach of contract. On 27 July, presumably 
under some pressure from this threat, the National Forest Board gave its 
approval to the project going ahead, pending approval by Cabinet. It took the 
step of seeking the additional endorsement of Cabinet because the permit 
required that any agreement made was to be executed by the Head of State, 
rather than the Board, since the latter had not been in existence at the time when 
the permit was issued. By this rather complex route, ultimate control of the 
project was returned to the political elite. However, the decision to involve 
Cabinet resulted in a very considerable delay to the project, since it did not 
receive NEC approval for almost a year. 
On 11 May 1996, a project agreement between the state and the developers 
was signed. The main benefits to the landowners, under the terms of this 
6 This figure is derived from multiplying the net volume (5.95 million cubic metres) by the 
commonly cited current price of a cubic metre of logged timber (K 150). 
7 In November 1996, it was understood that this action was still proceeding. 
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agreement, would be a standard royalty of K1 0 per cubic metre, plus a 
'premium' (based on 7 percent of the f.o.b. price) which, at current export 
prices, might be worth an additional K 10. There would also be an annual 
payment of K420,000 to fund local development projects. Villages located 
along the Aramia might also receive a further K150,000 per year if they agreed 
for logs to be barged on the Aramia- a process which would pose some acute 
risks to the region's environment. There would be a small infrastructure 
programme involving the construction of one medical clinic worth KlOO,OOO 
and a number of school classrooms worth up to K 100,000. Innovision would 
also obliged to spend K20,000 a year on 'marketing studies'. Operations were 
expected to start in the first half of 1997. 
Sino-PNG: the Makapa TRP as the Western Province Agro-Forestry 
Project 
From 1993 to 1995, while Innovision was trying, seemingly unsuccessfully, to 
enforce its definition of the Makapa project as a valid contract binding the state, 
other companies started to see that there was still an opportunity for them to 
acquire rights to the Makapa TRP. In the expectation that the state would break 
off negotiations with Innovision and re-tender the Makapa concession, these 
companies tried to mobilise landowner and political support for their specific 
proposals. These new plans often involved redefining the Makapa TRP so that it 
became something quite different from what most people understood by the 
term. 
The most audacious attempt to transform the Makapa TRP involved a 
company called Sino-PNG Resources. Basically, what Sino-PNG tried to do 
was to convert the Makapa TRP into one among many other 'development' 
projects for the whole of the Western Province. In what seems to reflect an 
increasing trend in logging proposals in PNG, Sino-PNG claimed that the 
Makapa TRP was no longer to be construed as a logging project, but part of an 
'integrated development package'. 
Sino-PNG was a newcomer to the PNG forestry sector. It was incorporated 
in PNG on 21 May 1993, and comprised a consortium of two Singaporean 
companies, Sino-PNG Resources Pte Ltd and Lum Chang Holding Ltd, the Hei 
Long Jiang Provincial Government of the People's Republic of China, and 
Innoprise International Incorporated Ltd from Sabah. It appears that Innoprise 
had become less interested in Innovision. Certainly, it is clear that, in August 
1994, Innovision (PNG) sold its interest in the Makapa TRP to Construction and 
Supplies House (CASH), a company with considerable links to Sabah.8 In 
exchange for securing the approval of the PNG government for the Makapa TRP 
to go ahead, and giving CASH the exclusive right to the concession, Innovision 
was to receive 5 percent of the net sales of timber from the concession. 
8 See New Straits Times, 25 August 1994. 
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It is uncertain whether Innoprise had links with CASH, but it does appear 
that, for a time, Innoprise was trying to secure access to the Makapa TRP 
through the Sino-PNG consortium. Since Innoprise is a statutory body of the 
State of Sabah, some people have argued that Sabah did not want to be directly 
involved in taking the State of PNG to court to seek damages for breach of 
contract. Other people have told me that Innoprise's apparent involvement in 
Sino-PNG had not been authorised by Innoprise, and that it was either a 
'mistake' or part of a deliberate misinformation campaign by supporters of 
Sino-PNG who were seeking to undermine the credibility of Innovision. In 
early 1996, I was informed by staff from Innovision that Innoprise was still 
backing Innovision, and a search of documents at the Investment Promotion 
Authority revealed no change in the ownership of Innovision. This 'return' to 
Innovision may be related to the stronger expectation that the Makapa project 
would go ahead through the permit issued to Innovision. 
It may also be the case that Innoprise thought it should seek alternative 
political backing against Minister Posai, who was, as I have already indicated, a 
strong backer ofNiugini Lumber. Sino-PNG was strongly supported by the MP 
for Middle Fly, Bitan Kuok, who was also Deputy Minister for Forests. In May 
1995, Kuok was actively promoting the project by visiting landowners 
associated with the Makapa TRP. This meant that the government was now split 
over the question of which logging company would gain its support, and it now 
had to confront the difficult task of adjudicating between the competing claims 
ofNiugini Lumber, Sino-PNG, and Innovision. 
Sino-PNG staff argued that, because their plans constituted a total 
development package, their interest in Makapa did not amount to a logging 
project, and so the project could be dealt with directly by the NEC instead of the 
Forest Authority. What this represented was an attempt to bypass those 
decision-making structures of the reform process which threatened the 
developer's ability to deal only with the political elite. It was an attempt to 
create new procedures, whereby tight elite control of resource development 
could be maintained. It reproduced elements of the pre-reform forestry sector, 
where the Minister had wide discretionary powers over resource allocation. 
Other logging companies objected to this attempted short-circuiting of reform 
procedures, rather ironically arguing that such tactics would distort the 'level 
playing field' established by the new Forestry Act and associated administrative 
regulations (personal communication, Brian Brunton, 1996). 
Supporting the impression that it was not just a logging company, Sino-
PNG claimed it would invest US$1.2 billion in infrastructure and resource 
development in the Western Province. Table 5.1 provides a rough guide to the 
company's expenditure plans. 
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Table 5.1: The Sino-PNG Resources 'development budget' for Western 
Province, 1995. 
Item 
Roads and transport 
Power distribution 
Water supply, treatment, and distribution 
Drainage and prevention of soi I erosion 
Telecommunications 
Port and harbour development 
Agroforestry development 
Industry development 
Social development 
Land development 
TOTAL 
Source: Sino-PNG 1995:35 
US$m 
210 
100 
100 
50 
10 
150 
300 
180 
50 
50 
1,200 
These expenditures had a VISionary sweep to them - for example, the 
US$21 0 million investment on roads and transport would involve a highway 
linking Kiunga to Nomad, which would then extend south to Wawoi Falls and 
on to Emeti in the lower Bamu area (see Map 5.1 ). However, a close reading of 
the various proposals indicates that specific details of these investments would 
only be clarified after appropriate feasibility studies. 
In exchange for a potential - perhaps fanciful - investment of US$1.2 
billion, Sino-PNG focussed its attention directly on the Makapa TRP, arguing 
that it required: 
full approval for the development of the Makapa TRP including but 
not limited to the execution of all necessary agreements, including 
project agreement and Timber Permits, between the relevant 
authorities and Sino-PNG by the NEC. Full approval of the 
development of the Makapa TRP is required as the Makapa 
development is the initial step undertaken by Sino-PNG for the 
concerted development of the Western Province of PNG as outlined in 
this proposal. The revenue generated from the Makapa development 
will also go towards funding the part of the wider and macro-
development of the Western Province PNG (Sino-PNG 1995, not 
paginated). 
In this account, the Makapa TRP appears as the source of a surplus capable of 
financing the development of the entire Western Province - something even a 
real gold mine has been unable to do. Balancing this visionary rendering of 
what the Makapa TRP might contain, Sino-PNG, in a far more pragmatic mode, 
demanded that it be exempt from any restrictions on the export of logs (until 
2005), and from payment of all taxes, including income tax on expatriate 
salaries, for an equivalent period. It also sought: 
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• Alienation of land required by Sino-PNG Resources for 
development purposes in the Western Province to Sino-PNG 
including the grant of leases and the award of all mineral rights, for 
up to a period of 99 years. 
• All necessary legislative changes required for the implementation 
and completion of the Development (ibid.). 
Proposals like these show why the 'Makapa TRP' cannot necessarily be 
understood as a coherent object. Rather, at the time of the Sino-PNG proposal, 
it was a highly unstable ensemble of potential forms of resource exploitation. In 
the situation that obtained in the PNG forestry sector in 1995, the 'Makapa TRP' 
could be transformed into virtually any kind of poorly documented set of 
'developments' covering a rather ill-defined area of terrain. Moreover, the 
Sino-PNG proposal appeared to be unconstrained by any serious consideration 
of the policies of the PNG state. Sino-PNG's assumption appears to have been 
that the PNG state could easily accommodate Sino-PNG by amending its 
existing legislation and policies. 
This assumption received some support from the actions of the Acting 
Minister for Forests, Titus Philemon. In July 1995, he gave written approval, in 
principle, for Sino-PNG to develop forest resources in the Western Province in 
what he referred to as the 'Makapa extension area'. The letter also expressed his 
intent to enter into a project agreement with Sino-PNG. The Minister defined 
the project area in utterly vague terms- it stretched 'from Fly River, Strickland, 
Aramia, Tumu, Nomad and Wawoi Falls' (Minister's letter to Sino-PNG, 17 
July 1995). Moreover, 'upon establishment of a full inventory of timber supply, 
boundaries may then be altered to correspond to the appropriate supply of 
timber to your commercial industrial complex proposed' (ibid.). Given this 
highly ambiguous definition, the 'extension area' could actually have included 
all of the Makapa TRP, but presumably the 'extension' was understood to 
exclude the area of the Makapa concession held by Innovision. The allowable 
cut was 'to be specified after establishing the boundaries of the project area', 
but, at the same time, the Minister gave permission for Sino-PNG to enter 'the 
project areas to undertake and conduct forest surveys ... within the areas 
defined' (ibid.). A Sino-PNG staff member told me that the area of the project 
was likely to be about 1.2 million hectares. 
What this represented was an attempt by a politician to totally ignore the 
procedures of the Forestry Act and, at the margins of his legal power, lock the 
state into possibly binding obligations to give Sino-PNG access to unclearly 
specified forest resources. At the very least, his letter gave Sino-PNG a greater 
degree of control over forest resources than it would have had if it had merely 
submitted its proposal to the Forest Authority through the normal tender 
procedures His actions indicate that some aspects of decision making in PNG's 
forestry sector had either returned to the pre-Barnett era or had never left it. 
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Niugini Lumber's 600,000 Hectare Redefinition of the Makapa TRP 
As a further example of instability in the definition of the Makapa TRP, I now 
want to quickly consider various proposals submitted by Niugini Lumber 
Merchants. This company is the other main opponent of Innovision. Niugini 
Lumber, like its parent Rimbunan Hijau, has always been quite effective in 
pursuing its interests in PNG. During the moratorium on additional logging 
projects that was in place from July 1990 to July 1992, Niugini Lumber was able 
to gain an extension for its Wawoi-Guavi Timber Permit. In December 1990, 
Niugini Lumber submitted a proposal to the Department of Forests to 
consolidate the three separate TRP blocks of Wawoi-Guavi into one timber 
permit. On 10 April 1992, despite the 'moratorium' on the issue of new permits, 
and without imposing any new conditions on the developer, the Minister for 
Forests, Jack Genia, gave the company what it wanted by issuing the new 
Timber Permit 1-7 (Wawoi-Guavi Timber 1993:v). 
As indicated above, this company has competed very intensively with 
Innovision for access to the Makapa resource. A good example of its 
competitive approach is found in a decision of the Executive Council of the Fly 
River Provincial Government. On 18 October 1991, this body had rescinded its 
previous decision for Innovision to be given first right of refusal for the Makapa 
TRP, and agreed that priority be given to Niugini Lumber. It had also requested 
Minister Genia to exempt the Makapa project from the moratorium on forestry 
projects, and had made a further recommendation - without any additional 
conditions or qualifications - that an additional 602,000 hectares be given to 
Niugini Lumber to be added to the Makapa TRP. Had this resolution been 
implemented, the Makapa TRP would have grown to an area of around 904,000 
hectares, which, when added to the adjacent Wawoi-Guavi concession, would 
have given Niugini Lumber control of 1,376,000 hectares. This would have 
been one of the largest and most valuable unified sets of concessions anywhere 
inPNG. 
In 1993, Niugini Lumber had submitted a detailed conceptual proposal for 
Makapa. In this document, Niugini Lumber almost emotionally argued: 
With the vision of long term development and forever-lasting forest 
resource to be harvested and regenerated to benefit the landowners and 
the country as a whole, we propose a bigger area to be set aside for this 
Makapa TRP..... We propose that the area be divided into four (4) 
blocks with total of 904,130 hectares. (Niugini Lumber 1993:1) 
It also sought to make the twenty-five year project 'renewable for another 25 
years' (ibid:4), arguing that this would allow government and landowner 
revenue to double to an enticing total of K774 million. The company also gave 
considerable emphasis to a series of minimal village 'infrastructure' 
developments. Typical of what it proposed were its plans for Bamustu, a village 
where a number of its strongest supporters resided. Niugini Lumber promised, 
during the life of a fifty-year project, to do no more than 'upgrade or rebuild' the 
church, to build a water tank, to 'study the possibility' of building a community 
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school, and to provide a dinghy for transport (with no mention of providing an 
engine). 
Capturing and Fragmenting Landowners: Landowner Companies 
Along with these kinds of potential 'infrastructure developments', the Makapa 
TRP has opened up the exciting possibility that landowners may be able to 
capture some capital, and bind it permanently on to their land, while receiving 
large royalty payments. Before reaching this stage of 'development', 
landowners exchange their 'support' for resources supplied by the investors. 
These resources involve access to prestigious, often paid, positions in investor-
funded landowner companies. Being a 'director on the board' also entails 
frequent trips to Port Moresby and occasional trips overseas. Smart operators 
try to maximise their links to investors, with the result that no investors can ever 
be.sure that they have recruited a permanent support base. 
From the perspective of the logging companies, it is essential to have 
access to a group that can be portrayed as the 'representatives of the 
landowners', to be mobilised in the process of lobbying government officials to 
endorse company proposals or when signing agreements. Groups of landowner 
supporters can also be mobilised to influence policy decisions, or to create the 
impression of disunity amongst 'the landowners' as a whole, thereby disabling 
the claims of another investor's landowner company to representative status. 
They can also be mobilised to express 'landowner' opposition to any 
government decision which threatens the position of the logging company 
backing the 'landowners'. At this level, the aims of landowners and logging 
companies are often compatible, and can be mutually empowering. Such 
compatibility of interests is also found in cases where logging companies 
transform specific 'representative landowners' into politicians by funding their 
political campaigns. 
Niugini Lumber's landowner company, Eksowa, was established in March 
1990. By July 1996, supporters of Niugini Lumber claimed that it had spent 
around K6.5 million trying to get control of the Makapa TRP, and much of this 
money had been spent on Eksowa and its supporters. The main core supporters 
of Niugini Lumber were Dibiyaso and Bainapi men from the villages of 
Bamustu and Pikiwa (see Map 5.1 ), but, through gifts to villages, offers of trips 
to Moresby, and associated flows of funds, Niugini Lumber was always able to 
temporarily mobilise supporters from most other villages associated with the 
Makapa TRP. It also sought to bind its key supporters by getting them to swear 
their total allegiance to the company on the Bible. In an area of strong mission 
influence, this was an especially potent attempt to permanently enrol landowner 
support. 
Eksowa members spent a great deal of time of lobbying against Innovision. 
In opposition to Eksowa, lnnovision established its own landowner company -
the Makapa TRP Development Corporation (MDC). The main supporters of 
MDC came from Makapa village, whose inhabitants were mostly Tulumsa and 
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Kamula people (see Map 5.1 ). Support for Innovision in other villages was not 
particularly strong, since Innovision did not spend as much money as Niugini 
Lumber on landowner support, and tenqed to fly only landowner company 
executives and directors into Port Moresby, ignoring 'ordinary' landowners. 
Innovision staff told me that it was explicit company policy, and was designed 
to avoid the development of a 'handout mentality' amongst landowners. But 
prud~nt financial management also played a part in Innovision's relationship 
with landowners. For example, when the Makapa permit was signed, Innovision 
gave the MDC K20,000 on the condition that, if Innovision did get the project, 
the money would be repaid from royalties during the first year of the project's 
operation.9 It may have also been the case that, after Innoprise downgraded its 
interest in Innovision, Innovision was strapped for cash, and was consequently 
unable to finance 'its' landowners to the same extent as Niugini Lumber. 
Innovision support was also weakened by the active participation of a New 
Zealand expatriate, Mr Henderson, who had married Suliyato Madie from 
Makapa village. In the early days of Innovision, Mr Henderson strongly 
supported the landowner company, and MDC supporters reciprocated by 
transforming him into a 'landowner'. He was listed as such in one report on a 
meeting between the landowners and Innovision, and was allocated to his wife's 
purported clan, 'Dopto Kamula'.IO But many people were critical of his past 
business practices and expressed reservations about his involvement in MDC. 
Many of these doubts focussed on his wife's Dopto Kamula Business Group, 
which was, for a time, receiving Kl,OOO a month in 'consultancy fees' from 
Innovision. 11 Niugini Lumber supporters used these associations to denigrate 
the Innovision bid as nothing more than a device to make the expatriate rich. 
By early 1994, in the context where Innovision was seemingly unable to 
conclude its negotiations with the state, and where the TRP appeared likely to be 
put to tender, the division between the landowners was widely seen as an 
obstacle to the development of the project. A 'unified' landowner company was 
established, known as Batanapi, and it immediately set about gaining 
recognition as the legitimate representative landowner company. It seems that 
this move was partly a response to national forestry officials who wanted to deal 
with a unified group of landowners which was somewhat more independent of 
the logging companies than were the previous landowner companies, Eksowa 
and MDC. 
Nevertheless, many of the meetings designed to generate a unified 
company were organised by a provincial government representative who was a 
strong supporter of Niugini Lumber. Despite selecting a man who had 
previously been the MDC chairman as the Batanapi chairman, and despite a 
9 From 'Affidavit of Suliyato Madie Henderson, sworn 2/6/95 ', p.4. 
10 My own Kamula informants argue that the Dopto clan is now extinct, and its land has been 
taken over by other clans. 
11 From 'Affidavit ofSuliyato Madie Henderson, sworn 2/6/95', p.4. 
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preponderance of previous Innovision supporters on the board, Batanapi 
endorsed Niugini Lumber as the preferred developer of the Makapa TRP. On 1 
May 1994, the new board wrote ofNiugini Lumber that 'we have seen you to be 
a true brother', and agreed that Batanapi, and not MDC or Eksowa, would be the 
official spokesperson for matters related to the TRP. Innovision had temporarily 
lost its landowners to its main opponent. As a token of these shifting alliances, 
the new Batanapi chairman was flown to Malaysia and the Philippines by 
Niugini Lumber. But this new alliance was more apparent than real, since many 
of the landowners on the new Batanapi board still maintained close relationships 
with Innovision. 
This tendency to back more than one contender at the same time was due to 
a growing perception that the national government would not award the project 
to Niugini Lumber, even if it was re-tendered. Such complexities were reflected 
in Batanapi 's own account of its options at that time: 
RESOLUTIONS: 
Leave N/Lumber or find others so that they can apply for the project 
because the project will be on Tender. All companies are line [sic] up 
but they want to deal with the landowners and they do not know who 
are the landowners (Batanapi records of meeting, 27 June 1994). 
Around this time, the Batanapi chairman was being actively solicited by other 
interested parties. In July 1994, he signed a letter of intent, on behalf of 
Batanapi, with Fillet Capital Corporation of San Diego, endorsing this 
organisation as the ·potential developer of Makapa. Around the same time, he 
also started to form links with Golden Springs International, who, on 14 
September 1994, formed their own landowner company, known as Kamula-
Doso Timber. They were interested in the area around the Makapa TRP, and 
were in direct conflict with Niugini Lumber's plans to extend the Makapa TRP 
into the same area. Despite these new alliances, the chairman still maintained 
his links with Innovision, at one point indicating to me that Innovision officials 
had expressed some interest in linking the Makapa development to the plans of 
Golden Springs. 
This strategy could not be maintained for long, and in January 1995, the 
chairman attempted to subvert Niugini Lumber's claims by recruiting all 
Batanapi supporters who had interests in land associated with the expansion of 
the Makapa TRP. He argued that members of the Kamula and Doso groups had 
no land within the Makapa TRP, and that consequently they should withdraw 
from any involvement with Batanapi. This was quite an extraordinary move, in 
that many board members of MDC (Innovision's landowner company), 
including the chairman, were in fact members of these groups, and for a long 
time had been claiming an interest in the Makapa TRP. They had maintained 
this interest in the face of very strong criticism by Niugini Lumber supporters, 
who had argued that the Kamula and Doso members of MDC really had nothing 
to do with land in the Makapa TRP. The chairman explained to me that he only 
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found out that this was 'true' after talking to elders during a Christmas trip to 
Makapa. 
He also argued that the Makapa TRP would take a long time to be 
developed because the various parties were likely to continue their legal 
contests, so it would be better for Kamula and Doso people to align themselves 
with Golden Springs, which was unencumbered by such disputes. In trying to 
align specific language groups with specific logging projects, the chairman was 
not just acting on Golden Springs' behalf. What happened can also be 
understood as an innovative attempt by some landowners, including the 
chairman, to establish a stronger, less 'ethnically' divided basis for links 
between landowners, projects, and potential developers. So, in early 1995, he 
engineered a seemingly complete withdrawal of all Kamula and Doso from 
Batanapi. He was apparently abandoning Batanapi to Niugini Lumber's core 
supporters, who, as mentioned earlier, were primarily members of the Dibiyaso 
and Bainapi language groups. 
Golden Springs International initiated a legalistic procedure to fix and 
specify Kamula and Doso support through a Memorandum of Understanding 
between itself and the Kamula-Doso landowner company. This agreement 
required the landowners to prevent any disputes from disrupting Golden 
Springs' operations, and in the event of such disruptions, the landowner 
company was to indemnify Golden Springs for any losses it might suffer. In 
exchange for securing such obligations from the landowners, the developer took 
on responsibility for organising 'all developments and logging operations' in the 
permit area, and undertook to pay compensation for damage to gardens and 
sacred places. The developer also agreed to give the landowner company cash 
advances of K20,000 to help build an airstrip at Somokopa (a village in the 
proposed concession area), and a further K 100,000 for construction of an office 
in the timber permit area and the purchase of a dinghy, engine, and radios. 
These advances were to be repaid by deductions from royalty payments. 
In practice, the memorandum had little effect. By September 1995, the 
signatories had started to drift away and join other companies, such as Sino-
PNG and Niugini Lumber. Apparently, Golden Springs was thinking of taking 
action against some of them, but could not do so, simply because the landowners 
had no resources to compensate Golden Springs for its putative losses. In any 
case, by the end of 1995, Golden Springs was no longer interested in the 
Makapa extension area, and the chairman of Kamula-Doso then started to have 
preliminary discussions with a Korean company, Halla, and simultaneously 
intensified his links with Innovision. 
The 'Greening' of the Makapa TRP? 
While these complex shifts in the allegiance of landowners to specific logging 
companies were occurring, further divisions amongst the landowners were being 
amplified by the activities of the New Zealand expatriate, his affines, and other 
supporters. Having split off from the Makapa Development Corporation in 
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1994, and then being excluded from the Batanapi corporation, they reformed 
themselves into another 'Makapa Development Corporation' and sought their 
own developer. They effectively used the MDC name to make high-profile 
assertions of their exclusive and privileged relationship to the Makapa TRP. 
They did this by placing an advertisement in The National (1 0 October 1994) 
which claimed that they were the only true representatives of the landowners. 
The advertisement read as follows: 
MAKAPA TIMBER AREA 
Makapa TRP Development Co. P/L hereby advises the public and the 
National Forest Authority that it is the true landowner company 
representing all groups from the Makapa area. 
We further advise that any person, group or company pretending to 
represent the people or attempting to influence the granting of a timber 
operation or licence in the area will be resisted with the full process of 
Law etc. 
We currently have an operating company which involves large PNG 
interests which is submitting a marketing and logging agreement for 
the area. 
This new MDC eventually secured the backing of Collins and Leahy, a company 
closely associated with Sir Danny Leahy. A new company, known as Pisa, was 
established to develop the Makapa TRP. Collins and Leahy held 50 percent 
equity, the landowners held 40 percent through the Makapa Timber 
Development Company, and a group known as Piskulik held 10 percent. Pisa 
has gained some support from people at Makapa, Wasapeya, and Pikiwa 
villages, but landowners often refer to it as 'the expatriate's company'- and this 
association is sufficient reason for some people to express their opposition to it. 
Of all the players in the Makapa TRP, Sir Danny Leahy was perhaps the 
most serious in seeking to ensure sustainable development, landowner equity, 
and possibly even meaningful landowner participation in the project's design 
and implementation. Indicative of this ideology was the attempt to involve the 
Pacific Heritage Foundation in the preparation of its plans. This is a group with 
an excellent reputation for trying to implement sustainable use of rainforest 
resources in parts ofNew Britain (see Henderson 1994b:20). 12 
As mentioned earlier, Mrs Henderson took out an injunction against the 
state finalising an agreement with Innovision. This legal challenge was seen by 
many landowners, especially those backing Innovision, as interference that 
would only further delay the start of the project. As a part of the court battle, 
Pisa was subject to a campaign which sought to undercut its legitimacy as a 
representative body. In this process, its support has probably diminished 
further. In late June 1995, the chairman and vice-chairman of the Makapa 
12 Max Henderson, founder of the Pacific Heritage Foundation, is not related to the Hendersons 
ofMakapa. 
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Development Corporation (which had supported Pisa) wrote to the Forest 
Authority, stating that 'our landowner company namely Makapa Development 
Corporation (MDC) has agreed to join forces with Batanapi Holding Pty 
Limited because we feel this is the only way to eliminate conflicts and 
unnecessary delays on the projecf. On 11 July 1995, Batanapi took out a full-
page advertisement in The National (a newspaper controlled by Rimbunan 
Hijau), announcing this unification and calling for early approval of Makapa by 
the National Forest Board and the acting Forests Minister. The advertisement 
also dealt with 'green issues' in its final paragraph: 
We are also aware that some foreign experts are concerned about 
environment and protection of rare insects. We welcome their 
expertise and invite them to write to us with their proposals and expert 
plans and programs so that our landowners can incorporate these into 
our forest development plan. The forest are [sic] with us in Makapa 
area so please send your ideas to us and don't keep them in Waigani 
alone. 
Despite this somewhat self-confident tone, Niugini Lumber's own power in 
respect of Makapa declined quite dramatically in the second half of 1995. 
According to landowners, around the time that the Forest Authority endorsed the 
permit originally issued to Innovision, Niugini Lumber was told not to interfere 
further in the Makapa project. Certainly, towards the end of 1995, Niugini 
Lumber had started to wind down its overt support of Batanapi, and very few 
supporters were being flown to Port Moresby. In the same year, Niugini 
Lumber temporarily lost control of its supporters when Lan Huwat, a Malaysian 
company interested in the Makapa concession, was able to fly the Batanapi 
board and other landowners to Malaysia, and almost managed to gain their 
endorsement as the preferred developer. Soon after these events, two key senior 
staff, who were coordinating Niugini Lumber's bid for Makapa, resigned from 
their positions. Moreover, once the project agreement was signed in May 1996, 
Niugini Lumber immediately ceased to fund Batanapi. Given these events, a 
number of previously strong supporters of Niugini Lumber moved over to 
Innovision, though some of Batanapi's board members were still lobbying 
against Innovision in October 1996 (see Post-Courier, 7 October 1996).13 
Transformations in Local Powers and Understandings 
From the landowners' perspective, the Makapa TRP and its long delayed start-
up represent the failure of government to provide the highly marginalised and 
impoverished groups of the Makapa TRP with access to opportunities for 
immediate 'development'. Landowners, particularly in the southern villages, 
l3 Despite such setbacks, Niugini Lumber has continued to try secure access to logging areas to 
the north of the Makapa TRP. It now hopes to achieve this by 'extending' its Wawoi-Guavi 
concession. To achieve this extension it is using another landowner company (Wawoi-Tomu), 
which is primarily supported by Kamula, Doso, and Kalamo people living at Somokopa and 
Kesigi. 
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have watched their region undergo a process of stagnation over the last fifteen to 
twenty years. Health and educational services remain much as they were, no 
innovations have been made in the local system of production, and there has 
been no fundamental change in the way of life in the villages. At the same time, 
there is an enormous interest in the possibilities of epochal change. There is a 
widespread concern with the meaning of the year 2000, which is thought to be 
associated with apocalyptic events, including the end of all current property 
relationships and the return of Christ. The logging project is seen as one vehicle 
that will quickly shift people into modernity and its associated wealth before the 
year 2000 has its effect.l4 
An equally significant basis of local support for logging was the 
proliferation of 'landowner' companies which provided large numbers of men 
with access to unprecedented wealth, prestige, and influence, by bringing these 
men into regular contact with developers and the often unstable networks of 
elite and bureaucratic power. They have also become familiar with forestry 
consultants, lawyers, and, to a more limited extent, the ideas of non-
governmental organisations and the power of international agencies such as the 
World Bank. 
Yet, despite this expansion of practical knowledge of modernity, Port 
Moresby, and PNG's forestry sector, the landowners have so far been unable to 
create any organisation that represents their unified interests. Given the pre-
existing divisions amongst the landowners, and the intense competition among 
men for senior positions in landowner companies, such an organisation was 
perhaps unlikely to have been successful, but the landowners have been further 
divided and destabilised by competing logging companies who do not 
necessarily require strongly unified and independent landowners. Rather, each 
potential investor is interested in maintaining patron-client ties with a small 
group of 'representative' landowners who are fundamentally dependent on the 
investor for further funds and resources. 
Landowner company board members and directors who find themselves in 
this position are unlikely to always represent the views and interests of the wider 
community. This point is not lost on other landowners, who often bitterly 
criticise directors for tricking the 'ground people' by doing deals in Port 
Moresby without telling them. At the same time, board members and directors 
are accused of 'eating' or 'stealing' future royalty monies, since it is thought 
that the investor will recoup all expenses in running the landowner company 
14 There is also a strong view that the younger generation, who tend to occupy most positions on 
landowner companies, owe their seniors at least some access to the benefits of development, and 
that these benefits should materialise before the elders die. Here a notion of inter-generational 
equity is reworked into the more culturally specific theme that the younger generation are indebted 
to the senior generation for the 'suffering' and 'pain' which the latter suffered when rearing the 
former. This emphasis on the previous generation tends to undercut a concern with 'sustainable 
development', either in the sense of long-term sustainability or in the sense of this generation's 
responsibility to the next generation. 
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from royalties, should the investor be successful. Some directors are said to be 
'like prostitutes' who just 'look for money' and 'jump' from one company to 
another. The result is that the 'ground people', even when overtly supporting a 
particular logging company, are highly suspicious of the directors of its 
associated landowner company. Partly because of such criticisms, some men 
holding senior positions in a landowner company rarely leave Port Moresby, and 
consequently have little direct contact with people at the village level. Such 
divisions within factions further contribute to the sense that, in the village, no-
one really knows what is going on, apart from the often hidden pursuit of self-
interest. The government did not intervene or in any way regulate this process. 
It simply refused to recognise the legitimacy of any of the feuding landowner 
companies, but by failing to intervene, it facilitated, by default, the landowners' 
transformation into competing and highly unstable factions which were 
organised and funded by potential investors. 
Moreover, neither the state nor the investors were really interested in 
landowner participation in the negotiations over the Makapa project. Most 
negotiations have taken place in Port Moresby, with little input from 
landowners, and indeed most landowners have little knowledge of the details of 
these negotiations. Many landowners still have no real understanding of the 
transaction which they were entering into when they signed the initial TRP 
agreement. Many people find it difficult to understand that the state now owns 
their timber and has given it to Innovision. They believe that, since they own 
the land, all their possessory rights in the trees are still active. People also think 
that they will be able to 'try out' any logging company that comes on to their 
land, and that, if they are not happy with its operation, they will be able to send 
it away. Embedded in this view is the belief that they still control access to the 
resource, and that they have the capacity to negotiate terms and conditions as the 
project develops. 
Such ideas are evident in assertions, by some landowners, that adequate 
recognition of their sovereign powers over 'land and resources', by the state and 
other parties, will result in a more successful development. Such ideas are also 
indicated in a 'Petition to get the Makapa Timber Project Operational', which 
was sent to the then Deputy Forests Minister, Bitan Kuok, by supporters of the 
Makapa Development Corporation: 
The living style of the people are just like in colonial day times where 
people are living like primitives who just came from the bush, while 
others are much well off than our people, where no proper health care, 
education, no proper social development, no good water during long 
drought, no proper economic and infrastructure development...... we 
are again so concerned that we are living like during colonial days. 
We are independent, PNG is an independent country and we as native 
of this country have every right to have any say over our property like 
land issues and the resources. Why is it that our area is still the least 
developed area in the county? (Makapa Development Corporation, 27 
January 1994) 
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The problems identified in the petition do not just refer to poverty, but to the 
failure of the landowners' 'independent' or sovereign status to be recognised. 
The state, in both its bureaucratic and political arms, is able to make arbitrary 
decisions about landowners' resources without sufficiently acknowledging the 
landowners' rights over their property. The petition provides an important 
insight into the level of frustration amongst landowners about the way in which 
the state operates: 
We now believe that no body is telling us, the landowners, the truth 
with our Makapa Timber Project when exactly the project is 
commencing. We believe that officers are cheating ... the 
landowners ...... We always stood for ourselves not for any contractor, 
we were always been with the state's decision but yet we seem 
(landowners) to be kept in the dark (ibid.) 
What this reflects is the very significant failure of the government to formulate 
an alliance with the landowners, and the landowners' resulting sense of isolation 
(rather proudly ex·pressed in the phrase 'we always stood for ourselves'), 
balanced by indications of their potential support for state decision making (if 
only they knew what those decisions were). What these quotes also reflect is 
landowner awareness that the state, represented by its 'officers', is possibly 
engaged in a 'dark' process of political and economic domination over the 
previously 'independent' landowners, pushing them back into 'colonial times'. 
Insofar as many of the negotiations concerning Makapa have involved only 
members of the political elite, staff of the Forest Authority, and the various 
logging companies, then this landowner perception of disengagement accurately 
reflects their situation. Landowners did not participate in the negotiations that 
led to the Makapa project agreement in May 1996. They were not parties to the 
agreement and did not sign it. By July 1996, they still had not been given a 
copy of the full agreement, which was being treated as confidential to the 
signatories. As one man put it (in July 1996), they were now being treated like a 
pig that has been bound: 
We have chains around our neck and legs. We are like a pig that's tied 
up. That pig can't move where it wants. It goes where you make it go. 
It can't move, when it does it hurts. It cries. No-one listens. It cries 
and cries and then it falls asleep in pain. It can't move. We 
landowners are like that now. 
Conclusions 
The material presented here has outlined some of the complexity in the 
definition of the Makapa TRP, as understood by various actors attempting to 
influence policy concerning the project. These various, often changing, 
definitions of the Makapa TRP have emerged in a national context where 
reformist policies were being defined and strongly contested by the Joggers and 
sections of the political elite. Due to this policy conflict, the state was unable to 
quickly implement the Makapa TRP, despite having identified it as a key project 
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in PNG's forestry sector. The Makapa TRP was not only potentially a major 
source of revenue for the government - it was, for a time, seen by the reformers 
as being likely to exemplify many of the benefits of the reform process. But the 
failure to implement the Makapa TRP became an icon, to their opponents, of the 
reformers' more general inability to effectively implement their policies. 
Yet the material on the Makapa TRP suggests that the reforms did not go 
far enough in dealing with obstacles to effective implementation. While the 
reforms weakened the discretionary powers of the Minister for Forests, there 
was no real attempt to destroy or transform the alliances between the wider 
political elite and the loggers. If anything, the reformers succeeded .in 
temporarily transforming a 'governing alliance' between the loggers and the 
elite which had previously run the forestry sector (see Barnett 1989) into a 
'defensive alliance' which aimed at constraining, and winding back, the reform 
process. What this case study reveals is that the reformers have been unable to 
effect a full structural transformation of forest resource allocation decisions. 
The reform process has not been robust enough to completely transform the 
permit given to Innovision under the old Forestry Act into an arrangement that 
fully conforms to the procedures of the new Act. Moreover, the reformers have 
been unable to prevent alliances between politicians and loggers from 
generating other definitions of Makapa which also seem to challenge procedures 
established by the Forest Authority. As this case study has shown, logging 
companies are still able to strongly influence elements of the state decision-
making process by recruiting influential politicians. The competing loggers in 
the Makapa TRP have been reasonably successful in continuing to operate with 
a model that allocates power to the political elite in the form of the Minister for 
Forests, other ministers, and the National Executive CounciJ. 15 Understood in 
these terms, the Makapa TRP represents the failure of the Forest Authority to 
effectively impose its reformist policies on the political elite. 
On the other hand, the national reform process and the associated policy 
shifts have delayed the Makapa TRP, and in this way slowed the rate of 
exploitation of PNG's forests to something less than what it might have been, 
had the project started in 1992 or 1993. The uncertainty associated with the 
negotiations over Makapa has created a space, albeit one which is increasingly 
implausible, where a national logging company, possibly with a real concern for 
socially appropriate and sustainable logging, may still emerge to be considered 
as an appropriate developer of the Makapa TRP. Secondly, sections of the 
bureaucracy were, for a time, able to take ·control of the negotiations with 
Innovision and, up to a point, effectively use their control of Innovision's 
uncertain access to resources as a point of leverage in their negotiations. 
IS The restriction of funding for the Forest Authoerity, the recent ( 1995) sacking of Jean Kekedo 
as its Managing Director, and the more recent (1996) attempts to amend the Forestry Act in ways 
that would have given the Forests Minister the power to appoint members of the National Forest 
Board, also exemplify this trend to weaken or subvert the independence and capacity of the 
Authority. 
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Threatening to revoke the permit meant that the state was able to use some real 
power in negotiations, at least up until the point when Innovision threatened to 
claim damages. What this suggests is that the reformists have had an important 
role in shifting the possible definition of the Makapa TRP away from that 
outlined in the initial proposals lodged by Innovision and Niugini Lumber in 
1992. While the newer definitions have yet to be actualised, the options now 
being considered for Makapa represent a considerable, albeit still contingent, 
achievement of the reform process. 
Despite these positive outcomes and possibilities, the material above shows 
that, fundamentally, many of the specific decisions associated with the Makapa 
TRP involved a weakening of national policy as formulated by the Forest 
Authority. The new forestry bureaucracy was unable to assure landowners of 
Makapa TRP that it was acting effectively in their interests, and it was unable to 
radically transform alliances between the elite and the loggers. What the 
Makapa case suggests is that any further attempt to reformulate the state's 
relationship with landowners (see Taylor, this volume) must be augmented by 
more effective state regulation of the elite's relationship with the loggers. 
CHAPTER6 
WHERE DO THE RAW LOGS GO? 
CONTRACTORS, TRADERS, AND LANDOWNERS IN LAK 
F ADZILAH MAJID COOKE 
Introduction 
The bulk of timber harvesting in Papua New Guinea (PNG) is carried out by 
Malaysian-based multinational companies. These logging companies generate 
extreme emotions in PNG. The Chan government has seen them as development 
pioneers whose presence needs to be promoted by political elites in power. 1 
Non-government organisations (NGOs) regard them as environmental vandals at 
best, or 'robber barons' at worst, whose activities are normally illegal and ought 
to be instantly stopped.2 At one time or another, different groups of local 
landowners have also seen Malaysian logging contractors as the perpetrators of 
large-scale environmental destruction, but have still thought they ought to be 
milked at every available opportunity. Yet the occasion for milking rarely 
presents itself, because the companies are too cunning to allow them such 
opportunities. More often than not the reverse is true. Willingly or unwillingly, 
landowners have often been used as mouthpieces for timber companies, most 
notably when they resist any change to what they perceive to be the 'cosy' deals 
which they have maintained with 'their' developers (National, 16 July 1996). 
The Malaysian companies themselves regard their role in PNG as that of an 
'investor' whose primary aim is to accumulate profit, even if the profit motive 
receives little emphasis in their own rhetoric when compared to the provision of 
'development' goods (health, education, infrastructure) to remote rural regions 
(Post-Courier, 23 June 1993; National, 13 March, 7 July, 16 July 1996). 
According to the Malaysian Prime Minister, Or Mahathir, the emotion 
associated with the activities of Malaysian logging contractors has something to 
In March 1996, during the visit of a Malaysian trade delegation headed by the country's 
Minister for Primary Industries, Lim Kheng Yaik, Prime Minister Chan issued an open invitation 
to Malaysian business interests to explore PNG's potential in various sectors, including agro-
forestry, finance and tourism. Wisely or otherwise, the Association of Southeast Asian (ASEAN) 
countries in general, and Malaysia in particular, are often held up as models of 'development' by 
political elites in power in PNG (see Post-Courier, I 0 April 1996; Independent, 19 July 1996; 2 
August 1996). 
2 See, for example, Henderson ( 1996a). The Independent newspaper ( 4 October 1996) recently 
published a summary of the findings of a report by the Environmental Investigation Agency, 
entitled 'Corporate Power, Corruption and the Destruction of the World's Forests', which 
compared timber companies to 'robber barons' that create social disharmony, threaten rare animals, 
and seriously damage the environment. 
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do with 'resentment among some regional powers' (read Australia) at the 
success of Malaysian investments in the South Pacific region (New Straits 
Times, Malaysia, 26 August 1994). In this conception, Malaysian logging 
contractors have become a political football within the changing (if not 
deteriorating) context of regional power relationships in the area, as evident in 
PNG's increasing unease with the nature of its links to Australia.3 
It is not the intention of this chapter to establish the 'true' role of Malaysian 
loggers in PNG. The aim is to examine the part played by one Malaysian 
logging company, Niugini Lumber (NGL), itself a subsidiary of the Rimbunan 
Hijau conglomerate of Kuching (East Malaysia), in influencing the nature of 
social change in the Lak electorate ofNew Ireland Province. The objective is to 
frame NGL's commercial intervention in Lak within the larger context of the 
world tropical timber trade into which PNG has been drawn. The first argument 
is that forest degradation in PNG constitutes one aspect of a larger production 
and consumption system which depends for its survival on the maintenance of 
low prices and large turnovers in the consuming countries - especially Japan. 
The second argument is that logging is voracious in PNG because of the 
uncertainties and risks attendant on timber harvesting generally- but especially 
in PNG. 
The Tropical Timber Trade, Logging Companies and Timber 
Production in PNG 
The image of Malaysian logging companies in PNG is one of a politically 
influential, and even all-powerful, machine (Post-Courier, 9 April 1996). Most 
of the Malaysian timber companies which operate in PNG are from Sarawak in 
East Malaysia. In Sarawak, the timber industry is dominated by one segment of 
the ethnic Chinese population, the Fouchow (Majid Cooke 1997). They may 
have partners who are not Fouchow, including Sarawak native groups and 
Malays from Sarawak itself and from Peninsular Malaysia, but in such 
partnerships they remain the controlling party. 
However, in the context of global trade, these contractors are nothing more 
than intermediaries in a raw log production chain which is dominated by 
3 Australia dominates the flow of both budgetary and programme aid to PNG, and the current 
shift from budgetary to programme aid is evidence of a struggle for control over the aid component 
of the PNG economy. The point at issue is the extent to which efficient and equitable spending of 
the aid budget is an internal matter, and how far donor concerns can be accommodated without 
infringing on the sovereignty of the recipient country. Australia's shared position with the World 
Bank in pushing for reform of PNG 's forestry sector as a fundamental condition of the current 
structural adjustment programme, and its public discomfort over the use of Australian helicopters 
in the Bougainville crisis, both exasperate PNG politicians. In public, PNG political elites have 
occasionally 'rapped Autralia on the knuckles', but economic reality (and dependency) often 
dictate the need for compromise (Independent, 2 August, 23 August, 6 September, 1996; Post-
Courier, 4 October 1996), even while PNG seeks to broaden its vision by 'looking north' to 
ASEAN, especially Malaysia (Independent, 2 August 1996), and by strengthening its relationship 
with other countries of the Pacific. 
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companies in consumer countries such as Japan and Korea. In the tropical 
timber industry, the Japanese sago shosha ('general trading companies') 
dominate the raw log trade, while their control of the tropical plywood trade has 
been weakened somewhat, in recent years,. by the planned entry of Indonesian 
products into the Japanese market (see Dauvergne 1996). The sago shosha link 
firms involved in the raw log trade, control distribution chains, and finance 
producers, wholesalers, and distributors, as well as final consumers - all for a 
small fee. According to Dauvergne (1996), wasteful consumption is a necessary 
outcome of their function and corporate structure. Moreover, they are able to 
control the market by the sheer volume of their purchases. When raw logs are 
perceived to be in short supply, the sago shosha commence a buying spree, 
sending prices up, creating instability and, ultimately, price collapse as excess 
logs are sold back into the market (Krause and Sekiguchi, cited in Nectoux and 
Kuroda 1989). Operating on a two-to-three month reserve stock, sago shosha 
are able to use these reserves to flood the Japanese market and lower log prices 
(Dauvergne 1996). 
In sum, producer companies in PNG, even the seemingly all-powerful 
Rimbunan Hijau, enjoy nothing more than a subordinate position in a world raw 
log trade that is dominated by the appetites of consumers. Malaysian loggers in 
PNG function to cater to consumer appetites for timber which are largely 
Japanese. Having exhausted sources in the Philippines and Sabah in the 1960s 
and 1970s, these consumers found new supplies in Sarawak and PNG (World 
Bank 1995:76). Malaysian logging companies, as longstanding suppliers to the 
Japanese market, are now also logging in Africa, South America, and other 
South Pacific island countries apart from PNG- especially the Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu and Samoa (ibid.). However, for these logging contractors, remaining 
in a subordinate position does not imply complete subjugation, and often 
produces some real advantages - a point which will be dealt with in more detail 
later. 
Operational Risks 
In general, timber harvesting can be a very lucrative business. According to 
Vincent and Binkley ( 1992:101 ), it is lucrative because of low royalties and 
premiums. Since concessions are awarded, withdrawn, or reissued under criteria 
which are often unclear, and certainly not based on economic efficiency, low 
premiums and royalties actually provide valuable perquisites for those in power 
(Barnett 1992; Taylor 1992). On the other hand, markets are uncertain, demand 
is controlled by consumer countries, sunk costs are high, and in the case of PNG, 
production itself may be risky because of uncertain operational conditions. 
Timber harvesting calls for heavy front-end expenses which usually include 
outlays on infrastructure, purchase or rent of heavy machinery, and fees payable 
to landowners who may or may not turn out to be representative of communities 
in the project areas. The more remote the logging site, the higher these 
operational costs are likely to be. Because of uncertainties about the richness of 
forest, about obtaining full landowner support and, even if such support is 
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forthcoming, of being able to proceed smoothly, large-scale logging is not for 
the faint-hearted nor the small, under-capitalised companies. 
Provincial and national governments see logging companies as potential 
providers of infrastructure and services to remote rural areas. In most licensing 
agreements, there have been clauses stipulating the responsibility of landowner 
companies for the construction of transport facilities, especially roads and 
bridges. This responsibility has commonly been transferred to the logging 
contractors by the Logging and Marketing Agreements which they have 
negotiated with the landowner companies, although the burden has occasionally 
been shared. Road and bridge construction may cost anything up to K100,000 
per kilometre, depending on the nature of the terrain and local soil conditions.4 
For convenience, road construction is normally sub-contracted, often to other 
Malaysian companies. 
Despite the relatively high labour costs in PNG, wages do not account for 
more than 15 percent of total operational costs. Apart from roads, the sunk costs 
on machinery constitute the other major component of front-end expenses. The 
requirements of each logging site are different, and the number of machines 
obviously depends on the size of the operation. In 1991, when logging in the 
Lak TRP began, a cluster of four different types of machinery cost over K2 
million. A single cluster includes machinery for the sawmill, a forklift, two 
types of bulldozer for logging, and additional machinery for road maintenance, 
including a shovel, a grader, an excavator, and a dump truck. More than one 
cluster of machines is sometimes required at a particular site at any one time. 
Some machines may be shared, that is flown or shipped from other existing 
logging sites, but this does not solve the problem of spare parts. Because parts 
are not readily available in PNG, they are often brought in directly from 
Singapore or Japan. In view of the distance, together with the high cost of 
transport within PNG itself, importing machinery and parts is a costly exercise. 
Calculations made by Kumar ( 1986:99), based on logging operations in 
Malaysia, where availability and distance may be less problematic, show that 
machinery and equipment account for anything up to 90 percent of fixed costs. 
There is no reason why such costs should be any lower in PNG. Moreover, there 
are other uncertainties specific to PNG operations. 
Six years after the adoption of the new National Forest Policy, no national 
forest inventory has yet been undertaken, and national forestry planning is based 
on maps which are described as 'inaccurate, confusing and misleading' (Brian 
Brunton, cited in the Independent Business Weekly, New Zealand, 2 August 
1996). Consequently, official calculations of annual allowable cut may or may 
not be reliable (Taylor 1992: 138). Admittedly, this in itself is not a problem 
peculiar to PNG. Because of uncertainties inherent in the biological qualities of 
the forest, and the difficulty of measuring the mean annual increment of 
particular species over a long enough period of time and a large enough 
4 Much of the information presented here on operational costs is based on a personal interview 
with NGL 's Lak Operations Manager, conducted on 13 July 1996. 
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geographical area, most calculations of annual allowable cut tend to be fairly 
fluid (Majid Cooke 1995). A national forest inventory may help, but only up to 
a point. At ground level, miscalculation of the potential timber volume from a 
given patch of forest can affect the attitude that loggers present to landowners as 
these are translated into the sums of money which the former are prepared to 
part·with in their negotiations with the latter. More importantly, miscalculation 
of timber volumes affects operational decisions over the question of how many 
clusters of machinery need to be used, or whether the outlays on infrastructure 
can be recuperated from the logging operations. 
The fees paid to landowners (some of whom are politicians) form part of 
the front-end expenses that logging companies have to bear (Nectoux and 
Kuroda 1989). 5 However, the purchase of landowners' good will is a protracted 
and unstable process which does not always yield predictable results, as will be 
explained in more detail in the next section. 
Counting the cost of machinery and equipment, the construction and 
maintenance of infrastructure, and upholding landowners' good will, logging is, 
in fact, a high-risk business. Moreover, regardless of alliances made with 
landowners, politicians and others, good networking alone does not convert trees 
into profits. Knowledge of the forest is important. Unless logging companies 
are prepared to undertake vigilant surveys themselves, they may have very little 
idea of what 'their' patch of forest may yield. It is frontier territory, where one 
may strike gold or oil, but luck has a lot to do with it as well. In Malaysia, 
losses from logging operations are represented in the expression untung tidak 
tahan rugi- 'profit that cannot withstand losses' (Majid Cooke 1994:428). The 
survival of logging companies is therefore driven by the urgent need to recover 
front-end expenses or sunk costs. It is this imperative that drives the logging 
frenzy in large-scale commercial operations, regardless of where it is done or by 
whom, Malaysians or others.6 
In 1996, in an attempt to restructure the PNG timber industry, the World 
Bank has persuaded the PNG government to effect a greater redistribution of 
forestry profits. This redistribution has been based on the perception that the 
landowners were receiving inadequate returns from their forest resources. In 
response, the Forest Industries Association (FIA) has told an incredulous public 
that the timber industry could not afford any further reduction to an already 
5 In Malaysia, the fees are usually paid by Chinese logging contractors to their Bumipuira 
partners in a system referred to colloquially as Ali Baba- the Bumiputra Ali and the Chinese Baba 
(Majid Cooke 1994; 1997). The Bumiputras are the licence-holders, but may or may not engage in 
actual harvesting for various reasons. The right to harvest any licensed area is sold for a fee to a 
contractor, usually Chinese. The fee paid to the licence-holder can be substantial, and is not taxed 
because the exchange is unofficial, and is actually illegal in the Peninsula under Section 23 of the 
National Forest Act. In Sarawak, on the other hand, with the very significant ethnic Chinese 
presence in the economic and political life of the state, Fouchow logging contractors may 
sometimes be awarded timber licences on their own account. 
6 See Footnote 2 above. 
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small profit margin (Post-Courier, 9 April 1996; National, 16 July 1996; 
Independent, 2 August 1996). What the industry might have been referring to is 
overall margins. Because of uncertainties over market conditions, inadequate 
resource surveys, and differences in the richness of each individual patch of 
forest, there are bound to be some operations that are much more (or less) 
profitable than others. It is one reason why many logging companies have such 
large and dispersed logging concessions. Such holdings enable them to balance 
the less viable timber licences against the ones that are more profitable. After 
all, maintaining supply to meet market demand is the priority; which forest patch 
the raw logs are produced from is of little or no consequence. Nevertheless, 
what the FIA understated was the fact that when markets (especially prices), 
timber yields, and machinery have been well synchronised, logging has been a 
highly profitable business indeed, as it was in 1993.7 Estimates of profit 
margins are undoubtedly contested territory because of arguments about what 
may be considered as acceptable risks (especially production costs) and 
reasonable profit levels. Moreover, since 1993, the log price has fallen, though 
it has not yet fallen below the levels of 1989. And regardless of the price levels, 
the reality of day-to-day existence for the logging companies remains with the 
problem of controlling production costs, especially sunk costs. 
While the cost structure of machinery, parts, and maintenance may be 
relatively inflexible because it represents the cost of 'dead labour', infrastructure 
costs and landowner fees may be more amenable to manipulation. The 
flexibility can be seen in the frequently sub-standard quality of logging roads 
and the various means and degrees by which landowner companies are 
manipulated or exploited in order to save costs. But another condition that 
drives the logging frenzy is found beyond the shores of PNG shores: this is the 
need to keep prices low in the international (especially northeast Asian) market 
and to keep sales volume (or turnover) correspondingly high. These two points 
are explored later, using examples from the Lak TRP in New Ireland. 
How to Maximise Profits or Recover Losses 
To ensure maximum profits, logging companies use many different strategies. 
These include cultivating smart business alliances internationally and within 
PNG. 
Internationally, smart business alliances can be made by cultivating 
favoured trading and marketing arrangements with consumers. Since 64 percent 
of PNG log exports are destined for Japan (Independent, 19 August 1995; see 
also Filer, this volume), and the market for raw logs in Japan is controlled by a 
few conglomerates or sogo shosha (Dauvergne 1996), it makes sense for logging 
companies to have good working relationships with these conglomerates. NGL 
at Lak, in conjunction with its parent company Rimbunan Hijau, maintains a 
long-term business relationship with a few sogo shosha, including Sumitomo 
7 In I 993, the price for PNG raw logs soared to US$ I 67 per cubic metre. One reason for the rise 
in price was the decline of supplies from Sabah (Dauvergne I 996). 
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and Nissho lwai, as well as with Stettin Bay Lumber Company in Rabaul, which 
is the subsidiary of a sago sasha (personal communication, NGL Lak Operations 
Manager, 13 July 1996). These long-term relationships have several advantages. 
Some of these include guaranteed and stable access to the Japanese market, as 
well as access to the range of services that sago shosha provide to timber 
suppliers, such as loans at relatively cheap rates of interest. Another key service 
is the links which sago shosha provide with other firms involved in the log trade, 
such as shipping companies and agents (Dauvergne 1996). 
More importantly, such relationships cushion raw log producers against 
price fluctuation. When the price is low, for example, Rimbunan Hijau's (and 
NGL's) logs are given priority; more logs are purchased from them in order to 
keep their volume and turnover at a steady level. On the other hand, when prices 
are high, their logs are not phased out of the market (personal communication, 
NGL Lak Operations Manager, 13 July 1996). Undoubtedly, this business 
arrangement helps to explain much of the momentum behind the company's 
production levels. 
While sago shosha may provide essential services for logging companies 
such as Rimbunan Hijau, their business style is detrimental to the sustainability 
of PNG forests. They are not discriminating in their sources; they do not 
distinguish between legal and illegal suppliers or between those logging 
concessions which are sustainably managed and those which are not. In fact, 
although some major sago shosha, including Marubeni, have agreed in principle 
to confine their log purchases to suppliers who follow sound environmental 
practices, most Japanese tropical log imports have originated from concessions 
that are not managed in a sustainable way (Dauvergne 1996; see also Light, this 
volume). 
Most logging contractors are driven by a form of competition which 
requires them to keep the price of raw logs low in order to maintain the large 
turnovers on which their profits are based. Several strategies are used in the 
process, including transfer pricing and the misdeclaration (or underdeclaration) 
of species. For lack of space, only the former is dealt with here. 
Transfer pricing, which may be effected by undervaluing purchases or 
overvaluing services, means lower (official) profit margins, leading to payment 
of lower corporate taxes, which in turn means lower costs and lower export 
prices. This reduction in export prices may not mean a corresponding reduction 
in import or consumer prices, but the undervaluation of exports does mean a loss 
of revenue to producer countries such as PNG. Surveillance, of the kind 
undertaken by the Swiss company Societe Generate de Surveillance, for 
example, may be able to control transactions involving material products such as 
raw logs, plywood, or even machinery, but it is doubtful whether control can be 
effectively exercised over fees and charges for services such as marketing or 
management consultancy. For obvious reasons, therefore, revenue loss from 
transfer pricing may be difficult to document. One attempt at estimating such 
losses, based partly on gains estimated in favour of logging contractors, arrived 
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at a figure of around K193 million in 1993, when prices boomed (Duncan 
1994).8 
In their capacity as financiers, sago shosha can further be relied upon for 
business expansion or diversification. Indeed, they have supported much of the 
downstreaming or value-added manufacturing undertaken by Sarawak timber 
companies (Perkasa, various issues).9 At the same time, the sago shosha are 
not so powerful that they have been able to prevent competition from Indonesia. 
In the 1980s, 90 percent of Japanese plywood consumption was produced 
locally, but by 1994, with plywood from Indonesia flooding into the Japanese 
market, only 50 percent of plywood was produced locally (Dauvergne 1996). 
However, such competition, while certainly making an impact on their control of 
the plywood market, does not cause much of a dent in their domination of the 
raw log trade. Their position is backed by high tariffs on value-added imports 
into Japan. In 1995, the tariff for plywood imports into Japan was 15 percent for 
plywood less than 6 millimetres thick, and a 1 0 percent for plywood more than 6 
millimetres thick - twice as high as those imposed by the United States (ibid.). 
Moreover, the Indonesian competition came at a price. It was a deliberate 
attempt at targetting the sago shosha but, because of difficult market conditions, 
the strategy used by Indonesia was to sell plywood at below world market prices, 
thereby increasing demand while artificially depressing all plywood prices 
(ibid.). This practice had detrimental effects on Indonesian forests because 
plywood production requires raw logs and it is not certain that these raw logs are 
produced from projects which operate under acceptable logging standards. 
There are other ways by which logging contractors operating in PNG could 
maximise their profits. They may make smart alliances with politicians, both 
provincial and national, and with landowners who are power-brokers in their 
own right. However, landowners do not speak with a unified voice. 
Even when alliances have been established, smooth and continuous 
operations are no certainty. Landowners continually change their minds and 
positions. The same landowners who have been tempted by the prospect of a 
once-in-a-lifetime taste of 'development' goods, and who therefore want logging 
in the first instance, may later turn against the contractors when forest 
degradation follows logging operations. Alternatively, landowners may turn 
8 It is worth noting here that Nissho lwai, one of the sogo shosha with which Rimbunan Hijau has 
links, was named in the Barnett Inquiry as a company engaging in chronic transfer pricing which 
enabled it to make substantial 'hidden profits' (Marshall 1990: 176; Times of PNG, 27 July 1991 ). 
9 Perkasa is the quarterly magazine of the Sarawak Timber Industries Development Corporation 
(STIDC). In February 1996, Nissho Iwai signed a joint venture agreement with Samling for the 
production of a range of value-added products (Perkasa, April 1996:11 ). The Daiken and ltochu 
Corporations of Japan are involved in a joint venture arrangement involving Proexcel (a subsidiary 
of Rimbunan Hijau), the Sarawak Timber Industry Development Corporation, and Limbang 
Trading to produce medium density fibreboard, largely for the Japanese market (Perkasa, June 
1994:4), and production began in March 1996 from their plant at the Kidurong Industrial Estate in 
Bintulu, Sarawak (Perkasa, June 1996:2). 
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against logging contractors because the undervaluation of raw logs leads to 
dissatisfaction with the amount of royalty payments. Depending on the degree 
of frustration, landowners may resort to various strategies, including violence, 
designed to increase their share of the returns from logging. 
On the other hand, windfalls may occur. After years of negotiation and 
uncertainty, resistant or deeply divided landowners may, because of a 
combination of timing and circumstance, suddenly decide to smooth over their 
differences and invite the loggers in (see Leedom, this volume). In mid-1996, 
landowners of the Weittin Valley segment of the Lak Timber Rights Purchase 
(TRP), whose land had been set aside for biodiversity conservation, decided 
have their land logged instead.l0 
The clear message to contractors in the field is that nothing is certain, 
neither the market, the timber volume, nor the landowners. As and when 
opportunities for logging present themselves, they must be seized swiftly. 
Moreover, time is not on the contractor's side. Experience must inform many 
logging contractors that tomorrow's landowners will not necessarily honour 
deals struck today. This uncertainty accounts for the unsustainable nature of 
logging in PNG. The logical logging strategy is to harvest as large an area as is 
allowable and do so as fast as possible (World Bank 1995:77-78). Logging is 
unsustainable when it does not take into consideration the general health of the 
ecosystem and, more narrowly, the regeneration potential of specific forest 
patches (see Louman, this volume). Unsustainability is partly fuelled by 
inadequate tools in the field, such as lack of good maps or a national forest 
inventory, as well as by the overall production and consumption system, already 
discussed, which is geared towards keeping the cost of production low and the 
level of consumption high. 
Uncertainty drives logging contractors to devise strategies to minimise risk 
at many different levels. There may be attempts to directly influence public 
policy, either through the Forest Industries Association (FIA) or by cultivating 
direct access to key members of the political elite. The FIA is a natural platform 
for influencing policy because it has been constantly consulted in the national 
policy process and is formally represented on the National Forestry Board. In 
1996, the chief executive of Rimbunan Hijau, Tiong Hiew King, was President 
of the FIA, and his views therefore received a good deal of publicity, all the 
more so because Rimbunan Hijau owned the English language daily newspaper, 
The National. The FIA's responses to policy issues have often reflected Tiong's 
views. For example, the FIA claimed, in August 1996, that the industry would 
suffer an attrition rate of 30 percent if the government implemented the World 
Bank's proposal to m crease landowners' share of forestry revenues 
10 This information was obtained from interview (dated 11 July 1996) with a landowner 
spokesperson who was also a director of the landowner company, Metlak Development 
Corporation. The Weittin Valley was set aside partly because the terrain was considered too 
difficult and inaccessible, thus uneconomical, for logging purposes, but once the surrounding areas 
had been logged, it may have become a commercially viable proposition. 
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(Independent, 23 August 1996). Tiong had publicised a similar claim a few 
months earlier, when he was a member of the visiting Malaysian trade 
delegation headed by the Primary Industries Minister, Lim Kheng Yaik, and his 
speech was published in full in his own newspaper (National, 13 March 1996). 
In an attempt to influence policy, logging contractors also cultivate direct 
access to members of political elites in power. During Prime Minister Chan's 
official visit to Malaysia in April 1996, he and his Deputy were both honoured 
guests of Rimbunan Hijau in Sibu, Sarawak (Post-Courier, 9 April 1996). 
During this visit, the Prime Minister reportedly agreed- at least 'in principle' -
to review the new forest revenue system supported by the World Bank. 
Indirect strategies may also be used. One such strategy is for logging 
contractors to persuade landowners to speak on their behalf in the public arena. 
Often they are successful. The controversy surrounding the World Bank's 
efforts to change the forest revenue system in 1996 provides additional evidence 
that some landowners identify their own well-being with that of logging 
companies operating in their areas, and are prepared to declare their affiliations 
quite openly. Landowner representatives are also inspired, to some extent, by a 
general unwillingness to allow governments to make decisions about land use 
that seem to infringe the constitutionally guaranteed rights of landowners 
themselves. In July 1996, the Vice-President of the PNG Forest Resource 
Owners' Association (PNGFROA) was quoted as follows: 
We appreciate the fact that the additional royalty announced recently 
by the government is a step in the right direction - but where will it 
come from if the operators (forest rtsource developers) can't pay it? ... 
Our people know that any benefit we get essentially comes from our 
operators and we want to protect our interests. What alternative can the 
government offer? We have nothing so far and can't believe that is 
going to change if our operators leave ... (National, 16 July 1996, my 
italics) 
Rimbunan Hijau could not have phrased these sentiments better. In this 
instance, they were able to persuade landowners to speak because these 
landowners may be directors or shareholders of landowner companies that are 
merely fronts for the contractors. In return, these shareholding landowners are 
supported in many ways, especially materially, by 'their' logging contractors, 
whether or not they represent the interests of many landowning clans from a 
given area (Taylor 1992:141). However, as is often the case in PNG, 
landowners do not speak with a unified voice (Filer 1996b; Holzknecht 1996a). 
At the precise moment when the PNGFROA was criticising the World Bank, 
another 'representative body' of landowners was defending it (National, 16 July 
1996; Independent, 4 October, 11 October 1996). 
Logging in the Lak TRP 
Lak is one of those areas that romantics would like to preserve. When 
discussing Lak with some New Irelanders in Kavieng and Rabaul, notions of Lak 
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as the last bastion of culture and custom, of people relatively untouched by 
'development', were regularly mentioned. One New Irelander in Rabaul, 
conscious of changes in Lak, commented: 'If I were in Lak, I would fight to 
keep the custom'. It is as if Lak not only represents 'custom', but as if 'custom' 
in Lak is seen as a static entity which has remained relatively untouched. 
Nevertheless, ideas about 'development' through large-scale logging and 
through more 'sustainable' forms of resource utilisation and conservation have 
been introduced into the area in rapid succession in the span of less than ten 
years. 
The history of the Lak TRP may contain features which are peculiar to New 
Ireland Province, but it would not be surprising if the pattern of power, its 
negotiation and abuse, had relevance to many other parts of PNG, where 
questions of profit maximisation and risk minimisation, the manipulation of 
landowner companies, local forms resistance, and local negotiations with the 
power of the logging company are no less pertinent. 
What may be distinctive about the Lak case, however, is the presence of a 
competing interest, namely that of an integrated conservation and development 
(ICAD) project funded by the Global Environment Facility and administered by 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the PNG Department 
of Environment and Conservation (DEC). What may be doubly distinctive is 
that the ICAD project established its presence in Lak in 1993, approximately two 
years after large-scale logging had begun, and withdrew, for various political 
and administrative reasons, in September 1996.11 On the other hand, Lak is 
only one of several priority conservation areas in PNG which have been 
identified as part of the ICAD 'process' (see Hedemark and Sekhran 1994). 
An understanding of recent events in Lak must take account of the fact that 
ideas about large-scale logging, sustainable development, and forest 
conservation have been introduced into the area in rapid succession within a 
timespan of less than ten years. Materially, logging has produced roads and 
royalties in a way which has affected Lak society on an unprecedented scale and 
at an unprecedented rate. Logging roads link previously isolated villages. 
Company vehicles travelling to and from logging sites have been the main 
means of transport for both goods and people, apparently without cost. 
ICAD project staff argued that NGL's style of logging did incur costs to the 
environment and to future generations. Under their mandate, the conservation of 
biodiversity in Lak meant nothing less than a complete halt to large-scale, 
unsustainable logging, and hence the removal of NGL from the area. Although 
the ICAD project itself was removed in September 1966, it was certainly a thorn 
in NGL's side for some time, and thus formed another element of the operational 
risk with which the company had to deal. 
11 There is not enough space to discuss the the reasons for this withdrawal in any detail here. 
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Map 6.1: The Lak Timber Rights Purchase. 
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The Lak TRP covers an area of approximately 80,000 hectares (see Map 
6.1 ), and the timber permit allows for the removal of up to I 00,000 cubic metres 
of timber each year under a selective logging regime (Hedemark and Sekhran 
1994 ). Nevertheless, export volumes have been relatively low (see Table 6.1 ). 
Table 6.1: Estimated timber export volumes from the Lak TRP, 1991-95. 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
12,100 47,500 35,300 8,700 24,700 
Source: personal communication, Nikhil Sekhran, 1996. 
These figures are mere estimates, there are other sets available. Moreover, 
export volumes do not correspond with harvest volumes since they do not take 
full account of the damage caused during felling. Likewise, declared production 
levels do not take account of the temptation and tendency for loggers to 
underdeclare harvest volumes because royalties are assessed on them. With 
tighter surveillance now in place through the Forest Authority's contract with 
Societe Generale de Surveillance, the potential for underdeclaring export or 
harvest volumes may have been greatly reduced, but this operation is a fairly 
recent introduction.I2 Consequently, the convention of calculating harvest 
volumes at a level 15 percent higher than export volumes may produce an 
underestimate. Nevertheless, even if the harvest volumes were inflated to a level 
30 percent higher than export volumes, the former would still remain below the 
annual allowable cut in the Lak timber permit. 
At the same time, operational costs may have been unusually high. NGL 
maintains the coastal road all the way from Weittin to Mimias, a distance of 
approximately 40 kilometres, having constructed a 27-kilometre section of that 
road at an average cost of K 100,000 per kilometre (personal communication, 
NGL Operations Manager, 13 July 1996). Maintenance costs have been very 
high because the road was set too close to the coast and has been affected by 
shifting river mouths. 13 It is common knowledge in Lak that the road may not 
last too long when logging is finished and NGL leaves. The road is substandard 
because of the company's effort to minimise sunk costs, but also, to some extent, 
because the history of the Lak TRP, like that of other logging concessions in 
PNG, is replete with factionalism. There had been disagreements among local 
clans before NGL secured the logging contract, because some clans had been 
supporting a New Zealand logging contractor, Leytrac (personal communication, 
Metlak Development Corporation Vice-Chairman, 11 July 1996). During these 
years, between 1989 and 1991, NGL had to make financial outlays in order to 
maintain its presence in the area by cultivating exchange relations with local 
12 SGS began its surveillance work in PNG in 1995 with financial backing from the European 
Union (Times of PNG, 6 April 1995). By July 1996, SGS surveillance of the Lak project was still 
in its infancy (personal communication, SGS Operations Manager, 16 July 1996). 
13 Road design was the responsibility of the provincial government, which was mainly concerned 
to link the villages strung along the coast of southern New Ireland. 
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clans and key landowning groups which supported its own bid for the logging 
contract.14 When logging did finally begin, many rules were broken because of 
the pressure to recover the previous cost of maintaining a presence. 
The pivotal personality behind the introduction ofNGL (and later the ICAD 
project as well) was Ezekiel Weisale. In 1990, Weisale represented the Lak 
electorate and was also Finance Minister in the New Ireland Provincial 
Government. Provincial elections were imminent, and Weisale may have 
believed that his political future depended on the evidence that he could bring 
'development' to his electorate. Arproval of the timber permit had certainly 
been the promise on which he had been elected the last time around (Filer 
1991a). Elections in PNG are a costly business. 
In 1989, forty-seven Lak clan members had signed the TRP agreement, but 
government approval of the timber permit had become entangled in the 
moratorium that was imposed on the issue of new licences as part of PNG's 
commitment to the Tropical Forestry Action Plan in 1990, and on subsequent 
attempts by a government Task Force on Environmental Planning in Priority 
Forest Areas to assign a different kind of priority to the Lak area (see Filer 
1991 b). When the timber permit was finally issued, NGL could not afford to 
waste any more time. The Mimias to Weittin road was constructed in a hurry so 
that logging could begin, and front-end expenses could be recuperated, with 
minimum delay. 
NGL has been found in breach of government logging standards on a 
number of occasions since the start of its operations in Lak. Operations were 
suspended for six months in 1993 for non-compliance with permit conditions 
and for severe environmental degradation. Operations were again suspended in 
February 1995, and this time the list of transgressions included irregularities in 
the construction of a log pond, the poor quality of snig tracks causing 
unnecessary damage, the poor standards of road construction and drainage, and 
excessive damage to residual tree stands. 15 These irregularities seem to indicate 
poor engineering standards, but a key factor would have been the speed at which 
logging was done. Because of the delays and risks which have already been 
discussed, logging occurred at a frantic pace whenever it could be undertaken at 
all. The resulting problems have been aggravated by the poor quality of 
technical staff available to supervise field workers. 
The Malaysian field supervisors were largely technical (bulldozer or 
chainsaw) operators who had been promoted. The poor quality of field 
supervision has been a well-known problem for some time in Sarawak, where 
most of the Fouchow companies are based, but it has only recently been 
recognised as such by the Sarawak Timber Association (Perkasa, June 1995). 
14 In 1991, the group supporting the New Zealand logging contractor was persuaded to change its 
mind and support NGL instead (personal communication, Metlak Development Corporation Vice-
Chairman, 11 July 1996). 
15 These are itemised in a letter frorr, the DEC dated 26 September 1995. 
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On the whole, logging crews in Sarawak are initially untrained; they learn 
through trial and error on the job. Trial and error in dense forest undoubtedly 
carries untold costs. The question is whether members of such logging crews, 
once promoted, have the capacity or the .skill to identify their own and their 
workers' shortcomings, and to conduct on-the-job training in PNG forests. More 
importantly, even if they can train or supervise, do they have the inclination to 
do so, especially considering that most of the local workers whom I interviewed 
found it very difficult to communicate with their supervisors in either English or 
Tok Pisin? According to local Forest Authority staff (personal communication, 
4 July 1996), Malaysian supervisors spend most of their time driving along the 
roads. It is true that the company has hired its own environmental officer, but 
his job has been to find ways of remedying, rather than anticipating and 
avoiding, the damage caused by logging (personal communication, NGL 
Operations Manager, 13 July 1996). Incompetent supervision has cost money 
because logging has occasionally been suspended. Together with relatively low 
production levels and high infrastructure costs, this means that the Lak project 
may not be Rimbunan Hijau's most prized operation in PNG. 
The question is: if logging in Lak is not as profitable as it could be, perhaps 
hardly profitable at all, why does the company stay? 
Rimbunan Hijau is a giant in PNG's logging industry, for it is reputed to 
control more than 50 percent of PNG's log harvest (Gumoi and Sekhran 
1995 :52; see also Filer, this volume). Profits can be transferred between 
different projects, and the company can afford to withstand losses in some of its 
ventures, so long as these can be recovered from others. Rimbunan Hijau 
(through NGL) maintains its presence in Lak as part of a long-term strategy 
which is possibly designed to secure sources of timber for a downstream 
processing plant at Alotau, in Milne Bay Province, which is planned to begin 
operations around the year 2000 (personal communication, NGL Operations 
Manager, 13 July 1996). 
Furthermore, the potential for profit has been enhanced by the framing of 
the Logging and Marketing Agreement (LMA) between NGL and the local 
landowner company, Metlak Development Corporation (MDC), which was 
originally signed in 1991, then renewed and revised in 1994.16 Briefly, MDC 
was apportioned 30 percent of gross timber revenues, while NGL retained the 
balance. On the surface, this was a generous arrangement, when compared to 
the normal practice of assigning 7 to 1 0 percent of revenues to landowner 
companies elsewhere. However, out of its 30 percent share, MDC was to pay all 
export taxes, plus infrastructural, agricultural, reforestation and other levies. In 
1994, the government increased export taxes by approximately 20 percent, with 
the result that MDC's debt to NGL has subsequently increased with each 
l6 NGL's exploitation of the landowner company is well documented in the 'MacKenzie Report' 
(MacKenzie 1995), and SGS staff also consider the Lak LMA to be 'a bad one'. 
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shipment of logs.l 7 MDC's interests were not enhanced by the revisions made 
to the LMA in the same year, because these only had the effect of increasing 
premiums (rather than overall returns) by a few percentage points. Further 
changes to the LMA cannot be made before 1998, and it is a moot point whether 
MDC's board of directors has learnt, or wants to learn, from the mistakes made 
in 1994. 
The face of Rimbunan Hijau in the field is presented by its Malaysian field 
staff. Field staff are mostly technicians - surveyors, accountants and foremen. 
There are no foresters among the staff at Lak. The field staff are expected to 
cope with very complex work and social situations in a country with which they 
have little familiarity, but they have been given little preparation in human 
resource management. It was only in 1996, five years after the start of its 
operations, that NGL employed someone to undertake personnel work at Lak. 
This individual had no formal training in personnel work, but was formerly a 
storekeeper with some experience in office work (personal communication, NGL 
Personnel Officer, 29 June 1997). It was clear, therefore, that NGL staff 
members were very much left on their own to deal with local conditions as best 
they could. 
Wage labour is evidently a new phenomenon in the Lak TRP area, even 
though local people were engaged in the production cash crops (especially cocoa 
and copra) for several decades before the arrival of logging (Albert 1986). The 
sparse population, the mountainous terrain, and the small production base often 
meant that boats from Rabaul bypassed the area, so local engagement in the cash 
economy was tenuous. Malaysian field staff were thus expected to deal as best 
they could with a local labour force whose members might not have any 
previous experience of regular wage labour, yet their authority was limited. The 
company's head office in Port Moresby took all major decisions regarding the 
application of inducements (whether carrots or sticks) to local workers, 
landowners, and decision makers at provincial and national levels. 
Although local men were very keen to secure employment with NGL 
because of the fortnightly pay packet, they were in no hurry to accept the 
discipline of wage labour, whose negotiation therefore became a serious 
business. Workers have often spent the better part of the day, between the times 
of checking in and checking out, engaging in activities unrelated to their work, 
like gossiping. There has also been a high level of absenteeism. Both 
phenomena could be described as part of a strategy of avoidance - a culturally 
accepted way of withdrawing from an unpleasant relationship (Kingston 1996). 
17 The Lak LMA (Clause 13.4) also sets no limit to the charges which MDC is to bear as 
commission for marketing agents, travelling and overseas expenses directly related to 'the 
marketing function', or 'demurrage expenses and specification claims' -whatever these may be. 
This is an example of the way that landowner companies can be squeezed by making the definition 
and the cost of services as vague as possible. A high marketing fee and travel charges incurred 
while marketing products overseas would mean higher sunk costs and less revenue available for 
overall distribution. 
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Such resistance to the discipline of wage labour was clearly connected to the 
confidence which workers derived from their status as landowners. Despite the 
high value associated with work for 'the company', nineteen of the twenty 
workers whom I interviewed had no intention of moving away from Lak once 
for they knew that their gardens would provide them with 'free food'. NGL 
demonstrated some flexibility in dealing with the high levels of absenteeism 
amongst local workers with different levels of skill - from log scalers up to 
mechanics. Company policy was to employ more workers than were actually 
needed in order to ensure that, on any given day, enough would turn up to keep 
the operations going (personal communication, NGL Operations Manager, NGL, 
13 July 1996). 
Under conditions of chronic uncertainty, company staff must constantly 
reinforce their relationships with timber workers who may also be landowners, 
but their capacities and their techniques for doing so vary with their 
personalities. Some field staff are 'top', while others get beaten up. Camp or 
site managers are 'top' when they show some compassion towards their workers, 
usually through the provision of material assistance in times of need, but also in 
their willingness to drink together (Kingston 1996). On the other hand, camp 
managers and field staff get beaten up for all sorts of reasons - refusing to allow 
the use of company vehicles for social purposes, failing to take sufficient note of 
workers' personal needs, or failing to represent their case for better working 
conditions to higher levels of management. IS One of the Malaysian field staff at 
Lak told me that 'timber workers look upon the logging company like god', but 
they do not make sacrifices to the deity. A former operations manager was said 
to have adopted a policy of 'bending with the wind' - providing financial or 
other assistance as and when requested. According to the current operations 
manager, 'he thought he was Jesus Christ', but he was soon recalled by head 
office and now languishes in happy anonymity back in Sarawak. Another 
manager fell victim to attacks of anxiety after being subjected to physical 
violence by timber workers on a couple of occasions, and he was also flown 
home. 
Under conditions of chronic uncertainty, the company has established 
exchange relations with specific groups. Some clan leaders have used strong-
arm tactics, such as roadblocks, to prise what they want out of NGL -
compensation for trees used in road or bridge construction, for example, or 
vehicles to carry their children to and from boarding schools in town. NGL's 
strategy in such cases has been to placate them with money or gifts. For 
example, one clan in Kamilal village had the use of an electricity generator 
which was apparently stolen from NGL and also the use of a car which was 
officially reserved for a local landowner employed as a supervisor at NGL's 
northern camp. This individual had a brother who had previously been 
employed by the company, who had a reputation for strong-arm tactics, and was 
18 For example, members of forest survey teams pay a lot of attention to the quantity and quality 
of their food rations during the periods when they live and work in the forest. 
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negotiating a hefty payout on his 'retirement' in July 1996 - partly in 
recognition of the key role which had previously played in NGL's campaign 
against the ICAD project. 
In their dealings with the Metlak board members and other key players in 
the local political scene, NGL staff were entering into the sort of exchange 
relationships which made it possible to make inroads into Lak social. By these 
means, the company reified exchange relationships in order to achieve 
commercial ends (Kingston 1996). 
The ICAD Project in Lak 
By contrast, the ICAD approach was guided by popular ideas about grassroots 
participation in environmental planning (Sekhran 1996). These ideas were 
commendable enough, but it was not clear how they should be translated into 
Lak terms. Moreover, in practice, the structures available for channelling these 
ideas were hierarchical and bureaucratic. 
In their pursuit of grassroots participation in environmental planning, ICAD 
project staff actually refrained from establishing exchange relationships with the 
local community. It appeared that the ICAD project was concerned with the sale 
of ideas about conservation and its long-term benefits for future generations. 
For their part, most people in Lak were interested in material signs or proof that 
these ideas would work in their favour in the short term. 19 After all, their 
discontent with logging had more to do with their desire to get a fairer share of 
the material rewards from this activity than with any clash of principle between 
the values of forest exploitation and nature conservation. On the other hand, the 
show of support for the ICAD project at various public forums suggests that 
local people were not opposed or closed to alternative ideas. Material benefits 
may be important in winning support, but even more important is the way they 
are distributed. NGL did not pave the road with gold; it merely put up a few 
water tanks at Lambom, substandard community halls in various villages, 
teachers' houses at W eittin and Morukon, and one aid post at Bakok. Of course 
there were the private deals with some members of the Metlak board of 
directors, but generally speaking, material benefits to the community were 
carefully rationed. For its part, the ICAD project also spent money in the area-
19 Much of the data in this section derives from an informal meeting held with the local ICAD 
committee on 7 July 1996, followed a few days later by personal interviews with some of the 
members. The ICAD committee comprised the nominated representatives of several Lak villages. 
Committee members actively participated in planning and publicising various components of the 
ICAD project. They were treated as 'volunteers' by ICAD project staff, but did not accept this 
designation, and made several attempts to get the project to pay them for services rendered. In 
many societies of the 'Third World' the idea of 'volunteer' work is not necessarily a new one, but 
may not be understood in the same way as it is in the West. In Siar village, it was noted that local 
women formerd groups in which they donated labour to meet the needs of various members, e.g. 
for clearing clearing of bushes or planting garden crops. However, local people may not have seen 
the value of volunteer work on a long-term and unpaid basis because participants would normally 
need to be rewarded in order to live. 
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on repairs to the hospital at Silur, for example, and on a motor bike for the local 
kiap- not to mention the 'invisible' funds spent on surveys and research in the 
area. Likewise, the relative popularity of the ICAD project with some of its 
supporters in Siar village was probably due to the fact that some project staff had 
entered into personal exchange relations with the villagers. On the other hand, 
the project also offered some incentives which were visible and tangible, yet 
proved to be relatively inaccessible - like the dinghy and the truck which were 
used as bait to galvanise the community into getting rid of the logging company, 
and which later came to be seen and resented, by some local people, as rewards 
which were being withheld in the sort of treatment which is meted out to 
naughty children.20 
As noted earlier, the ICAD project's mandate for conserving biodiversity 
required a complete halt to large-scale logging. This was a big ask when the 
local clans were not united, and the best that some clans could do was simply to 
show their support. The approach that ICAD project staff adopted in the field 
was encapsulated in the overarching question: What should Lak as a community 
do to get NGL out? In view of the complexity of the relationships between and 
within clans, the appropriate place to start would be the constitution of the clans 
themselves, since they appear to be the pivot of all collective action. In which 
case, it would have made sense to ask which particular clans were involved in 
making particular decisions about the use of land or forest resources, and to 
recognise the identities of one's friends and enemies at the outset. The aim here 
would not have been to promote some sort of clan hierarchy through differential 
treatment, but rather to gain a knowledge of local power relationships as a guide 
to project implementation. In retrospect, what may have been lacking in the 
ICAD project approach was the ability to adopt effective strategies to deal with 
local power relationships. This faHing was partly due to the politically naive 
assumption that Lak was a single community which could mobilise its members 
for the task of getting rid ofNGL. 
At the same time, we must recognise that the institutional structures within 
which the ICAD project operated were not conducive to political sophistication, 
precisely because of their hierarchical nature. In order to uphold the values of 
accountability and transparency in decision making, the project staff in Lak were 
at the end of a line, or the bottom of a pyramid, which included the Conservation 
Resource Centre (part of the DEC) in Port Moresby and the UNDP offices in 
Port Moresby and New York. 
Admittedly, the choice of Lak as a project site was deliberate and political, 
in the sense that this was an experimental or pilot project intended to pit the 
20 Apart from meetings with the ICAD committee members, my account of local perceptions of 
the ICAD project is also based on discussions with clan leaders at Siar village and with 
government officials like the kiap and the forester. In June and July 1996, there was a widespread 
feeling that ICAD project vehicles were inaccessible to the people, despite the fact that one of them 
had just recently been used to transport some village people from Siar and Pukolmal to Kamparam, 
approximately ten kilometres away, for a singsing (village festival). 
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values of conservation squarely against those of 'development'. Furthermore, 
the project had to be established rapidly in the face of a logging project which 
was already operational. As a result, there was no time for prior social analysis. 
However, the belief of the national government and its overseas aid donors in the 
feasibility of this ICAD is revealing in itself, because it reflects a kind of naivety 
regarding the complexities of social life. Lessons from around the world suggest 
that the business of conservation has more to do with managing people and 
human relationships than with conserving flora and fauna (Utting 1993). Social 
relations are the key to decisions about the exploitation of the biological and 
physical world. The question why societies conserve or destroy forests is 
likewise a social question. 
However, although there is certainly an awareness of the social dimensions 
of forest abuse in the conservation community, the model prescribed for 
predicting change often assumes that a more accurate understanding of the 
physical and biological mechanisms of abuse is the primary task. The irony, in 
the present case, is that NGL had an instant grasp of what was going on in Lak, 
partly because it had spent some years establishing a presence before it moved in 
at the opportune moment to promote its own self-interest through the actual 
business of logging. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested that the form and scale of logging in PNG are both 
tied to the global features of tropical timber production and consumption. 
Consuming countries, especially Japan and South Korea, dominate the world 
trade in tropical timber, especially raw logs, while intermediate countries such as 
Malaysia occupy a special niche as production agents. The roles are hierarchical 
and cannot be easily changed, although Indonesia has managed to modify the 
hierarchy to the point where it has gained significant control over the plywood 
trade by cutting prices and circumventing the sago shosha. On the other hand, 
the Indonesian experiment has had substantial economic and environmental 
costs, and PNG should not seek to replicate it, even if this were a feasible option. 
But PNG cannot compete directly either with Indonesia or with Malaysia, where 
attempts have been made to attract Japanese investment to Sarawak with 
incentive packages which include a mixture of planned infrastructure and other 
services (Perkasa, March 1994, August/September 1996, September/October 
1996). 
The additional problem for PNG is that the consuming countries try their 
best to exclude any new entrants who threaten their own control over the tropical 
timber trade, as they do by imposing high tariffs on value-added products such 
as plywood, yet they have no desire to exercise any direct control over the 
production and importation of raw logs. This explains why countries such as 
PNG find it more convenient to continue producing raw logs. With changing 
patterns of production in consumer countries, the consumption of tropical raw 
logs has declined, and the trade may change direction with the substitution of 
other materials. There is no bright economic future in the production and export 
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of more raw logs, because prices will need to be kept low to meet the needs of 
plywood manufacturers in consumer countries, such as Japan, who already face 
competition from Indonesia. This means that PNG may have to produce more 
for less, with obviously detrimental effects on its economy and its forest 
resources. Hence the current need to explore the alternatives to large-scale 
logging. 
The case of Lak suggests that local communities are interested in the 
alternatives, but these must operate within specific economic, political and 
socio-cultural conditions. Ironically, NGL was able to grasp the complexities of 
these conditions and used them to its own advantage. It expected and exploited 
divisions within the community, targetting useful power-brokers and 
manoeuvring to enter into exchange relationships with them, while 
disempowering those who were excluded from these relationships. This is not 
an approach which aspires to any semblance of social justice or popular 
participation, and it ought to be treated with extreme disdain. However, if there 
is a lesson to be learned here, it consists in the need to make sense of power and 
culture well before one tries to make sense of biology and ecology. 
CHAPTER 7 
LIVING WITH LOGGING AND BROKEN PROMISES: 
MADANG TIMBERS IN THE MADANG NORTH COAST TRP 
BILL F. SAGIR 
Introduction 
The Madang North Coast Timber Rights Purchase (TRP) was negotiated in the 
pre-Independence era, and became an integral part of the Gogol timber project 
(see Montagu, this volume). It covers an area of about 14,990 hectares. A 
timber permit was issued over the area on 27 October 1971, and should have 
expired on 27 October 1995, but a one-year extension was granted by the PNG 
Forest Authority at the request of the current licence-holder and operator, 
Madang Timbers Pty Ltd. 
Although the North Coast TRP covers a large area, much of the information 
presented here has been gathered from the smaller operational area known as 
Wasab-Yab-Y oidik, where I conducted fieldwork in 1991, 1994, and 1996. 
Some reference will also be made to the Ari area, which I visited briefly in April 
1996, and for which I have gathered other information from reports kept in the 
provincial forestry office in Madang. 
Local Policy Processes 
Madang Timbers has engaged in a number of practices which can be regarded as 
the foundations of the 'local policy process' which governs its logging 
operation. These include: 
• a strategy of 'appeasement', by which the company has consciously adapted 
its practices to meet the demands which local villagers have made on its 
resources; 
• a policy of avoiding the threat of conflict with local villagers through the 
practice of 'patchwork logging'; and 
• attempts to secure the support of landowners through false promises of future 
material benefits. 
Appeasement and Accommodation 
Since 1990, when the campaigns of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
caused an upsurge in landowner militancy, the logging company has embarked 
on a policy of keeping the landowners happy enough to prevent them from 
disrupting logging operations. In the Wasab-Yab area, the company agreed to 
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let villagers use its machinery to fell and haul logs from areas outside the TRP 
boundary into their villages. Villagers then used chainsaws and wokabaut somils 
to cut up the logs for sale both within and outside the village. People in Yab had 
a contract with the Catholic church in Alexishafen to provide sawn logs of 
various sizes. In this case, the use of company machinery seems to have been 
fuelled by the need to meet the church's demands for sawn logs. 
The company knew that this practice was illegal, but the company and the 
villagers alike saw the need to accommodate each other's interests, just so long 
as the authorities did not get to know about it. In September 1995, however, 
forest inspectors who went to the area to check on the activities of Mad~mg 
Timbers found out about this practice. Although they told the villagers that this 
was against the law, and should therefore cease, the villagers took no heed of 
their advice, but kept on using company machinery for their own logging 
operations. Madang Timbers was also warned that it should stop letting the 
villagers use its machinery in this way, and in October 1995, the company 
decided to act on this warning. This caused some unrest in the villages of Yab 
and Gabaksal, which resulted in some villagers being locked up in police cells. 
In the wake of these events, Madang Timbers reversed its previous decision and 
allowed the practice to continue, albeit on a limited scale. This was possibly due 
to its desire to finish cutting the commercial timber still standing within this part 
of the TRP. In January 1996, forestry officials issued a stronger warning to the 
company, which again decided to stop the practice altogether, provoking a 
second round of unrest. This time, the reason which villagers gave for their 
protest was the company's failure to build the classrooms which it had promised 
to build at Komindor community school, but the real reason may still have been 
their desire to keep using company machinery to fell and haul logs for 
themselves. By this time, however, Madang Timbers had already begun moving 
its equipment out of the Wasab-Yab area and into the Ari area, either because 
the first area had been logged out or else because this was another way to avoid 
further conflict. 
Another plank in this policy of appeasement was company's willingness to 
fell of small logs by roadsides at the local people's request, thus increasing the 
volume of timber on which royalties could be calculated. The company itself 
had no market for these undersized logs, which therefore ended up in Jant's 
woodchip mill. When provincial forestry officers enquired ctbout this practice, 
Madang Timbers responded with a letter which said that: 
Landowners insisted that small logs must be extracted also from the 
roadsides and to maintain good relationship with the landowners, we 
accepted their request to take some small logs for royalty payment 
calculation. 
The willingness of the logging company to keep landowners happy by doing 
such things, and the ability of landowners to manipulate this weakness, meant 
that both parties were collaborating in a form of environmental mismanagement 
by further depletion of local forest resources. 
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The need for this policy of appeasement is evident from those instances of 
conflict in which certain influential individuals in the local villages have fallen 
out of favour with the company, and then mobilised their followers to disrupt 
logging operations. One example from the Wasab-Yab area will illustrate this 
point. During its operations in the Yab area, Madang Timbers employed a man 
from a neighbouring village (Garup) as a mechanic. During the course of his 
employment, this man made use of company tools for his own ends. When the 
company found out, and the man was sacked, he persuaded his fellow villagers 
to disrupt the logging operation, complaining that the company was infringing 
into part of Garup territory which was not part of the North Coast TRP. The 
company had, in fact, been guilty of this infringement, and the mechanic knew 
about it, but he did not do anything about it so long as he was employed by the 
company and could use company tools for his own benefit. 
This man was acting in much the same way as one of the local ringleaders 
in the protests against the company's decision to curtail the use of its machinery 
for felling and hauling logs to supply village sawmills. Both men were able to 
incite their followers to a level of violence which meant that police had to be 
called in to quell the disturbances. 
Conflict Avoidance through Patchwork Logging 
The patchwork pattern of logging is a forest management practice whereby the 
logging company operates simultaneously in several different areas. This can be 
justified on technical grounds, because it facilitates the continuity of operations 
when bad weather hampers work in particular parts of the TRP, but it also serves 
as a device for avoiding conflict with specific groups of landowners, and even 
enables the company to avoid its commitments to provide social services and 
infrastructure to local communities. 
By logging several areas at once, the company has been able to maintain its 
operations, when there was landowner unrest in one area, by concentrating its 
equipment and personnel in the other areas. This strategy was evident when 
there was an outbreak of landowner unrest among the Yoidik people, neighbours 
ofthe Wasab and Yab people, in 1989. Madang Timbers was operating in parts 
of the Far North Coast TRP (under Timber Permit 12-6) at the same time as it 
was operating in the Y oidik area. When the Y oidik people disrupted logging 
operations because their royalty payments were long overdue, Madang Timbers 
was easily able to move its equipment to the Far North Coast TRP. As we have 
seen, the same strategy was evident in the case of the unrest which occurred 
among Yab and Gabaksal villagers in 1995, when the logging equipment was 
moved to the Ari operation area. And when landowners in the Ari area caused 
trouble with compensation demands for a villager killed by a company vehicle, 
the company again concetrated its operations in the Far North Coast TRP. 
This policy was one which not only enabled the company to avoid open 
conflict with landowners, but also enabled it to escape from undertakings to 
provide social services to landowners. The lack of services was often cited 
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amongst the reasons for landowner unrest in the North Coast TRP. As 
previously noted, a contributing factor to landowner unrest in the Wasab-Yab 
area was the company's failure to build the three double classrooms which it had 
promised to build at Komindor community school. This was a promise the 
company made when it wanted the landowners to support its application for a 
orie-year extension to the North Coast Timber Permit. When company officials 
were later asked why the classrooms had not been built, the response was that 
they would have been built if there had not been an outbreak of unrest which 
forced the company to leave the area. It appeared, in this case, that landowner 
unrest was being used as an excuse for the company to break its promises to 
provide essential services. 
Promises, Promises 
Madang Timbers has a policy to employ unskilled and semi-skilled manual 
workers (mostly men) from within its current areas of operation. Unskilled 
workers are those employed as road builders and those who tie logs to chains for 
hauling. Semi-skilled workers include drivers, heavy equipment operators, and 
log scalers. When it moves from one area to another, these workers are laid off 
and left behind so that new ones can be employed in the next area. 
During the Wasab-Yab operations, in the decade from 1985 to 1995, sixty 
to eighty local men were employed at one time or another. In 1991, Wasab men 
complained during interviews about the long hours and weekends which they 
spent working on roads and bridges, motivated by promises of generous 
overtime payments which were never forthcoming. In April 1996, these very 
same complaints were raised again in Yab and Gabaksal. In October 1995, 
workers from Y ab, Gabaksal, Was ab, and W asab-amal stopped work because 
their wages had not been paid for such a long period of time. They joined forces 
with other landowners in causing disruption to logging activities, only to be 
chased off by police, and some ofthem ended up in police cells. 
It is by no means clear that Madang Timbers or its predecessor, Wewak 
Timbers, ever really had a policy of providing infrastructure and social services 
to the people living within the North Coast TRP. In effect, the two decades of 
logging in the area have only seen the people living with broken promises. 
Promises of social services, such as educational and health care facilities, were 
made in the very beginning as a means of enticing the people to agree to logging 
in the area. More recently, when its permit was about to expire, representatives 
of Madang Timbers ran around the area, making frantic promises to provide 
infrastructure and social services if the company had its permit renewed or 
extended by at least one year. Landowners from both the Ari and Wasab-Yab 
areas agreed to an extension on this basis. In the Wasab-Yab area, the company 
promised to build three double classrooms at Komindor community school, 
build a house for a community health worker, upgrade roads in the area, and help 
th~ villages fell and haul logs to their villages. In the Ari area, the company 
promised to 'fulfil infrastructural requirements', build school facilities and an 
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aid post, and upgrade roads in the area. The failure to keep these promises has 
caused a lot of the recent disturbances among landowners. 
Whatever roads and bridges have been built by the logging company were 
not meant for the long-term benefit of local people, but only for the specific 
purpose of extracting logs, and they have soon become unusable once logging is 
completed. Barnett ( 1992:97) described the situation as follows: 
The dazed and disillusioned forest owners stood watching in disbelief 
as foreign operators removed their trees before moving on to the next 
area, leaving environmentally disastrous logged-over hillsides, 
temporary gravel/mud roads and rotting log bridges to erode and cave 
in to clog the watercourses [my italics]. 
This description certainly fits the case of the North Coast TRP. 
The Actors and Their Interests 
The Pre-Reform Period 
In the period which ended with the major reforms of the national forestry sector 
in 1990, the main actors in the negotiation of the Madang North Coast TRP, in 
order of appearance, included the landowners, the colonial state, Fletcher 
Holdings (Wewak Timbers), the Japan New Guinea Timber Company 
(commonly known as 'Jant'), Gasmata Resources (Madang Timbers), and the 
Madang Provincial Government. 
The Landowners 
Australian patrol officer G.L. Szarka, after conducting a patrol through the 
Wasab-Yoidik area in 1952, noted the existence of a good stand oftimber in the 
area, reaching as far as the inland village of Bunu. Tropical hardwoods like 
Taun (Pometia spp.), Kwila (lnstia spp.), Talis (Terminalia brassii), and Cedar 
were said to be present in this area. Szarka also noted the possibility of bringing 
timber to the beach without too much difficulty, by making use of the 
Surumerang River, and thought that development of this forest area would 
provide a 'good opportunity for future native enterprise' (Madang District Patrol 
Reports). 
In the 1960s, when resource inventories were carried out, the Australian 
administration told local people of the many benefits which would follow from 
logging. These included infrastructural development, in the form of roads and 
bridges, access to social services, and agricultural development once the forests 
had been cleared. Local political leaders made promises of substantial and 
regular royalty payments (De' Ath 1980:36). The people themselves, not only in 
the Wasab-Yoidik area, but also in other parts of the TRP, did then see logging 
as a 'good opportunity' for development. Logging presented an opportunity for 
them to become 'developed' and to 'catch up' with coastal villages which were 
seen to be more 'developed' than the inland villages. Landowners in the North 
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Coast TRP, like those. in the Gum TRP, were not interested in reforestation as a 
post-logging land use option. They were interested in commercial agricultural 
development (Lamb 1990:75). In parts of the TRP area, this was seen as a way 
of stopping young men from migrating to work on coastal plantations. 1 On the 
whole, the proposed project seemed to elicit a sense of pride amongst people in 
the inland villages, and, for this reason, it was welcomed wholeheartedly by 
most of them, even if some may have welcomed it out of fear of the kiap and the 
colonial administration. In either case, at this point in time, they can still be seen 
as mere recipients of 'development' - people who accepted things without 
question. 
The Colonial State 
For the colonial state, in the period of transition to self-government, the logging 
project presented a good opportunity for economic progress to be made, not just 
on behalf of the local people, but also for the nation at large. As Ross (1983) 
notes, the colonial administration expected the exploitation and development of 
PNG's forest resources to support its own policies for social and economic 
development during this period of transition. However, his analysis also shows 
that the timing, scale, and financing of major forestry projects have normally 
been determined as much, if not more, by decisions and events occurring outside 
PNG as by the public policies laid down by the colonial and post-colonial state. 
This argument certainly applies to the case of the North Coast TRP. 
Having completed its survey of the North Coast TRP, the colonial state 
made a down payment of A$13,955 to the various groups of landowners within 
the TRP area as the purchase price of rights to extract timber from their land. 
The rights to harvest timber on four TRPs in Madang Province -North Coast, 
Gogol, Naru, and Gum -were unsuccessfully offered for public tender in 1964 
and 1966 (see Map 7.1 ). When they were offered again, in 1968, the consortium 
of Japanese firms now known as Jant submitted an application and began 
feasibility studies to see if the variety of species present in the Madang forests 
could supply a pulping operation.2 Their application was unsuccessful because 
the Japanese could not agree to Australian demands for Australian or PNG 
interests to hold a majority equity share in the pulpwood logging project. In 
1969, however, Australia changed the equity requirement and asked the Japanese 
to apply again (see Montagu, this volume). 
1 In 1991, an old man in Wasab village told me that, when a kiap (patrol officer) and some local 
government councillors came and told his people about the project in the late 1960s, the people felt 
happy that this would release them from their role as wokbois (contract labourers) on mission and 
other privately owned plantations on the coast. 
2 Jant included a prominent Japanese financial institution, Nomura Securities, and a giant paper 
company, Honshu Paper Corporation. It was initially interested in developing an operation to 
produce cardboard from tropical hardwoods. 
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Map 7.1: The North Coast, Gogol, Naru, and Gum TRPs, Madang Province 
(courtesy ofSimon Montagu). 
Papua New Guinea 
0 15 
kilometres 
30 
Bismarck 
Sea 
Madang Timbers in the Madang North Coast TRP 13 7 
Jant. Wewak Timbers. and Madang Timbers 
Jant's second application was almost turned down when the company refused to 
forge a partnership with Wewak Timbers, which was already carrying out a 
selective sawlog operation in the Gogol area. It was eventually agreed that Jant 
would subcontract Wewak Timbers to continue its sawlog operation in the North 
Coast TRP, while Jant itself would concentrate its woodchip project in the 
Gogol, Naru, and Gum TRPs. On this basis, Jant was finally granted the permit 
(Timber Permit 12-3) for all four TRPs in August 1971. Jant's own logging 
operations have since been conducted on a scale far greater than the sawlog 
operation in the North Coast TRP, with a much more intensive training regime 
for local workers, and a far more substantial pattern of infrastructural 
development (see Lamb 1990; Montagu, this volume). 
Wewak Timbers continued to operate on a much smaller scale, despite the 
fact that a controlling interest in the company had been acquired by the New 
Zealand company, Fletcher Holdings. The new owners built a sawmill in 
Madang town, not far from Jant's own woodchip mill, to produce sawn logs for 
domestic consumption as well as for export. Jant and Wewak Timbers agreed to 
exchange logs suitable for each other's purposes at mutually agreeable prices. 
The logging roads built by Wewak Timbers in the North Coast TRP were 
far less sophisticated than those built by Jant in the other areas, and its 
sawmilling operation soon ran into difficulties when equipment imported from 
New Zealand proved to be unsuitable for sawing tropical hardwoods.3 In 1985, 
the high cost of processing timber in PNG, and the low international prices of 
processed timber, persuaded Fletcher Holdings to seii its interests to a Malaysian 
logging company, Gasmata Resources. At the same time, the Madang Provincial 
Government, then under the leadership of Premier Andrew Ariako, also 
purchased an 8 percent equity share in the business, which partly explains the 
change of name from Wewak to Madang Timbers. The new owners insisted that 
they could only make a profit by exporting raw logs, rather by than processing 
timber for both export and domestic consumption. The government finaiiy 
agreed to a compromise, whereby most of the logs could be exported in raw 
form, but some would still have to be processed for domestic consumption. 
Donor-Funded Reforestation 
In 1985, the New Zealand government approved a grant of NZ$1 0.2 miiiion, 
over a period of six years, for the implementation of a 'demonstration 
reforestation project' in PNG. The area around Wasab viilage was one of four 
locations selected for the implementation of this project. However, the New 
Zealand government, the PNG government, and the local viiiagers have never 
shared a common understanding of the purpose of this project. 
3 The company had to fly in specialist technicians from New Zealand to handle major problems in 
servicing this equipment, and finally decided to replace it altogether. 
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The New Zealand government saw it as a pilot project to investigate the 
feasibility of government-sponsored reforestation on customary land by 
collecting cost and growth data which could later be presented to aid donors as 
part of a commercial plantation forestry programme. But the PNG government 
regarded it as part of an existing programme which embraced a range of other 
activities in each of the four provinces where the project was being 
implemented. Activities in the Wasab area were thus seen to have six specific 
objectives: 
• to provide a commercially viable and sustainable alternative to harvesting 
natural forests, which were seen to be a rapidly diminishing resource base for 
established forest industries in Madang Province; 
• to demonstrate the potential of commercial saw log production for both export 
and local markets; 
• to demonstrate efficient medium-scale plantation forestry as a viable form of 
land use, and as a means of restoring the productivity of logged-over forests 
in an area close to the provincial capital; 
• to complement the existing reforestation projects in the Gogol Valley 
(designed to maintain the supply of pulpwood) through the development of 
plantations containing high-value crops, thus diversifying the range of local 
forest products; 
• to build on the silvicultural and management experience of the Gogol project 
in order to: (a) determine the optimum range of species for the local climate 
and soil conditions of the project site, given specific end-use objectives; (b) 
introduce agroforestry systems combining wood crops with agricultural 
crops; and (c) compare the benefits of open and line planting of the major 
species selected for the project; and 
• to establish a suitable framework of cooperation between national and 
provincial forestry staff, local landowners, and the forest industry (PNGDOF 
1984). 
For the people of Wasab and other local communities, the reforestation 
project presented itself as the latest means of achieving the benefits of 
'development' and 'catching up' with their coastal neighbours. They 'gave' 
their land to the project in the hope that this 'gift' would be reciprocated by the 
PNG and New Zealand governments (Filer 1989). The PNG government was 
supposed to survey the land and then lease it from the customary owners. The 
landowners thought that they would receive substantial rental incomes once this 
process was complete, but it has never been completed. New Zealand's bilateral 
assistance for the project has come to an end, and no-one is now caring for the 
trees (mostly eucalyptus) which the landowners planted when they were 
employed on project funds. Since the lease arrangements were never completed, 
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the trees presumably belong to the local landowners, yet they may not even be 
aware ofthis.4 
The Period of Reform 
There have been some important changes in the identities, activities, and 
interests of actors engaged in the negotiation of the North Coast TRP during the 
present decade. The post-colonial state, with the support of overseas aid donors, 
has been seeking to impose a major reform of forest policy and forestry 
legislation in the wake of the Barnett Inquiry; NGOs have been much more 
active in their conduct of campaigns against large-scale logging operations; the 
Madang Provincial Government was suspended in 1992, then subjected to a · 
nationwide reform of local and provincial government in 1995; and early in the 
same year, Gasmata Resources sold its stake in Madang Timbers to another 
Malaysian company, WTK Realty. 
NGOs and Landowners 
In 1990 and 1991, environmental NGOs were very active in their campaign 
against logging operations in Madang Province. Members of various groups, 
such as Wau Ecological Institute and Asples Madang for a Better Environment, 
walked the length and breadth of logging areas in the province on a campaign to 
'critically raise the consciousness of the people' (personal communication, Otto 
Avorosi). Much of the campaign was aimed at Jant's long history of clear-fell 
logging in the Gogol and Naru TRPs, but the North Coast TRP was also 
included. 
This campaign resulted in strong anti-logging and anti-Asian sentiments 
among the village people, as I was able to observe during my fieldwork in 
Wasab village in 1991. Wasab people now believed that they could cut down 
their own trees, process the timber with wokabaut somils, and then sell it to local 
consumers. So they felt, at this time, that large-scale logging was unnecessary 
and destructive. The men who worked for Madang Timbers, during its 
operations in the Wasab area, talked a good deal about the harsh treatment they 
received at the hands of Asian supervisors and the long hours which they worked 
without overtime payments. From these experiences, they had come to regard 
all Asians as greedy and dishonest. 
By 1994, these feelings seemed to have mellowed, and there was less 
vociferous opposition to large-scale logging. The number of wokabaut somils in 
the area had certainly increased, but rather than telling the logging company to 
leave, the people felt that they could use the company to pursue their own 
interests. By this time, as previously noted, they had started using company 
machinery to fell and haul logs from outside the TRP boundary to the villages, 
4 Section 8(t) of the National Forest Policy states that: 'Customary land owners will receive all 
proceeds from the sale of timber and other forest produce that are harvested from their plantations 
and wood lots.' 
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where the wokabaut somils could be used to cut them up. On the other hand, the 
logging company still got some of the blame when this activity was prohibited 
by regional forestry officials in 1995. 
The Post-Colonial State 
Following the introduction of the new National Forest Policy in 1991, and 
gazettal of the new Forestry Act in 1992, regional and provincial forest 
inspectors, who were now employees of a unified National Forest Service, began 
to carry out more frequent and intensive checks on the conduct of logging 
operations in Madang Province. In this way, the state was seen to be more 
energetic in its imposition of the rule of law, but this, in turn, disrupted some of 
the existing forms of collusion between the logging companies and local 
landowners, thus making life more difficult for both of them, and provoking the 
landowners to take action against the companies. 
Meanwhile, the Madang Provincial Government remained in a state of 
suspension from 1992 to 1994, so provincial politicians lost much of their 
previous power to interfere in relationships between logging companies, 
government officials, and local landowners. When new provincial elections 
were held at the end of 1994, two of the new members elected to the Provincial 
Assembly were men who had been very active in the campaign against logging 
companies in the 1990-91 period. It was widely- expected that these two men 
would join forces with other members to form a government which would bring 
new pressures to bear on the logging companies. However, the two men joined 
opposing factions in the Assembly, and all provincial members soon disappeared 
into oblivion when the old system of provincial government was abolished by 
the passage of the new Organic Law on Provincial and Local-Level 
Governments in 1995.5 The newly constituted provincial authorities have been 
too preoccupied with the process of institutional reform to take any significant 
action in the forestry sector. No consideration has been given, for example, to 
the possibility of selling the provincial government's 8 percent equity in Madang 
Timbers. 
The Logging Companies 
In early 1995, Gasmata Resources sold its interest in Madang Timbers to WTK 
Realty, despite the fact that the North Coast timber permit was due to expire in 
October 1995. Prior to the expiry date, company officials held a number of 
meetings in different villages in the North Coast TRP in order to convince the 
residents that the Forest Authority should grant Madang Timbers a one-year 
extension or a renewal of its permit so that it could complete its operations those 
parts of the TRP which still contained commercial volumes of timber. As 
previously noted, the villagers agreed to this proposal because of the 
5 The new Organic Law abolished provincial assemblies made up of elected representatives from 
a set of provincial electorates, and replaced them with authorities which included the national 
members of parliament and the presidents of local government councils from each province. 
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undertakings which the company made to provide additional infrastructure and 
other material benefits. 
Meanwhile, Madang Timbers had come into conflict with another logging 
company, called Taway Timbers, which one forestry official referred to as a 
'ghost company', probably because he knew very little about it. This company 
was said to have been started by an Asian man who was married to a local 
woman, and who had entered into an agreement with his in-laws to fell trees on 
their land and sell the timber to unknown Asian companies. In 1995, Madang 
Timbers accused Taway Timbers of trespassing into its own area of operations at 
Ari. In a letter written to the Provincial Forest Officer in Madang, the Madang 
Timbers management alleged that, on 26 September 1995, when Madang 
Timbers had stopped the movements of its own logging trucks after heavy rains, 
a Taway Timbers truck carrying 'short length baby small undersized logs' had 
caused a lot of damage to the logging road in the. Ari operation area. The letter 
went on to complain that these 'supersmall, undersized logs' had been left to rot 
away, and to demand K20,000 in compensation from Taway Timbers to repair 
the damage to the road. This demand brought no response from Taway Timbers, 
which now appears to be defunct. 
At the time of my fieldwork in April 1996, Madang Timbers was already 
winding down its own operations in the Madang North Coast TRP. Operations 
in the Wasab-Yab area had ceased altogether, and those in the Ari area were 
about to follow suit. Substantial amounts of equipment had been moved to the 
Far North Coast TRP, whose permit is not due to expire until 1998, and Madang 
Timbers had also secured the contract to log the Sogeram TRP, whose current 
permit expires in the year 2000. 
The Costs and Benefits of Logging 
What have the landowners of the North Coast TRP, especially those of the 
Wasab-Yab and Ari areas, gained or lost, in wealth, power, and knowledge, from 
their experience of two decades of logging? 
Wealth 
In economic terms, it could be argued that the losses outweigh the gains. As we 
have seen, the colonial state bought the right to extract logs from the North 
Coast TRP for A$13,955, but when this money was divided up amongst the 
landowners, individuals finally received less than A$5 each. Landowners were 
promised that royalties would be paid every six months, but payments were 
initially made on an annual basis, and seem to have ceased altogether after 1980. 
In 1991, the cessation of royalty payments was a major political issue, and one 
on which I was repeatedly questioned by my informants in Wasab village.6 
6 The Wasab villagers received a royalty payment almost as soon as I had left the field, and I was 
apparently given some credit for this, probably because I was known to have taken the matter up 
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Up until 1996, landowners have been entitled to 25 percent of the royalties 
which the government has collected from logging companies on the volumes of 
timber harvested each month (see Filer, this volume). Table 7.1 shows the 
volumes of timber harvested from the North Coast TRP, the total royalties paid 
to the government in respect of this harvest, and the 25 percent share which 
should have been passed on to landowners, during the period from 1978 to 1990. 
Table 7.1: Annual timber production and royalty payments for the Madang 
North Coast TRP, 1978-June 1990. 
Year Timber harvest (m3) Total royalties (K) Landowner share 
1978 28,347.380 28,967.91 7,241.98 
1979 33,048.291 38,622.47 9,655.62 
1980 41,189.685 41,073.17 10,268.29 
1981 32,698.480 37,585.67 9,396.42 
1982 22,446.549 23,738.33 5,934.58 
1983 21,244.435 32,070.12 8,017.53 
1984 26,010.659 43,058.05 10,771.26 
1985 17,707.672 36,145.69 9,036.42 
1986 12,553.043 37,747.38 9,436.85 
1987 4,101.034 13,520.17 3,380.04 
1988 22,479.411 67,983.07 16,988.27 
1989 12,368.000 52,424.14 13,106.04 
1990 10,896.000 33,480.11 8,370.03 
TOTAL 285,090.693 486,413.28 121,603.33 
Source: Department of Forests records held at Hohola. 
Note: 1990 figures are for the first six months only. 
The statistics in Table 7.1 indicate that individual landowners would not have 
received more than K5 per annum in royalty payments, even if the payments had 
been made on time. 
Apart from their problems with royalty payments, people in both the 
Wasab-Yab and Ari areas have complained about the lack of compensation for 
the damage which logging has done to their gardens and economic trees. 
Madang Timbers has consistently failed to pay such compensation, despite its 
promises to do so. 
Employment of local people, especially men, has certainly contributed to 
their economic gains, although the logging company has rarely employed more 
than fifty at any one time, and most of them have occupied jobs with low levels 
of skill and correspondingly low levels of pay. In Wasab village, I found that 
men who were employed by Madang Timbers used most their wage incomes to 
with provincial forestry officials, although it seems likely that the consciousness-raising efforts of 
local NGOs were also partly responsible. The more important' point, however, is to ask why 
people had been denied their entitlement for such a long time. 
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purchase consumer and household goods, and my own household survey showed 
that households whose heads had worked on the logging project had more 
durable household goods than those of other households (Sagir 1992). In Yab 
and Gabaksal, most of the logging company's employees started their own trade 
stores, but most of these closed down after a few months of operation. A very 
small proportion of such wage incomes was invested in other income-earning 
activities such as cash cropping. 
Economic losses are difficult to measure, but could be inferred from the 
statements made by people in both the Wasab-Yab and Ari areas, that game had 
been much easier to catch, and· fruits and nuts had been much more plentiful, 
before the advent of logging. In the Wasab-Yab area, people complained about 
the disappearance of flying foxes, which are considered as some kind of delicacy 
in the local diet. Logging has removed the big trees which used to attract large 
numbers of flying foxes at certain times of the year, and local people are left to 
grieve over the recollection. The logging company's practice of leaving many 
trees to rot when they have been felled is also perceived by local people as a 
symbol of their economic loss. 
The loss of wealth was conceived in cultural, as well as economic, terms. 
The spiritual significance of the forests was seen to be lost as logging destroyed 
many of the sacred sites (pies masalai) where ancestral spirits dwelt, and no 
compensation was paid for this destruction. Whenever sickness or misfortune 
has afflicted an individual or family, it has sometimes been attributed to the 
destruction of a particular pies masalai associated with the clan to which they 
belong. For example, when I was in Wasab in 1991, a child had to spend some 
weeks in the the general hospital in Madang, and the sickness was attributed to 
the father's decision to let the logging company fell trees in a pies masalai 
belonging to his clan. 7 
Power 
In 1991, Wasab villagers were clearly suffering from what Filer (1996a) 
describes as the 'demoralisation effect' of large-scale development. The 
feelings of powerlessness and alienation were obvious, but obviously hard to 
quantify. Local people had welcomed the logging operation as a means to 
achieve 'development', but their expectations had not been fulfilled, and they 
could no longer identify with the forests which they had lost. The feeling of loss 
of power and identity is 'posthumous', in the sense that people grieve after their 
loss of control over an environment which they have sacrificed to the goal or 
thing they call 'development' (Filer 1996b). 
The situation in the villages of Yab and Gabaksal appeared to be somewhat 
different. In these cases, they tried to maintain a sense of their own power, of 
maintaining some control of their own lives, by negotiating and collaborating 
7 The child in question eventually dropped out of school, and this was also seen as a loss due to 
logging. 
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with the logging company in the depletion of their forest resources. To some 
extent, they were successful in using the company to pursue their own interests 
and achieve their own goals. However, this was really a false sense of control 
which was likely to disappear once the company had left the area, and the local 
people were left with the reality of a depleted resource. 
Knowledge 
Gains in local knowledge might be said to include changes in people's 
perception, and the accompanying practice, of 'development'. Initially, local 
people thought of development largely in terms of tangible benefits such as 
roads, bridges, schools, health centres, opportunities for cash cropping, and, 
most importantly, the acquisition of money. It was the promise of such things 
during the 1960s which had made them consent to logging in the first place. 
And there was no difference in the way that men and women had approached the 
question of development in these terms (see Sagir 1992, 1994). 
By 1991, this perception of development had begun to change after the 
campaigns which NGOs had mounted against logging in the province. At that 
stage, I found that it was not only common for villagers to express anti-logging, 
anti-Asian sentiments, but they had also begun to talk about sustainable 
development, by which they basically meant the need to save some of their 
resources for future generations. Unfortunately, for the people of Wasab at least, 
most of their forest resource had already disappeared by this time. People in 
Yab and Gabaksal still had some of their resource left, and saw the wokabaut 
somil as a means to pursue the goal of sustainable development, yet this 
aspiration was threatened by the impatience of some individuals to make quick 
money by using the logging company's machines as an adjunct to their own 
practice of small-scale forestry. 
Through the work of NGOs, villagers within the TRP have also become 
more knowledgeable about the interests of other parties, such as government 
agencies and logging companies. The general feeling in this area was that the 
state does not represent the interests of ordinary landowners, or Papua New 
Guineans in general, but those of rich people and foreigners, especially Asians. 
Villagers in Yab and Gabaksal accused forestry officials in Madang of siding 
with the logging company, and arranging for the police to harrass, arrest, and 
detain those villagers who caused any disturbance, when they should have been 
taking care of landowners' grievances. 
Local villagers have also acquired some knowledge of institutions like the 
World Bank, which now figures prominently in their discourse on 
'development', although the accuracy of this knowledge is questionable. 
Villagers mistakenly believe that the World Bank has been responsible for the 
influx of Asian logging companies into the country because it wants the PNG 
government to repay its loans quickly. The Bank is also seen as a villain 
because of the part which it played in promoting the government's proposed 
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Land Reform Bill, which is thought to have been intended to take land out of 
customary ownership for sale to rich Papua New Guineans and foreigners. 8 
In 1996, I also found that certain forms of environmental rhetoric, which 
had not been present in 1991 and 1994, had become quite common in the Yab-
Gabaksal area. For example, one could hear village people talking about land 
being 'our life' and the earth being 'our mother'. One elderly man who showed 
me around some of the areas which had been logged kept repeating the 
vernacular phrase og ka in i ginen ('this earth is our mother'). Such statements 
bear no relationship to any local myths of origin, but are evidently derived from 
the teachings of environmental NGOs. 
Such gains in knowledge are offset by some significant losses. The most 
significant of these, according to people in the Wasab-Yab area, is the loss of 
magical knowledge associated with flying foxes. In the past, when large 
numbers of these animals had settled in a particular tree, anyone wishing to cut 
down the tree would perform this magic in order to make them remain on the 
tree when it fell. The older men say that it now seems pointless to teach young 
men this magic when there is no way they can practise it. 
Another significant loss is the knowledge of how to make and use a 
particular type of cane fish trap, which resembles a basket with one end open. 
Although local women still know how to use these traps, and could pass these 
skills to their daughters, the young men are no longer willing to learn the art of 
making them, for the older men complain that they are more interested in going 
to dances and beer parties than in gaining such traditional knowledge. 
Conclusion 
How should we characterise the relationship between the local 'policy process' 
in the North Coast TRP and the recent reforms of national forest policy? The 
first point to be made in response to this question is that this particular logging 
operation began in the period before Independence, at a time when the colonial 
state was attempting to strengthen and diversify the country's economic base. 
From this point of view, recent policy reforms in the forestry sector have only 
had a marginal impact on the history of the North Coast TRP, because most of it 
had already been logged before these reforms were introduced. It is true that the 
state has recently done more to ensure that Madang Timbers complies with the 
laws and regulations which govern the forestry sector, but there are still some 
aspects of the National Forest Policy which seem to have made virtually no 
impact on the behaviour of the logging company. Despite a notional 
commitment to reforestation, for example, and the government's collection of a 
'reforestation levy' from the logging companies, the only evidence of 
reforestation in the North Coast TRP is the result of a New Zealand-funded aid 
project. 
8 These ideas seem to have been disseminated in 1995, at a public forum convened by university 
students in Madang town to campaign against the land reform bill. 
146 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the earlier activities of Madang 
Timbers and its predecessor, Wewak Timbers, were part of the national pattern 
of logging operations which prompted the establishment of the Barnett Inquiry, 
and thus contributed to the redirection of forestry policy during the 1990s. Some 
of the practices in which Madang Timbers has engaged are indeed very similar 
to those which were described and condemned in the various reports of the 
Bamett Inquiry. For example, the company has continually ignored the 
regulation which requires loggers to leave twenty-metre buffer zones on both 
banks of any permanent waterway; it has felled trees right across the course of 
the Surumerang River, dragged logs across streams, and blocked streams with 
the branches and leaves of felled trees. Likewise, many of the trees which have 
been felled have been left to rot in the bush (see Sagir 1992:56-57). Such 
practices could still be observed in the Yab-Gabaksal area in April 1996. 
At the same time, there is no reason to suggest that the local 'policies' of 
Madang Timbers have had any specific influence on the national policy process. 
Its policies of appeasement and conflict avoidance, as described at the beginning 
of this chapter, have merely been intended to ensure the logging company's 
economic survival through the continued exploitation of the local timber 
resource. As stated earlier, some of these 'policies' have actually clashed with 
aspects of the new National Forest Policy, and in these instances, Madang 
Timbers has been obliged to change some of its own practices. 
CHAPTERS 
PROCESS AND OUTCOME IN THE GOGOL: 
ISSUES IN FOREST PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT 
SIMON MONTAGU 
Introduction 
The Gogol Valley lies approximately 30 kilometres southwest of Madang, on the 
north coast of Papua New Guinea (PNG). The valley has been the scene of 
large-scale, clear-felling timber operations for the past twenty-three years. 
Timber extracted from the valley is used in the production of woodchips for 
export and sawn timber for domestic supply. The Gogol project has the 
distinction of being the first operation in the world to utilise mixed tropical 
rainforest species as a source of woodchips for the international pulp and paper 
industry. 
This chapter examines the historical development of the Gogol Woodchip 
Project and reviews the resultant outcomes. The review focusses on the resource 
planning and management activities undertaken by key participants involved in 
the development process. This focus reveals the ad hoc nature of the entire 
planning process, and the type of outcomes which this process produces. In so 
doing, it highlights the significance of historical circumstance as the driving 
force which has controlled the development of the Gogol project. 
The chapter proceeds as follows: 
• Firstly, I define the key participants involved in the development of the 
Gogol project, and describe the role which each of them had in the planning 
and subsequent management of timber extraction in the valley. 
• Secondly, I review the general planning environment in which the project 
evolved, discussing the key regulatory and administrative instruments 
employed in the planning process. 
• Finally, I review the outcomes of the planning process, and assess the 
relationship between the initial objectives of the project and the resultant 
outcomes. 
Background 
The historical significance of the Gogol Woodchip Project for the emergence of 
industrial-scale resource development in PNG has been reviewed extensively by 
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various authors (see, for example, Cavanaugh 1971; De' Ath 1980; Davidson 
1983; Lamb 1990). Consequently, only a general overview need be given here.l 
The Physical Environment 
The topography of the Gogol Valley is a mixture of steep low hills, broad 
floodplains, river terraces and swamps. The floodplains and swamps are low-
lying (generally below 50 metres above sea-level) and subject to seasonal 
inundation. Hills are more dominant in the southern and northwestern portions 
of the valley. Elevations of more than 300 metres are rare (Haantjens et al. 
1976:46; Lamb 1990:46). The rivers running through the valley2 are unstable 
and change course regularly, creating a hydrological dynamic of perpetual 
erosion and deposition. 
Landscape dynamics are accentuated by natural disasters. Geological 
evidence suggests that nearby offshore volcanoes periodically blanket the area 
with volcanic ash. A fault line runs through the Gogol Valley, roughly parallel 
to the Gogol River. Earthquakes and other seismic events are a regular 
component of the natural dynamics of the area, resulting in folding, faulting, 
land slumpage and slippage, and tsunamis. Over a longer period of time, 
seismic activity has also resulted in several changes in sea level. Within a 
shorter time frame, forest fires are a common occurrence during extreme dry 
seasons, and floods are a regular feature of the wet season. 
The soils of the area are generally silty clays or clay loams, with deep, 
undifferentiated profiles and only moderate fertility (Saulei 1984:352). Close to 
the Gogol River, structureless loams or silts predominate. Textures become 
heavier, and silty clays predominate, away from the river. Surface drainage is 
slow because of the flat topography, and internal drainage is hampered by the 
heavy soil textures (Lamb 1990:52-53). Even on sites not regularly flooded, 
water tables are commonly at or near the surface during the wet season 
(Davidson 1983 :57). 
The climate of the region is tropical, featuring distinct wet and dry seasons. 
Rainfall is in the order of 3,000 mm per year, with most falling in the months of 
December to May.3 Rain falls on an average of twenty-four days per month 
during these months. Temperatures remain stable throughout the year, with 
maximum temperatures around 29° C in the wet season, and 33° C in the dry. 
Vegetation roughly parallels the region's topography, with drainage acting 
as a major determinant. Vegetated areas can be divided into three main types: 
lowland hill forests, alluvial forests, and a mosaic of vegetation found near the 
1 Unless otherwise noted, the material presented was taken from De' Ath (1980). 
2 The main rivers are the Gogol and the Naru. 
3 Rainfall data for the Gogol Valley has only been collected since the early 1970s. Most 
estimates of rainfall throughout the region are based on data from Madang town. 
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coast. The floristic composition of these forests is extremely rich, characteristic 
of closed-canopy tropical forest in general. 
The lowland hill forests are found on the steeper slopes, away from the 
valley floor. Structurally, these forests consist of three tree layers above a 
ground layer of shrubs, ferns, and forest seedlings. The upper canopy trees 
average 36m in height, with occasional emergents up to 45m. The alluvial 
forests cover the low-lying plains that flank the rivers of the region, and are thus 
subject to seasonal inundation. While this influences floristic composition, these 
forest are structurally similar to the hill forests. The range of girth sizes of the 
canopy trees are more variable, however, and the sub-canopy layer is generally 
more dispersed. Species composition remains diverse. 
Both of these forest types contain areas of anthropogenic disturbance, 
mainly in the form of regrowth over old subsistence garden sites. While this has 
generally resulted in secondary forest regrowth interspersed with fruit trees, 
some areas have converted to grassland. 
The area closer to the coast is a more complex mosaic of vegetation. 
Higher population densities have ensured that garden regrowth and grassland 
areas are more prevalent. Furthermore, the lower relief of this area results in 
greater and more enduring inundation, creating a series of swamps and swamp 
forests (Robbins et al. 1976:1 06). 
The Social Environment 
Living within the valley are a number of 'clans' which maintain traditional 
rights of ownership and control over the land and its resources.4 These groups 
traditionally supported themselves through subsistence gardening practices 
combined with hunting and gathering in valley's forests. As in other parts of 
PNG, food production was not especially difficult, but health surveys undertaken 
before the start of logging indicated that their existence was not entirely idyllic 
(Lamb 1990:67). 
While traditional subsistence activities continue throughout the valley, the 
advent of a cash economy has introduced a market-oriented dimension to these 
activities, with revenues from crop surpluses used to purchase foodstuffs and 
other merchandise from trade stores. Furthermore, clear-felling has significantly 
reduced the amount of forest available for traditional hunting and gathering 
practices, thus reducing the supply of bush materials and foods. The cash 
economy has also spawned a market for wildlife. Ownership of firearms has 
increased, and with it the capacity of landowners to take advantage of this new 
market for wildlife (Lamb 1990:63). 
Estimates of the human population of the Gogol Valley vary. Missionary 
reports from the 1880s indicate that the area was densely populated when 
4 The groups commonly identified as 'clans', both by government officials and by members of 
local communities, may not fit the definitions adopted by anthropologists. 
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mission stations were established west and south of the Gogol River. A dramatic 
decline in population, primarily the result of smallpox introduced by New 
Guinea Company personnel, occurred some time after the establishment of these 
stations, while malaria forced the withdrawal of all mission personnel from the 
valley by 1912. The decline bottomed out in the early 1920s, and the population 
was growing by the 1940s (Cavanaugh 1976: 176). 
The general consensus on population figures in the years prior to logging 
operations falls around 2-3,000 (see Table 8.1 ). However, De' Ath ( 1980:77) 
arrived at a figure closer to 4, 100 by taking into account the impacts of 
migration and absenteeism. The 1980 census counted 4,872 residents (see Mitio 
1984), suggesting some increase after logging had started. The 1990 census 
figures document a continuation of this trend, for they counted approximately 
5,300 people living inside the Gogol, Naru, and Barum TRPs.s 
Table 8.1: Population statistics for the Gogol and Naru TRPs, 1969. 
Population 
Number of villages 
Number of clans 
Area (hectares) 
Crude population density (persons per 100 ha) 
Average area (ha) per clan 
Source: Lamb 1990:56 
Gogol 
1183 
11 
168 
52,270 
2.3 
311 
Naru 
1141 
7 
93 
15,800 
7.2 
170 
Genealogies compiled during the early years of the Gogol project identified 
over 250 distinct landowning groups across the valley, speaking eight separate 
languages (Colton 1976: 193).6 Under traditional settlement patterns, these 
groups were scattered across the valley, living predominantly on their own clan 
lands and divided along linguistic lines. While some large villages now exist,? 
villagers tend to frequent these only on major ceremonial occasions, residing 
instead in clan hamlets or in bush houses constructed near their gardens. Access 
to most areas has grown with the construction of logging roads, which have 
increased the mobility of the local people to areas across and outside the valley-
including the Madang town. The increased use of Tok Pis in throughout the area 
has also lessened the impact of linguistic boundaries. 
5 Local forestry officers have identified the relevant villages within the South Ambenob, Gal Utu 
and Trans-Gogol rural census divisions. 
6 Over twenty-one languages are reportedly spoken in the region surrounding the Gogol Valley 
(Z'graggen 1975, cited in Lamb 1990:56). 
7 This situation is largely an artifact of colonial efforts to bring people together in villages which 
were easier to administer, although roadways have also facilitated this centralisation. 
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Simple averages suggest that each clan owns between 170 and 311 hectares 
of land (see Table 8.1 ). In reality, the differences between landholdings are 
much greater. The overall effect is that some clans are relatively well off, while 
others are facing a land shortage. Most of the land is held in small blocks 
interspersed with the lands of other clans. As a result, disputes over boundaries 
have been, and continue to be, a source of great social tension (Lamb 1990:58). 
The History of Forestry 
Government interest in the forest resources of the Gogol Valley dates back to the 
early 1950s. Colonial forest ·policy of the time sought to establish a large 
number of small milling operations across PNG in order to supply local timber 
demand. The timber resources of the Gogol were evaluated in this light, in the 
hope of establishing a timber supply accessible to the township ofMadang. 
The initial assessment took place in 1959, at a broad reconnaissance level, 
to ascertain whether state acquisition of rights to timber was justified, and to 
gauge local attitudes towards such a proposal. This first report recommended 
further investigation of the area, with a view to developing it as an immediate 
source of timber for the local urban market and for export (Davidson 1983 :48). 
Following this recommendation, a second survey was conducted in 1962, 
lasting approximately five months. This survey undertook a more thorough 
sampling of forest types in the valley, with statistical analysis indicating a bias in 
favour of Intsia (kwila) species. As a result of these findings, a third and still 
more intensive survey was carried out in late 1963. On this occasion, the survey 
team was serviced by helicopter, and more than 600 quarter-acre survey plots 
were analysed (ibid.). 
The findings of the third survey prompted the Administration to purchase 
timber rights over an area of 52,000 hectares for a term of forty years 
(Cavanaugh 1976: 178). The purchase agreement offered a once-off payment of 
K50,000 for rights to all timber above 1.52 metres dbh. 
The Administration unsuccessfully put harvest rights over this area up for 
public tender in 1964 and 1966. When the rights were offered for a third time in 
1968, one bid was received from a consortium of Japanese interests. This bid 
served as the starting point for a long and, at times, rancorous series of 
negotiations between the consortium and the Australian government. These 
negotiations ended in August 1971, when the Gogol Timber Agreement was 
signed by the Administration and the Japanese consortium trading as 'Japan 
New Guinea Timber'- commonly known as Jant. 
Following the inception and preliminary planning of the Gogol Woodchip 
Project, a fourth and more detailed assessment of the Gogol area was conducted 
in 1970. Unlike previous surveys, which assessed the area's potential as a 
source of selectively harvested sawlogs, this survey also evaluated tree sizes 
(greater than 25 cm girth) which were suitable for woodchip production (De' Ath 
1980:33; Davidson 1983:48). 
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Motivations for Development 
The development of the Gogol project did not take place in a vacuum. The 
economic, social and political events of the late 1960s, when the project was 
conceived, was to shape its ultimate direction. Locating the project in the 
broader context of the era therefore sheds light on the motivations which 
underscored its conception and development. 
The colonial administration and the national government have both 
championed the Gogol project since its inception. Official enthusiasm for the 
initial concept appears to have flowed from its status as a 'world first.' There 
appears to have been a great deal of political optimism that the project would 
inspire other forms of development in the area. It was viewed as the anchor of a 
large-scale industrial complex based in Madang, centred around the manufacture 
of paper and paper-based products. The project was also seen as a model for the 
development of other resource-based industrial complexes elsewhere across the 
Territory.8 
The inception of the project coincided with a period of significant policy 
change in the Territory. From the mid-1960s, economic development policy was 
refocussed to encourage the rapid utilisation of natural resources as a means to 
achieve greater economic and social development. Instrumental in this policy 
change was a report by the World Bank (IBRD 1965), which advocated a more 
rapid programme of development, centred in part around the greater utilisation 
of the Territory's forest resources. It saw considerable potential for expansion in 
the forestry sector (ibid:34 ), and recommended that the Administration facilitate 
this expansion as much as possible (ibid: 158). The report also assessed the 
world market potential of the Territory's timber reserves, and argued that the 
Territory was well placed (both geographically and in terms of reserves) to 
capitalise on the expanding Japanese market for sawlogs and timber projects 
(ibid: 157). 
The recommendations of the World Bank report were given further 
momentum when the Administration produced its second five-year development 
plan in 1968. The forestry component of the plan sought an even greater 
expansion in output, and aimed to establish a forest industry based on large, 
integrated timber complexes, centred around 'big lick' concession areas. The 
initial Gogol proposal obviously fitted this bill when it was put forward in 1968. 
The timing of the Gogol proposal also coincided with an international push 
for the independence of the colonial territories of the South Pacific. Australia 
played its own part in this movement, and was preparing for its eventual 
withdrawal from PNG at that point, in the early 1970s, when the Gogol project 
reached a serious conceptualisation phase. De' Ath (1980) argues that the 
8 Particularly in light of the developments occurring in the mineral sector. Proposals for the 
Bougainville copper mine were circulating around the same time, and exploration around the site 
of the future Ok Tedi mine had just begun. 
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Administration, in its eagerness to ensure a strong economic base for an 
independent PNG, welcomed the proposal and became a strong advocate for its 
implementation. 
Davidson ( 1983) suggests that support for the project was reinforced by the 
economic status and potential of the Gogol Valley itself. Without the 
development of a woodchip operation in the area, the valley had little else to 
attract other forms of development or to gain much priority from the state in the 
provision of public infrastructure and services. The area's forest resources were 
never considered to be very substantial, and further analysis actually 
downgraded the quality of the stock. Agricultural potential was always low as a 
result the area's low-lying topography, seasonal inundation, and naturally poor 
soils. Population density was low, and there is evidence to suggest that the 
various social systems of the valley were disintegrating at an increasing rate 
(Colton 1976: 192). Frustration with the poor economic conditions in the area 
had prompted the formation of cargo cults and a high level of outmigration 
(Davidson 1983 :62).9 
The poor economic and social conditions of the area were apparently 
recognised by the local population. Cotton's (1976) work, which was based on 
extensive patrols in the area, showed that the residents could see their chances 
for development were slight, and that health and education opportunities for 
their children were limited. Davidson (1983) adds that, despite numerous 
reservations about the project (particularly the likelihood of squatters moving 
into the area), the people agreed to dispose of their timber rights largely because 
of their feeling of economic backwardness and the lack of other development 
options. 
The Gogol Woodchip Project 
The Gogol Woodchip Project formally commenced operations after the Gogol 
Timber Agreement had been signed on 11 August 1971. The agreement gave 
Jant the rights to all pulpwood in the project area, while the rights to the sawlogs 
were granted to a small PNG logging company, Wewak Timbers. 
Jant's permit to harvest timber for pulp was issued in July 1972. The 
company spent much of 1972 and 1973 tooling up and developing the necessary 
infrastructure- the woodchip mill and harbour facilities in Madang, and logging 
roads in the project concession areas. The first shipload of woodchips was sent 
to Japan in June 1974. 
The operation of the Jant mill is dependent on a concession of 
approximately 68,000 hectares, made up of four separate Timber Rights 
Purchase (TRP) areas: the Gogol (52,265 ha), the Gum River (5,063 ha), the 
Naru (15,811 ha), and North Coast ( 15,001 ha) (see Map 7.1 ). Timber extraction 
9 Col ton ( 1976) suggests that the majority of the able-bodied men of the Gogol area were absent 
from the area when the project started. 
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was originally planned to proceed at the rate of 3-4,000 hectares per annum, with 
a 20-25 year lifespan placed on the resource. Although annual logging rates 
have remained around the proposed level, the predicted life of the resource has 
since been downgraded, following revisions of the quality of the timber resource 
in these areas.10 Jant's own estimations now suggest that the resource will last 
until late 1997, at a reduced harvest rate of around 1,000 hectares per annum. 
From that point on, operations will be dependent on plantations and local tree 
farms (personal communication, Joe Loreakena, 11 1995). 
Actual logging operations involve crews of loggers moving into designated 
logging coupes and clear-felling all trees above 20 cm in diameter. Felled trees 
are snigged by bulldozers to loading ramps, where they are sorted on the basis of 
size into sawlogs and pulplogs. These are separately loaded and trucked to 
Madang, then washed and weighed in the presence of a government inspector, 
and either cut into sawn timber at the mill belonging to Madang Timbers (the 
successor to Wewak Timbers) or reduced to woodchips in Jant's chipper.12 The 
chips are stockpiled before being conveyer-fed onto Jant's transport vessel for 
shipment to Honshu's paper mills in Japan. 
Principal Actors 
From an analytical perspective, three primary groups of actors have been 
involved in the planning and management of the Gogol project: the government, 
the developer, and the landowners of the Gogol Valley. Each group has had a 
different input into the planning and management of the Gogol project, and the 
impact of each has varied over time. This section reviews the inputs and impacts 
of each group in turn. 
Government Agencies 
The impact of the Gogol project on the surrounding physical and social 
environment mirrors the comprehensive scale of the project. Clear-felling 
results in the total destruction of the forest ecosystem (at least temporarily), with 
an associated impact on other ecological, social, and physical systems. These 
impacts cut across the administrative turf of many government agencies at both 
the national and provincial level, and thus draws them into the planning process. 
Furthermore, the phased nature of the development of the project, and the 
differential impacts experienced through the different phases, has meant that the 
10 The resource has proven to be more diverse in quality (for woodchips) than was originally 
estimated. 
ll Jant Public Relations Officer. 
12 l was told that sawlogs are now sold to a company called Tiway (or Taway) Timbers (see 
Sagir, this volume). The Madang office of the National Forest Service was using this company's 
fax machine in March 1995, after its own telephone lines had been disconnected for non-payment 
of bills. 
Process and Outcome in the Gogol 155 
input of different government agencies has varied in both form and extent over 
the life ofthe project. 
In this process, it is possible to identify four national agencies with a long-
term involvement in the planning process, whose principal planning and 
management functions are discussed in this section. 
Madang Timber Working Group 
The government's early involvement in the Gogol project was controlled by an 
interdepartmental body established specifically for the coordination and 
management of state activities in the area. This body was know as the Madang 
Timber Working Group (MTWG). The colonial administration established the 
MTWG in 1972, drawing representatives from the four departments directly 
involved in the Gogol project: those of Forests, Agriculture, Lands, and the 
Chief Minister (subsequently Prime Minister). The primary tasks of the line 
agencies involved in the MTWG are summarised in Table 8.2. These points are 
expanded upon in the sections below. 
Table 8.2: Functions of the line agencies involved in the Madang Timber 
Working Group. 
Agency 
Forestry 
Agriculture 
Lands 
Primary Function 
Forest species and volume assessments 
Forest typing and land use classification 
Silvicultural research 
Regulation of environmental impacts of logging 
Advocate for agricultural development initiatives m the 
area 
Provide extension services to agricultural projects 
established in the area 
Delineation of clan land boundaries for royalty purposes 
Delineation of clan land boundaries for the drawing up of 
land leases (for reforestation lands) 
Note: Due to the phased nature of the Gogol project, the primacy of these functions has 
varied over time to coincide with the different nature of operations through the different 
phases. 
The departmental officers of the MTWG attempted to incorporate local 
perspectives on the planning and development of the Gogol project by making 
allowance for local representation on the committee. By 1976, the group 
included seven village leaders elected by the people of the Gogol area (Gegeyo 
1976: 185). 
The MTWG served two major functions. Firstly, it attempted to coordinate 
the activities of the government departments which had a role in the planning 
and management of the Gogol project. Secondly, it attempted to perform a 
liaison function between the government, the local residents, and Jant. 
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In its liaison capacity, the first task of the MTWG was to patrol the areas to 
be affected by the project. Over a two-week period, the patrol team held village 
meetings throughout the Gogol TRP area, in which they tried to inform residents 
of the current state, and probable future impact, of the project. Group members 
also used these sessions as an opportunity to solicit local residents' opinions on 
the project, and their future aspirations for the area, and they introduced the 
departmental representatives on the MTWG in such a way that local residents 
would be aware that they had someone to help them in their dealings with the 
company and with different levels of government (Gegeyo 1976: 186; Davidson 
1983:65). 
The hands-on, localised approach of the MTWG quickly made it the main 
agency of the Administration in planning and managing the development of the 
Gogol project. It was later to facilitate the compilation of genealogies and the 
survey of clan boundaries throughout the project area, and to coordinate the 
distribution of royalty payments, as well as serving as the mediator between the 
landowner and the developer (Lamb 1990:80). 
Papua New Guinea Forest Authority 
The PNG Forest Authority and its predecessor, the Department, of Forests, has 
been the principal government agency in the Gogol Valley for the past thirty 
years. The nature of the Gogol project has ensured a close association between 
forestry officers, local residents, and the resource developer since the inception 
of the project. 
Before the project proposal was formulated, government activities in 
relation to the area's forests were exploratory and transitory. The Department of 
Forests established a permanent presence in the Gogol area in 1969, when it 
constructed the Baku Forestry Station near the village of Mawan. The Baku 
station initially served as a research laboratory, nursery and administrative 
office, though it is now in a state of disrepair. 13 The local forestry officer still 
maintains an office there, 14 but the research laboratory no longer exists, and the 
nursery is no longer fully operationaJ.15 
13 On one of my trips to the Gogol area (in March 1995), I visited the centre with Bob 
Thistlethwaite, a former forestry officer based at Baku Station. My assessment of the facility's 
decline is based on his comments and reactions. 
14 Much of his time has been spent in producing and updating the only competent map of the 
progress of the logging project to date, but there is no evidence to suggest that his superiors have 
taken an interest in the results of this work. 
15 I noticed that the nursery did have young seedling trees in it whenever I visited Baku station. 
It appears that they belonged to Gogol Reforestation Company, which has an agreement with the 
Forest Authority to use what remains of the physical plant (mainly the nursery 'standout beds') for 
the propagation of its own seedlings. In return, the Authority receives a percentage of the tree crop 
turned out from the nursery. 
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The permanent presence of the Forest Authority in the Gogol area, coupled 
with the phased nature of the Gogol project, means that it has played a diverse 
and, at times, controversial role in the planning and management of the area's 
forest resources. For example, during the inception phase of the project, from 
1968 to 1971, the Department of Forests occupied a dual role, for it represented 
the interest of residents of the Gogol and Naru TRP areas in negotiations over 
the harvest rights for these areas, while also actively promoting the development 
of timber reserves in these and other locations across the Territory. It can be 
argued that this entailed a conflict of interest, and that, in theory at least, the 
ability of this agency to perform either task with authority was compromised as a 
result. 
Some of the other key activities ofthe agency are summarised in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3: Key activities of the line agencies responsible for the Gogol forestry 
project. 
Phase 
Exploration and 
resource assessment 
Project inception 
Pre-logging 
Operational 
Operational 
(reforestation) 
Activities 
Survey timber resources of Gogol area 
Assess potential of Gogol timber reserves 
Negotiate acquisition of timber rights from traditional owners 
Advertise harvest rights for Gogol Valley 
Select potential developer 
Negotiate agreement between developer and state for harvest 
rights 
Liaise with local residents regarding timber agreement 
negotiations and seek their input 
Oversee pre-logging operations (road construction, etc.) 
Liaise between residents and Jant over pre-logging operations 
Monitor logging operations 
Enforce legislative and administrative measures controlling 
logging operations 
Liaise between government, Jant, and Gogol residents over 
issues arising from project operations 
Arbitrate in disputes between residents and Jant 
Arbitrate at local level in disputes between residents and 
government 
Advocate benefits of land leases for reforestation amongst 
Gogol landowners 
Negotiate land leases between government and landowners 
Provide local-level extension services for local tree farmers 
Department of Agriculture and Livestock 
The colonial administration and the individual proponents of the Gogol project 
always envisioned agricultural development as an integral part of their regional 
development strategy (Serjeantson 1976:201 ). The proponents advocated 
various schemes that would follow behind logging operations, capitalising on the 
value of the land cleared in the logging process. The challenge of implementing 
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these schemes has been the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture and 
Livestock (DAL) and the relevant divisions of its predecessor, the Department of 
Primary Industry (DPI). 
The principal planning and management functions of DAL have comprised 
the promotion of various forms of agricultural development in the area, and to 
the provision of local-level extension services to any agricultural projects 
established there. DAL's advocacy role is revealed in the Gogol Land Use Plan, 
which reflects the perceived importance of agriculture as a post-logging land 
use. Although the main emphasis of the plan lay on the provision of land for 
future reforestation and the continued supply of pulpwood to the Jant chip mill, 
significant exclusions were made for the subsistence farming needs of present 
and future generations of Gogol residents, smallholder agricultural and cattle 
pr9jects, and large-scale agricultural development. The final land use plan 
(discussed below) set aside approximately 15,300 hectares (about 23 percent) of 
land in the Gogol area for these purposes. 
Despite these planning efforts, very little land in the Gogol has actually 
been converted to any form of permanent agriculture. This is probably the result 
of the natural limitations of the Gogol Valley, although low population densities 
have played a part. The low-lying topography and naturally poor soils of the 
valley limit agricultural potential, while low population densities limit the 
amount of labour available to any large agricultural projects. 
DAL's extension services in the Gogol area have also diminished. This is 
largely due to the lack of agricultural activity in the area, but also to the general 
collapse of extension services which followed their decentralisation to the 
provinces, and to severe operating constraints placed on all government agencies 
by PNG's current budgetary and fiscal problems. 
Department of Lands and Physical Planning 
The role of the Department of Lands and Physical Planning (DLPP) and its 
predecessors, while complex and important, has been sporadic in comparison to 
those of the other government agencies involved in the project. The primary 
responsibility of DLPP has been the survey and mapping of clan boundaries, on 
which the distribution of timber royalties is based. While boundary adjustments 
have been required from time to time, as clans have questioned the veracity of 
earlier land claims, the nature of the work has not required DLPP to maintain a 
constant presence in the project area. 
The demarcation of clan boundaries has been based on meetings held with 
members of adjoining clans in order to reach agreement over ownership and 
boundary position. The adjoining clans then elected guides to accompany a 
survey party while it used field survey techniques to delineate the boundaries 
and codify them into a mappable form (Leet 1976:205). 
More recently, DLPP has also been responsible for the negotiation and 
administration of land lease arrangements between the landowners and the 
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government. These have been designed to secure sufficient areas of land for 
reforestation efforts in the valley. DLPP has often been required to conduct 
additional boundary surveys identifying lease boundaries, and to create and 
administer the lease agreements. 
Jant 
The planning and management actiVIties of Jant have been conducted at a 
different level from those of the government. Jant's primary resource 
management concern has centred on the continuous supply of pulpwood to its 
chip mill in Madang. All other 'project-related activities in the area have been 
ancillary to the key task of extracting timber.I6 
It is difficult to describe the specific details of Jant's logging programme, 
since these details are not generally available, even though they can be inferred 
from the impression left on the landscape in the wake of logging activities. 
However, several observations can be made in an effort to characterise the 
nature of the resource planning and management activities undertaken by Jant. 
Jant's logging operations, while very directional in their aim of securing a 
continuous supply of pulpwood to the chip mill, have nonetheless been flexible 
in their application. The environmental, political, and cultural environment of 
the project has had a considerable impact on the operational direction of Jant's 
planning processes. 
Throughout the life of the Gogol project, Jant has had to incorporate a great 
degree of flexibility in its operational planning framework, as a result of 
numerous uncertainties in its operational environment. Many technical and 
operational dimensions of the project were developed through trial and error. 
Neither Jant nor anyone else at the time had a lot of technical or operational 
expertise in conducting large-scale clear-felling operations under the challenging 
physical conditions found in the Gogol area. Learning by trial and error has 
necessarily demanded a degree of flexibility in the decision-making process. 
A great deal of the uncertainty surrounding the management of the natural 
resources of the Gogol area has also stemmed from the lack of specific 
regulatory guidelines. The colonial administration placed only loose controls 
over production scheduling and broader problems of environmental 
management, presumably on the assumption that existing regulations were 
sufficient for a project of this nature. As the project progressed, however, and it 
became apparent that this assumption was ill-founded, the government has made 
several attempts to introduce additional controls over various aspects of the 
project. Jant has generally attempted to incorporate such changes into its 
l6 These include the construction and maintenance of logging roads, the associated extraction of 
gravel from river beds, the operation of the Jant chip mill, and the management of company 
reforestation programmes. 
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operating procedures, and its ability to do so has been both a component and a 
product of the flexibility inherent in its operational planning framework. 
In a similar vein, Jant has also had to maintain a considerable degree of 
flexibility in its operations in order to accommodate the ad hoc demands of 
landowners. 
Landowners 
Of the three groups with some stake in forestry operations in the Gogol area, 
local landowners have the largest stake. They 'bet the farm' on the project, 
hoping for the benefits which they thought, or were led to believe, would result 
from it. They have endured the fundamental changes in lifestyle which clear-fell 
logging brought about, and they continue to bear the brunt of the impacts of 
logging operations on a daily basis. 
Despite the size of their stake, they have had the least input into the 
planning and decision-making process. Few avenues exist at the local level for 
any sustained and meaningful input into this process. Although landowner 
consent was required for the state's acquisition of timber rights, and although 
numerous attempts have been made to solicit landowner input over the life of the 
project, the system of timber rights transfer - the TRP Agreement - has 
marginalised the landowners within the planning and management process. 
Once the government had assumed control over the resource under the TRP 
agreement, and then transferred the harvest rights to Jant under the Gogol 
Timber Agreement, decision-making powers were transferred out of the valley, 
in both a figurative and a literal sense, and the residents themselves have become 
peripheral to the decisions which were made. 
The lack of effective mechanisms for landowners to voice their concerns 
and express their desires has prompted landowners to resort to confrontational 
strategies in order to get a hearing. On occasions dating back into the early 
years of the project, disgruntled Gogol residents have blockaded roads, disrupted 
logging crews, and sabotaged Jant equipment in order to draw attention to their 
grievances (see Post-Courier, 5 July 1994). While these strategies have been 
successful in gaining the attention of Jant and the government, the frequency of 
their repetition indicates that they have led to few substantive changes. 
Instruments of Forest Management 
Resource planning activities relating to forest management in PNG take place 
within a framework defined by a range of legislative and administrative 
instruments developed to promote particular planning and management goals. 
The Gogol project has evolved within the planning and administrative 
framework defined by four main instruments:-
• The statutory regime governing forest use and management; 
• The Gogol Timber Agreement; 
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• The various timber permits issued to Jant; and 
• The Gogol Land Use Plan. 
Statutory Regime 
The implementation of national forest policy and the administration of a timber 
industry has been the responsibility of a separate, national-level line agency 
since the development of a formal forest management regime in the late 1930s 
(see Mantu 1985). At the time of the inception of the Gogol project, forestry 
operations were administered under the provisions of legislation dating back to 
this era, primarily the Forestry Ordinance 1936/37 of the Territory of New 
Guinea (as amended to 1971 ). This ordinance and its supplementary regulations 
defined the procedure for the allocation of rights to harvest timber, and described 
the general context of government control over forest resource development. 
The primary objective of the Forestry Ordinance was to provide the 
administrative and regulatory environment for a national forest industry based 
on small-scale, selective harvesting techniques. The emphasis of the regime was 
placed on broad, national-level goals, such as the acquisition and management of 
a national forest estate. Consequently, it provided little in the way of specific 
planning guidelines or resource management criteria operable at the project 
level. Instead, operating conditions were negotiated and administered on a 
project-by-project basis. The negotiated terms and conditions of each project 
were then formalised in either a Timber Permit or a Timber Agreement. 
While this negotiated procedure was sufficient to handle 'typical' forestry 
projects in PNG, it became problematic in the Gogol case, simply because so 
many dimensions of the project were new and unknown. The unique nature of 
the proposal meant that very little technical expertise existed within Jant, the 
Administration, or the wider forest industry, which could comprehend the 
impact and ramifications of large-scale clear-felling in this tropical environment. 
Few specific guidelines could be drawn from the pool of institutional expertise 
and experience within the colonial forestry service. As a result, few specific 
terms and conditions were formally documented in the initial Timber 
Agreement. 
Once the project became operational, and the impacts became clearer, 
efforts were made to develop project-level guidelines, but these generally lacked 
any specific or binding obligation. Their implementation by Jant was dependent 
on government persuasion and the developer's good will. 
The uncertainty and ignorance which characterised these initial negotiations 
over the Gogol project do not account for the apparent lack of impact of more 
recent changes in the statutory regime. The longevity of the Gogol project has 
seen it survive, relatively unchanged, through numerous changes in the statutory 
and administrative regime pertaining to the natural environment in general, and 
forestry in particular. Statutory controls over forestry have undergone several 
changes, the most recent being the reforms ushered in by the findings of the 
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Barnett Inquiry. Other broader environment management initiatives have been 
formalised in the Environmental Planning Act and the Environmental 
Contaminants Act of 1978, and, to a lesser degree, in statutes like the 
Conservation Areas Act of 1978 and the Water Resources Act of 1982 (see 
Whimp, this volume). 
Once again, however, the fundamental problem with these changes has been 
the singular lack of initiatives capable of providing a bridge between the high-
level ideals of the statutory framework and specific, operational guidelines 
which can be implemented at the project level. Recent efforts have been made 
to close this gap, within the forestry sector, with the publication in April 1996 of 
a Logging Code of Practice by the PNG Forest Authority. However, it is too 
early to say whether these guidelines are having any impact on operations in the 
Gogol or in any other logging areas. 
The impact of legislative changes has also been lessened by the lack of 
retrospective application of many new laws. In some cases, such as the 
Environmental Planning Act ( 1978), the option to apply new rules to existing 
projects is expressly ruled out. 17 More often, however, a lack of institutional 
resources, capacity, and flexibility has made it almost impossible to implement 
substantive changes to the management of the environment. 
The Gogol Timber Agreement 
Beneath the national governance framework, the operations of the Gogol project 
are controlled through a negotiated Timber Agreement. The original Gogol 
Timber Agreement was signed in August 1971, and a renegotiated version 
(without any significant changes) was signed towards the end of 1995. 
The content of the agreement is project-specific and very functional in 
nature. It lays out the various obligations of the government and Jant (mostly 
Jant) in relation to particular operational aspects of the project. Matters covered 
in the original ( 1971) agreement include: 
• the utilisation of the timber resource; 
• the state's option to acquire equity in the project; 
• the woodchip pricing structure; 
• the company's responsibility for road construction, and the 
obligations of both parties to undertake road maintenance; 
• the Administration's right to view company contracts; 
• the supply of electricity to the company; 
• the company's obligation to construct a wharf and the state's 
prerogative to use the wharf; 
17 According to Section 3(2): 'This Act does not apply to any project to which applies the - (a) 
Mining (Bougainville Copper Agreement) Act 1967; or (b) Mining (Ok Tedi Agreement) Act 
1976; or (c) Petroleum (GulfofPapua Agreement) Act 1976.' 
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• the company's obligation to train and recruit PNG nationals; 
• the procedure for the leasing of land; 
• the company's obligation to submit plans for waste disposal, noise 
and pollution control; 
• the Administration's undertaking to provide for public peace and 
welfare; 
• the Administration's undertaking to obtain land for reforestation; 
• the procedure for the entry and stay of foreign personnel; 
• the agreement of both parties on the capital structure and mode of 
financing of the project prior to the grant of a timber permit; 
• the formation of an operational and incorporated company; and 
• general legal applicability of the agreement 
The commitments made in the agreement are couched in general terms, and 
there are no specific milestones or deadlines to mark their achievement. Most 
deal with particular facets of the business and operations of Jant. The agreement 
offers little in the way of specific directives for action in the planning and 
management of the Gogol forest resource. The two clauses that directly mention 
the forest resource (Clause 2 on 'Resource Utilisation' and Clause 13 on 
'Reforestation') do so in only general terms: 
2. Utilisation. 
The company undertakes to establish an industry in accordance with its 
proposal and to the satisfaction of the Administration, in particular the 
company undertakes -
(a) to arrange for the conversion of the saw log component of the forest 
resource; 
(b) to ensure that arrangements made are such that a substantial viable 
sawmilling operation will result; and 
(c) to use its best endeavours to reach a suitable agreement with a local 
sawmilling company for the conversion of a saw log component; or 
(d) if unable to reach an agreement with a local sawmilling company to 
provide evidence of the offer made, and to establish a sawmilling 
complex to utilise the sawmill component of the resource. The 
minimum annual intake to be 10,000,000 super feet log volume per 
year, to be achieved as soon as practicable ...... 
13. Reforestation. 
The Administration will endeavour to obtain an adequate area for 
reforestation to maintain the industry at a viable level. The 
Administration may make arrangements with the company for 
Company participation in the reforestation on such terms and 
conditions as mutually agreeable. The terms and conditions may 
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include, inter alia, the utilisation of the harvest from the future 
plantations and the possible extension of the permit period. 
Gogol Timber Permits 
The regulatory schemes established under the Forestry Ordinance (and 
continued to the current day under successive Forestry Acts) have all required 
that logging operations only proceed following the issuance of, and in 
compliance with, a Timber Permit. Timber permits provide a binding 
commitment between the logging operator and the government. Generally 
speaking, they detail the particular rights and responsibilities incumbent upon 
the logging operator following the receipt of harvest rights from the government. 
The formal and legally binding obligations established within a timber 
permit ensure that they are not readily available for public scrutiny. It is 
therefore difficult to comment on the resource planning and management 
obligations set out in the original Gogol Timber Permit (TP 12-1 ). However, 
discussions with forestry officers did provide the opportunity to examine the 
contents of the renewed version of the Timber Permit (TP 12-21, dated 24 June 
24 1992). Some brief comments can therefore be offered, assuming that this 
permit is fairly typical of those applied, at various times, to the whole of the 
Gogol project area.I8 
In line with its specific administrative and regulatory function, the Timber 
Permit addresses the twin issues of resource planning and environment 
management. Clause 6 calls for Jant's logging activities to proceed in 
accordance with a five-year forest working plan, formally vetted and approved 
by the proper forestry authorities. The permit provides specific details (Clause 
6.2) of the information to be included in this plan. It also outlines a procedure 
for the periodic review and updating of the working plans (Clause 6.4), as well 
as requirements for the submission of completion reports for logged-over areas 
(Clause 6.5). 
Nothing within the permit defines the express purpose of such plans, nor of 
the process of having them vetted and approved. Given their production 
planning orientation, the presumed purpose is to provide the forestry authorities 
with an overview of the project's ongoing operations and the future sequencing 
of resource utilisation. 
Stipulations for the environmentally sensitive management of operations in 
the project area are set out in Clause 7. The provisions of this clause address 
both general environmental management conditions and the particular 
l8 Following the significant increase in awareness of the environmental implications of large-
scale logging, and in the wake of the findings of the Barnett Inquiry, it is probably safe to assume 
that this new permit is more specific and detailed than the original. The amount of detail given 
over to environmental matters, particularly in comparison to the original 1971 Timber Agreement, 
and the addition of clauses specifically addressing issues raised by the Barnett Inquiry (i.e. transfer 
pricing and arms-length pricing) offer credence to this assumption. 
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environmental impacts of logging operations, such as water pollution and soil 
erosion. Clause 7.2 provides an example of the more general management 
obligations prescribed in the permit: 
Clause 7.2: Environmental Precautions 
The Permit Holder shall use its best endeavours to overcome and 
minimise the deleterious effects caused by its operations on the 
physical environment and the inhabitants of the Permit Area and in 
particular shall comply with all environmental control conditions 
included in the approved Forest Working Plan and with the following 
provisions: 
(a) Logging will be selectivel9 and will take place only on slopes up to 
thirty (30) degrees; 
(b) there will be no logging on slopes greater than thirty (30) degrees; 
(c) there will be no logging within fifty (50) metres of rivers, streams 
or watercourses. 
(d) there will be no logging in proximity to villages, gardens, burial 
grounds or areas of cultural importance; and the Permit Holder shall 
identify such areas in consultation with the local people, taking into 
consideration existing and projected land-use patterns, and the nature 
and abundance of forest produce required by villagers; and 
(e) as a minimum requirement, there will be no logging: 
(i) within one hundred (1 00) metres of any garden in use, burial 
ground, or area of cultural importance, or 
(ii) within five hundred (500) metres of any inhabited village.20 
References to specific impacts of logging activities are made in twelve sub-
clauses. These range from the control of soil erosion (Clause 7.6) and 
compaction (Clause 7.16), to fire prevention measures (Clause 7.14) and 
measures to promote forest regeneration (Clause 7 .17). The following is 
indicative of the content of these clauses: 
Clause 7.10: River Bank Damage 
The Permit Holder shall take all precautions consistent with sound 
forest management practices to ensure that the banks of any river or 
stream are not damaged, and that the course of any river or stream is 
not altered as a result of the operations of the Permit Holder. 
As with the Timber Agreement, the commitments set out in Clause 7 are notable 
for their generality and largely devoid of any specific criteria or standards that 
19 It is not known why this specification was included in TP 12-21. 
20 My observations of logging activities in the project area indicate that all of these provisions 
have been violated at one time or another, some (such as logging within 50m of watercourses) 
more frequently than others. 
166 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
would facilitate the monitoring of operational compliance. Vague commitments 
to take 'all reasonable steps' and to abide to unspecified 'sound forest 
management practices' are all that this clause offer. 
Gogol Land Use Plan 
Beyond the statutory and regulatory controls governing the Gogol project, a 
detailed land use plan was also prepared for the area. In 1971, the Department 
of Forests conducted an assessment of post-logging land use, which focussed on 
the need to identify sufficient land for the development of large-scale timber 
plantations. The government's planners recognised the need to ensure a 
continuous supply of resource to the Jant mill following the depletion of the 
natural forest. 
The land use plan followed fairly standard procedures for land classification 
and assessment of suitability. The Gogol landscape was classified using a 
hierarchical model of 'land systems' .2 1 An existing land systems classification 
for the Gogol-Madang area (CSIRO 1976) was subdivided on the basis of 
terrain, with areas of similar terrain grouped into discrete 'land units'. Land 
units were further sub-divided into 'land components' on the basis of vegetation. 
Twenty resultant 'land-types' were defined, representing areas of unique 
vegetation (land components) and topography (land units). These are 
summarised in Table 8.4. 
2I This approach was in widespread use across Australia and PNG, and was a standard resource 
assessment procedure for the Australian Commonwealth Government at the time. Large areas 
could be classified and assessed in relatively short periods of time using aerial photography. The 
procedure follows a hierarchical conceptualisation of the landscape as a spatial complex of various 
environmental parameters. Different parameters are used to distinguish different complexes down 
through the hierarchy. 
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Table 8.4: Land types of the Gogol Valley. 
Terrain Vegetation Land Area 
(land units) (land components) type (hectares) 
Flat Secondary forest 1 5,250 
Kunai grassland 2 460 
Pit-pit 3 860 
Floodplain forest 4 4,300 
Well drained terrace forest 5 4,570 
Poorly drained terrace forest 6 6,270 
Swamp forest 7 580 
Hill forest 8 780 
Gentle Secondary forest 9 1,840 
Kunai grassland 10 600 
Well drained terrace forest 11 740 
Poorly drained terrace forest 12 960 
Hill forest 13 7,530 
Moderate Secondary forest 14 2,060 
Kunai grassland 15 510 
Hill forest 16 12,830 
Broken Hill forest 17 4,440 
Rugged Secondary forest 18 1,310 
Kunai grassland 19 470 
Hill forest 20 10,400 
Source: Adapted from Lamb (1990). 
Each land type was rated on a five point scale for its suitability for 
commercial forestry and reforestation purposes. In the process, other non-
forestry land uses were also assessed, although this was done primarily by 
reference to general physical characteristics (based on the land unit 
descriptions), and did not consider the effect of factors relating to managerial 
dimensions of these alternate land uses (distance to market, skill levels of 
operators or staff, market prices, etc.) (Davidson 1983: 78). The resultant 
suitability rankings are shown in Table 8.5. 
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Table 8.5: Land suitability rankings for the Gogol project area. 
Land 
type 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Roading Logging 
1 3 
1 5 
4 5 
1 
2 
3 1 
2 2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
3 
3 
3 
5 
1 
1 
2 
3 
5 
2 
4 
4 
5 
3 
Erosion Reforest 
-ation 
4 1 
4 2 
5 
4 1 
4 1 
4 3d 
4 4d 
3 2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3d 
2 
3t 
3t 
3t 
4t 
4t 
4t 
4t 
Agri-
culture 
2 
4 
1 
2 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Cattle 
ranches 
4 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
4 
3 
3 
3 
Subsist. 
gardens 
2 
3 
4 
2 
1 
4 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
3 
2 
Notes: 1 = most suitable; 5 = least suitable; d = soil drainage is a major constraint; 
t =terrain is a major constraint. 
Source: Adapted from Lamb (1990) 
Based on this assessment, eight land use scenarios were developed, 
allocating land in different proportions to different land use priorities across the 
valley. Each scenario set aside at least 20,000 hectares for reforestation 
purposes, which was considered to be the minimum area required to sustain 
commercial forestry in the area. 22 They also documented the location of areas 
suitable for partial or total conservation, land for agricultural development, and 
areas (such as swamps or steep hills) unable to support commercial forestry. 
Details of the land uses for these eight scenarios are presented in Table 8.6. 
22 Experience with plantations elsewhere in PNG suggested that at least 20,000 ha grown on a 
10-12 year rotation would be sufficient to maintain continuous supply to the Jant mill once the 
natural forest had been logged (Lamb 1990:83). 
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Table 8.6: Post-logging land use scenarios for the Gogol Valley (area in 
hectares). 
Land use 
Small holder agriculture, no reforestation 
Benchmark reserves 
Reforestation plus smallholder agriculture 
(Land for reforestation) 
Large scale agriculture 
Cattle 
Selective logging and enrichment planting 
Swamps and river edges 
Table 8.6 (continued). 
Land use 
Small holder agriculture, no reforestation 
Benchmark reserves 
Reforestation plus smallholder agriculture 
(Land for reforestation) 
Large scale agriculture 
Cattle 
Selective logging and enrichment planting 
Swamps and river edges 
Source: Adapted from Lamb (1990) 
Scenario 
1 2 3 4 
3,900 3,900 3,900 3,900 
1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 
25,100 26,900 25,600 27,800 
(18,800) (17,700) (19,200) (18,300) 
34,400 
3,000 
5 
3,900 
1,300 
25,900 
(19,400) 
4,900 
29,000 
3,000 
32,600 
3,000 
4,800 
29,200 
3,000 
Scenario 
6 
3,900 
1,300 
28,400 
(19,000) 
4,900 
26,300 
3,000 
7 
3,900 
1,300 
26,300 
(19,700) 
4,900 
4,600 
23,800 
3,000 
4,700 
27,100 
3,000 
8 
3,900 
1,300 
28,500 
(19, 100) 
4,900 
4,700 
21,500 
3,000 
The eight scenarios were evaluated by the MTWG, and Scenario 3 was 
preferred. Two further modifications- 3A and 3B -were prepared, reflecting 
MTWG's assessment of landowner aspirations on the basis of its village patrols. 
Scenario 3B (detailed in Table 8.7) was eventually accepted by the MTWG and 
forwarded to Cabinet for its consent. It was adopted as the basic planning 
document for the area in 1974 (Lamb 1990:84). 
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Table 8.7: Post-logging land use in the Gogol Valley under Scenario 3B. 
Land use 
Clear-felled 
Selectively logged 
Not logged 
TOTAL 
Large-scale agriculture 
Cattle projects 
Plantation forestry 
Subsistence gardening, small-scale 
agriculture, agroforestry 
Enrichment planting, 
natural regeneration 
Benchmark reserves 
V ill age reserves 
Village smallholder projects* 
Swamps, rivers, etc. 
Hill forest on rugged terrain 
Hectares (0/o) 
1,160 (2) 
3,140 (5) 
20,000 (29) 
6,000 (9) 
14,840 (22) 
1,280 (2) 
900 (1) 
3,980 (6) 
2,000 (3) 
14,840 (22) 
68, 140 (1 00) 
* This category reflects Davidson's (1983) assessment of Scenario 3B. Lamb (1990) 
places this area in the clear-felled, small-scale agriculture category. Landowners of the 
area in question were initially not interested in logging, and thus their land was not 
expected to be logged in the post-logging scenarios. They did eventually agree to 
logging, however, which may explain why Lamb (1990) places them in the clear-felled 
category. 
Source: Adapted from Davidson (1983) and Lamb (1990) 
Outcomes 
Collectively, these instruments create a limiting framework within which the 
planning and management decisions of the Gogol project are made. Their terms 
and conditions formally define the specific rights and obligations bestowed on 
the parties involved in the planning process. They inform and direct the 
activities of these actors. 
There is considerable variation in the strength and specificity of the 
commitments produced by these instr11ments. This in turn affects the degree to 
which they are translated into meaningful or purposeful action. Analysing the 
current state of the Gogol project in light of these commitments offers one 
means of evaluating the outcomes of the planning process. 
Impact on Post-Logging Land Use 
What has been the impact of this limiting framework on the planning and 
management of land use in the Gogol Valley in the wake of logging operations? 
The short answer to this question is: very little. The Gogol Land Use Plan 
offers the strongest statements on follow-up land use, but few of the land uses 
which it envisages have materialised as planned. The key land use- plantation 
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forestry - accounted· for only 6,225 hectares by the end of I994. Although 
planting targets of around I ,000 hectares per annum have been achieved over the 
past five years, total plantation area falls well short of the 20,000 hectares 
envisaged in the plan. 
It is now seems unlikely that anything near the 20,000 hectares proposed in 
the land use plan will be given over to plantation forestry. Under Jant's latest 
planning schedule, only I 0,000 hectares of plantation is required to supply the 
chip mill. This is largely due to a change in the species being planted. Initial 
planning estimates were based on plantations of Eucalyptus deglupta, and 
many of the early plantations were based on this species. However, further trials 
within the Gogol confirmed that Acacia mangium was a more suitable 
pulpwood source because of its shorter rotations, higher yields, and greater 
tolerance to a range of site conditions, especially surface water ponding 
(Thistlethwaite I995:6). Jant anticipates an eight-year rotation from A. 
mangium, down from ten for E. deglupta.23 
None of the various agricultural schemes envisioned in the land-use plan 
have ever been fully realised. Several schemes were initiated, but few have 
either survived over the long term or produced significant alternative means of 
livelihood for large numbers of people. A small number of cocoa blocks were 
established by DAL, more as demonstration blocks than as operational ventures. 
Most of these were not maintained and have now been cut. Local residents have 
shown little interest in establishing blocks of their own, due largely to the 
limited marketing opportunities for such crops in the local area. Coconut and 
coffee plantings were also established, but most have since been abandoned. 
Cattle ranchinr, once thought of as the best smallholder activity for the 
people of the Gogol area, also failed to take off. In I978, there were thirteen 
separate projects, with 306 head of cattle altogether (Lamb I990: I70). Now 
there are three cattle projects operating in the valley, but with only a few head of 
cattle (ten to twenty) in each one, and they are limited to the supply of strictly 
local needs (Thistlethwaite I995: I 0-II ). Officers from the DAL branch in 
Madang are promoting local cattle production once again, but as small 
enterprises for the supply of fattened cattle to the local abattoir. 
The unwillingness of landowners to make land available for the projects 
proposed in the plan appears to have been the largest impediment to its 
implementation. The large-scale agricultural project certainly foundered for this 
reason (Lamb 1990:91 ). Local people's negative experiences with logging, the 
government, and Jant made them wary of renewing any future commitments. 
23 With 3.5 by 3.5 metre spacing, the anticipated harvest volume of A. mangium at year eight is 
160m3 /ha, while yields from E. deglupta at year ten are around 120-130 m3 /ha (Thistlethwaite 
1995:7). 
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Their dissatisfaction with revenues received from logging operations, and with 
the level of returns from lease agreements, has compounded this problem.24 
In cases where landowners have been willing to lease land for plantations, 
the spatially dispersed nature of customary land ownership limits the viability of 
such ventures. Much of the land offered has been in small and dispersed blocks. 
The marginal cost of establishing and maintaining plantations on such blocks is 
high, it is expensive to construct road access, and difficult to arrange fire 
prevention and control measures. 
The difficulty of coordinating Jant's logging operations with the conversion 
of land to uses outlined in the plan also caused the plan to founder. Land 
allocated for cattle ranching, for example, was in areas which were not 
designated for logging until well into the life of the project, and which were still 
unlogged in March 1995. Profits, prestige, and hence local interest in cattle have 
declined since the plan was adopted, and other smaller cattle enterprises have 
come and gone over the intervening years without a great deal of success. 
Impact on Infrastructure Provision 
One of the great desires of local residents was that the project should provide 
roads into and across the Gogol Valley (Colton 1976: 192). The construction and 
maintenance of roads has since become one of the most contentious aspects of 
the project. 
Much of the disagreement has revolved around differences in the allocation 
of responsibility for this work. Jant has tried to stick to the formal obligations to 
which it is committed under the terms and conditions of the Gogol Timber 
Agreement and the various timber permits. The costs of road construction have 
always been a substantial component of Jant's operating budget, and the 
company has been reluctant to spend more on road construction than is essential 
for the continuation of its operations. 
Jant's formal interpretation of its responsibilities has sometimes brought it 
into conflict with local residents and with national and provincial government 
officials. The majority of landowners were not privy to the conditions 
negotiated under the various agreements, and therefore had no knowledge of 
Jant's obligations relating to road construction. The matter only became an issue 
once Jant withdrew from logged areas and discontinued the maintenance of 
roads in these areas. The design of the roads and the environmental conditions 
in the area ensured that these roads deteriorated quickly without maintenance. 
Local resentment towards Jant grew as the roads crumbled and bridges were 
washed away. Many interpreted Jant's behaviour as a sign of ill-will, unaware 
of the economic motivations behind the company's actions. 
24 Leases normally run for thirty years or more, with a rent of 50 toea per hectare paid in five-
year increments. A 2.5 percent royalty has been paid to the landowners for timber subsequently 
harvested from the leased land. Landowners have generally been unwilling to lease land under 
these terms. 
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This is not to say that Jant has not tried to accommodate local requests for 
road construction. In the early days of the project, considerable community 
pressure was brought to bear on the company to construct roads ahead of its 
logging schedule. Jant acceded to these requests, and has cautiously continued 
to do so ever since. Jant's field supervisors will redirect heavy equipment from 
logging areas to assist in clearing or maintaining nearby roads, provided the 
request does not interfere with logging operations (personal communication, Joe 
Loreakena, March 1995). 
Relations between Jant and the government have also been strained over the 
issue of road maintenance. Jant contributes approximately 35 percent of the cost 
of maintaining the paved roads between the Gogol area and Madang town. Both 
parties have voiced concern over the other's commitment to road maintenance 
over the years. 
Jant has also been criticised for the haphazard development of its road 
network. Little strategic forethought has gone into the planning of roadways 
across the valley. Roads have been built without proper regard for 
environmental and ecological conditions, let alone the requirements of local 
landowners. 
In Jant's defence, some of these problems can be ascribed to the uncertainty 
of company operations in the Gogol area. The combination of many different 
factors make it difficult to develop long-range operational plans. Individual 
landowners can object to logging activities and force the company off their land 
at any time, seasonal factors can force operations to be suspended, and the 
variability of forest quality can force changes to logging schedules. Jant has had 
to incorporate a considerable degree of flexibility into its planning horizons in 
order to accommodate these unanticipated operational changes. 
The project does not appear to have boosted the development of other key 
forms of public infrastructure. Improvements in school and health care facilities 
have not kept pace with the population increase in the Gogol. De' Ath (1980) 
reported eight aid posts and two health centres (one at Utu mission and one at 
the Jant base camp) in the Gogol Valley. Two additional aid posts had been 
established by early 1995, bringing the total complement of health care facilities 
to twelve.25 All but two of these facilities are constructed out of bush materials. 
Current facilities are not equitably located throughout the valley, requiring some 
villagers to walk for up to two hours each way to receive medical attention 
(personal communication, Dick Bart,26 March 1995). 
School facilities have not improved. Current enrolment in community 
schools across the valley is roughly 1,800 students. Many of the school 
buildings were constructed prior to, or early in the life of, the Gogol project, and 
have received declining levels of maintenance over the past twenty-five years. 
25 These figures were supplied by the Health Office, Department of Madang, March 1995. 
26 Health Officer, Department of Madang. 
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Some are now in a considerable state of disrepair. Other schools lack adequate 
housing for teaching staff (personal communication, Robert Solon,27 March 
1995). 
Impact on Employment 
Another anticipated benefit of the Gogol project was the employment 
opportunities which it was expected to create - both within the valley and 
throughout the Madang region. Initial estimates suggested the project would 
create around 1,500 jobs (Department of Forests Annual Report 1971/72, quoted 
in Lamb 1990: 167). Employment seems to have peaked in the 1980s, when the 
project employed roughly 1, 100 people. More recent statistics are difficult to 
locate, but current estimates are around 800-900.28 
In line with the wishes of the landowners (and subsequently the conditions 
of the Gogol Timber Agreement), Jant initially followed a hiring policy which 
gave preference to people from the Gogol Valley. However, most of the jobs are 
seasonal labouring positions which require low levels of skill and attract 
correspondingly low wages. Many local people found that there were few 
benefits in working for Jant, particularly given the fact that most of the seasonal 
work coincides with the period of greatest gardening and social activity. As a 
result, they only tend to join the Jant workforce on a casual basis when they have 
an immediate need for cash. Jant has consequently relaxed its employment 
policy, and obtains the majority of its workforce from Madang town. 
As with all projects of this nature, the overall impact of the Gogol project 
on employment has been uneven. Jant has maintained a commitment to employ 
skilled Papua New Guineans, and has treated these employees well enough to 
cultivate a sense of commitment to the company. 
Aside from wage employment, the project has opened up two other avenues 
for Gogol landowners to obtain a cash income. The first is the opportunity for 
contract labour in the business of tending Jant's plantations. The company sub-
contracts some of the establishment work and most of the routine maintenance 
tasks to local clans or, alternatively, district church and youth groups. 
Conditions in the Gogol Timber Agreement and timber permits stipulate that 
local villagers get the first chance to bid for these contracts, although the small 
population in the valley often means that local contractors are unavailable, and 
others must be found elsewhere. Contract rates vary depending on the task, but 
estimates supplied by forestry officials indicate that they normally work out at 
around K4-5 per person per day. 
27 Education Offficer, Department of Madang. 
28 My investigations revealed that Jant has not filed an Annual Return with the Investment 
Promotion Authority since 1987. Current estimates are based on conversations with managerial 
staff of Jant itself and with officers of the Madang office of the Forest Authority. Current field 
operations utilise three logging teams, down from the four or five teams at the peak of operations. 
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The second avenue is the establishment of tree farms. There are now 
believed to be around 120 tree farmers in the Gogol Valley, with an estimated 
2,000 hectares under private plantings. Most of the established farms are small, 
with only two or three farms in the order of 15 hectares. The majority are less 
than 10 hectares, with the average around 2-3 hectares. 
Tree farms are a largely unanticipated and unplanned spin-off from the 
Gogol project. They emerged early in the life of the project, after a few 
landowners working with Jant's reforestation teams began planting trees on their 
own land. These landowners established small areas of Eucalyptus deglupta 
(Kamarere ), and Jant started logging these areas between 1986 and 1990. The 
farmers were surprised at how much they earned from the trees, particularly in 
comparison to their income from royalties, lease fees and stumpage rates on 
leased land. The perceived benefits of tree farming have spread rapidly, and 
demand for seedlings has grown significantly. 
In the past, the government and Jant both supplied seedlings to interested 
landowners, and provided technical assistance free of charge, but budgetary 
constraints have reduced the role of the National Forest Service in recent years. 
Jant has taken over the operation of the nursery at Baku station, providing the 
Forest Service with seedlings in return for use of the facility. The Forest Service 
sells these seedlings for 10 toea each, while Jant gives the seedlings away. Table 
8.8 shows the increase in Jant's distribution of seedlings between 1990 and 
1994. 
Table 8.8: Jant's distribution of seedlings, 1990-1994. 
Year 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
TOTAL 
Number of Seedlings 
23,650 
61,430 
65,561 
95,950 
130,000 
376,591 
Estimated Area (ha)* 
38 
98 
105 
154 
208 
603 
* Area based on a nominal spacing of 4 x 4 metres ( 625 trees per hectare). 
Source: Information provided by Jant, March 1995. 
More recently, Jant has established a loan programme which provides 
interested tree farmers with small amounts of money to assist in the 
establishment of plots. Jant has also provided support for the establishment of 
several privately run nurseries to meet both its own needs and the local demand 
generated by tree farming. 
Although interest remains high, the long-term viability of tree farming in its 
current form is questionable. Neither Jant nor the Forest Authority has done 
much to coordinate the establishment of farms. As a result, farms are scattered 
across the valley, few are contiguous, and many are either too small or too far 
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away from existing roads to make harvesting viable. Estimations of the cost of 
establishing and maintaining a five-hectare tree farm indicate that the venture is 
now marginal at best (Thistlethwaite 1995).29 The combination of these facts 
led Thistlethwaite (1995) to conclude that Jant gives a 'very low second priority' 
to tree farming, and that current efforts are more a gesture of goodwill than a 
serious attempt to supplement commercial plantations through guided tree 
farming initiatives. 
Broader Considerations 
This sketch of some of the outcomes of the Gogol planning process serves to 
illustrate one critical point about this process: its impact has been very 
haphazard. This fact by itself seems to indicate some failure on the part of an 
organised and purposefully directed planning process. Yet this conclusion 
understates the influence of a number of historically and politically contingent 
factors over the planning process, as well as overstating the ability of the process 
to accommodate and counteract the influence of these factors. 
The key point to emerge from the preceding discussion is that the overall 
planning framework - the statutory, regulatory, and administrative instruments 
used for forest management - provides only general guidance for the 
management of forests at the project level. In the Gogol case, the details of this 
task are left almost entirely to Jant, which understandably manages the resource 
with one purpose in mind - to ensure a continuous supply of pulpwood to its 
chip mill in Madang. 
The management controls that do exist for the Gogol project derive from a 
broader set of controls intended to manage forestry on a national basis. No 
regulatory controls have ever been developed to deal specifically with the unique 
aspects of forestry operations in the Gogol area, most notably the clear-felling of 
natural forests for pulp wood. Resource control has derived from existing 
regulatory devices designed for the management of selective logging operations. 
This lack of specificity is more a victim of circumstance than a product of 
design. This framework was shaped by various events which coincided with the 
start of operations in the Gogol area, and it therefore needs to be considered in a 
historical context. 
Firstly, the uncertainties and unknown dimensions of the Gogol project 
were largely responsible for the lack of specific guidelines controlling the 
project's operations. The entire concept of clear-fell logging was unknown, 
from a regulatory point of view, at the time of the project's inception. 
29 Earlier estimates had suggested a return of around K 1,000 per hectare (see Lamb 1990: 172). 
Thistlethwaite's estimates are based on a yield of 125m3 from an eight-year rotation of Acacia 
mangium (on which the majority of all plantations and tree farms in the Gogol are now based), 
while Lamb's figures are based on a yield of 200m3 from a ten to thirteen-year rotation of 
Kamarere. 
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Commercial forestry in PNG prior to the Gogol project was on a much smaller 
scale and was based on selective harvesting techniques. In the absence of any 
projects of a similar nature and size, local knowledge about the issues and 
impacts associated with large-scale clear-felling of lowland tropical forest was 
minimal. Government personnel also had to contend with the fact that many 
aspects of the project's operations could only be roughly estimated when it 
commenced. 
Wider events also had a bearing on this situation. Following its policy 
direction of the mid-1960s, the Administration was keen to establish large-scale 
industrial projects as the basis for economic development in the impending post-
colonial era, and the Jant proposal fit the bill nicely in this regard. While a lot of 
effort was directed at ensuring that the benefits of development accrued to local 
landowners, considerable effort was also directed at accommodating the 
requirements of Jant. The Administration wanted to establish an environment 
conducive to large-scale resource development, foreign investment, and 
(hopefully) economic growth. Some of its dealings with other forestry projects 
had resulted in the erosion of its own credibility, prompting several timber 
producers to shift their attention to other parts of Southeast Asia. The 
Administration became wary of scaring off the Jant project - with its 'world-
first' status - and hoped that the successful negotiation of an agreement with 
Jant would raise the visibility of a flagging timber industry. 
The development of the Gogol project also took place in a period of great 
political uncertainty and complexity in PNG, as the country moved rapidly 
towards self-government and eventual indepeRdence. As late as 1968, the 
Australian Minister for Territories had been unwilling to set a target for even 
limited self-rule in PNG. By the end of the decade, however, political events in 
both PNG and Australia forced the Australian government to recognise that 
colonial rule was coming to end much faster than had been anticipated only a 
few of years earlier .(Lamb 1990: 12). The Administration found itself in an 
ambiguous position, and, as a result, opted not to engage the trickier problems of 
the day, such as the uneven impacts of resource development and the resultant 
social unrest, or difficulties of promoting development under PNG's customary 
land tenure system. Instead, it left these problems to an imminently independent 
government. 
Negotiations over the Gogol project took place in this uncertain political 
and economic climate. The attentions of the Administration were drawn in 
several different directions as it prepared for its own withdrawal and attempted 
to balance competing national and local-level goals in an effort to maintain some 
semblance of national unity. Not surprisingly, the Administration was never in a 
particularly strong bargaining position with Jant. After the protracted 
negotiations, and the erosion of its credibility in the eyes of the international 
timber industry, the Administration was looking to save face and restore lost 
credibility by successfully concluding its negotiations with Jant. 
178 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
The ultimate consequence of this situation was that, at the end of the 
negotiations, only vague commitments had been given on a number of critical 
aspects of the project, particularly reforestation and development controls, 
leaving all parties with a great deal of uncertainty. The Administration had only 
a vague notion of the operational dimensions of the Jant proposal, and therefore 
did nothing to control or regulate them in any specific manner. Jant had only 
vague prescriptions for its operating environment, and was left to interpret these 
largely on its own terms. Finally, the landowners knew little about what had 
been negotiated and what it would mean for their future way of life. 
Conclusion 
It is difficult to know what conclusions to draw from the Gogol experience. The 
project continues to hold a unique and prototypical status amongst forestry 
operations in PNG. No other project shares the technical specifications of the 
Gogol project, nor its place in the evolution ofthe modern state ofPNG. 
This is not to say that specific lessons have not been learnt from the Gogol 
experiment. Jant and the forest industry have developed the technical skills to 
extract wood chips from mixed tropical forests on a profitable basis.30 Jant and 
the government have also accumulated a pool of expertise on the task of 
managing Western-style, industrial-scale development in a non-Western 
environment. The government has been given a lesson on the administrative and 
regulatory demands of industrial-scale resource extraction, while villagers in the 
Gogol have crashed headlong into the calculating rationality of the 
internationally defined marketplace. 
From a natural resource planning perspective however, the conclusions are 
a little more indeterminate. It is difficult to know whether the problems of the 
Gogol project are a result of a complete breakdown in the planning process, or 
simply the result of historical and political circumstance. In reality, the truth 
probably lies somewhere in between. 
On the one hand, the planning framework, consisting of the various 
statutory and administrative instruments that set the context for resource use and 
management, did not appear to provide the necessary guidance for the deliberate 
and intentional management of the Gogol's natural environment. No clear 
process existed to gently ease the project into the Gogol Valley, and none seems 
to have evolved since. The initiative for resource management has been left to 
the one group whose objectives are the most clear-cut- Jant. 
Unfortunately, the objectives of Jant are also the most singular in focus. It 
has always viewed the Gogol as little more than a source of feedstock for its 
milling operations, and has managed the resource accordingly. As a result, 
broader management considerations and an integrated perspective on all the 
30 The continued operation of the Gogol project is perhaps the best indicator of its productivity -
better than the history recorded in its balance sheets. 
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resources of the Gogol Valley have always been lacking. Some efforts have 
been made to take purposeful steps to implement an envisioned future for the 
valley, but these have been largely ad hoc and, for the most part, have missed 
their mark. 
The invisible hand of history cannot ·be understated either. The historical 
sequence through which this project has unfolded has been shrouded in 
technical, administrative, and political uncertainties. The consequence of this is 
that the project has not really developed as planned, but has simply evolved. 
Events have unfolded in a contingent manner, with important decisions taken as 
and when required by the historical and political events of the moment. 
In the final analysis, therefore, the Gogol experience makes most sense ·if it 
is evaluated in light of both the specific character of the governance framework, 
and against the backdrop of a politically and economically uncertain epoch, in 
PNG's recent history. The governance framework gave only a loose definition 
of the planning process, so resource planning and decision making has always 
taken place in an opportunistic environment. Under these conditions, it is not 
surprising that events of the moment can quickly overwhelm even the best laid 
plans. The history of the Gogol project suggests that they often do. 
CHAPTER9 
CUTTING THE WOOD OF WOODLARK: 
RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS FOR LOGGING ON MUYUW, 
MILNE BAY PROVINCE* 
FREDERICK H. DAMON 
Introduction 
Elders from Woodlark Island in Milne Bay Province used to begin their origin 
myths by saying 'The Creator cursed us'. Insofar as logging is concerned, the 
island's recent experience suggests that the Creator did indeed curse the place. 
Although coconut plantations and expanding villages are beginning to transform 
the island's appearance, from a distance it seems to be dominated by dense 
rainforests. But the inference that might be drawn from this view- an untapped 
wealth of rainforest resources for contemporary logging - is illusionary. The 
island does have old forests. Yet truly impressive-sized Eucalyptopsis found in 
the volcanic region are often hollow and rotting. The island's prized ebony 
barely makes the grade, and many of the trees meeting the 50 cm dbh 1 limit 
often have little of the high-demand black heartwood. Furthermore, the ebony is 
often found in such treacherous terrain that machinery becomes stranded or 
* Data for this chapter was gathered in the process of conducting ethnobotanical research across 
the northern islands of Milne Bay Province. This research was facilitated by a University of 
Virginia Sesquintennial Associateship, for which thanks are given to the University's Centre for 
Advanced Studies. The project involves collaboration with Or Linus Digim 'rina of the 
Department of Anthropology and Sociology at the University of Papua New Guinea, to whom 
thanks are given for stimulating discussion of some of the issues which this paper engages. 
Voucher specimens for flora collected on the island have been deposited at the Lae and Harvard 
herbaria, and tentative identifications have been received from Mr Max Kuduk (Lae) and Or Peter 
Stevens (Harvard): thanks go to both men and their institutions for much kind advice and help. A 
portion of the research entailed organising a study of tree growth on 'Woodlark', and I thank Or 
Herman Shugart of the Department of Environmental Sciences at the University of Virginia for 
stimulating and partly funding that work, and officials of the National Forest Service in Lae, the 
Milne Bay Provincial Forest Management Committee, the Murua Local Government Council 
(especially its clerk, John Alison), and elders and helpers across the island for their contributions to 
the survey process. Rolly Christiansen also strongly supported the forest growth survey and held 
many conversations with me about the status of logging on the island: if it is not evident from what 
follows, I should say that I have the highest regard for Mr Christiansen and for what he is trying to 
accomplish. This paper also draws on innumerable Muyuw friends, acquaintances, and 
relationships which are now some twenty years old, as well as on conversations with forestry 
officials in Alotau and the island's two forestry project supervisors, Noel Dibela ( 1995) and 
Samuel Alosious. 
1 Diameter at breast height. 
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wrecked in the process of extracting it. Many other trees tend to be small. The 
island's logger reports that 80 percent of all but one significant genus -
Calophyllum - are undersize. And even those trees that meet legal size limits 
often shrink below the minimum between the time they are cut and the time 
forestry officials take their measurements. Since the industry is now more 
tightly regulated (especially for those operators who cannot afford to pay 
bribes), significant logging on the island may now be a thing of the past. 
Yet the Creator's curse may be a blessing in disguise. The problematic 
nature of the island's trees, the island's small size from the point of view of 
large-scale logging, and its remoteness, may make Woodlark unworthy for 
today's industrial logging standards. But these very factors might make timber 
activity on a different, smaller scale one of a number of attractive options for the 
indigenous population's future development. 
In this chapter I shall review Woodlark Island's relevant ecological and 
social context, its logging history since the Second World War, as well as the 
current logging situation, and I shall then offer some guidelines for the future 
based on current indigenous land use patterns. In so doing, I attempt to deal 
with three of the four issues discussed by other contributors to this part of the 
monograph. These are: 
• the main turning points in the island's logging history; 
• a description of the main stakeholders, their interests, plans, motives, etc; and 
• what these people have gained and lost from the experience. 
I exclude from serious consideration here the effects of the Woodlark experience 
in the provincial and national policy arenas because of the limitations of my own 
knowledge. As my description develops, I try to go from relevant ecological and 
ethnographic facts to real or potential policies as I have experienced them on the 
island. By 'policy' here I do not just mean the formal deliberations of 
governmental or political institutions; rather I include what I take to be the 
developmental presumptions of the European order that has increasingly come to 
dominate this island from some time in the first half of the nineteenth century. I 
offer this material as an anthropologist with some thirty-six months on the 
island, stretching from July 1973 to July 1996. My most recent research 
concerned the culture's ethnobotany, and thus I am able to draw on local 
knowledge directly relevant to the question of logging in contemporary Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), insofar as logging impinges on what is left of contemporary 
cultures. Prior to this, I have been concerned to describe Woodlark's place in 
the Milne Bay Province-wide regional system known to the anthropological 
world as the Kula Ring (see Map 9.1 ).2 In this regional system, which remains a 
dominant force in many people's lives, social units continually pass two major 
2 This region of Milne Bay Province is one of the classic areas in anthropology. Consequently, 
there is a massive anthropological literature devoted to the area. Much of the significant literature 
written before 1990 is referenced in Damon ( 1990). 
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wealth items clockwise and counter-clockwise around a circle of inter-related 
islands. As will soon become apparent, a consideration of the island's logging 
resources and potential should take account of the local culture's place in this 
larger social setting. 
Map 9.1: The Kula Ring. 
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The Ecological and Social Contexts of 'Woodlark' Island 
The island's common European name, Woodlark, dates from the late 1830s, 
while its current official (government) name, Murua, follows from a Trobriand 
pronunciation, and its real, indigenous name is Muyuw. In this paper I employ 
the indigenous name. The oldest European centre, now the centre for logging 
and mining activities, remains near Kulumadau Mountain in the centre of the 
island. The present administrative centre, together with an airstrip dating from 
the Second World War, is at Guasopa in the southeastern corner (see Map 9.2).3 
3 I thank Auridiam Consolidated NL for permission to reproduce Map 9.2, which is taken from 
the Inception Report on the Woodlark Gold Project Environmental Plan, prepared by 
Environmental Management and Monitoring Ltd in August 1996. 
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Located in the far northeast corner of Milne Bay Province, Muyuw is a 
mixed classic coral atoll, one of a number of islands on what geologists call the 
Woodlark Rise, a geological formation perhaps stretching from below the New 
Georgia Group in the Solomon Islands to the Huon Gulf. Gawa, K weywata, 
Iwa, Kitava, and the Trobriand Islands are the other major inhabited islands on 
this formation. Although they may all be the result of volcanism, Muyuw is the 
highest of the group and the only one with evident igneous and basaltic 
foundations. It has a mountainous core with two named ranges, perhaps formed 
by a single eroded caldera, running on a northeast to southwest angle in the 
island's centre.4 The highest peak, Tabakuiy, is some 300 metres high. Several 
individual mountains - Kabat, Kulumadau and Ginaua - appear to be volcanic 
cones, although that may not be literally true. 
The island rests asymmetrically around its volcanic base. There are several 
coral platforms which apparently rise to the north while they sink to the south, 
creating a landmass rectangular in shape, some sixty-five kilometres long and 
thirty kilometres wide at its centre. Relatively steep rises or sheer cliffs 
dominate the northern side of the island while much of the southern side is 
swampy. The outer edge of the coral platform extends for a kilometre (at the 
eastern end) or much further (at the western end) from the southern shoreline, 
providing lagoons with significant marine resources for the local population, and 
of indeterminate value for a national or international market. 
The island's flora varies in accordance with geological and ecological 
conditions. One set of trees is found on the limestone platforms that dominate 
the eastern, northern and western portions of the island. A different set is found 
on the volcanic south-central part. This difference probably has more to do with 
soil variation than elevation. The 'mountainous' areas also tend to be swampier 
and far more difficult to traverse than the limestone dominated areas which 
readily soak up the rains (up to 4000 mm per annum). The island is a difficult 
environment- for Western life forms at least. 
Nasikwabw (or Alcester Island), which lies some fo.1y-five kilometres 
south of Muyuw' s volcanic centre, is a raised portion of the southern reef 
system, most of which is under water. In the traditional economic system, 
Nasikwabw provides a base for a sailing community which facilitates 
communication between Muyuw and the island cultures to the south. Because of 
its sailing obligations, Nasikwabw's population depends on Muyuw for much of 
its food, and with the exception of some nut- and fruit-bearing trees, there is 
little exploitation ofthis island's landscape. In consequence, the island supports 
many ebony trees, a genus which seems to need undisturbed environments in 
order to thrive. 
4 Recent geological exploration work by mining companies has created sufficient new data to 
rework 'Woodlark's' geology. However, the most useful physical descriptions of the island 
remain those of Oilier ( 1975) and Oilier and Pain ( 1978). 
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The flora of all islands resting on the Woodlark Rise is clearly the result of 
a complex interaction between each island's geological setting and the social 
systems created through human occupation of the region, which began at least 
2,000 years ago, and the patterns here remain part of people's implicit or explicit 
knowledge of their environment - in other words part of their culture.5 The 
design from Gawa, just west of Muyuw, to the Trobriands is obvious and easy to 
define. Comparatively high forest growth rings each island, especially on the 
steeper sides. On Gawa, Kweywata, Iwa and Kitava, several tiers lead to an 
oval-shaped concavity entirely dominated by gardens and early successional 
forest growth monitored and significantly determined by the local inhabitants. 
The tiers are all gardened or planted with fruit- or nut-bearing trees, whereas the 
shorelines or steeper rises have higher forests monopolised by light-demanding 
trees which are also significant for local populations. Many species are also of 
commercial significance. Included are Pometia pinnata, Intsia bijuga, several 
Calophyllum species, including the common beach Calophyllum (C. 
inophyllum L.), and at least in some areas, Endospermum medulosum and 
Palaquium. 
There is multifaceted evidence suggesting that these floral environments are 
intentionally (or unintentionally) determined by the well-formed regional social 
system. First, most islanders believe their garden soils are reproduced by one 
commonly found tree- Rhus taitensis- which has similar names (gweda/gwed) 
in the local languages.6 This tree is not found in natural forest gaps, only in 
regions significantly transformed by roads or gardens. 7 While some islands and 
villages allow it to sprout at will, others transplant seedlings next to root crops or 
alongside young nut or fruit trees. 
Second, different islands or regions were planted with, or known for, trees 
of regional significance. lwa grows a species of Terminalia (T. catappa, 
known locally as saido) which is thought to be unique in the whole province, and 
whose soft-shelled nuts are traded for the products of other islands. Gawa and 
Kweywata are known for producing the largest class of outrigger canoe, a craft 
5 Aspects of this system have been described in the work by Hide et al. ( 1994). I particularly 
thank Or Michael Bourke for numerous exchanges concerning aspects of the systems partly 
described in this work. I 
6 Other trees also play this role for people in more localised areas, e.g. several Dysoxylum 
species in southeastern Muyuw. 
7 
'Woodlark Island' is famou_s- internationally, and denoted as an environment worth protecting 
for biodiversity purposes, because of a unique species of cuscus (Phalanger lullulae). By the mid-
1980s, timber cutting and gold exploration activities had developed to the point of appearing to 
threaten this animal's natural environment. Partly as a consequence, biologists from Oxford 
University ( 1987) organised two research trips to investigate the species. Although it had been 
presumed that this animal would tend to be found in the island's least inhabited zone, the south-
central mountainous region, it appears to be more common around villages. The genus Phalanger 
is known to be an indiscriminate forager, but Muyuw people say one of its main foods is the nectar 
from the Rhus taitensis and a vine frequently seen in the first five to ten years of garden fallows. I 
thank one of the Oxford researchers, Or Chris Norris, for discussing some of the relevant issues. 
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that plies the whole eastern half of the province, from a species of Calophyllum 
abundant on both islands (and also on the smaller and no longer inhabited 
Dugumenu). This tree is also one of the two really significant commercial 
Calophyllum species on Muyuw, and I shall discuss it again later in this chapter. 
Two other Calophyllum species found most commonly in Muyuw' s volcanic 
region furnish the best masts for this same type of canoe, while several hectares 
of north-central Muyuw are known as the only reliable source of a leguminous 
tree used to fashion its outriggers. 8 A species of pandanus found just east of the 
volcanic centre is (or rather has been until recently) a major source of leaves for 
the traditional sail. Budibud (or the Laughlan Islands), southeast of Muyuw, was 
and remains almost entirely planted with coconuts, and thus serves as a sort of 
coconut bank for Muyuw and other nearby islands. Although both maturing and 
sapling ebony trees can be found in many inaccessible Muyuw locations, I 
suspect that the ebony trees of Nasikwabw were deliberately placed on that 
island as an economic resource when ebony saplings were employed for making 
traditional weapons (such as spears for hunting larger sea animals such as 
turtles) and some tools. In any case, such examples could be multiplied. 
Finally, most islands or island sectors are identified with a particular 
species of tree which is used locally as a source of firewood in 'ritual' and life-
cycle contexts, and thus incorporated into the network of vital labour obligations 
between inter-married groups. Much of eastern Muyuw, for example, identifies 
with a tree which is only found in young fallow gardens, while north-central 
Muyuw identities with a Syzygium species found in middle-aged fallows, and 
western Muyuw is linked to an old-fallow species. These trees symbolise the 
age of the garden fallows which these groups typically cut- young, middle, and 
old respectively. At the same time, south-central Muyuw is identified with a tree 
which is very hard and difficult to cut, symbolising the traditional indifference to 
gardening which accompanied that area's specialisation in stone-tool 
manufacture. Boagis, a sailing village at the southwestern extremity of the 
landmass, uses another tree that only grows near the sea, the wood from which is 
used as a critical component in the technology that ties masts to the keels of the 
largest class of outrigger canoe. Muyuw (and Gawa) people identify Gawa's 
tree as one that grows only along the beach - a hard and heavy species, whose 
cutting, splitting, and carrying for firewood represent the difficulties posed for, 
and transformations required of, a sea-based society perched on top of a column 
jutting 150 metres above the sea, since the bundled firewood has to be carried up 
the island's two sets of steep cliffs to the inhabited areas.9 lwa is identified with 
a nut tree planted by its inhabitants, which is emblematic of its anthropogenic 
landscape. Dawson Island, one of the islands to the south of Muyuw, is 
8 People from other islands sail to the village of Kaulay, which lies closest to this area, in order to 
refit their craft. 
9 Although she was unaware of the use of this tree, Munn's (1977) analysis ofthe symbolism of 
fabrication entailed in the production of Gawa's famous canoes- canoes designed to ply the whole 
eastern half of Milne Bay Province - shows how this specific practice is part of a system of 
transformations. 
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identified with Intsia bijuga. Knowledge of these tree usages thus constitutes a 
kind of 'totemic' communication system (see Levi-Strauss 1966). In reference 
to these trees and their distinctive usages, people locate themselves and others in 
a set of complementary roles and places in what is virtually a province-wide 
regional system. 
Two conclusions may be drawn from the material presented up to this point. 
First, the data suggests that this region is similar to the environments which 
recent ecologically sensitive observers (for example,. Posey 1985; Balee 1989) 
have begun to describe in the Amazonian region of South America. Such 
environments are parts of constructed social systems, not natural entities to 
which people adapt on the basis of what Westerners might regard as their 
'limited' level of technological development. 10 Second, it follows that these 
areas are, from the indigenous point of view, 'developed'. So, when outsiders 
enter this area presuming that something is lacking or that development is 
needed, they are creating an implicit or explicit misunderstanding between their 
own views and those of the inhabitants educated in this region. 11 
Muyuw may therefore look like an island dominated by dense rainforests, 
but it is really part of a larger ecological and social region which is the subject of 
local knowledge, classification and use, and which is probably made to be the 
way it is. This point, however, raises a particular problem in the case of Muyuw 
because it looks so different from other islands to the west. Those islands are all 
densely populated, just fringed by 'rainforest'. Except for the areas immediately 
surrounding the current distribution of villages, 12 the interior of Muyuw, unlike 
the centres of the v\lestern islands, is not now a vast plane of garden land, but is 
covered by such rainforests. Why? This is not just an interesting academic 
question which may be answered by archaeological research; it also has some 
practical significance because of the distribution of many of the most 
commercially significant trees found on the island. I shall try to explain. 
When compared to the population of some 20,000 in the Trobriand Islands, 
and the equally dense if not denser population distributions on the small islands 
from Kitava to Gawa, Muyuw's current population of under 3,000 is an enigma. 
It is known that the island suffered a major demographic collapse after the 
earliest colonial encounters of the 1840s, reaching a low point of some 800-900 
around 1915. But the population estimates at the beginning of this decline are 
equally puzzling - several thousand certainly, but not as many as 10,000 or 
20,000. Be that as it may, scattered artifacts found throughout much of the 
10 The Woodlark Cuscus (Phalanger lullulae), which feeds off the tree Rhus taitensis, may be 
part of the island's human-created environment. According to Chris Norris (personal 
communication, October 1995), 'the current evidence suggests that cuscuses in general, and 
Phalanger orientalis in particular, tend to get moved around by human agency in this region'. 
11 
'Educated in this region' is, of course, a qualification which requires further discussion, since 
educational contexts are changing. 
12 Along the eastern, southeastern, and southwestern shorelines, the north-central part of the 
island, and several village locations on its western appendage, known as Mwadau Island. 
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uninhabited part of the island do suggest a different population distribution or 
size in the past, and this may serve to explain the incidence of two of the more 
significant commercial trees growing on the island, which are two out of some 
six Calophyllum species. The identification of these trees is not certain. One 
appears to be similar or identical to Calophyllum peekelii L., the other similar 
or identical to Calophyllum leleanii P.F. Stevens. 13 Across the island they are 
known as apul and kausilay/kosilay respectively. The latter, kausilay, is the 
most significant because it is the main tree used to fashion outrigger keels. Both 
trees are gregarious; they normally occur in groves, and isolated trees are rarely 
encountered. The former species, apul, tends to be found on wetter ground that 
fringes swamps, especially in the southeastern third of the island.14 By contrast, 
kausilay is found on drier ground defined by uplifted limestone platforms. A 
most important fact about both trees is that in the high (30-40 metre) forest, 
where mature trees are found, one may see thousands of seeds and hundreds of 
sprouted seedlings but no saplings or middle-sized trees. I have only found 
small to middle-sized apul on the fringes of meadows in the lowland expanses 
dotting the island's volcanic uplifts. These meadows are named and apparently 
quite stable. If in some sense natural, they are also regularly burned after major 
dry periods as people traipse through them hunting wild pigs. Away from these 
meadows, to the east of the island's mountain ranges, mature apul are common, 
13 These tentative identifications are courtesy of Or Peter F. Stevens, who is a Malesian 
systematist, Curator of the Harvard University Herbaria, and the expert on Calophyllum in Papua 
New Guinea. For Mr Rolly Christiansen, the owner of the island's logging company, Milne Bay 
Logging, there is a 'true' Calophyllum, plus the 'beach' Calophyllum and some others. His 'true' 
species is the one which Stevens suggests is Calophyllum peekelii L., and he does not distinguish 
it from Calophyllum leleanii. Although the former tends to grow somewhat larger than the latter, 
they are the only two trees consistently found and cut at about the 50 cm dbh minimum size for 
export logs. Not all Muyuw people clearly distinguish the various types of Calophyllum; only 
those who are engaged in their various and complex uses for the manufacture of outrigger craft. 
Kausilay (Calophyllum leleanii) is the one used for outrigger canoes, and less knowledgeable 
people regard it as the prototype for the whole group (which is not named as such, but is clearly 
recognised as a group). Although my generalisations draw on empirical support from across the 
island, my understanding of Calophyllum derives from extensive interviews and observations with 
people in southeastern Muyuw. Their experience with the genus can only be described as 
'studied'. It is impossible to deal with all of the complexity in the local understanding or ecology 
of the trees here. Nevertheless, these are vital issues for organising any commercial logging on the 
island. I am less certain of the facts with other commercial trees, yet many are found in 
environments similar to these two Calophyllum species. This is true of Endospermum 
medulosum, Pometia pinnata (undoubtedly a tree of a later successional stage than 
Calophyllum), perhaps several of the commercially significant Sterculia, Dysoxylum, and one 
Aglaia species. The Sterculia and Dysoxylum are cut, but are not as significant commercially as 
the others. When found inland, Intsia bijuga grows near young Calophyllum leleanii P.F. 
Stevens. 
14 Another Calophyllum species is found in the swamps. Although it has also been cut for 
timber, it does not reach the sizes of the other two and, unlike all the others, it is a major food 
source for another of the island's resources, wild pigs. For the sake of future maintenance of the 
Muyuw culture and resource base, this tree (probably Calophyllum vexans) should not be 
exploited commercially. 
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but they are also beginning to rot, die, and fall. Once a guide casually mentioned 
to me that new ones would grow up in the gaps created by fallen older ones, but 
I saw no evidence of this, and I therefore wonder what conditions allowed them 
to grow in the first place- presumably a significant deforestation. 
Like the apul, smaller kausilay trees are not found in the high forest, though 
the kausilay represents a somewhat different case because large trees are not just 
found in drier areas, but quite often on land which is unusually rocky. But more 
than this, saplings and middle-sized trees are only located on the edges of garden 
areas that have not been cut because the ground is so filled with coral limestone 
that it cannot be worked. Muyuw people know this, of course, and have a 
special name for this kind of 'land'- sasek. The avoidance of such land creates 
patchy garden regions, 'islands' 15 of higher trees surrounded by gardens, or a 
much lower and distinctively different early-succession forest. In eastern 
Muyuw these patches tend to be small, with gardens forming around them. In 
north-central and western Muyuw, they tend to be long, as if the islands were 
ridge tops, with the gardens in valleys. In any case, people know that their 
intentional use of the landscape creates the conditions which this tree needs in 
order to reproduce in significant numbers. 
My use of the term 'patch' to translate the concept of 'island' is intentional. 
I draw from Winterhalder's (1994) attempt to make the ecological notion of a 
'patch' - meaning a spatially and temporally heterogeneous area - useful for 
anthropological analysis. Although they are not part of his purpose, 
Winterhalder cannot avoid the policy implications of this notion: 
... it would be better to manage for the recurrence of desirable states 
than constantly try to force an ecosystem to maintain a particular 
state ... [As for policy recommendations,] it is enough to note here that 
current approaches to policy almost universally adopt an equilibrium 
view: thus much environmental and developmental policy attempts to 
suppress temporal variation (e.g. fire control), homogenize spatial 
heterogeneity (monocrop tree planting), and introduce connectedness 
(industrial-scale timber harvesting), all of which promote constancy 
and stability at the expense of variability and resilience ... 
(Winterhalder 1994:39-40). 
Milne Bay Logging has created three monocrop tree plantations in its pursuit of 
systematic forestry. 16 My own argument would be that Winterhalder's 
15 The vernacular word is tasim, which is derived from the word for 'cut' or 'chop' and the word 
for 'island'. The concept is clearly motivated, and part of a convoluted indigenous system whose 
outlines may be suggested by noting that gardens are designed to represent all of the major social 
categories in the culture. Gardens are also understood to be boats, in part weaving their ways 
among the 'islands'. Aspects of the relevant system are discussed in Chapter 5 of Dam on ( 1990). 
16 Two of these are planted with species of Planchonella and Calophyllum, and may make 
reasonable progress because both trees seem to be require large amounts of light and usually only 
grow on the edges of higher forest. Although gregarious, they cannot be observed (on Muyuw at 
least) in the natural state in anything like the high concentration of the plantations. The third 
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'patchiness' is an intentional feature of Muyuw society, thought, and 
environment - as well as the larger system in which they are ensconced. This 
social system creates and organises itself around heterogeneity. 
For the indigenous system of knowledge, the patches of older growth 
amidst early succession regrowth, created by the selective use of land, are 
important because the way in which the kausilay trees bend from shade to light 
creates the necessary curvature of an outrigger keel, and local people study this 
development over the years. These facts point to the conclusion that human 
action created the conditions for at least two, and perhaps more, of the island's 
most important commercial timbers. It therefore seems very likely that 
commercial logging has been exploiting a resource previously created by 
humans. Among other things, this means that random surveys of the island's 
'commercial timber potential' may be very misleading. One survey line 
designed to gauge this potential in southeast Muyuw followed along a virtual 
corridor of kausilay, which I would guess to be the limit of gardening when the 
island's population was larger at some time in the nineteenth century, and was 
then used to project species numbers over almost 15 percent of the island. As a 
result, the southeastern third of the island is supposed to contain, as various 
people told me, a million cubic metres of timber. This may be a radical 
overstatement, because kausilay are rare or non-existent away from the route of 
the survey line. This situation does not appear to be unique to Muyuw.I7 
The History of Logging 
'European' whaling ships probably ignored the island in the 1820s, when they 
first entered its waters. However, from an unsuccessful episode of Christian 
missionisation in the late 1840s down to the present day, the European order has 
looked at 'Woodlark' only to think that there must be souls or sales into which it 
can convert the island's perceived 'raw materials'. In the 1880s, copra from the 
Budibud coconut stands was the first botanical product to be commoditised. 
Thereafter, Europeans and some Muyuw people gradually started coconut 
plantations along the southeastern, southwestern, and western sides of the island. 
With one or two exceptions, most of these plantations have now reverted to 
forest. But copra production, even following the Coconut Ordinances effected 
in the 1920s and the re-emergence of indigenous planting after 1950, has always 
taken a back seat to the development of the island's mineral resources. Gold 
plantation contains the island's species of ebony - a tree that appears to need mature forest cover to 
reach maturity itself. 
17 Jean Kennedy (personal communication; Kennedy et al. 1991: 116) reports a similar situation 
in Manus. Nearly 'pure stands' of mature Calophyllum euryphyllum are found, often over old 
village sites. During treks through the eastern, southeastern, and far western sectors of Muyuw, I 
got to the point where, if I came across kausilay, I would start looking for, and then quickly find, 
either evidence of dense coral outcroppings unsuitable for gardening, or potsherd or shellfish 
evidence of human occupation. My discussion of these findings with Rally Christiansen prompted 
him to recollect his own experience of cutting the trees and concluding that these were 're growth' 
trees. Expanding garden areas in southeastern Muyuw are now downing dozens of large kausilay. 
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was discovered on the island in 1895, creating an instant gold rush, several 
mining operations, a European centre located near Kulumadau Mountain (see 
Nelson 1976), and a legacy which is now prompting a fresh attempt to mine the 
island's certain but probably small deposits. Europeans left when the Pacific 
War began, but 'Woodlark' and the Trobriands were the first islands which 
MacArthur invaded in 1943 on his way to the Philippines, though there had been 
no Japanese occupation of either place. Some I 0,000 Americans camped on 
Muyuw for a few months - an episode which accounts for the island's only 
airstrip (originally used by fighter aircraft supporting the attacks on Rabaul) and 
the roads in the southeastern corner. 
After the war, as the colonial frontier moved to new parts of the Territory, 
only one European family returned with any sustained interest and success. This 
was the family of Mr R.C. Neate, his wife, and their one son, Don Neate. It was 
Don who, with his own wife and six children, eventually cast off his father's 
fantasies of mineral wealth and established a company called Kulumadau 
Enterprises. The Neates and their company presented a model of European 
activity for Muyuw people, whose evaluations have shifted over the years. 18 In 
a general sense, the Neates created the links that moved 'Woodlark' from its 
nineteenth century moorings to whatever the twenty-first century will bring. 
More concretely, Don Neate and his wife gathered island resources - marine 
resources, crocodile skins, copra- in a manner typical of other small European 
outposts of the era; created three trade stores; provided transportation, materials, 
and business support for companies engaged in the never-ending search for 
minerals (mostly copper and gold); organised local carving of ebony craft 
objects for an expanding national and international market; 19 started cutting and 
exporting the ebony trees themselves; established a modest but increasingly 
efficient lumber mill which, in its best years (1975-77), cut some 500,000 
superfeet of lumber annually; and last, but by no means least, when they left the 
island in 1978, they created an indigenous corporation called Woodlark Island 
Development Corporation (WIDC0).20 I shall return to the Neates' social 
legacy later. 
18 Muyuw people are intense and critical observers of what they see and imagine, and the Neates 
and Rolly Christiansen are very different people. Muyuw who were bitterly critical of the Neates 
in 1982 were using their activities as models of correct behaviour in 1996, at the expense of MBL, 
for which many people said they would no longer work. There is no space to discuss this issue 
here. However, as may be typical of situations like that of Muyuw, the Europeans who have 
marked the island have been so few, and their engagement so intense, that their 'personalities' and 
styles of business operation have become active forces in indigenous models of appropriate or 
inappropriate action. 
19 Among all but the island's traditional carvers, who used to reside along an uplifted ridge in the 
southeastern sector of the island. 
20 WIDCO is currently engaged in an attempt to sort out landownership disputes, and remains at 
the centre of all non-traditional activities except those of the churches, whose influence is growing 
at a rapid rate. 
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The Neates' home, sawmill, and lumbering activities were all located in or 
around Kulumadau, the 'volcanic cone' and old European residential and mining 
centre. In the early 1970s, they had a truck, a small bulldozer, several small 
diesel-powered boats, and a barge for moving the bulldozer. Some of the trees 
they cut down were dragged to their mill or to nearby 'roads' by teams of 
villagers, usually from Dikwayas (or 'Dicoyas') and Kaulay (or 'Kauray') 
villages. As a result, the people of these two villages, and now the entire 
population resident on the north-central and south-central coasts, presume that 
they can partly or completely sustain themselves by periodic or regular 
employment in a European extraction sector.21 The Neates mostly cut 
Calophyllum, an undetermined species of Syzygium ('watergum'),22 Pometia 
pinnata ('taun'), Manilikara, and Endospermum medulosum ('basswood'). 
The boats that supplied their needs and carried away their exports were coastal 
trawlers that could rarely go further than Lae, or perhaps Rabaul. 
Communication with the outside world was by short-wave radio and, from some 
time in the 1960s, a fortnightly government charter which landed unpredictably 
on the airstrip at Guasopa, at a distance which sometimes required one or two 
days to be spent in further transportation on one of the Neates' diesel boats. By 
these means, and on a very small scale, the island's ebony gradually became 
known to the rest of the world. But for their time, which came at the end of 
Australia's overt control ofPNG, the Neates had a relatively large operation. 
This was dwarfed by the next real chapter in the island's logging history. 
After a couple of fitful years of trying to keep the Neates' operation going, 
WIDCO made arrangements with Milne Bay Logging Company (MBL) to cut 
the island's timber. MBL was created by another Australian, Rolly Christiansen, 
who had worked in the country - mostly in New Britain - as a logger since the 
late 1960s. MBL came to the island in 1980 and started cutting in 1982. Within 
its first six months of operation it cut 10,000 trees and sustained an annual cut of 
. 3 
about 50,000 m through to 1991. 
MBL changed the island's infrastructure and many islanders' expectations. 
When the Neates left the island in 1978, there were probably less than 20 
kilometres of passable roads, of which a significant proportion in the 
southeastern corner were a legacy of the Second World War. By 1983, a road 
was cut from Kulumadau to Guasopa, while another circled the western half of 
the island (see Map 9.2). By 1988, there were some 200 kilometres of roads, 
and there was a growing expectation that villages situated along these roads 
should have several of their own vehicles, usually purchased from royalties 
rather than wages.23 By the mid-1990s, in the central part of the island, people 
21 Perhaps not paradoxically, plans and actions for indigenous engagement in the European sector 
are, in 1996, better established elsewhere on the island. 
22 I know of five species on the island. 
23 These roads have been a source of continual conflict between MBL, the local population, and 
the provincial and national governments. As part of the conditions attached to its presence on the 
island, MBL has been obliged to construct various roads at its own expense. The road that 
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expected to ride on these vehicles and on MBL trucks from one village to 
another for sporting contests, especially soccer matches, held every Saturday. 
By 1988, MBL had as many as ten bulldozers, four logging skids, five fork lifts, 
two large dump trucks, road graders, and so forth. This was a scale of activity 
previously unseen by any of the island's younger generation, and otherwise only 
reminiscent of the Second World War. 
The Neates' docking and loading area had been located at the mouth of a 
creek in the northeast corner of what is known as Kalopwan (or 'Kwaipain') 
Bay. For the new scale of activities a much deeper wharf, loading area, 
machinery repair area, and a village (and graveyard) for the workers' (some 
imported from Rabaul) were created close to Boiboi, at the mouth of the bay. 
The arrival of two or three freighters per month was not unusual up to 1991, 
though these vessels were not all filled with island timbers. MBL commonly 
had an arrangement to cut and deliver some 1,000 m3 of Endospermum 
medulosum ('basswood') each month. Most of the raw logs were sent to East 
Asian markets. By the mid-1990s, MBL had a satellite phone, a fax machine, 
and had created a global interest in the island's ebony. In 1995 and 1996, up to 
100 m3 of ebony was being shipped to Japan to make ceremonial posts inside 
Japanese houses. MBL's owner spoke with Australian, German, Papua New 
Guinean, and United States businessmen about the wood. In 1996, it was no 
surprise that a plane load of Saudi Arabians swooped down to examine the ebony 
stands. 
MBL's near decade of cutting were the first boom years for industrial 
logging in PNG. I have the impression that the company did what it wanted in 
the early years. But by the late 1980s and early 1990s, new rules were beginning 
to create difficulties. In mid-1990, the island was examined by members of a 
governmental Task Force on Environmental Planning in Priority Forest Areas, 
whose brief was to look for possible sites for the combination of nature 
conservation and sustainable development (see Filer 1991 b, Young 1991 ).24 In 
1995 and 1996, local forestry officials told me of the enormous waste which they 
encircles the western half of the island also facilitated a good deal of lumbering activity, but the 
required road to Guasopa, completed by 1983, did not have the same effect, and now remains a 
major expense for the company, especially with logging revenues next to non-existent. Eastern 
Muyuw people anxiously await another road, which is supposed to traverse the northeastern 
shoreline to the eastern side of the island, and complain about Christiansen favouring people in the 
centre who take their roads for granted. Christiansen now believes that he is performing duties that 
are more properly those of the government, and counts the various taxes and royalties that he and 
WIDCO pay against the services the island does not receive. Furthermore, there is no doubt that 
the roads which run through the island's mountainous terrain have transcended MBL's engineering 
capacities. 
24 From my own point of view, it is unfortunate that the island was not selected for further 
intervention along these lines, though the visit of the Task Force may still have prompted 
Christiansen to re-evaluate his own conception of sustainable development. 
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now had under control.25 The company lost its permit to cut after 1991, just 
when tropical timber prices rose to unusual heights, and it was only renewed for 
a year from about May 1995 to May 1996, and this on land which had already 
been cut once. In the past, roads could be cut in any direction that seemed 
convenient, and any tree that could be sold could be cut down, so many trees had 
to be sold with the designation of 'small' or 'super-small'. But now roads had to 
be carefully monitored, and all trees marked before cutting and carefully 
measured to ensure sufficient size. Sample hectares, laid out ahead of time, 
were to be evaluated for damage after they were cut. MBL's owner saw all this 
as being too restrictive for an operation of his size, yet his operation was too 
small to afford the cost of paying bribes. The two young forestry officials, 
whom I got to know in 1995 and 1996, felt that they were introducing a badly 
needed system of control, yet they became bored because there was so little to 
do. Rolly Christiansen refused to cut any new wood in the area for which he was 
granted a permit, partly because there was so little wood to be cut, but partly also 
because of his ebony work and engagement in support activities for Auridiam 
Consolidated NL, the Australian gold mining company prospecting on the 
island. Christiansen had hired his own planner who, like the two forestry 
officials, was a young man from Milne Bay Province who had been educated in 
Lae, and whose own surveys led him to conclude that there was very little left 
which could sustain a profitable timber operation. Many hectares were 
producing less than 15 m3, less than 50 percent of norms elsewhere in the 
country,26 and far less than in other tropical regions. 
In 1982, MBL officials told me they had estimated there were twenty years' 
worth of timber left on the island. By 1991, after he had been cutting nearly 
50,000 m3 a year, Christiansen told me that this rate could no longer be 
sustained. All the cutting to that time had been on the western half of the island. 
The company hoped to gain permission to cut the eastern half, but that was not 
forthcoming. Even if it had been, Christiansen now estimated that the island 
could only sustain a maximum cut of 28,000 m3 a year. Remarkably up to date 
on the state of the market and political dialogues swirling around tropical 
forests, Christiansen assumed that shortly nobody would be able to sell any 
tropical products unless they could prove they were 'green'. And he wanted to 
become that. He hoped 6-8,000 m3 out of the annual cut of 28,000 m3 would be 
earmarked for lumber production by a small mill which he had purchased, and 
by others which he hoped to persuade the local villagers to purchase on their 
own account. At the same time, he figured ebony cutting would have to decline 
to 20 m3 a year, rather than the rate of up to I 00 m3 in 1995-96, and the only 
way to make this profitable would be to have the ebony turned into some kind of 
25 This is what I was told, but I do not have the ability to judge the quality of MBL 's operations 
myself. In 1996, I surveyed two hectares which had been cut in the 1980s, and found that they 
were filled with young to middle-sized commercially significant trees, not unlike those that had 
been harvested. The regrowth was 'natural' and had not been organised by MBL. 
26 Harvest rates in West New Britain, which currently accounts for roughly half of PNG's total 
log exports, average 25-30 m3 (personal communication, Michael Bourke). 
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finished product on the island. Although, at the time of writing, it seems that 
governmental concerns with environmental controls over logging have 
foreclosed any future action on his part, Christiansen's creative and ambitious 
view of the future addresses the island's current situation rather than its history. 
The Current Situation 
MBL's owner, Rally Christiansen, has also become the manager of WIDCO, the 
indigenous development corporation which the Neates established in 1978. 
Being married to a Muyuw woman, it also turns out that he is a brother-in-law to 
many of its officers.27 Deeply embedded in the vagaries of local culture, in a 
way that almost inverts the distanced colonial manner of the Neates, he actively 
participates in many social processes. Closely tied to, and now a long-term 
observer of, the local social scene, he told me that he thinks the biggest threat to 
the future of logging on the island now is the way in which the islanders are 
cutting down the forests for gardening purposes. 
He may be correct, for a number of interrelated reasons. New patterns are 
developing which will have serious long-term consequences for the island's 
environment and whatever social system the current trajectories generate. 
Clearly one factor is a rapidly increasing population, whose impact has several 
dimensions. First, although Muyuw's own population is a long way from 
challenging the island's resource base, it has exceeded 2,000 and is now pushing 
towards 3,000.28 By contrast, the islands to the west are genuinely crowded. 
There is a continuing exodus of people from the Trobriands, Kitava, and lwa, 
and although government officials do not believe their excess population can just 
shift across to Muyuw, as they did in the early 1980s, there is still a small but 
steady stream of people moving from west to east. 
27 WIDCO has a number of officers, a board of directors drawn from across the island, and a 
mass of shareholders comprising all those people resident in the Murua Local Government Council 
(LGC) area who have bought shares for a kina each. Although WIDCO's officers think things are 
going very well, few if any of the directors agree with them, and there is a near-total breakdown in 
communication between the manager and the officers, on the one side, and the board and most 
islanders on the other. Christiansen is an effective operator in his own way, but is playing too 
many roles not to become trapped by their contradictory effects. He bankrolled his father-in-law's 
participation in the inter-island exchange system without knowing it; he has helped many other 
people and keeps 'open house' to an extent which shocks government officials (both national and 
expatriate); and he has doled out money to help pay school fees in a manner not untypical of a 
traditional Muyuw big man. All of which has only prompted some Muyuw people to hold up his 
actions as examples of irresponsible financial dealings: 'A European would not act that way'. 
28 The population of the Murua LGC area, which includes all the islands from lwa to Budibud, 
has just risen above 5,000. At least 2,000 people live on the outer islands. The main land mass of 
Muyuw has nearly 3,000 residents, including outsiders employed by MBL and the mining 
interests, plus a number of government officers and the school population located at Guasopa, and 
various Trobriand, Kitavan, and other people from nearby islands who may or may not be 
permanent residents. 
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Alongside population growth, a second major issue is the way that people 
are cutting the forests for their gardens. Everyone thinks it best to cut the older 
types of forest, and they do so with relish. Consequently, scores of 
commercially valuable trees are being cut, and most are left to rot. There is also 
a different aesthetic sense and knowledge base among the new generations of 
people now practising the 'traditional' system, which brings us back to my 
earlier qualification concerning the locus of education. Most people have now 
been to schools, and increasing numbers have been educated in other parts of the 
country. A 'modern' landscape for them is one with no trees. Furthermore, the 
main message which many people have picked up in school is that their elders 
did not know anything. So they see no reason to avoid cutting down trees in 
places like the very rocky areas known as sasek, which formerly created the 
special 'islands' of vegetation. In the past, according to elders, these would have 
been left to provide stocks of seeds for the older types of forest, to cast longer 
shadows which force crops and younger trees to grow faster and larger, and (a 
mixed blessing in the traditional perspective) to provide homes for various 
fauna. If current trends continue, the patchy landscape of the traditional Muyuw 
garden area will be homogenised. 
The impact of a growing population is combined with the effect of Western 
notions of land and its ownership being grafted onto 'traditional' Muyuw social 
categories. It is here that the legacy of the Neates has the greatest force. The 
idea behind WIDCO was that it would combine the island's landowners in a 
single body so that they could represent themselves as a unit to the island's 
probable future developers and receive a rent from that development. WIDCO 
has in fact distributed dividends - twenty times most people's original 
investments, according to Christiansen - and the desire for such income is so 
great that Christiansen believes any attempt to divert it to productive investment 
would lead to major tribulation. 
WIDCO's intended purpose needs to be seen in light of the island's 
contradictory history of land tenure. As gold and copra production started in the 
1890s, the colonial administration solved the problem of land tenure at a stroke 
by declaring 95 percent of it to be state land. The original development never 
proceeded as intended, and especially after the international economic collapse 
of 1929, there were no more new attempts to claim land for large coconut 
plantations. However, successive generations of outsiders and islanders have 
continually revisited the question of whether they should consider most of the 
island to be alienated government land or follow the 'indigenous' system of land 
ownership. And, as it turns out, this is a choice between an act of expropriation 
which nobody could now defend (even if some government officials take it as a 
fact of life) and a system which clearly varies with the eyes of the beholder, 
especially the Western beholder.29 As all recent distributions of resources, 
29 'Traditional' notions of landownership, as they emanate from the subclan construct called 
data, are discussed in Dam on ( 1990), while the current situation is considered at greater length in a 
forthcoming article (Damon n.d.). 
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whether from mmmg or logging, have followed from these realities, some 
attention needs to be paid to them here. 
In 1996, Muyuw people told me that; in 1978, the Neates organised a 
meeting of all the island's elders so that they could write down a record of the 
land owned by each subclan, and thereby create an enduring and official 
document. All copies of this document are now reportedly lost. The 
descriptions of the meeting which I have collected make it quite clear that no-
one could figure out what was actually 'said' without a deep knowledge of the 
social personalities who did or did not make themselves heard, as well as a good 
understanding of the local rules of public discourse. Elsewhere I have described 
some of the rhetorical forms used in Muyuw public meetings (Damon 1983). 
Suffice it to say here that public speaking and decision making usually flows, as 
does much in the culture, through the negation of some initial perspective. 
Moreover, when people speak as they spoke in that 1978 meeting, they do not 
speak as autonomous persons freely entitled to their opinions. They speak as 
representatives of an indigenously defined distribution of resources whose 
understanding is, by our standards, situational. One aspect of that particular 
situation was the consciousness on the part of some younger participants that the 
older participants would soon die. As is the case throughout much of PNG, 
Muyuw life courses are structured so that most events and decisions can be 
reversed in the future. Consequently, there is no straight .line to be drawn 
between an accurate record of that meeting and the present state of affairs, since 
a younger generation of spokesmen has redefined what was said. 
'Subclans' are defined by Westerners and most government officials as the 
agencies which lay claim to land (as a source of rent). The Muyuw are a 
matrilineal people: everybody is in the same group as their mother. There are 
two tiers to their notion of a group, one containing the other. The superordinate 
category kum, customarily translated as 'clan', is not a land-holding, or other 
resource-holding, unit. Instead, it regulates marriage: people must find spouses 
from a different 'clan'. This is a formulation that is regional in scope. The clan 
identities of people from the north and west are virtually identical to those in 
Muyuw, and where they are different, in the south, there is a set of animal 
identifications which allows people to convert the terms of one system into those 
of the other. Unlike the system noted earlier in this paper, which designates 
differences between regions by reference to their special trees, this one specifies 
similarities or identities between peoples in this vast, nearly province-wide 
social system. In any case, there is a lower-level category, that of the 'subclan' 
(dal), and this is the category to which the ownership of resources is in principle 
assigned. So there may be two subclans in the same clan, but they will not 
necessarily own the same things. Their difference is represented by where they 
or their ancestors (often a brother and a sister) supposedly came out of the 
ground- usually on some mountain top, in a swamp or estuary, on a tiny island, 
or elsewhere in what is now Milne Bay Province. Just as there are people in 
Muyuw who think they came out of the ground on Rossel Island, for example, in 
the southeastern corner of the province, so there are other people elsewhere who 
think they came from Muyuw. Lots of people who supposedly came out of the 
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ground atop one of Muyuw's mountain ranges, Lukiduse, are to be found on 
Gawa, Kweywata, lwa, and elsewhere. Sometimes people know, or once knew, 
the story of how their ancestors travelled from their places of origin to the 
vicinity of their current place of residence. Such knowledge actually increases 
as one moves west from lwa to Kitava and the Trobriands - a difference that is 
recognised on Muyuw, and is a matter of no little concern to elders worrying 
about the future. Not surprisingly, in 1996, after twenty years of more intense 
Western resource exploitation on the island, there were lots of young people 
under thirty years old who were telling me much more than their elders could 
tell me back in 1975 or 1982. And several of those elders still alive in 1996 
would ask me what I had been told, and then, in disbelief, correct it, or else call 
it a lie, and wince at some of the bizarre t::tles which were now being used to 
claim 'ownership', but which nobody would have imagined a few years earlier. 
Taken as a set, many of these subclan stories are contradictory, or at least 
create contradictory claims about places of origin. Such contradictions have no 
bearing on significant resources and transformations in the society's traditional 
forms of wealth, which were located in affinal relations and not in subclans. The 
stories may have created differences, but they did not arbitrate or determine 
resource claims. The locations specified in myth were realities negated by 
further developments, in much the same way that speeches are negated in public 
meetings. Ambiguities over real resources (as opposed to places of origin) were 
resolved by a system of credits and debts which operated through the exchange 
of produced items or resources, pigs, and vegetable produce in mortuary rituals. 
Although they vary from one island to another, rituals of this kind are important 
everywhere in Milne Bay Province for defining the conditions of the future by 
actions performed over deceased persons and their relationships (see Damon and 
Wagner 1989). Access to resources, including significant garden and village 
land, and also such things as sago and betelnut orchards, was always regulated 
by the outstanding balance of debts and credits between intermarried groups. 
Land was not 'owned' as such, it was 'entitled' by this or that group making 
reference to debt relations which were always reversible if sufficient resources 
could be mustered to cancel outstanding debts. The future, so to speak, 
determined those realities which the West likens to contracts about land 
ownership which are fixed in terms of its own notion of the past or of 
'precedent'. To the Muyuw elders, and most other people now more than forty 
years old, the dialectical relationship between mythical origin places and real 
resource claims was transparent, for it was mediated by ritual. To increasing 
numbers of younger people, and to the European social order, the relationship is 
opaque and the rituals are a waste of time. 
Occasional government action, that 1978 meeting about 'landownership', 
and the arrival of resource-extracting companies like MBL and Auridiam (the 
mining company) have all helped to dispense with the old system and usher in a 
new one. External agencies want unambiguous claims to land to follow from 
people's places of origin, whether they came out of the ground or landed on the 
island. So now, claims to land are being made which elders still think, and 
virtually everyone twenty years ago would have thought, to be extraordinary and 
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sinister.30 By any standards, of course, real money is involved. For example, 
WIDCO maintains absolute control over the island's ebony, but it contracts the 
cutting and selling to MBL. If MBL can effect some sales, WIDCO gives it a 
contract. Then MBL goes to people who have land claims and asks them to 
identify appropriate trees. MBL then harvests the logs and pays the 
'landowners' a significant portion of the income from its sales. In 1995, this 
was KSOO per tree, each of which might generate 1-3 cubic metres of black 
ebony which could be sold for about US$2,000 per cubic metre. When I left the 
island, Christiansen was looking forward to disbursing some K80,000 in 
royalties to 'landowners', as well as dividends to WIDCO shareholders, Muyuw 
'individuals', 'business associations', clans or subclans, and 'villages' .31 
Local people are increasingly making the assumption that land is owned by 
specific social units, and that all previous ways of dealing with resources are 
defunct. One consequence of this is that smaller units of people are moving onto 
'their land', basing their claims on origin stories, so that they can keep an eye on 
it and, given the extent of overlap in origin and migration stories, make their 
presence incontestable when the time comes to distribute royalties. When they 
move to these areas, they garden on the land, and thus continue the process of 
cutting down older forests, usually following the aesthetic norms listed above-
they cut everywhere. Muyuw people who have actually lived on the island for 
the last five to ten decades are not the only ones doing this. When these new 
procedures were explained to me, I raised the question of the greater verbal 
abilities and propensities of peoples to the west. Friends in southeastern Muyuw 
indicated that the government had already decreed against any claims from this 
quarter, thus protecting them from a problem they agree would otherwise exist. 
I then discovered some Kitavan men who came to the island when MBL was 
recruiting labour in the early 1980s, and who claim that they belong to a subclan 
which came out of the ground in Muyuw and, in the process of moving west, 
gained a right to a large sector of land near one of the lakes on the western half 
of the island. These were dismissed as idle claims by some elders whom I 
questioned in central Muyuw, and yet the young man serving as the Murua Local 
Government Council President completely agreed that the Kitavans owned the 
land because they were 'traditional landowners' - a statement he made in 
English, even though he and I conducted all our other formal and informal 
30 And thus capable of generating witchcraft (bwagau) accusations. At the time of writing, these 
seemed to be passe in the eastern third of the island, but a good deal of migration and new village 
construction on the western end of the island is the result of witchcraft fears. 
3l Ebony harvesting does appear to be very wasteful, and if the forestry officials are correct in 
their understanding of how the trees mature, there is virtually no-one, from Rolly Christiansen 
down to the landowners, who knows how to deal with the tree. 'Landowners' merely walk through 
the deep woods looking for large trees, and then insist that MBL workers cut down the trees which 
they select. Sometimes they do not meet the limit Christiansen has imposed (55 cm dbh), but there 
is little the MBL workers can do when an irate landowner insists on the cutting. But the critical 
issue is how much of the blacker heartwood is in the tree. Large trees (over 55 cm db h) might still 
have very little, and so end up being wasted almost completely, though some of this rejected wood 
is shunted into the increasingly active individual craft carving sector. 
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conversations in Muyuw. In short, not only is the population increasing, it js 
also spreading out, as people from near and far turn origin places and mythical 
wanderings into claims of ownership which they think they can best substantiate 
by their physical presence. 
This shift in the definition of land ownership has a related consequence. 
Although government forestry officials have apparently denied MBL new 
permits to cut on the island, they have declared the whole island to be a single 
'Forest Management Area'. This runs contrary to the inferences which local 
people are making from the 'new ideals' of land ownership. For one of the 
reasons why MBL has not been able to gain permission to log east of the central 
mountain ranges is that people who consider themselves to be the owners of that 
land want to find their own logger and have him set up a logging operation just 
for them. What is at issue here is an enormous portion of the southeastern part 
of. the island, perhaps some 20 percent of the total. Although some people find 
these claims to be ludicrous, especially those holding major debts from the 
relevant subclan, most people agree that one subclan owns most of this land. 
The members of this group claim to have signed papers with an Australian who 
will soon turn up and start work. They believe that one of their subclan brothers, 
well-ensconced in the government bureaucracy in Alotau, the provincial capital, 
is actually organising and safeguarding their interests. Because of this, they say 
that they will refuse to release any of their land for mineral exploration or any 
other purpose.32 
Suggestions for the Future 
The consolidation of new landowning principles, the operations of MBL, the 
exploration work by various mining companies over the last two decades - all 
leave the inhabitants of the island positioning themselves to claim royalties from 
other people's work. Their own work is another matter. In this section, I 
suggest how current 'traditional' land use patterns might be harmonised with 
small-scale timber extraction or lumber production. Small-scale extraction is 
consistent with what seems conceivable by the only resident with real experience 
in making commodity production viable on the island - Rolly Christiansen.33 
The nature of the market which exists outside the island, and the organisation of 
capital and labour which would be necessary or sufficient to acquire and 
reproduce this hypothetical system of production, are important issues which lie 
beyond the scope of my discussion here. Yet it might be pointed out, in this 
respect, that new activities to absorb the island's increasing population are 
32 From conversation with this person in July 1996, I would say that nothing is going to happen, 
because the deal with the Australian logger has apparently dissolved. This case illustrates some of 
the divergence in viewpoints between islanders who live on the island and those who only frequent 
it for special occasions, some of whom regard the place as a vacation spot which they prefer to be 
undisturbed. 
33 In late 1996, partly due to Christiansen' s influence, a villager in southeastern Muyuw 
purchased a small sawmill in the hope that he could do some cutting for his fellow villagers and 
other potential buyers. 
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urgently needed, and one of the most important reasons for this is the 
undermining of traditional forms of skill and knowledge, which means that 
something new must come to absorb an idle creativity. 
The central fact which emerged from the earlier discussion of local ecology 
is that many, if not most, of the commercially valuable species of trees which 
grow on the island are trees that can or must grow from disturbances created by 
human activities.34 The potential, then, is to take advantage of growth patterns 
created as part of the culture's normal agricultural periodicities. For several 
decades, current gardening practices that follow from island-wide desires to cut 
old fallows could result in much wood suitable for producing lumber. Many 
villages clear several hectares of old-fallow forests every year. In southeastern 
Muyuw, the older fallows tend to have lots of Dysoxylum,35 as well as groves 
of Calophyllum, Palaquium, and Endospermum medulosum, the last of 
which appears very quickly and in great numbers along roads and in early 
succession growth from older forests. Odd numbers of several Syzygium 
species are also found in southeastern Muyuw, while in the north-central part of 
the island, along with Pometia pinnata, several Planchonella species and a 
different Syzygium species (the ritual firewood) are abundant. If one were 
considering the export of raw logs, this opportunity would not really exist 
because, with the exception of the Calophyllum and some of the Dysoxylum, 
few of these trees reach or exceed the 50 cm dbh limit. But if the point at issue 
is local production of relatively high quality lumber from trees with 20-45 cm 
dbh, many villages could generate enough wood to keep small sawmills running 
for as long as a market and local willpower are present. 
Sooner or later, ecological, demographic, or other conditions will mean that 
it is inadvisable to simply cut down what appear to be the island's abundant and 
undisturbed forests for gardening purposes. The question then is how to adapt 
these conditions to gardening and small-scale logging requirements. Here again, 
traditional practices probably supply a key. The point on which to focus is the 
patchy environment which the traditional system already takes advantage of 
through its intentional creation of those 'islands' of higher trees surrounded by 
gardens. In southeastern Muyuw, I have found every significant commercial 
tree inside these islands (with the exception of Pometia pinnata). In some of 
them, Calophyllum, several species of Sterculia and Dysoxylum, and 
Palaquium and Endospermum medulosum are particularly common. In north-
central and western Muyuw, Palaquium and Endospermum medulosum, 
Syzygium, and (in older areas) Pometia pinnata are abundant. Clearly these 
areas would have to be carefully monitored, but for small-scale production 
34 I am sure my knowledge is incomplete, but the only tree I know of that is commercially 
significant, and that does not seem to require major (human) environmental modification, is 
Mastixiodendron smithii M. and P. It is found in many of the island's environments, sometimes 
in very high concentrations, and sometimes clearly in late successional fallows. 
35 In eastern Muyuw, Dysoxylum are thought to be beneficial to crops, perhaps even better than 
the Rhus taitensis discussed above. Stable isotope analyses do indeed suggest that at least one 
species fixes nitrogen. 
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purposes this might not be difficult, and might even represent a continuation of 
the existing practice of monitoring the growth of Calophyllum for outrigger 
canoe production. 
In short, 'current' ideals of land use present a viewpoint on consumption of 
the island's resources which might bring valuable practices from the past into a 
future where new values have to be produced - and reproduced. 
Conclusion 
I conclude this chapter by reviewing its main points and trying to answer the 
questions posed for this part of the monograph - at least insofar as their answers 
suggest a possible future for the island. 
Muyuw, considered as an ecological and social entity, was, and 
significantly remains, a node in a vast social system, designed in such a way that 
it can endure, albeit problematically, through various natural and social 
perturbations. The islanders' skills, knowledge, and social relations were not 
conceived, and never have existed, in, isolation. Europeans, and the new 
representatives of a European order, always think the place is far from home, 
forgetting ~hat it is home for the people who live there. In any case, it is likely 
that the timber resources which the new European order has found on the island 
during the latter half of this century were created by the historical development 
of a pre-existing social system. I have tried to suggest that future development 
might appropriately be built on what is left of the traditional system, because 
that system may be useful for constructing a sustainable future. And the island's 
most recent history strongly suggests that a full-scale industrial logging system 
will not be capable of doing so. 
The main turning point in the island's logging history is the replacement of 
the Neates' Kulumadau Enterprises by Milne Bay Logging. It may be that the 
most valuable resources created by that transition will turn out to have been the 
business models which both companies have bequeathed to the island. The 
Neates were perfectionists on a small scale, presenting a contrast, in many 
people's eyes, to MBL's broken machinery and apparent inattention to detail. 
Although he radically transformed the scale of business operations, developed 
Western infrastructure and Western desires, and created the promise (and even 
the reality) of integrated social relations, Christiansen has provided people with 
a problematic model of how to run a business. 
If, out of the ashes of MBL's decade-long experience of industrial logging, 
there comes the successful institutionalisation of smaller scale lumber 
production based in several villages, whether in the hands of MBL or other 
islanders, then this too will be a major turning point in the island's history. It is 
evident, however, that there will be a decade or more of trial and error before 
that point can be reached. 
Muyuw culture is the complex effect of the island's place in the 
northeastern corner of the Kula Ring (the traditional inter-island exchange 
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system) and its location at the very end of the Western world-system (which may 
or may not be laden with resources). Furthermore, local people's interests, 
motives, and knowledge vary radically with their differential perspectives. For 
those actively or passively ensconced in the traditional system, the periodic 
arrival and subsequent behaviour of Europeans have always been treated as extra 
resources to satisfy the long-term and never-ending demands of Kula and 
kinship obligations. In the mid-1970s, Christiansen's Muyuw father-in-law was 
an ambitious man from Dikwayas whose Kula aspirations were frustrated by the 
two most powerful elders of that village. After marriage, his luck changed: by 
1995, he had received what is probably the most famous Kula valuable in the 
Kula Ring.36 For younger Muyuw people, men mostly, educated in the church 
and government school system, MBL represents the latest failure in 
'development'. Some told me that they thought they would find development in 
logging, and having learnt their lesson, they are now anxious to try mining 
instead. There are, of course, people between these two extremes who treat 
logging and its offshoot activities merely as a source of European exchange 
items useful for acquiring the 'things' of the 'new order'- from clothes to food 
to church buildings to school fees. Very few if any of these people have 
ingrained into their consciousness the labour requirements of commodity 
production. Focussed Western desires, for some commodities and activities, are 
becoming more apparent. Yet these desires are not as strong as the negative 
features which most associate with commodity production. There are a number 
of people from north-central Muyuw, between the ages of thirty and fifty, who 
once worked with the Neates, then with WIDCO in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, some even with MBL, and who now enjoy themselves, their children, and 
their grandchildren back in their villages. This is another reason why small-
scale lumber production, if it could be periodic, might represent a more realistic 
economic future than anything else. Few if any Muyuw people on the island 
have to work like Europeans, and WIDCO dividends are helping, in a way, to 
assure this outcome. Those interested in 'development' should perhaps 
remember what it took for European standards of work to become the implicit, 
tacitly accepted, order. For a while, at least, most Muyuw will keep to their own 
standards. 
36 The mwal Klibulouboul, which figures importantly in Dam on ( 1983 ). 
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CHAPTER 10 
A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S LOG EXPORT INDUSTRY 
COLIN FILER 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary account of the 'official 
statistics' through which the Government of Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
endeavours to assess the economic significance of the country's log export 
industry. Having considered the general size and shape of the industry in the 
period since Independence, I shall go on to consider three particular questions to 
which the government's statistical endeavours have recently been addressed. 
These are: 
• the concentration of capital within the log export industry; 
• the definition and measurement of 'sustainable forest management'; and 
• the distribution of log export revenues between stakeholders. 
I have also included two appendices which show the current state of knowledge, 
within the PNG Forest Authority, about the ownership, control, size, and output 
of each individual logging project in the country. While some readers may find 
this volume of information to be somewhat indigestible, I should point out that 
some of it has been quite hard to come by, and there is some evidence to suggest 
that the Forest Authority is currently engaged in one of the favourite pastimes of 
the national bureaucracy, which is the conversion of official statistics of all 
kinds into 'state secrets'. Hopefully, the publication of this chapter will serve, in 
some small way, to discourage this pursuit. 
There are several measurable aspects of the log export industry which have 
not been discussed in this chapter, either because they are of rather limited 
interest as matters of current policy debate, or else because they are discussed by 
other contributors to the present volume. For example, little or nothing has been 
said about the income and expenditure of the Forest Authority itself, the 
economics of 'downstream processing' or 'small-scale forestry', the financial 
operations of landowner companies, or the 'non-timber' values of the rainforest. 
In the final section of this chapter I shall briefly discuss the inferences 
which can be drawn from public debate about the significance of statistical 
information on the log export industry in an attempt to understand the 
relationship between 'science', 'capital', and 'politics' in PNG. 
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The Significance of Log Exports in the National Economy 
Some economists would say that PNG is a mineral-dependent economy, while 
others might prefer to say that it depends on the extraction of a narrow range of 
natural resources - oil, gold, copper, fish, and logs. If we only consider the 
formal sector of the national economy, leaving aside the great mass of economic 
activity which is undertaken outside it, both forms of dependency are much in 
evidence. Extractive industry, almost entirely under the management of foreign 
capital, currently accounts for something like 90 percent of the value of PNG's 
domestic exports, and probably contributes about half of the government's non-
grant revenues. From this point of view, PNG might therefore be described as a 
nation (and a government) of resource rent collectors (see Filer 1997b). 
There has been a slow but steady increase in the significance of mineral 
exports in the period since Independence, from something less than half to 
something more like two thirds of all domestic exports. Raw log exports, by 
comparison, contributed less than 5 percent of domestic export values during the 
1970s, between 5 and 10 percent from I98I to 1992, but I6.3 percent in I993 
and 18.1 percent in I994 (see Table I O.I ). In 1994, the government collected 
about K I3 I.3 million in log export taxes - more than I 0 percent of all non-grant 
revenues, and almost half the amount which the mining and petroleum 
companies paid in corporate taxes during that year. However, the recent 
increase in the quantities of 'resource rent' captured by the state has gone hand 
in hand with a serious fiscal crisis and a substantial devaluation of the kina. 
The figures shown in Table 10.1 are mainly those published by the Bank of 
PNG, on the basis of information supplied by the Internal Revenue Commission. 
These figures do not contain a breakdown of total export tax revenues, but it is 
normally assumed that log export taxes have accounted for more than 95 percent 
of such revenues in recent years. 1 Confusion sometimes arises because of the 
apparent discrepancy between the figures published by the Bank of PNG and 
those produced by the Forest Authority (and occasionally published in the PNG 
Timber Digest) on the basis of information contained in its own database.2 
Early in 1995, the figures produced by the Internal Revenue Commission 
showed that log export volumes had risen from 1. 75 million m3 in 1992 to 2.43 
million m3 in 1993, and about 2.8 million m3 in 1994, while the Forest 
Authority's figures for the same period showed an increase from 2.04 million m3 
in I992 to 2. 76 million m3 in I993, followed by a decline to about 2.5 million m3 
in 1994. This discrepancy naturally flowed through to the calculation of log 
export revenues. When the Commission initially estimated that log export taxes 
would be worth about K141 million in 1994, the Authority was simultaneously 
1 The assumption in Table I 0.1 is that log export taxes have constituted 96 percent of all export 
taxes throughout, though recent changes in the forest revenue system (discussed later in this 
chapter) would suggest that the proportion has recently been increasing. 
2 The establishment of this database was one of the achievements of the World Bank-funded 
Forest Management and Planning Project in the National Forestry and Conservation Action 
Programme. 
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estimating that they would only be worth Kll3 million.3 The explanation for 
this discrepancy seems to lie in the timing of the measurements made by the 
Commission and the Authority, because the former measures the volume and 
value of the log exports on which taxes are paid in a particular year, while the 
latter measures the volume and value of the logs which are actually shipped out 
of tlie country. Although this means that the Forest Authority's data are more 
'up to date' than those of the Internal Revenue Commission, they are less 
accessible, and cannot readily be compared with other economic data published 
by the Bank of PN G. 
Table 10.1: Volume, value, and revenue contribution of PNG's log exports, 
1978-1999. 
Year 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Export 
volumes 
('000 m3) 
421 
476 
618 
749 
1,063 
1,003 
1,278 
1,158 
1,299 
1,450 
1,348 
1,349 
990 
1,062 
1,601 
2,375 
2,944 
2,513 
3,000 
3,090 
3,180 
3,280 
Export 
values 
(K million) 
11.8 
20.9 
30.0 
31.5 
49.6 
43.2 
69.9 
58.4 
68.0 
103.0 
90.5 
90.0 
65.2 
81.2 
140.0 
400.2 
483.1 
436.7 
564.0 
605.6 
648.7 
695.4 
0/o share of 
domestic 
export values 
(02.3) 
(03.0) 
(04.7) 
(05.8) 
(09.1) 
(06.5) 
(08.7) 
(06.5) 
(07.0) 
(09.3) 
(07.4) 
(08.6) 
(06.2) 
(06.2) 
(08.0) 
(16.3) 
(18.1) 
(12.8) 
(16.9) 
(19.3) 
(18.5) 
(19.8) 
Log export 
taxes 
(K million) 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
4.7 
12.4 
12.6 
13.7 
16.5 
15.6 
11.4 
12.2 
17.7 
25.0 
70.9 
131.3 
127.6 
144.0 
146.9 
149.9 
152.8 
0/o share of 
non-grant 
revenues 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
(0 1.1) 
(02.6) 
(02.3) 
(02.5) 
(02.5) 
(02.3) 
(01.4) 
(01.6) 
(02.2) 
(02.7) 
(06.3) 
(1 0.2) 
(08.6) 
(09.6) 
(09.7) 
(09.9) 
(09.5) 
Sources: Bank of PNG Quarterly Economic Bulletins for all actual figures to 1995; 1996 
Government ofPNG Budget Papers (Tables 2.2, 2.3, 4.1) for 1996-99 projections. 
3 Table 10.1 shows that the Commission later adjusted its figures downwards, but not far enough 
to match the estimates made by the Forest Authority. 
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Table 10.1 shows that, by the end of 1996, government planners were 
predicting an increase in the nominal export price of raw logs at the rate of K8 
per cubic metre each year for the next four years. It also shows that they were 
projecting an increase in the physical volume of exports beyond the level of 3 
million cubic metres per annum, which some commentators (including the 
World Bank) regard as the limit of 'sustainability'. The government's 
inclination to 'solve' its fiscal crisis by issuing new timber permits, despite the 
efforts of the World Bank to prevent it from doing so, is partly due to the fact 
that government revenues from log exports are worth considerably more, per 
unit of export value, than those obtained from the mining and petroleum sector. 
Log export taxes currently account for more than one third of log export values, 
while corporate taxes paid by mining and petroleum companies account for less 
than 12 percent of mineral export values. Furthermore, the 'production' of a 
new mining or petroleum project is a far more complex and time-consuming 
business than the issue of a new timber permit. 
Figures produced by the PNG Forest Authority show that Japan is currently 
the destination for well over half of PNG's raw log exports, while South Korea 
accounts for slightly more than one quarter, and a variety of other countries 
import the remainder. Table 10.2 shows that the volume of Japanese imports fell 
quite noticeably between 1994 and 1995, and this is consistent with a long-term 
decline in the Japanese market, which is due to material substitutions in the 
Japanese plywood industry and competition from its Indonesian counterpart (see 
chapters by Cooke and Light, this volume). On the other hand, these figures 
need to be treated with considerable caution, firstly because they may represent 
short-term fluctuations which disguise the long-term trend, and secondly 
because of the level of 'political interference' with long-term trends in the 
regional log export trade.4 Figures for the first half of 1996 show that Japan 
imported more than 63 percent of the 1.4 million cubic metres exported in that 
period, while the South Korean share declined to less than 20 percent, and the 
Philippines accounted for nearly 1 0 percent, of this total. The rapid growth of 
PNG's exports to the Philippines over the last three years can be explained by 
the exhaustion of that country's own timber resources, and the consequent need 
to supplement the supply of raw material to its domestic plywood industry, but 
since that industry is also in decline, it is unlikely that PNG's exports to this 
market will increase much further (personal communication, Peter Dauvergne, 
1997). Representatives of PNG's log export industry appear to believe that 
mainland China represents their best chance of compensating for any further 
contraction in the Japanese and South Korean markets (personal communication, 
4 For example, PNG's share of the Japanese market may actually grow, while the total size of that 
market continues to shrink, because other countries in the region decide to follow the Indonesian 
example of imposing a log export ban in order to encourage the development of a domestic 
plywood industry. Furthermore, Table 10.2 appears to understate the volume of PNG's exports to 
Japan by a very considerable (and annually variable) margin. Data produced by the Japanese 
Lumber Importers Association show that Japan imported more than 1.9 million cubic metres of 
logs from PNG in 1994, and almost 1.6 million cubic metres in 1995 (personal communication, 
Peter Dauvergne, 1997). 
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Bob Tate, 5 1997), but there is as yet little evidence of growth in the Chinese 
market.6 
Table 10.2: PNG log exports by country of destination, 1994-95. 
Country 1994 exports Av. price 1995 exports Av. price 
('000 m3) (o/o) (USD/m3) ('000 m3) (o/o) (USD/m3) 
Japan 1,509.8 64.9 165 1,388.8 57.7 140 
South Korea 601.0 25.8 137 656.8 27.3 116 
Hong Kong 71.3 3.1 209 78.5 3.3 230 
China 47.9 2.1 167 49.9 2.1 171 
Taiwan 41.0 1.8 135 60.9 2.5 104 
Philippines 35.2 1.5 Ill 126.9 5.3 104 
Thailand 10.2 0.4 121 13.8 0.6 117 
India 9.4 0.4 220 17.5 0.7 217 
Malaysia 15.9 0.7 113 
TOTAL 2,325.7 100.0 158 2,409.0 100.0 135 
Source: PNG Forest Authority Timber Digest. 
According to the Bank of PNG, raw logs currently account for between 97 
percent and 98 percent of all exports of 'forest products'. Jant's woodchip 
exports from Madang Province account for most of the balance (see Montagu, 
this volume). The domestic market currently consumes about 400,000 cubic 
metres of timber a year, or roughly 15 percent of the current log harvest 
(personal communication, Bob Tate, 1997). Despite the appearance of a national 
policy consensus in favour of 'downstream processing', the raw log export 
business is still responsible for an unprecedented share of output and activity in 
PNG's forest industry. 
It is thought that the forestry sector, as a whole, currently employs between 
6,500 and 7,000 people (nearly all men).? This represents about 3.5 percent of 
formal sector employment, which is roughly the same as the proportion of jobs 
normally occupied in the mining and petroleum sector. Of this total, there are 
some 500 public servants employed in the regulation of the forest industry, and 
perhaps another 2,000 people employed in the sawmilling business, while the 
rest are engaged in logging and log exports. There has been some public debate 
about the numbers of 'Asians' employed in the logging industry (see Henderson 
5 Research Officer, PNG Forest Industries Association. 
6 In the first half of 1996, PNG exported roughly 37,000 cubic metres of logs to China, which 
represented 2.6 percent of total log exports during that period. 
7 A recent newspaper advertising campaign by the Forest Industries Association claims that more 
than twice this number of people are dependent on the forestry sector for their employment. This 
claim takes account of additional jobs which are thought to be generated by the industry's 
backward linkages (personal communication, Bob Tate, 1997). 
212 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
1996a), but the poor quality of PNG's employment statistics does not warrant 
further discussion of this point. 
The Concentration of Capital in the Log Export Industry 
Under Part IV of the 1991 Forestry Act (Sections 104-114 ), all 'forest industry 
participants and consultants' are obliged to register with the Forest Authority 
before doing business in the forestry sector. The National Forest Policy 
(Ministry of Forests 1991 :35) regards the process of registration as one of the 
strategies that was designed to secure the goal of greater national participation, 
but the Act treats it as an instrument for the control of malpractice. One of the 
outcomes of the registration process was an attempt by some senior staff and 
consultants of the Forest Authority to establish the form and extent of the 
interconnections between the various companies engaged in the log export 
industry. 
During the last few months of the Namaliu government, and then again 
during Tim Neville's occupation of the Forests Ministry from 1992 to 1994, the 
main focus of public debate on this issue was the form and extent of the control 
exercised over the log export industry by one Sino-Malaysian company, 
Rimbunan Hijau (RH).8 The debate came to a head in June 1993, when the 
Minister seems to have concluded that this company was using all sorts of 
'connections' to block the implementation of the National Forestry Development 
Guidelines (PNGMOF 1993b ), even while it was supposedly seeking to 
influence public opinion in its favour by financing a new national daily 
newspaper. At this juncture, the Post-Courier published a feature article 
(Togarewa 1993) which claimed, amongst other things, that RH controlled 80-86 
percent ofPNG's log export market, and had made a profit of between K350 and 
K400 million on the export of PNG logs in 1992. These claims were vigorously 
denied by the directors of RH and its affiliated companies, who maintained that 
they only controlled 'about, or less than, 40 percent' of PNG's log exports, and 
could hardly have made such a remarkable profit on logs exported in 1992 when 
the total value of PNG's log exports in that year was only about K179 million 
(Post-Courier, 23 June 1993). 
Official figures show that the value of PNG's log exports in 1992 was 
certainly not more than K 179 million, and might even have been less (see Table 
10.1 ).9 But the proposition that RH controls a very substantial proportion of 
PNG's log export market has been repeated in numerous writings on the subject. 
For example, Kiirschner-Pelkmann and Callick (1995:39) cite two other 1993 
newspaper articles, including one published in Malaysia, as evidence that RH 
already controlled at least 60 percent of PNG's log exports, while Henderson 
(1996a: 143) mentions an 'internal report made for the Department of Forests' 
8 'Sino-Malaysian' companies are defined here as Malaysian companies owned or controlled by 
persons of Chinese ethnic origin. 
9 The company directors were apparently quoting the Forest Authority's figures, rather than those 
of the Internal Revenue Commission. 
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which held 'one Malaysian logging company' responsible for 86 percent of the 
total timber harvest. tO However, these claims cannot be substantiated directly 
from the Forest Authority's own register of 'industry participants', which was 
established shortly after the gazettal of the new Forestry Act in 1992. 
Figure 10.1 shows, in summary form, the connections which could be 
shown to exist, in 1993, between those 'forest industry participants' who were 
thought to be part of a Sino-Malaysian cartel which was either dominated or 
controlled by RH. The evidence clearly revealed the existence of several distinct 
clusters of companies, each containing a combination of foreign companies 
(including some which were directly engaged in PNG's log export industry) and 
national companies (normally local landowner companies) with which they were 
obviously doing business. The foreign companies in each cluster were 
connected by mutual shareholdings, overlapping directorships, or shared office 
facilities (as revealed by common fax and phone numbers), while their links to 
the national companies were typically revealed by the use of sequential cheques 
from a single chequebook to pay their registration fees to the Forest Authority. 
In this way, it was possible to identify a core group of companies associated 
directly with RH, and five other companies or groups of companies whose links 
to RH and each other were either tenuous or dubious: 
• Cakara A lam, a subsidiary of Land and General Bhd, which was contracted to 
export logs from the West, Central and East Arawe timber permits in West 
New Britain Province; 
• WTK Realty and its local subsidiaries, whose main operations were in the 
Vanimo area of West Sepik Province, but which also had contracts in 
Madang and West New Britain; 
• the 'Monarch group' of companies, all subsidiaries of a Singaporean 
company called Monarch Logging, whose main operations were in the Lolo 
area of West New Britain, but which also had contracts in Madang, Oro, and 
Milne Bay, and was effectively managed by Mr Hii Yii Ann; 
• Dominance Resources, which held the Umbukul timber permit in New 
Ireland, and was one of a group of companies under the effective control of 
Dr Phillip Ling; and 
• a group of companies registered in the Philippines, including Super 
Mahogany and Timber Producers and Marketing, which had one logging 
contract in Morobe Province. 
10 Henderson' s article was also written in 1993. In a paper written in early 1994 (Filer 
1996b:289), I myself have previously estimated that RH controlled more than 70 percent of PNG 's 
log exports, since this was the percentage suggested by one of the Forest Authority's own former 
consultants (PNGADCP 1993 ). 
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Figure 10.1: The putative Sino-Malaysian logging cartel, 1993. 
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Although the Forest Authority's database contained little or no evidence to show 
that RH actually controlled all or any of these other corporate interests, 
suspicions were converted into rumours, and even into 'facts', by the circulation 
of long lists and elaborate diagrams based on this body of data. 
It is somewhat ironic that the Forest Authority's own efforts to prevent the 
continued 'leakage' of such information into the public domain have been 
accompanied by complaints from the Forest Industries Association (FIA), as 
well as from non-governmental organisations (NGOs), that the Forest Authority 
is now being far too secretive with its data. From information supplied by 
sources within the FIA itself, it is possible to confirm some of the linkages 
represented in Figure 10.1, but also to identify some changes (or some new 
revelations) in the pattern of corporate relationships since 1993. 11 These 
changes do seem to indicate that RH has strengthened its own position in the log 
export business, but not to the extent of directly controlling much more than 50 
percent of it. 
Table 10.3 shows that the core group of companies associated directly with 
RH has increased its share of the log export market from about 3 6 percent in 
1994 to just over 40 percent in the first half of 1996. However, these figures 
definitely understate their current market share, and probably also understate the 
rate of its growth over the last three years. Firstly, the Hong Kong-based Seal 
Corporation sold its PNG logging interests to RH in 1992. 12 Secondly, the 
Monarch group of companies, though not shown to be part of the RH core group 
in the Forest Authority's database, appears to have been taken over some time in 
1991, not long after RH had made its debut in the PNG logging industry.l 3 
Monarch Investments, Saban Enterprises, and Putput Logging are certainly now 
regarded as RH subsidiaries by officers of the FIA, and there is widespread 
circumstantial evidence of collaboration between the two groups of companies 
over the last five years. On the other hand, the same sources maintain that the 
Dominance group, under the leadership of Phillip Ling, is still operating 
independently of RH, and that this group has increased its own share of the 
export market through the acquisition of Yema Timbers from the Monarch 
group, and through the exercise of greater control over the Super Mahogany 
group. 14 WTK Realty is also widely regarded as a competitor of RH, despite 
11 Information in the following paragraphs is primarily derived from Bob Tate (personal 
communication, March 1997). 
12 These comprised timber permits in Manus (West Coast) and Western (Oriomo-Wimare) 
provinces, the latter being held through a subsidiary called Forest Management Services (see 
Appendix A). 
13 If the takeover had been an offshore transaction, perhaps involving the purchase of ProExcel 
Sdn Bhd (the Malaysian parent company of Saban Enterprises), then this might explain the absence 
of any clear linkage in the Forest Authority's database. Majid Cooke (this volume) treats ProExcel 
as an RH subsidiary. 
14 The Forest Authority database indicates that Monarch Holdings held a 70 percent stake in 
Yema Timbers in 1992 or 1993, but FIA staffmaintain that Yema Timbers is now definitely part of 
the Dominance group. The Forest Authority database suggests that the Monarch, Dominance, and 
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the fact that these two companies are owned and controlled by separate branches 
of a single Chinese 'clan' which dominates the logging industry in Sarawak.l5 
And Cakara Alam hardly even qualifies for membership of the putative cartel, 
since the chairman of its parent company, Wan Azmi Wan Hamzah, is a member 
of the ethnic Malay business elite which has been promoted by the Malaysian 
government to counter the influence of the ethnic Chinese business community. 
Table 10.3: Percentage share of PNG log exports produced by different 
corporate interests, 1994-96. 
Interest group 1994 1995 1-6/96 
Rimbunan Hijau core group 36.1 38.1 40.4 
Seal group (under RH) 0.8 0.5 0.4 
Monarch group (under RH) 10.5 7.6 5.0 
Dominance group 1.8 2.0 2.2 
Super Mahogany group 1.3 0.2 0.5 
WTK Realty 13.3 17.4 14.6 
Cakara Alam 9.8 11.4 10.0 
Turama Forest Industries 6.0 4.4 6.2 
Stettin Bay Lumber 4.7 2.4 5.8 
Open Bay Timber 4.4 2.7 3.5 
Nam Yang Timbers 3.0 2.7 2.4 
Other/unknown interests 8.2 10.8 9.0 
Source: PNG Forest Authority Timber Digest. 
There have been suggestions that RH exercises some kind of control over 
Turama Forest Industries (TFI), either through its stake in an offshore parent 
company, or through the contractual relationship between TFI and Concord 
Pacific, but these suggestions do not appear to carry much weight. 16 There is no 
suggestion that RH exercises any kind of control over the Japanese companies 
which run the Stettin Bay and Open Bay logging operations, or over the Korean 
company, Nam Yang Timbers. If we assume that RH controls half of the 
business assigned to 'other/unknown interests' in Table 1 0.3, but we do not 
Super Mahogany groups were (and may still be) connected through the multiple directorships of 
John Boo and his wife, Delma Dumas, but Boo's role in the management of these companies may 
be limited to his professional capacities as an accountant. 
15 The two branches of the clan, now commonly known as the Wongs (WTK) and the Tiongs 
(RH), are thought to have 'fallen out' some years ago. An article in the Asian Wall Street Journal, 
reprinted in the Times of PNG (3 March 1994 ), dates the 'family feud' back to 1975. On the other 
hand, they are still connected through financial institutions such as the Hok Hua Bank, which 
might therefore be regarded as the axis of any Sino-Malaysian cartel. 
l6 According to the Forest Authority database, the directors of Concord Pacific include the 
ubiquitous John Boo (see Figure 10.1 and Footnote 14), but TFI appears to have terminated its 
relationship with this company in 1995. TFI itself (along with PNG Forest Products) belongs to 
the Prime group of companies, which is listed on the Singapore stock exchange and controlled by 
ethnic Chinese interests, but I have no further evidence of a link with RH. 
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assume that it controls TFI or the Dominance/Super Mahogany group, then RH 
is left with approximately 50 percent of the total log export business. And we 
arrive at much the same result if we make the equally plausible assumption that 
RH does exercise some kind of control over the Dominance/Super Mahogany 
group, but only controls about 20 percent of the 'other/unknown interests'. 
In either case, one would have to conclude that RH is certainly the 
dominant player in PNG's log export industry- a fact which is confirmed by 
Francis Tiong's present role as President of the FIA- but this does not amount 
to a monopoly. The role which RH plays within the log export industry might 
then be compared with the role payed by Chevron, Placer Dome, and BHP, 
respectively, within the petroleum, gold, and copper export industries - in other 
words, a relatively standard pattern of capital concentration in the business of 
resource extraction. 
Sustainable Forest Management 
The Tropical Forestry Action Plan Review found a number of deficiencies in the 
way that the Department of Forests had dealt with the problem of defining and 
measuring 'sustainable forest management': 
• the actual log harvest levels forecast in the revised National Forestry 
Development Programme of 1988 were not shown to be related to any clear 
conception of 'sustained yield management' (World Bank 1989: 18); 
• the Department's plan to achieve the goal of 'sustainability' by converting 10 
percent of all logged-over areas to forest plantations was evidently 
contradicted by its plan to sell off the small areas of government plantations 
which already existed (ibid: 19); and 
• official estimates that each hectare of productive forest contained 50-60 cubic 
metres of commercial timber did not match the actual measured output of 20-
30 cubic metres (ibid:21 ). 
The World Bank produced its own calculation of sustainable yields from 
the natural forest by: 
• estimating that 40 percent of the gross 'operable area' of 15 million hectares 
was actually available for logging; 
• multiplying the net utilisable forest area of 6 million hectares by an estimated 
harvesting yield of 30 cubic metres per hectare; and 
• dividing this total by an estimated rotation length of 50 years to arrive at a 
maximum annual allowable cut of 3.6 million cubic metres (ibid:21 ). 
It was assumed here that the overall rate of deforestation would be roughly equal 
to the rate of reforestation, given that the area under forest plantations had grown 
from 23,580 hectares in 1979 to 35,896 hectares in 1988 (ibid:23), and that a 
good deal of government land was still theoretically available for this purpose 
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(ibid:26), even if the Department's own target of 100,000 hectares by the year 
2000 was clearly unrealistic (ibid:27).17 
In 1991, the new Forestry Act and National Forest Policy addressed the 
problem of sustainability by setting out the conditions for production of a 
National Forest Plan. According to the Policy (PNGMOF 1991 :5), each 
provincial government was required to identify five different types of land 
within its own borders: 
• 'production forests', meaning long-term timber production areas; 
• 'protection forests', excluded from production by various environmental 
considerations; 
• 'salvage forests', meaning forested areas to be cleared for other uses; 
• land currently without forest cover which would be 'suitable for 
afforestation'; and 
• 'reserve forests' - a residual category for forested areas which had not yet 
been classified. 
It seems that this classification was meant to form the basis for a 'schedule for 
the management and utilization of forest areas within the province' (ibid:6), 
which would itself be part of the Provincial Forestry Development Guidelines, 
while the Provincial Forest Development Programme would be required to 
demonstrate a more specific commitment to 'sustained yield management' of 
those areas designated as 'production forests'. For this purpose, the 'allowable 
cut' would initially be set 'by dividing the total merchantable resource within the 
production forest by an assumed cutting cycle of 40 years' (ibid:6), this being a 
provisional estimate of the period of time which the average stretch of 
production forest would take to recover its timber value after selective logging. 
These calculations would then be incorporated into the National Forest Plan, 
allowing the latter to arrive at an annual statement of 'allowable cut' in each 
province for the succeeding year .18 
Bamett (1992: 1 09) took particular exception to this method of achieving 
the goal of sustainability, describing it as a 'simplistic and unsatisfactory 
device'. 
This formula is not based upon research on Papua New Guinea forests, 
in fact the very concept of there being a scientifically determined 
17 In 1988, roughly 70 percent of the area devoted to forest plantations was under government 
control. The government was attempting to enlarge the area of plantations on customary land 
through the New Zealand-funded Demonstration Reforestation Project (see Filer 1989), but the 
problems encountered by this project were cited by the World Bank as evidence of the 
implausibility ofthe official target. 
18 This statement appears to be missing from the National Forest Plan which finally made its 
appearance in 1996 (PNGFA 1996). 
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sustainable yield cycle has been challenged by many competent 
authorities. Moreover, many of those who do believe in the concept 
would advocate a much longer cutting cycle of around 70 to 80 years. 
In any event, to work out a formula on a province-wide basis rather 
than to consider the characteristics and needs of each individual forest 
area would allow for gross and unnecessary overcutting of some 
valuable and irreplaceable forests on the rationale that other forests 
exist in the same province so that for the province as a whole, the 
annual allowable cut will not have been exceeded (ibid: 115) 
The National Forest Policy did state (1991 :6) that the formula would be 
'subject to review in the light of further research', and although there was no 
mention of such activities in that part of the document which was devoted to 
research policies and strategies, the National Forestry and Conservation Action 
Programme (NAFCAP) included a Rapid Resource Appraisal (RRA) project 
which was part of this process of review. This project was largely funded by the 
Australian government, and a report was produced in 1993. The main aim of the 
exercise was to produce an interim body of data which would enable the 
National Forest Service to produce the provincial and national plans required by 
the National Forest Policy, and thus to meet the conditions required by the 
World Bank and other aid donors for further funding of the NAFCAP (personal 
communication, John McAlpine, 19 1997). Some of the main findings of this 
study are summarised in Tables 10.4 and 1 0.5. 
The consultants engaged in this study arrived at their definition of the 
'maximum annual sustainable yield' for each province (see Table 1 0.5) through 
the analysis of data produced by the Department of Forests in respect of all 
actual and potential concession areas, and comparison of this data with other 
information obtained from the PNG Resource Information System.20 
• First, they deducted from the 'gross operable area', which amounted to a total 
of 12.6 million hectares,21 those areas which were not available for logging 
because of previous disturbance or problems of access, and thus arrived at a 
'net productive area' totalling 8.8 million hectares. 
• Having subtracted another 10 percent (800,000 hectares) from this total to 
allow for 'buffer zones' around streams and water holes, they estimated that 
approximately 712,000 hectares out of the remaining area had already been 
logged before 1993, while another 7.2 million hectares had not yet been 
harvested by that date (see Table 10.4). 
19 Team Leader, Rapid Resource Appraisal project. 
20 The basis of these calculations was a map of forest types at a scale of I: I ,000,000 (see 
Saunders 1993), although some work was also done on the mapping of vegetation types at a scale 
of I: I 00,000, in recognition of the fact that this interim study would eventually be supplanted by a 
more detailed forest inventory (personal communication, John McAipine, I997). 
21 Rather less than the estimate of I5 million hectares previously made by the World Bank. 
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• A further 15 percent deduction was made from this combination of logged 
and unlogged forest in order to allow for reading and other infrastructural 
requirements of logging operations, thus leaving a 'potential forest area' of 
approximately 6.8 million hectares (see Table 10.4). 
• Assuming that this would be the maximum area available to a regime of 
sustainable natural forest management, they proceeded to calculate the 
'maximum annual sustainable yield' by making further estimates of the 
volumes of commercial timber contained in the area which had not yet been 
harvested, and the natural growth rates of commercial timber species after 
selective logging had occurred. 22 
Table 10.4: PNG's commercial forest areas by province, 1993. 
Province Forest logged Forest not yet Potential forest 
before 1993 logged in 1993 area in 1993 
'000 ha ( 0/o) '000 ha (o/o) '000 ha (%) 
Western 35.1 (4.9) 1,460.6 (20.2) 1,271.3 (18.8) 
Gulf 35.1 (4.9) 925.5 (12.8) 816.5 (12.1) 
Central 23.4 (3.3) 318.7 (4.4) 290.8 (4.3) 
Milne Bay 40.0 (5.6) 81.4 ( 1.1) 103.2 (1.5) 
Oro 60.2 (8.5) 181.5 (2.5) 205.5 (3.0) 
S. Highlands 7.8 ( 1.1) 52.0 (0.7) 50.8 (0.8) 
Enga 1.0 (0.1) 18.9 (0.3) 16.9 (0.2) 
W. Highlands 13.6 (0.2) 11.6 (0.2) 
Chimbu 50.5 (0.7) 42.9 (0.6) 
E. Highlands 2.6 (0.4) 94.1 (1.3) 82.2 (1.2) 
Moro be 22.1 (3.1) 380.9 (5.3) 342.6 (5.1) 
Madang 58.6 (8.2) 449.7 (6.2) 432.0 (6.4) 
East Sepik 662.7 (9.1) 563.3 (8.3) 
West Sepik 42.4 (6.0) 836.4 (11.5) 719.9 (1 0.6) 
Manus 4.8 (0.7) 70.2 (1.0) 63.8 (0.9) 
New Ireland 133.5 (18.8) 262.0 (3.6) 336.2 (5.0) 
E.N. Britain 103.2 (14.5) 311.1 (4.3) 352.2 (5.2) 
W.N. Britain 118.4 (16.6) 893.2 (12.3) 859.9 (12.7) 
N. Solomons 23.5 (3.3) 184.8 (2.5) 177.0 (2.6) 
TOTAL 711.8 (1 00.0) 7,247.8 (100.0) 6,765.6 (100.0) 
Source: McAlpine 1993. 
22 These growth rates were estimated at between 0.8 and 1.0 cubic metres per hectare per annum. 
A Statistical Profile of the Log Export Industry 221 
Table 10.5: Provincial resources and estimates of sustainable yields, 1993. 
Province Commercial timber Max. sustainable Actual log 
standin~ in 1993 yield from 1993 exports in 1994 
'000 m (0/o) '000 m3 ( 0/o) '000 m3 (%,) 
Western 29,231 (17.3) 1,051 (16.5) 203 (8.7) 
Gulf 19,435 (11.5) 757 (11.9) 171 (7.4) 
Central 6,879 (4.1) 233 (3.7) 112 (4.8) 
Milne Bay 1,864 ( 1.1) 103 (1.6) 37 (1.6) 
Oro 4,582 (2.7) 205 (3.2) 43 (1.8) 
S. Highlands 880 (0.5) 41 (0.6) 
Enga 844 (0.5) 14 (0.2) 
W. Highlands 747 (0.4) 9 (0.1) 
Chimbu 2,047 (1.2) 34 (0.5) 
E. Highlands 3,762 (2.2) 66 (1.0) 
Moro be 11,039 (6.5) 343 (5.4) 53 (2.3) 
Madang 11,338 (6.7) 432 (6.8) 28 (1.2) 
East Sepik 13,184 (7.8) 563 (8.9) 16 (0.7) 
West Sepik 20,906 (12.4) 720 (11.3) 112 (4.8) 
Manus 3,105 (1.8) 64 (1.0) 18 (0.8) 
New Ireland 4,507 (2.7) 336 (5.3) 82 (3.5) 
E.N. Britain 7,781 (4.6) 352 (5.5) 203 (8.7) 
W.N. Britain 23,113 (13.7) 860 (13 .5) 1,237 (53.2) 
N. Solomons 3,800 (2.2) 177 (2.8) 
Unknown 11 (0.5) 
TOTAL 169,047 (100.0) 6,359 (100.00) 2,326 (1 00.0) 
Sources: PNG Forest Authority Timber Digest, December 1994 (1994 export volumes); 
McAlpine 1993 (other data). 
If we compare the result of these calculations with the actual volume of log 
exports in 1994 (see Table 1 0.5), it would appear that a claim to 'sustained yield 
management' could be made in all provinces except West New Britain, which 
accounted for more than half of all the logs exported in that year. However, the 
authors of the study went on to point out that a substantial proportion of the 
'potential forest area' would not continue to be available for timber harvesting, 
either because it would be set aside for conservation purposes or (more likely) 
because it would be converted to other uses - primarily agriculture. 23 In other 
23 According the the Biodiversity Country Study (Sekhran and Miller 1994 ), 25-30 percent of the 
area designated as 'operable forest' by the Forest Authority has biodiversity values which should 
warrant conservation. At the same time, over the last few years, there have been several so-called 
'agro-forestry' development proposals which would entail the total clearance of substantial areas of 
forested land for oil palm or other tree crop plantations (see Wood, this volume). But the RRA 
considered that the main threat to the 'potential productive area' would be the subsistence 
gardening needs of a rapidly growing rural population. 
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words, the 'potential forest area' could not be equated with the area of 
'production forests' defined in the National Forest Policy because parts of it 
would either become 'protection forests' or 'salvage forests'. The problem, 
then, was to arrive at a more realistic estimate of the 'probable', as opposed to 
the 'maximum', potential forest area. The authors of this particular study 
suggested that the figure could be as low as 3. 7 million hectares, which would of 
course entail a corresponding reduction in the estimates of sustainable yield. 
Other commentators have suggested figures as low as 3 million hectares, with a 
sustainable log harvest of only 3 million cubic metres a year (see PNGADCP 
1993; Nadarajah 1994). 
There were already a number of additional reasons for doubting the 
sustainability of the harvest levels of 1994. 
• Firstly, the official export figures almost certainly underestimated the actual 
export volumes, since there were bound to be some operators whose 
shipments were not fully reported to the government. 24 
• Secondly, the level of harvest will always be greater than the level of exports. 
Over the last few years, the difference has been officially estimated at 
between 600,000 and 1 million cubic metres per annum.25 This figure is 
understood to apply to timber which is subject to further processing before 
being exported or consumed by the domestic market. 
• Thirdly, the volume of timber which is officially 'harvested' may not include 
a substantial number of full-size logs which are wasted in one way or another, 
and certainly does not include those very substantial volumes contained in the 
(mainly immature) trees which are critically damaged by careless logging 
practices, even though this second form of wastage represents a substantial 
detraction from some future harvest. 
• Finally, the very uneven spatial distribution of logging operations (as shown 
in Table 1 0.5) was likely to create additional pressures for the conversion of 
forested land to agricultural use in those areas (such as West New Britain) 
where current harvest levels were extremely high, and those provinces in 
which harvest levels were obviously unsustainable would also be those in 
which logged-over forests were more likely to be cleared for other uses. 
For these various reasons, it now seemed very unlikely that sustainable timber 
production would be possible if the country officially exported more than 2 
million cubic metres a year for any significant period of time. But Table 10.1 
shows that exports have substantially exceeded this amount each year since 
1993, and that the government is currently projecting exports in excess of 3 
million cubic metres for the forseeable future. 
24 The volume of such 'concealed' exports may be less significant than their value, because they 
are likely to comprise those species (such as rosewood) which are subject to a species-specific 
export ban. 
25 Jant's woodchip mill alone accounts for 200,000 cubic metres of logs processed onshore. 
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In 1994, the PNG government was obliged by its own fiscal crisis to 
negotiate an 'economic recovery' (or 'structural adjustment') programme with 
the World Bank. The practice of 'sustainable forestry' was one of the main 
conditions which the Bank imposed on the financing of this programme. The 
numerical dimensions of this practice were specified in three government 
commitments: 
• to limit the total annual log harvest from existing timber concessions to the 
level attained in 1994 (approximately 3 million cubic metres); 
• to refuse requests from logging companies to carry forward unused permitted 
cuts from one year to the next;26 and 
• to limit the annual harvest in all new concessions (or extensions of existing 
concessions) to one thirty-fifth of the net loggable area. 
During the course of 1996, however, the government appeared to back away 
from these commitments when the Forests Minister declared that the Forest 
Authority would speed up the allocation of new timber permits in order to raise 
the annual harvest to 5 million cubic metres, and sought to amend the Forestry 
Act in ways which appeared to raise the level of ministerial control over this 
process. These actions provoked a stand-off between the government and the 
World Bank, as the latter held out for restoration of the original commitments 
and preservation of the existing legislation before it would release the second 
tranche of the economic recovery loan. 
The Minister's position was apparently supported by the Forest Authority's 
departure from the conservative calculations of 'sustainable yield' which had 
been made in the wake of the RRA. The 1996 National Forest Plan (PNGFA 
1996:11) declared that the total area of 'production forest' was 11.9 million 
hectares, and the 25.7 million hectares of 'reserve forest' included another 8.2 
million hectares of 'potential production forest'. The area of 'protection forest' 
was given as 1. 7 million hectares, but no attempt had yet been made to specify 
the area of 'salvage forest'. It seems that the National Forest Plan was now 
equating the combination of actual and potential 'production forest' with what 
the RRA had defined as the 'gross operable area', and that the Forest Authority's 
estimate of the size of this area had grown from 12.6 million hectares to 20.1 
million hectares. These calculations appeared to justify a projected annual 
harvest, from 1997, of 4.7 (or perhaps 4.9) million cubic metres, of which 
approximately 2.9 million cubic metres would be derived from existing projects 
(ibid: 13). 
At first sight, it may seem that these optimistic forecasts have received a 
measure of support from the Forest Inventory Mapping System (FIMS), the 
26 According to Max Aitken (PNGADCP 1993), the combined 'maximum allowable cut' under 
the permits issued before the end of 1994 was 8.45 million m3 in 1993, 7.82 million m3 in 1994, 
7.49 million m3 in 1995, then falling to 6.41 million m3 in 1998 and 4.82 million m3 in 2001. 
Aggregate harvest levels have regularly fallen well short of the maximum allowable cut. 
224 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
long-promised inventory of PNG's forest resources which has now supplanted 
the earlier RRA in the calculations of the Forest Authority. As in the case of the 
earlier exercise, construction of the FIMS has been funded by the Australian 
government, and the system was installed as a database in the Forest Authority's 
computers early in 1997. The system is based on a mapping and description of 
the nation's forest resources and other vegetation, at a scale of 1: 1 00,000, in the 
years 1975 and 1996 (Hammermaster and Saunders 1995).27 From the 1975 
data, the whole country has been divided into a very large number of individual 
'forest mapping units' (FMUs), each of which has then been allocated to one of 
fifty-nine 'vegetation types', of which thirty-six have been classified as 'forest 
types'. A further distinction has been made between forty-two 'forest zones', 
each of which contains those FMUs of the same forest type which also contain 
the same combination of merchantable tree species. 
As in the case of the RRA, the definition and measurement of what is now 
called 'potential production forest' has been based on the progressive exclusion 
of other categories from the 'gross forest area'. 
• First, the 'gross forest area', which is defined as the total area of forest 
identified in all vegetation types, has been reduced to an 'adjusted forest area' 
by the exclusion of small patches of natural or human disturbance. 
• Second, those areas of land which ought to be excluded from logging because 
of the existence of extreme or serious physical limitations of altitude, slope, 
terrain, or inundation have been classified as 'non-potential production 
forest' within this 'adjusted forest area' .28 
The 'adjusted forest area' which existed in 1975, both 'potential' and 'non-
potential' production forest, is then divided into four parts by reference to the 
change which has (or has not) occurred between 1975 and 1996: 
• part has been logged and left to regenerate; 
• part has been logged and then cleared for conversion to permanent land use; 
• part has been cleared for conversion to permanent land use without being 
logged beforehand; and 
• the remaining part has neither been logged nor cleared for conversion to 
permanent land use. 
Tables 10.6 and 10.7 show the total areas of 'potential' and 'non-potential' 
production forest, respectively, which existed in each province in 1975 and 
1996, and the areas which have either been logged (with or without being 
27 The 1975 data was based on air photographs taken over the years 1972-75, while the 1996 data 
was based on a combination of Landsat imagery and rapid ground surveys by Forest Authority 
staff and consultants. 1975 was chosen as the baseline year because there had been very little 
commercial logging activity before that date. 
28 This area of exclusion includes all land covered by mangroves. 
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cleared) or cleared without being logged in the intervening period. The 
summary data available to me do not provide separate measurements of the areas 
of 'potential' and 'non-potential' production forest which have been logged and 
cleared, but they indicate that the aggregate area which has undergone this 
particular transformation is 421,029 hectares, leaving an aggregate area of 
2,3?4,232 hectares which has been logged and left to regenerate.29 
Table 10.6: Transformation of PNG's 'potential production forest', 1975-1996. 
Province Total Logged Cleared but Total 
area in 1975 (some cleared) not logged area in 1996 
'000 ha (o/o) '000 ha (o/o) '000 ha (o/o) '000 ha (o/o) 
Western 4,694.6 (34.9) 175.4 (9.5) 108.2 (17.0) 4,447.5 (38.5) 
Gulf 1,258.6 (9.4) 86.0 (4.7) 10.5 (1.7) 1,170.4 (1 0.1) 
Central 682.6 (5.1) 193.9 (10.5) 25.7 (4.1) 522.6 (4.5) 
Milne Bay 336.7 (2.5) 102.2 (5.5) 29.1 (4.6) 251.4 (2.2) 
Oro 569.8 (4.2) 124.2 (6.7) 37.4 (5.8) 452.3 (3.9) 
S. Highlands 403.8 (3.0) 2.3 (0.1) 40.8 (6.4) 375.4 (3.3) 
Enga 474.2 (3.5) 19.1 (3.0) 460.3 (4.0) 
W. Highlands 62.6 (0.5) 8.8 (1.4) 56.4 (0.5) 
Chimbu 142.4 ( 1.1) 26.4 (4.2) 128.5 (1.1) 
E. Highlands 90.1 (0.7) 7.4 (0.4) 11.3 (1.7) 82.2 (0.7) 
Moro be 321.7 (2.4) 67.4 (3.6) 20.7 (3.3) 265.0 (2.3) 
Madang 611.7 (4.5) 78.3 (4.2) 66.0 (10.4) 525.0 (4.5) 
East Sepik 618.7 (4.6) 23.1 (1.2) 46.0 (7.3) 568.6 (4.9) 
West Sepik 1,572.1 (11.7) 93.7 (5.0) 124.6 (19.7) 1,407.4 (12.2) 
Manus 101.3 (0.8) 14.8 (0.8) 45.0 (7.1) 62.8 (0.5) 
New Ireland 332.0 (2.5) 197.0 (1 0.7) 1.8 (0.3) 170.9 (1.5) 
E.N. Britain 227.8 (1.7) 150.9 (8.2) 7.9 (1.3) 96.0 (0.8) 
W.N. Britain 708.2 (5.3) 530.9 (28.7) 4.9 (0.8) 259.5 (2.2) 
N. Solomons 244.8 (1.8) 244.8 (2.1) 
TOTAL 13,453.5 (100.0) 1,847.3 (100.0) 634.0 (1 00.0) 11,547.1 (100.0) 
Source: PNG Forest Inventory Mapping System. 
29 Observant readers may note that the measured decline in the aggregate area of both 'potential' 
and 'non-potential' production forest between 1975 and 1996 (a total of 3,053,416 hectares) is 
considerably greater than the sum of the areas which have been 'converted to permanent land use' 
(a total of 1,554,218 hectares). I have not yet been able to obtain a satisfactory explanation of this 
anomaly, but it may be due to the existence of substantial areas of logged-over forest which have 
been 'left to regenerate', but have not (yet) done so. It should also be noted that the statistics 
presented here are still regarded as provisional outputs of the database (personal communication, 
John McAlpine, 1997). 
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Table 10.7: Transformation of PNG's 'non-potential production forest', 1975-
1996. 
Province 
Western 
Gulf 
Central 
Milne Bay 
Oro 
S. Highlands 
Enga 
W. Highlands 
Chimbu 
E. Highlands 
Moro be 
Madang 
East Sepik 
West Sepik 
Manus 
New Ireland 
E.N. Britain 
W.N. Britain 
N. Solomons 
Total Logged 
area in 1975 (some cleared) 
'000 ha (0/o) 
1 ,046. 7 ( 6.5) 
1,175.0 (7.3) 
1,251.3 (7.7) 
522.0 (3.2) 
1,019.9 (6.3) 
1,500.8 (9.3) 
242.2 (1.5) 
391.2 (2.4) 
224.0 (1.4) 
440.3 (2.7) 
1,733.7 (10.7) 
972.0 (6.0) 
1,461.1 (9.0) 
1,495.6 (9.2) 
6.3 (0.0) 
409.8 (2.5) 
998.1 (6.2) 
990.5 (6.1) 
324.4 (2.0) 
'000 ha (0/o) 
48.3 (5.1) 
16.0 (1.7) 
44.1 (4.6) 
20.2 (2.1) 
7.3 (0.8) 
5.6 (0.6) 
4.5 
96.9 
19.3 
4.5 
29.9 
1.1 
186.2 
162.1 
302.0 
(0.5) 
(10.2) 
(2.0) 
(0.5) 
(3.2) 
(0.1) 
(19.6) 
(17.1) 
(31.9) 
Cleared but 
not logged 
'000 ha (0/o) 
47.5 (9.5) 
7.4 (1.5) 
13.5 (2.7) 
14.0 (2.8) 
13.8 (2.8) 
86.3 (1.7) 
14.8 (3.0) 
87.1 (17.4) 
16.0 (3.2) 
11.8 (2.4) 
70.5 (14.1) 
30.5 (6.1) 
17.6 (3.5) 
30.3 (6.1) 
1.9 (0.4) 
0.4 (0.1) 
25.7 (5.1) 
10.0 (2.0) 
TOTAL 16,204.8 (1 00.0) 948.0 (100.0) 499.2 (100.0) 
Source: PNG Forest Inventory Mapping System. 
Total 
area in 1996 
'000 ha (0/o) 
971.4 (6.5) 
1,159.7 (7.7) 
1,205.4 (8.0) 
498.9 (3.3) 
1,006.5 (6.7) 
1,442.2 (9.6) 
229.0 (1.5) 
337.0 (2.2) 
212.0 (1.4) 
430.7 (2.9) 
1,600.7 (10.6) 
945.0 (6.3) 
1,448.7 (9.6) 
1,441.6 (9.6) 
4.4 (0.0) 
233.9 (1.6) 
828.8 (5.5) 
737.3 (4.9) 
324.4 (2.2) 
15,057.8 (1 00.0) 
If we now compare the provisional outputs of the FIMS (Tables 10.6 and 
10.7) with the corresponding estimates made in the RRA (Table 10.4), we may 
be struck by the difference between the 6.8 million hectares of 'potential forest 
area' which was thought to exist in 1993 and the 11.5 million hectares of 
'potential production forest' which is now said to have existed in 1996. If we 
assume that these are two attempts to measure the same thing, then it seems that 
the estimated area of 'potential production forest' was 70 percent greater in 1996 
than it was in 1993. This discrepancy is all the more remarkable when we 
compare the earlier estimate that 712,000 hectares of forest had already been 
logged before 1993 with the current estimate that 2.8 million hectares had been 
logged by 1996, which seems to represent a simultaneous increase of nearly 300 
percent in the area of forest whose potential production values have (at least 
temporarily) been realised. Should we therefore conclude that this new set of 
data justifies a corresponding increase in the estimates of aggregate sustainable 
yield, and therefore supports the claim implied in the National Forest Plan (and 
openly stated by representatives of the log export industry) that PNG's natural 
forest resource can sustain an annual harvest of approximately 5 million cubic 
metres, instead of the 3 million cubic metres implied by the calculations of the 
RRA? 
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The architects of the FIMS maintain that there are three main reasons why a 
positive answer cannot be given to this question: 
• Firstly, the database shows that more than one third of the area which has 
already been logged falls is classified as 'non-potential production forest' 
(see Table 10. 7), which means that it should not have been logged under a 
regime of sustainable forest management. 
• Secondly, the area of 'potential production forest' includes several 'forest 
types' or 'forest zones' whose combination of tree species do not warrant 
commercial exploitation under current market conditions, and which are 
therefore excluded, in practice, from the area of interest to logging 
companies.30 
• Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the estimates which have previously 
been made of 'typical' regeneration rates, and which support the idea of a 
'standard cutting cycle' of 30-40 years, are now regarded as maximum, rather 
than average, rates, and there are many 'forest types' or 'forest zones' in 
which the rates of regeneration are now shown to be much lower, and in 
which the 'cutting cycle' should therefore be twice or three times the 
'standard' length (personal communication, John McAlpine, 1997). 
From these considerations, it can be argued that the FIMS provides more reasons 
for the Forest Authority to limit the numbers and types of forest area which are 
made available for commercial logging than arguments in favour of extending 
the aggregate area of 'production forest'. 
The Political Distribution of Log Export Revenues 
During the period of national independence, logging companies have been 
obliged to share their revenues with the government and with local landowners 
in various forms and various proportions. 
• At the time of Independence in 1975, timber royalties were levied at the rate 
of K3.18 per cubic metre. The rate was raised to K3.95/m3 in 1976, then to 
KS .411m3 in 1981, and finally to K 1 O/m3 in 1996. In the early years of 
Independence, timber royalties were divided between the national 
government, the provi.ncial government, and local landowners in the ratio 
1 :2:1; from 1986, they were divided between the provincial government and 
local landowners in the ratio 3: 1; as of 1996, local landowners are due to 
collect the entire amount, in recognition of their status as the true 'resource 
owners'. 
30 Although the FIMS contains estimates of 'gross merchantable volume' for both 'potential' and 
'non-potential' production forest, these estimates are not presented here because they create the 
misleading impression that these are volumes of timber which can be profitably extracted and sold. 
According to Lamb ( 1990:35), a 'typical' hectare of forest in PNG yields only 30 cubic metres of 
marketable timber out of a 'standing volume' of 100-130 cubic metres. 
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• Any income which the government may have lost in the process of 'giving 
away' an increasing share of timber royalties to local landowners has been 
more than made up by the imposition of a log export tax, which was first 
imposed in 1979, and whose average rates have been raised on four separate 
occasions during the 1990s. From 1979 to 1995, different rates of tax were 
imposed on different species of timber, but tax rates have now been linked 
directly to the export price of logs. 
• Local landowners or landowner companies have been able to secure a variety 
of additional cash benefits from logging contractors in the process of 
negotiating the development of specific projects. Before 1996, the value of 
such 'levies' and 'premiums' varied widely between one project and another, 
but the national government has now attempted to rationalise this form of 
redistribution through the creation of a standardised Project Development 
Levy. 
• Finally, permit holders have generally agreed to spend some of their own 
revenues on the provision of 'social infrastructure' within their concession 
areas, and this may be regarded as a 'benefit in kind' to local landowners, or 
an indirect form of budgetary support to the government (which would 
otherwise pay for such provision). The value of such benefits has normally 
been equated with the combined cash value of royalties, levies, and premiums 
(see World Bank 1989). 
The Tropical Forestry Action Plan Review criticised (and effectively 
stalled) the government's proposal to revise the fiscal regime in the forestry 
sector in such a way that royalties and export taxes would both be charged as a 
fixed percentage of export value, because it carried 'a potential political risk of 
exposing resource owners to the consequences of market instability, from which 
they are presently shielded' (ibid:32). It was also critical of the use of royalty 
rate allowances and indirect infrastructural levies as the preferred method of 
compensating for variations in the average cost of production between different 
logging operations, since low-cost producers would probably still have the upper 
hand, and inefficient loggers might also be inefficient in the business of 
providing social infrastructure (ibid:33). 
Under Part VI of the 1991 Forestry Act (Sections 119-121 ), the government 
was committed to the establishment of a new 'forest revenue system', but no 
details were provided in the legislation. The National Forest Policy (PNGMOF 
1991 :40) promised an 'early comprehensive study on State taxes, levies, 
royalties, charges, and obligations to be imposed on the forest industry, and 
minimum rentals and purchase prices due to resource owners', and in the 
meantime undertook to maintain the existing method of calculating and 
distributing royalties, so that: 
• 'Resource owners will continue to receive all royalties collected from timber 
and other forest produce harvested from natural forests.' 
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• 'The national and provincial governments shall continue to receive 25 
percent and 75 percent, respectively, of royalties from timber and other forest 
produce harvested from State land.' 
The Act allowed the Minister and Board a substantial measure of discretion in 
deciding the rate at which royalties and levies would be charged on individual 
projects, presumably so that the Act would not have to be amended in light of 
the revenue study promised in the Policy.31 
The Forest Revenue Study, like the RRA and the FIMS, was funded by the 
Australian government as one of the projects implemented under the 
NAFCAP.32 The revenue study found that the existing fiscal regime in the 
forestry sector was 'reasonably efficient', but it was 'probably not fair, certainly 
not simple, and does not seem to encourage good forest management' (Shedden 
Agribusiness 1991 :viii). It went on to propose that: 
• resource owners should receive a royalty payment of between K4 and K5 per 
cubic metre of all logs harvested; 
• the government should tax the logging industry by a combination of 
'stumpage' charges on all logs harvested, and an additional export tax on all 
logs exported, and thus encourage downstream processing by subjecting 
processors to the former, but not the latter, charge; 
• stumpage charges should vary with the value of the species being harvested, 
while log export taxes should vary with the export price; and 
• tax receipts should be credited to a Forest Revenue Stabilisation Fund which 
would first be used to cover the government's own costs in regulating the 
industry, and surplus then made available to Local Area Development Funds 
in each concession area. 
For reasons discussed elsewhere (see Taylor, this volume), four years 
elapsed between the completion of the revenue study and the introduction of a 
new forest revenue system in the government's 1996 budget. The 
recommendations of the revenue study were subject to a certain amount of 
interdepartmental consultation during 1992, but ran into opposition from the 
logging industry and landowner company representatives in 1993. In December 
1993, Cabinet decided to defer its final approval of a new system pending further 
evaluation of its merits by a ministerial committee which failed to hold a single 
31 Some commentators, such as John Millett ( 1991 ), complained that this would cause 
'considerable investor uncertainty' because it gave no guarantee of a level playing field. Millett 
also expressed some doubt about the allowance made in Section 121 for the Forest Authority to 
meet its own costs out of levies charged on the industry, especially in light of its stated aim of 
achieving 'increased down-stream processing'. 
32 It was, in fact, the first stage of a 'Forest Revenue and Financial Study' which also included a 
'Corporate Planning' component which was desgined to develop the financial administration of the 
new Forest Authority. 
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meeting throughout 1994. The introduction of the new system in the budget of 
November 1995 was largely the result of further pressure applied by the World 
Bank during the negotiation of the 'economic recovery programme'. 
Meanwhile, the government had attempted to reduce the extent of its fiscal crisis 
by the simple expedient of raising the rates of export tax levied under the old 
revenue system, once in the budget of November 1993, and then again in the 
'mini-budget' of March 1994 (see Table 1 0.8). 
Table 10.8: Export tax rates under the old revenue system, 1979-1995. 
Species 1979-90 1191-11/93 11/93-3/94 3/94-11/95 
Kwila, Pencil Cedar, 
Planchonella: 10% 30% 33% 46% 
Calophyllum, Mersawa, 
Taun, Walnut: 10% 20% 23% 36% 
Burckella, Canarius, 
Gluta, Hopea, Terminalia: 10% 12% 15% 28% 
All other species: 10% 9% 13% 26% 
Weighted average: 10.0% 14.3o/o 17.3% 31.1o/o 
Note: the weighted average represents the effective subsidy to downstream processors. 
Source: PNG Forest Authority. 
The government's failure to introduce the new revenue system, or even to 
raise the rate of taxes charged under the old system, before the end of 1992, 
seems to have created a substantial 'windfall profit' for the logging companies 
during 1993 and 1994, when prices were hovering around US$170 per cubic 
metre. One economist (Duncan 1994) has estimated the size of this windfall 
profit to have been about K225 million - more than the sum of about K200 
million which the government actually collected in log export taxes over the 
same period (see Table 10.1 ). Another economist (personal communication, 
John Millett, 1997) has estimated that the government would have made an extra 
K200 million in log export taxes over the four years from 1992 to 1995, if the 
new revenue system had already been in place during that time. 
The new revenue system proposed in the 1996 budget differs from the one 
which was recommended by the Forest Revenue Study: 
• resource owners were to receive a substantially higher royalty payment of 
K10 per cubic metre of all logs harvested (from which the national 
government would deduct a 5 percent royalty withholding tax), and a Project 
Development Levy whose value would also be greater than the various levies 
and premiums which they had previously been receiving; 
• there would be no system of 'stumpage' charges on all logs harvested, only 
an export tax on all logs exported; and 
A Statistical Profile of the Log Export Industry 231 
• there was no provision to channel tax receipts through a Forest Revenue 
Stabilisation Fund in order to cover the operating costs of the 'Forest 
Authority. 
However, the new revenue system does follow the prescriptions of the Forest 
Revenue Study in its creation of an export tax regime which is considerably 
more 'progressive' than its predecessor, because the rate of tax is tied directly to 
the export value of the logs, and so the government's share of the economic rent 
increases with the market price ofthe commodity. Table 10.9 shows how export 
tax rates are calculated under the new revenue system, while Table 10.10 
compares the levels of tax collected under the old system and the new system· at 
different log export prices. Tables 10.11 and I 0.12 incorporate the effects of the 
new revenue system into a portrait of the changes which have taken place in the 
overall distribution of log export values between different stakeholders and 
different forms of income over the period from 1988 to 1996. 
Table 10.9: Export tax rates under the new revenue system, 1996. 
Price band Tax rate 
Up to K90/m 15% off.o.b. value 
K91-110/m3 K13.50 + 30o/o of amount above K90 
Klll-130/m3 Kl9.50 + 50o/o of amount above KilO 
Kl31-150/m3 K29.50 + 55o/o of amount above K130 
K 151-200/m3 K40.50 + 60% of amount above Kl50 
Over K200/m 3 K70.50 + 70% of amount above K200 
Source: PNG Forest Authority. 
Table 10.10: Comparison of export taxes under the old and new revenue 
systems. 
Log price Log price Tax under old system Tax under new system 
(USD/m3) (PGK/m3) (K) (o/o) (K) (o/o) 
110 147 45.80 31.2 39.50 26.9 
120 160 49.85 31.2 46.89 29.3 
130 173 53.90 31.2 54.82 31.7 
140 187 58.27 31.2 63.72 34.1 
150 200 62.32 31.2 72.06 36.0 
160 213 66.36 31.2 80.56 37.8 
Note: average log price in 1996 has been K 175/m3, giving a weighted average tax rate of 
3 K56/m under the new system. 
Source: PNG Forest Authority. 
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Table 10.11: Distribution ofPNG log export revenues, 1988-1996 (in kina). 
INCOME CATEGORY 1988 1990 1992 1993 93-94 1994 1995 1996 
Average log price (Kina/m3) 71.00 66.00 87.00 169.00 163.00 158.00 160.00 175.00 
Income to local landowners: 6.34 6.21 6.73 8.79 8.64 8.51 8.56 21.11 
Royalties 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 3.56 9.50 
Other levies & premiums 2.78 2.65 3.17 5.23 5.08 4.95 5.00 11.61 
Income to provincial gov't: 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 0.00 
Income to national gov't: 8.29 7.79 14.36 26.80 30.78 50.42 51.04 57.59 
Log export tax 7.10 6.60 13.17 25.61 29.59 49.23 49.85 56.09 
Reforestation levies 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Royalty withholding tax 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.50 
Income to logging contractor: 55.12 50.75 64.66 132.16 122.33 97.82 99.15 96.30 
Assessed logging costs 38.23 42.51 47.33 49.50 49.50 50.29 57.79 66.96 
Balance to logging contractor: 16.89 8.24 17.33 82.66 72.83 47.53 41.36 29.34 
Balance in real 1996 Kina 29.58 12.98 24.51 111.82 98.52 63.28 47.93 29.34 
Table 10.12: Distribution of PNG log export revenues, 1988-1996 (%shares). 
INCOME CATEGORY 1988 1990 1992 1993 93-94 1994 1995 1996 
Average log price 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Income to local landowners: 8.93 9.41 7.74 5.20 5.30 5.39 5.35 12.06 
Royalties 5.01 5.39 4.09 2.11 2.18 2.25 2.23 5.43 
Other levies & premiums 3.92 4.02 3.64 3.09 3.12 3.13 3.13 6.63 
Income to provincial gov't: 1.76 1.89 1.44 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.00 
Income to national gov't: 11.68 11.80 16.51 15.86 18.88 31.91 31.90 32.91 
Log export tax 10.00 10.00 15.14 15.15 18.15 31.16 31.16 32.05 
Reforestation levies 1.41 1.52 1.15 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.63 0.57 
Royalty withholding tax 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.29 
Income to logging contractor: 77.63 76.89 74.32 78.20 75.05 61.91 61.97 55.03 
Assessed logging costs 53.85 64.41 54.40 29.29 30.37 31.83 36.12 38.26 
Balance to logging contractor: 23.79 12.48 19.92 48.91 44.68 30.08 25.85 16.77 
Balance in real 1996 Kina 41.66 19.67 28.17 66.17 60.44 40.05 29.96 16.77 
Note: The '93-94' column shows the distribution of log export revenues between the 
budget of November 1993 and the mini-budget of March 1994. The adjoining columns 
show the distribution during the remaining months of those years. 
Source: PNG Forest Authority. 
The figures given in Table 10.11 for 'other levies and premiums' paid to 
landowners before November 1995 are estimated averages and exclude any 
additional non-monetary benefits (infrastructure, for example) provided by 
logging contractors or landowner companies. The Project Development Levy 
which now replaces these miscellaneous forms of income has a standard 
minimum rate (as shown in Table 10.11 ), though higher rates are to be charged 
when export prices are unusually high. It should also be noted that the figures 
shown in the final ( 1996) column apply to existing projects. The distribution of 
revenues arising from new projects is identical except that the 'reforestation 
levy' is transferred from the national government to the landowners, and is 
therefore added to the Project Development Levy. 
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Tables 10.11 and 10.12 show the logging contractor's residual share of log 
export revenues in both nominal and real prices. The bottom line represents the 
balance in terms of current purchasing power, and thus takes account of the fact 
that one kina could buy more in 1988 than it can now, because of the effects of 
devaluation and inflation. This balance is understood to contain the contractor's 
own profits and the cost of providing any additional benefits for landowners 
which may have been negotiated outside the terms of the official fiscal regime. 
At a log export price of US$130 (K 175) per cubic metre, which is close to 
prevailing market prices in 1995 and 1996, Table 10.12 shows that the new 
system has the immediate effect of reducing the logger's share log export 
revenues from 62 percent to 55 percent of the gross revenue, while increasing 
the landowner's share from less than 6 percent to more than 12 percent. The 
government's share, which had been raised substantially by the 'mini-budget' of 
March 1994, has hardly been altered by the introduction ofthe new system. 
In 1996, the logging companies have mounted a vigorous campaign against 
the new revenue system, even threatening at one point to mount a 'capital strike' 
against payment of the new royalty rates and the Project Development Levy. 
Industry representatives have argued that the government's figures overstate the 
size of the balance which will now end up in the contractor's pocket because 
they understate the average cost of production, which means that some operators 
will no longer be able to achieve a normal rate of return on their operations 
(Post-Courier 14 March 1996, 9 April 1996). The 'assessed logging costs' 
shown in Table 10.11 are assumed to be equivalent to US$50/m3 in 1993 (when 
the US dollar had roughly the same value as the PNG kina). Economists 
associated with the World Bank and the PNG Forest Authority currently 
maintain that average logging costs fall within the range of K60-70/m3, while 
industry representatives claim that they fall within the range of K90-11 O/m3. If 
the industry representatives are right, then the typical logging contractor has 
hardly made any profit at all for the last three years. 
Part of the problem here is to take account of the wide range of variation 
which is known to exist between the gross revenues and the production costs of 
individual logging operations. The Forest Authority's own database showed that 
logs exported from the Rottock Bay project during 1995 secured an average of 
US$205/m3, while logs exported from the Gar project (also in East New Britain 
Province) secured an average of only US$89/m3. There are currently no data 
that would permit an assessment of the extent to which this range of variation is 
due to the vagaries of corporate accountancy, rather than differences in the 
quality of timber being harvested. Nevertheless, the 'progressive' features of the 
new revenue system are partly intended to mitigate the effects of such variation 
on the profitability of different operations. But they do not take account of the 
separate, and possibly unrelated, range of variation in the costs of production. 
The Forest Revenue Study did include an assessment of this second range 
of variation, based on a small stratified sample of logging projects in different 
parts of the country. The results of this exercise were later reviewed and 
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summarised by consultants working on the World Bank-funded PNG Forest 
Management and Planning Project (see Table 1 0.13). Their calculations have 
apparently formed the basis of the Forest Authority's decision to assess the 
average logging cost at US$ 501m3 in 1993. The recent burst of complaints from 
the logging industry has prompted the World Bank to promise a further 
investigation of this subject, but no such study had been undertaken by the end 
of 1996. 
Table 10.13: Estimated range of logging costs in PNG, 1993. 
Item 
Planning/survey 
Road construction 
Felling (labour contract) 
Skidding 
Scaling (labour contract) 
Loading/trucking 
Log dump (sort/stack) 
Shipping (barging) 
Shipping (stevedores) 
Fuel, oil and parts 
Administration 
TOTAL 
Low cost 
Nil 
K10/m3 
K2/m3 
K2/m3 
50t/m3 
K2/m3 
Kllm3 
K2/m3 
50t/m3 
10% 
10% 
K22.40/m3 
Source: PNG Forest Management and Planning Project. 
Conclusion: Science, Capital, and Politics 
High cost 
K2.50/m 
K20/m3 
K5/m3 
K5/m3 
Kllm3 
K10/m3 
K2/m3 
K7.50/m3 
K1/m3 
20% 
10% 
K66.00/m3 
What might now be said, by way of conclusion, about the relationship between 
these various sets of numbers, apart from the fact that they all fit then original 
definition of 'statistics', being bodies of data collected on behalf of the state? 
The answer to this question needs to take account of the additional fact that these 
data have been assembled and interpreted as integral components of a single 
process of policy reform, in which donor-funded experts and their bureaucratic 
counterparts have sought to pit the force of 'scientific argument' against the 
powers of logging capital and the erratic qualities of national and local-level 
politics in PNG. The question itself can therefore be divided into three parts: 
• How have the reformers themselves conceived the 'big picture' revealed by 
their numerical calculations? 
• How have other stakeholders reacted to arguments which stem from such 
conceptions? 
• What is the value of statistics as an instrument of persuasion in this political 
setting? 
A Statistical Profile of the Log Export Industry 235 
We may begin to assemble answers to these more specific questions by 
considering the relationship which may or may not exist between the calculus of 
'sustainable forest management', taken as the middle term in our general 
equation, and the two measurable 'objects' which exist to either side of it- first, 
the distribution of log export revenues, and second, the concentration of logging 
capital. 
Sustainability, Efficiency, and Equity 
It should be apparent, from my previous discussion, that the World Bank's 
approach to the first of these matters tends to assume the feasibility of 
harnessing a progressive log export tax to the goal of maintaining a form of 
'sustained yield management' which can be defined in terms of an aggregate 
national log harvest and the imposition of a standard 35-year cutting cycle on all 
new timber concessions granted by the Forest Authority. Although the Bank has 
been prepared, at times, to countenance a more complex definition of 
'sustainability', and a fiscal regime whose own complexity might be justified in 
light of this definition, these complexities have apparently been sacrificed to the 
more urgent task of defending the fundamental provisions of the Forestry Act 
against a coalition of national politicians, logging companies, and landowner 
company executives who are unable or unwilling to grasp the merits of detailed 
scientific and economic arguments. 
This is not a position which naturally recommends itself to the experts who 
have been paid to integrate measures of 'sustainability' into the planning process 
envisaged by the National Forest Policy. As we have seen, the natural scientists 
were obliged to produce a number of 'guesstimates' in order to satisfy the 
Bank's desire to keep the process of policy reform moving along a particular 
path, knowing full well that a great deal more time and money would have to be 
spent before they could produce the kind of database which would enable the 
Forest Authority or the Department of Environment and Conservation to make 
an accurate assessment of 'the likely physical environmental outcomes from any 
significant forestry operation' (personal communication, John McAipine, 1997). 
From their point of view, it is hard to imagine a fiscal regime which could serve 
as an administratively simple method of transferring a larger proportion of log 
export revenues to the national government and local resource owners, yet 
simultaneously function to encourage the sustainable management of individual 
timber concessions. This is primarily because the very wide variation in the 
economic value and physical accessibility of different parts of the national forest 
resource provides a clear incentive for loggers to concentrate their operations in 
the most highly valuable and most accessible areas, to the point where these 
areas are 'over-exploited', while other areas are still 'under-exploited', even 
while the aggregate national harvest remains at a level which is theoretically 
sustainable.33 
33 I am grateful to Gerard Ward (personal communication, March 1997) for providing me with a 
more detailed argument along these lines. The problem, according to Ward, is that 'one needs to 
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The planning process envisaged by the new Forestry Act and the National 
Forest Policy is one which actually militates against the application of a 
scientifically sophisticated approach to the business of sustained yield 
management, precisely because it requires each of the country's nineteen 
provinces to produce its own forest plan for national approval, but without the 
availability of sufficient scientific expertise at the provincial level, without due 
recognition being given to the private (communal) ownership of local forest 
resources (see Taylor, this volume), and without any statutory mechanism for 
ensuring consistency between these nineteen plans and their national counterpart 
(personal communication, Ben Everts,34 1996). The apparent contradiction 
between the practice of sustainable forest management and the pursuit of 
provincial participation has been further exaggerated by the more recent reforms 
of the provincial government system itself, as embodied in the New Organic 
Law of 1995 (see chapters by Nen and Taylor, this volume). In practice, the 
provincial planning function has been taken over by the newly centralised 
National Forest Service (see PNGF A 1994, 1995a), but the planning process as a 
whole has become a political football kicked back and forth between a Minister 
whose prime concern is to expedite the issue of new timber permits, by 
commanding the production of the National Forest Plan, and government 
officials who can still block his shots with their mastery of legal technicalities 
and scientific data. 
This may help to explain why the World Bank has studiously avoided any 
reference to the planning process in the conditions attached to PNG's structural 
adjustment programme, and why some of the planners in the National Forest 
Service have concluded that the planning requirements of the Forestry Act are a 
positive hindrance to the achievement of 'sustainability' at the only level where 
this can be sensibly pursued - which is the level of operational project 
management. Any attempt to rationalise these aspects of the Act carries the 
obvious risk of encouraging politicians to continue their pursuit of more dubious 
amendments, of the kind most recently blocked by the World Bank's loan 
conditions, which would give them greater control over the National Forest 
Board. The main focus of bureaucratic reform has therefore shifted to the 
practical enforcement of the Logging Code of Practice (PNGFA/DEC 1995) and 
the Planning, Monitoring, and Control Procedures for Natural Forest Logging 
(PNGFA 1995b). 
There is no doubting the need for greater regulation at the local level, with 
or without the warrant provided by national plans and guidelines, but the current 
pattern of relationships between logging companies and local communities, 
which has been documented at great length in the first part of this volume, does 
get temporal and spatial sequencing running properly to attain effective national sustainability' and 
this cannot follow from the imposition of a 'simple annual maximum cut', whether by fiscal or 
other means. 
34 Team Leader, Forest Management and Planning Project. The discussion which follows is 
based on an interview with Mr Everts conducted in June 1996, at the conclusion of this World 
Bank-funded project. 
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not bode well for its achievement. Even if a broad consensus had been reached 
over the future direction of national policy, it might still be argued that the 
diversity of tree species and low timber volumes which are characteristic of 
PNG's forest resource mean that large-scale industrial logging is unlikely to 
remain an attractive economic proposition unless it continues to be carried out in 
an environmentally destructive manner. This is one of the reasons why 
commentators like Barnett ( 1992) have doubted the validity of the forty-year 
'cutting cycle' which has commonly been used in calculations of sustainable 
yield. Such arguments have now been reinforced by the evidence of variable 
regeneration rates contained in the Forest Inventory Mapping System. But then 
one may wonder whether the 'fine-tuned' planning which is theoretically 
possible with the aid of this new database can be applied, in practice, to an 
industrial and political setting which has so many messy features. 
Although the policy reformers have applauded the World Bank's apparent 
concern to raise the share of resource rent which ends up in the pockets of local 
landowners, they have generally failed to comment on the possibility that such 
an increase in landowner revenues will provide an additional financial incentive 
for landowners to applaud the unsustainable exploitation of their own forest 
resources. The disappearance of the 'reforestation levy' into their 'consolidated 
revenues' may likewise be seen as a way of discouraging the local pursuit of 
sustainability (personal communication, Gerard Ward, 1997). The reformers 
have tried to square this particular circle by suggesting that landowners have not 
previously possessed the knowledge, or perhaps even the power, to make a 
'rational' response to market signals (see Brunton 1996), but it is not at all clear 
whether other stakeholders have now developed the capacity to convince 
landowners that the short-term financial gains from large-scale logging carry a 
long-term price which ought not to be paid by future generations or the global 
community (see Filer 1997b). 
Meanwhile, the log export industry may have its own vested interest in 
pushing the definition of 'sustainable management' back to the national level, 
where its argument with the World Bank can be pursued as a fairly 
straightforward public debate about the impact of taxation levels on the 
aggregate national harvest. On the other hand, one of the few things which 
industry representatives Gurrently share with many of their local critics is a high 
level of suspicion about the Bank's own motivations in the conduct of this 
argument. Amongst the ranks of the reformers, there are some who believe that 
the Bank's concern with 'sustainability' has always been subordinate to its other 
aim of distributing log export revenues in what it considers to be the most 
equitable and efficient manner, while others maintain that this concern has 
largely been driven by the need to gratify a Western green lobby which has very 
little idea about the best way to regulate forestry practice in a country like PNG. 
One of the government's forestry consultants has told me that the Bank's 
'heavy-handed approach' has been motivated by the frustrations of its failure to 
influence the direction of forest policy in Indonesia, while an official of the 
Forest Industries Association attributes the same phenomenon to a desire to take 
revenge on the Malaysian logging industry for a similar refusal to toe the line. 
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In PNG's rumour-driven political system, which sits uneasily alongside its 
donor-driven policy process, it is hardly possible to assess the relative merits of 
such conjectures. But they to serve to show how the various sets of numbers 
recently installed in the Forest Authority's computers are primarily connected by 
the logic of stakeholder relationships. 
State, Capital, and Community 
The question of capital concentration is commonly treated, by all stakeholders, 
as a question about the extent to which 'monopoly power' may either hinder or 
facilitate the imposition of a regime of 'sustained yield management' and the 
optimal distribution of log export revenues between 'industry participants'. 
Those who complain about the dominant position occupied by a single company 
(RH), and who publicise figures which seem to exaggerate the extent of its 
control over the log export industry, are clearly convinced that this purported 
mdnopoly is inimical to the values of 'sustainability' and 'equity' alike. As we 
have seen, the 'battle against big capital' reached its peak in 1993, when the 
reforming zeal of the Forests Minister and the newly appointed General Manager 
of the Forest Authority resulted in a very public confrontation with RH, whose 
reputation as a monopolist has been firmly embedded in subsequent public 
debate about the log export industry (see Filer 1996b ). This confrontation was 
coupled with the preparation of the Forestry Development Guidelines, which not 
only required the imposition of a new revenue system and the limitation of log 
harvests to 'sustainable levels', but also proposed an end to raw log exports by 
the turn of the millenium. In this way, it was implied that the economic power 
of RH was one of the main reasons for the absence of 'sustainability' and 
'equity' in the log export industry, and the imposition of a log export ban was 
the most effective way of breaking this stranglehold. 
As previously noted, it is the form, rather than the extent, of capital 
concentration which seems to warrant the suspicion that Sino-Malaysian 
domination of the log export industry is the main obstacle to the rationalisation 
of forest management in PNG, primarily because the relevant companies are not 
accountable to the shareholding public in the same way as their counterparts in 
the mining and petroleum sector, and therefore deserve to be portrayed as a 
corrupting influence on the body politic.35 But this imputation is not amenable 
to statistical analysis, and despite its political appeal, it also tends to conceal a 
more complex dynamic in the mutual relationships of the major stakeholders. 
Firstly, the loggers and the donors have found some common ground in 
their opposition to the log export ban proposed in the Forestry Development 
Guidelines, since the donors and their affiliated experts have consistently argued 
that 'downstream processing' is liable to diminish the proportion of economic 
rent which accrues to the resource owners without creating any new incentives 
35 Henderson (1996a) has published the most fulsome account of 'corruption' in PNG's log 
export industry. 
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for sustainability (see World Bank 1989; Duncan 1994).36 Such arguments have 
helped the loggers to persuade some resource owners, or their representatives, to 
join in their campaign against the Guidelines, even while the donors have been 
funding other projects in the process of reform which seek to undermine this 
'unholy alliance' (see Simpson, this volume), and also funding the activities of 
local NGOs whose members have continued to support the imposition of an 
export ban (see Brunton 1996).37 Meanwhile, some of the 'reformist' elements 
within the forestry bureaucracy have come to the conclusion that it is easier for 
the state to negotiate the rationalisation of forest management with one or two 
'big operators' than it is to deal with a larger number of smaller companies with 
less experience of PNG, with lower levels of investment, and with fewer reasons 
to participate in an efficient management regime. In this respect, the common 
ground between the larger logging companies and government authorities is the 
pursuit of institutional sustainability when dealing with a host of resource-
owning groups whose own capacity to speak with a united voice is currently as 
limited as their capacity to deal with the statistics of resource development. 
36 The Indonesian government's promotion of its own plywood industry is held up as an 
illustration of this point (see Majid Cooke, this volume). 
37 In 1996, World Bank officials were dangling substantial financial carrots in front of previously 
hostile NGOs in order to attract their support for crucial features of the country's structural 
adjustment programme. 
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Appendix A: The Current Distribution of Timber Permits (June 1996) 
Most of the information contained in this appendix is based on two sources: 
• A PNG Forest Authority 'Projects List', dated 12 June 1996. 
• Annex 4 of a report on 'Representative Resource Owner Bodies for Forestry 
Projects' (Whimp 1995), whose information is sourced to the PNGFA 
Company Registration Database as of May 1995. 
All permits listed in either of these sources have been included in this appendix. 
Those which appear in the earlier, but not the later, of the two sources are 
presumably permits which had expired by June 1996. Footnotes are used to 
indicate any discrepancies between these two sources in respect of permits 
which are listed in both. 
Most of the permits listed in either of these two sources are shown on the 
maps contained in the 1996 National Forest Plan, dated May 1996. Those 
permits which do not appear on these maps (and which have presumably 
expired) are marked with an asterisk. 
Information on the identity of contractors (as opposed to permit-holders) is 
derived from the second of these two sources. Footnotes are used to indicate 
those cases in which such information is known to be out of date. 
Provinces have been arranged in the order used by the National Census 
Office rather than the PNG Forest Authority. Projects within provinces have 
been arranged in an order which reflects their spatial relationship, initially by 
census district, but potentially by open electorate. This means that all projects 
which fall within the boundaries of a single district (or electorate) are grouped 
together. 
There are two additional projects (Putput Freehold and Utan Plantation) 
which appear in the Forest Authority's records of 'Exports by Projects' for the 
years 1993-95 (see Appendix B), but which do not appear in any of the other 
three sources mentioned here. They are therefore omitted from this appendix. 
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PROVINCE & PERMIT 
WESTERN 
TP-1-6: Oriomo Wimare 
TP-1-7: Wawoi-Guavi Blocks 1-3 
TP-1-9: Makapa 
GULF 
FMA 2-12: Turama3 
TP-2-15: East Kikori/Urama Gopera 
TP-2-14: Vailala Consolidated 
CENTRAL 
TP-3-35: Ome Ome 
TP-3-27: Iva Inika 
TP-3-26: Gorohu 
TP-3-32: Vanapa North 
TP-3-34: Edevu 
TP-3-30: Orman Lako 
LFA 3-2: Lako lmila 
TP-3-33: Marshal! Lagoon 
TA-025: Cape Rodney-Kupiano* 
TL-3-8: Yanu Land Lease* 
TP-3-28: Bonua Magarida 
TP-3-29: West Gadaisu 
MILNE BAY 
TP-4-3: Sagarai Gadaisu 
TP-4-6: Gara Modewa 
TP-4-5: West Gurney 
TL-4-2: Woodlark Islandd 
ORO 
TL-5-2: Awowota State Land* 
TP-5-10: Embi Hanau 
TP-5-9: Ioma Block 4 
LF A-5-1: Y ema Gaiapa 
WESTERN HIGHLANDS 
TP-9-13: Kuli LPA 
MORO BE 
TP-13-34: Morobe Coast 
TP-13-32: Kui Buso & Extension 
TL-13-15: Bulolo Forest Plantation 
TP-13-33: Watut West 
TP-13-31: Buhem Mongi 
TP-13-27: Umboi Island 
PERMIT HOLDER [CONTRACTOR] 
Forest Management Services (PNG) 
Wawoi Guavi Timber Co. 
Innovision (PNG) 
Turama Forest Industries [Concord Pacific] 
Gopera Investments [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Shisei Enterprises Co. 
Ome Ome Forest [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
lmi Development Co. [Kerawara]b 
Hams Forest Development 
Koneri Development [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Honeri Timber Resources Dev't 
T L Timber Development 
Abau Timbersc 
Landwell Resources 
Landwell Resources 
Landwell Forestry 
Magarida Timbers [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Maisi Trust Co. [Santa (PNG)] 
Ulabo Timber Co. 
Suau Investment Co. [Saban Enterprises] 
Hiai Magi Timber Co. [Ulabo Timber Co.] 
Woodlark Island Dev't Corporation 
Ambogo Sawmill 
Ambogo Sawmill 
Binandere Holdings [Green Mountain] 
Yema Timbers 
Angalimp Business Group 
Golden Pines Sawmilling Co. [contractor unknown] 
SKB Development [Timber Prod. & Mark. Co. (PNG)] 
PNG Forest Products 
PNG Forest Products 
Low Impact Logging 
Umboi Timber Investment [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
a The new FMA includes the old Turama Timber Permit (TP 2-12) held by Long-Term Trading 
Pty Ltd. 
b The current contractor has been identified by staff of the FIA (personal communication, Bob 
Tate, 1997). According to Whimp ( 1995), it was formerly Hong Jeon Co. 
c Whimp ( 1995) gives the permit holder as Land well Resources. 
d Now shown as a Timber Permit in the National Forest Plan. 
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PROVINCE & PROJECT 
MADANG 
TP-12-18: Rai Coast 
TP-12-21: Gogol Valley 
TP-12-20: Sogeram 
TP-12-3: North Coast & Naru Gum 
TP-12-6: Far North Coast 
TP-12-22: Kumil 
EAST SEPIK 
LF A-11-1: Lower Sepik 
LFA-11-2: Hawain 
WESTSEPIK 
TP-10-8: Vanimo Timber Area 
LF A-1 0-1: Bewani 
LFA-10-2: Pegi Pulan 
~ANUS 
LFA-18-2: Kali Bay 
LFA-18-1: Jaha 
TP-18-2: Manus West Coast 
NEW IRELAND 
TP-16-41 : Mussau 
TP-16-48: Umbukul 
TP-16-45: West Kaut 
LFA-16-1: Nakmai 
LFA-16-2: Ugana 
TL-16-2: Komale Plantation P.323* 
TP-16-4 7: Konogogo* 
TP-16-42: Central New Ireland 
LFA-16-12: Suralil Rasrik* 
TP-16-46: Lenai 
TP-16-43: Lak 
EAST NEW BRITAIN 
TP-15-49: Inland Pomio 
TP-15-55: Waterfall Bay Extension 
TP-15-59: Nutuve 
TL-15-11: Bergberg 
TL-15-12: Bergberg Extension 
TP-15-45: Tokai Matong 
TP-15-56: Cape Orford 
TP-15-44: Gar 
TP-15-52: Senbam Extension 
PERMIT HOLDER [CONTRACTOR] 
Raikos Holdings [Saban Enterprises] 
Jant 
Sogeram Development Co. [Madang Timbers] 
Jant [Madang Timbers] 
Madang Timbers 
Papir Development Corporation 
Sepik River Dev't Corporation [Mosko Lumber (PNG)] 
Wongwong Logging [Sovereign Hill (PNG)] 
V animo Forest Products [WTK Realty] 
Wawunai [WTK Realty] 
Wawunai [WTK Realty] 
Kali Bay Dev't Corporation [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Jaha Development Corporation [Monarch Investment] 
Kai Beseu Kampani [Seal (Manus)] 
Concord Pacifica 
Dominance Resources 
Kabato Development Co. [Timbers (PNG)] 
Nakmai (1989) [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Ugana Timbers [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Komale 
Konogogo Timber Resources [contractor unknown] 
Basoma Holdings [Lombda] 
Sopathin Development Co. [Santa (PNG)] 
Lenai Dev 't Corporation [Lusco Enterprise] 
Metlak Development Co. [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Magasaki [Jumbo Enterprises] 
Mumore Co. [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Kisoi Development Corporation [contractor unknown] 
Palmalmal Investments [Lombda] 
Mid-Rivers [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Elmere Legru [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Balokoma [Niugini Lumber Merchant] 
Maden Co. [Bismark Industries] 
Muvanastum [Bismark Industries] 
a According to Whimp ( 1995), the permit was formerly held by a landowner company, Mussau 
Timber Development, with Concord Pacific as its contractor. 
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PROVINCE & PERMIT 
EAST NEW BRITAIN (cont.) 
TL-15-8: Warongoi L.P.A. 
TL-15-9: Taraiwara• 
TP-15-40: Gaulim Extension 
TP-15-54: Vudal 
TP-15-34: Kerevat Balsa Plant'n 
TP-15-57: Ramandu Portiona 
TP-15-58: Seraji 
TP-15-53: Open Bay Consolidated 
WEST NEW BRITAIN 
TP-14-41: Bakada Madedua Ext'nb 
TP-14-43: Ulamona Consolidated 
TP-14-38: Hargy Consolidated 
TP-14-58: Maututu (Hargy)* 
TP-14-52: Ania Kapiura Consol'dd 
TP-14-57: Mosa-Laeim 
TP-14-50: Kapuluk & Ext'n 
LFA-14-6: Aria Vanu Block 1 
LFA-14-13: Aria Vanu Block 3 
TP-14-56: Rottock Bay 
LFA-14-2: Lolo Block 1 
LF A-14-3: Lolo Block 2 
LFA-14-12: Lolo Block 2 Ext'n 
TP-14-53: West Arawe 
TP-14-54: Central Arawe 
TP-14-55: East Arawe 
LFA-14-4: Pulie Anu 
LFA-14-5: Anu Alimbit 
LFA-14-8: Alimbit Andru 
LFA-14-10: Passismanua Block I 
LFA-14-14: Passismanua Ext'n 
LFA-14-11: Andru Johanna 
LFA-14-1: Atuvo 
LFA-14-7: Atuvo Extension 
LFA-14-9: Avio Amgen 
NORTH SOLOMONS 
TP-17-13: Kunua 
TP-17-14: Manetai 
PERMIT HOLDER [CONTRACTOR] 
Richard Gaul~ Industries [Taraiwara] 
Taraiwara 
Gaulim Logging Corporation [Richard Gault Industries] 
Kairak Investment [Lombda] 
Teperoi Timbers 
Urisikuat Timbers [Leytrac] 
Nangal [contractor unknown] 
Open Bay Timber 
Unevulg Development [Open Bay Timber] 
Ulamona Sawmill Development [PNG Forest 
Resourcest 
Shin Asahigawa 
Kumo Development Corporation 
Stettin Bay Lumber Co. 
Stettin Bay Lumber Co. 
Nam Yang Timbers (PNG) 
Aria Vanu Timber Co. [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Aria Vanu Timber Co. [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Evenpio Investments [Rimbunan Hijau (PNG)] 
Lolo Development Co. [Monarch Investment] 
Lolo Development Co. [Monarch Investment] 
Lolo Development Co. [Monarch Investment] 
Milupol Development Co. [Cakara Alam (PNG)] 
Central Arowe Resources [Cakara Alam (PNG)] 
East Arowe Timber Resource [Cakara Alam (PNG)] 
G.R. Logging [WTK Realty] 
G.R. Logging [Fonsen Logging] 
Kandrian Timber Investment [Island Forest Resources] 
Passismanua Inland Timber Res. [Timbers (PNG)] 
Passismanua Inland Timber Res. [Timbers (PNG)] 
A J Timber Development [WTK Realty] 
Menvuvu [Timbers (PNG)] 
Menvuvu [Timbers (PNG)] 
Sare Resources [Timbers (PNG)] 
Northwest Bougainville Dev't 
Asikopan 
a TP-15-57 apparently replaces TL-15-10 ofthe same name, as shown in Whimp (1995). 
b Also known as Extended Mengen. 
c Whimp ( 1995) records the permit holder as Archdiocese of Rabaul TA Vunapope. According to 
FIA staff, PNG Forest Resources is not the operator, but purchases and exports logs cut by the 
landowner company, Ulamona Sawmill Development, which acquired the permit from the Catholic 
mission (personal communication, Bob Tate). 
d Includes TP-14-14 (Bulu) and TP-14-19 (Fulleborne Extension). 
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Appendix B: Log Export Project Profiles 
Most of the information contained in this appendix is based on two separate 
outputs from the PNG Forest Authority database, both dated 12 June 1996: 
• Information on current project status, timber permit period, project area, and 
estimated resource are all derived from the 'Projects List' which has also 
been used as the primary source of information for Appendix A. 
• Information on actual exports for each year from 1993 to 1995 has been taken 
from a separate listing of 'Exports by Projects' for each of these years. 
Information on projected harvest levels for the years 1996-2001 has been taken 
from Appendix 7 of the 1996 National Forest Plan. 
The following codes are used to indicate the 'status' of each project in June 
1996 (Column 1): 
OP =operating; 
NO = not operating; 
AC =accepted; 
PE = permit extended; 
PS = permit suspended; 
NA =no information available. 
In those cases where information on exports during the years 1993-95 is not 
matched by any corresponding information on project status, permit period, 
project area or estimated resource, it can normally be assumed that the permit 
had expired by June 1996. 
For ease of cross-reference, the permits listed in Appendix B are listed in 
the same order as in Appendix A. 
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PROVINCE Permit Project Estimated Actual exports (m3) Projected 
&PERMIT period area resource --------------------------------- harvest 
[STATUS] (years) (ha.) (m3) 1993 1994 1995 1996-2001 
WESTERN 
TP-1-6 [OP]: 87-97 24,289 729,040 28,788 
TP-1-7 [OP]: 92-02 474,078 3,228,912 328,373 285,591 275,014 1 ,983,156 
TP-1-9 [AC]: 92-12 301,494 7,900,000 
Total 799,861 11,857,952 328,373 285,591 275,014 2,011,944 
GULF 
FMA 2-12 [OP]: 88-08 187,733 2,716,077 171,526 285,591 104,918 970,176 
TP-2-15 [OP]: 92-02 83,800 1,509,312 4,942 12,155 99,534 
TP-2-14 [OP]: 91-03 88,680 1,431,508 3,601 2,926 92,400 
Total 360,213 5,656,897 180,069 288,517 117,073 1' 162,110 
CENTRAL 
TP-3-35 [OP]: 92-02 25,870 376,667 115,152 
TP-3-27 [OP]: 88-98 13,463 184,400 57,576 
TP-3-26 [NO]: 89-99 23,641 965,752 
TP-3-32 [PS]: 90-00 78,422 300,000 27,049 5,945 
TP-3-34 [OP]: 92-02 26,850 326,652 9,596 
TP-3-30 [OP]: 90-00 20,275 357,652 43,182 
LFA 3-2 [OP]: 89-99 45,000 900,000 13,166 7,134 
TP-3-33: 29,254 17,803 
TA-025: 15,545 
TL-3-8: 17,818 14,588 
TP-3-28 [NO]: 88-08 108,000 1,518,630 73,815 51,779 
TP-3-29: 12,285 5,446 99,534 
Total 341,521 4,929,753 133,172 116,665 28,711 280,543 
MILNE BAY 
TP-4-3 [NO]: 87-02 118,951 540,378 57,072 
TP-4-6 [OP]: 90-00 23,000 129,200 46,720 36,399 17,722 59,448 
TP-4-5 [NO]: 90-98 22,673 354,230 19,192 
TL-4-2 [PE]: 93-96 30,332 70,000 3,953 2,179 
Total 194,956 1,093,808 46,720 40,352 19,901 107,176 
ORO 
TL-5-2: 5,401 4,660 
TP-5-1 0: 32,432 99,870 
TP-5-9 [NO]: 88-98 29,620 566,400 115,152 
LFA-5-1 [OP]: 91-06 38,930 1,170,000 35,471 64,111 10,539 199,740 
Total 68,550 1,736,400 73,304 64,111 15,199 207,381 
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PROVINCE Permit Project Estimated Actual exports (m3) Projected 
&PERMIT period area resource 
---------------------------------
harvest 
[STATUS] (years) (ha.) (m3) 1993 1994 1995 1996-2001 
W.H'LANDS 
TP-9-13 [NO]: 88-98 1,618 35,000 
Total 1,618 35,000 
MORO BE 
TP-13-34 [NA]: 96-05 440,800 1,221,800 
TP-13-32 [NO]: 91-01 45,600 640,000 58,335 38,991 4,506 73,714 
TL-13-15 [PE]: 96-31 4,500,000 
TP-13-33 [NO]: 92-02 31,950 436,840 172,728 
TP-13-31 [OP]: 91-96 38,190 373,350 
TP-13-27 [OP]: 91-01 42,261 56,946 70,001 29,259 61,177 135,540 
Total 598,201 7,228,936 128,336 68,250 65,683 295,618 
MADANG 
TP-12-18 [OP]: 92-02 75,000 860,375 19,957 43,455 35,023 178,344 
TP-12-21: 
TP-12-20 [OP]: 90-00 56,480 276,073 172,440 
TP-12-3: 
TP-12-6 [OP]: 88-98 9,950 344,799 3,263 4,992 
TP-12-22 [NO]: 95-04 59,200 592,200 
Total 200,630 2,073,447 23,220 43,455 35,023 177,888 
EAST SEPIK 
LFA-11-1 [OP]: 91-01 39,978 640,000 141,830 
LFA-11-2 [OP]: 92-02 40,000 1,282,000 9,107 16,178 14,966 35,667 
Total 79,978 1,922,000 9,107 16,178 14,966 177,497 
WEST SEPIK 
TP- I 0-8 [OP]: 91-11 287,428 31 I, I 00 135,820 182,639 194,934 920,244 
LFA-10-1 [OP]: 88-03 38,600 54,577 71,814 78,209 23 I ,336 
LFA-10-2 [OP]: 89-98 10,000 500,000 769 25,385 233,448 
Total 336,028 81 I, I 00 I 91,166 254,453 298,528 1,385,028 
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PROVINCE Permit Project Estimated Actual exports (m3) Projected 
&PERMIT period area resource 
---------------------------------
harvest 
[STATUS] (years) (ha.) (m3) 1993 1994 1995 1996-2001 
MANUS 
LF A-18-2 [OP]: 91-01 10,067 84,000. 41,479 21,176 6,146 66,580 
LFA-18-1 [OP]: 89-99 9,000 31,500 22,326 38,107 57,066 
TP-18-2 [OP]: 88-03 32,667 1,614,437 62,049 23,736 12,096 178,350 
Total 51,734 1,729,937 125,854 83,019 18,242 301,996 
N. IRELAND 
TP-16-41 [OP]: 91-96 35,736 236,000 33,421 23,638 
TP-16-48 [OP]: 92-02 22,700 520,000 22,250 55,849 35,949 66,580 
TP-16-45 [OP]: 91-96 11,190 219,750 30,460 5,481 13,370 21,400 
LFA-16-1 [NO]: 74-96 110,050 800,000 
LFA-16-2: 40,424 6,572 
TL-16-2 [OP]: 92-96 347 10,400 
TP-16-47 [NO] 95-00 1,315 73,153 
TP-16-42 [OP]: 91-01 98,100 840,000 18,548 30,198 11,714 171,210 
LFA-16-12: 1,224 
TP-16-46 [OP]: 92-97 2,290 48,830 3,478 2,421 4,162 
TP-16-43 [OP]: 90-00 80,629 648,900 41,294 11,652 30,165 35,668 
Total 362,357 3,397,033 157,678 112,173 124,619 322,658 
E.N. BRITAIN 
TP-15-49 [OP]: 92-02 83,000 2,000,000 15,067 36,350 58,596 78,468 
TP-15-55 [OP]: 92-02 15,860 300,000 5,200 8,696 
TP-15-59 [NA]: 95-05 52,600 1,052,000 
TL-15-11 [OP]: 92-96 2,900 60,000 11,245 15,031 
TL-15-12 [NO]: 92-97 5,000 150,000 35,668 
TP-15-45 [OP]: 89-99 22,170 420,000 70,672 48,282 52,803 45,180 
TP-15-56 [OP]: 92-02 33,760 1,821,913 51,615 83,225 
TP-15-44 [OP]: 89-98 10,111 40,000 51,709 17,517 231 
TP-15-52 [OP]: 91-99 9,100 103,000 43,474 38,981 113,464 
TL-15-8: 31,463 3,466 5,903 63,576 
TL-15-9 [OP]: 92-98 17,000 300,000 20,589 9,859 8,323 
TP-15-40 [PE]: 88-96 2,845 135,000 
TP-15-54 [OP]: 92-97 9,770 99,000 28,788 
TP-15-34 [OP]: 87-97 120 36,000 
TP-15-57 [OP]: 95-05 23,592 812,800 32,585 
TP-15-58 [OP]: 95-05 15,000 300,000 
TP-15-53: 84,405 80,759 48,692 627,762 
Total 302,828 7,629,713 297,146 270,668 275,376 1,084,454 
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PROVINCE Permit Project Estimated Actual exports (m3) Projected 
&PERMIT period area resource 
------------------------------- harvest 
[STATUS] (years) (ha.) (m3) 1993 1994 1995 1996-2001 
W.N. BRITAIN 
TP-14-41 [NO]: 86-96 57,100 680,000 47,211 51,879 17,454 243,735 
TP-14-43 [OP]: 87-96 21,565 760,000 20,458 24,520 10,811 162,290 
TP-14-38 [NO): 88-98 25,300 400,000 
TP-14-58 [NO]: 95-05 14,045 613,906 57,576 
TP-14-52 [OP]: 90-14 409,793 7,100,000 112,935 90,304 29,262 1,055,784 
TP-14-57 [OP]: ??-02 20,980 685,645 67,490 53,194 29,742 
TP-14-50 [OP): 89-09 169,140 3,500,000 75,444 93,045 64,794 577,824 
LFA-14-6 [OP]: 89-04 39,650 1,107,000 69,647 47,667 32,868 116,516 
LFA-14-13 [OP): 92-02 39,650 1,035,000 191,920 
TP-14-56 [NO]: 91-96 20,640 240,000 2,149 3,149 
LFA-14-2 [OP]: 90-99 39,500 800,000 10,678 38,844 117,705 
LFA-14-3 [OP]: 90-02 40,000 800,000 63,006 52,054 34,813 228,276 
LFA-14-12 [OP]: 92-02 40,000 676,000 32,123 77,021 56,385 335,280 
TP-14-53 [OP]: 90-00 68,181 1,617,000 130,159 99,890 91,568 299,612 
TP-14-54 [OP]: 91-06 63,500 1,397,760 32,527 105,236 104,839 266,324 
TP-14-55 [OP]: 91-01 61,600 1,397,760 42,370 94,009 76,888 347,172 
LFA-14-4 [OP): 88-98 40,000 800,000 65,719 64,299 42,670 104,628 
LF A-14-5 [OP]: 89-09 32,800 800,000 44,932 90,115 74,036 167,640 
LFA-14-8 [OP): 90-05 39,930 1,200,000 59,569 96,395 73,917 178,344 
LFA-14-10 [OP): 92-02 40,000 650,000 36,076 142,366 90,375 178,341 
LFA-14-14 92-02 34,840 650,000 290,995 
[NO): 
LFA-14-11 [OP]: 92-07 40,000 1,385,000 70,881 88,002 77,920 577,824 
LFA-14-1 [NO): 91-01 4,548 
LFA-14-7 [OP): 91-01 40,000 1,000,000 115,848 104,550 62,486 271,080 
LFA-14-9 [OP]: 91-01 37,980 1,000,000 147,009 110,602 54,931 117,705 
Total 1,440,742 30,295,071 1,233,404 1,497,975 1,067,752 5,886,571 
N.SOLOMONS 
TP-17-13 [NO): 88-98 23,864 380,000 38,384 
TP-17-14 [NO]: 88-98 24,070 327,310 
Total 47,934 707,310 38,384 
UNKNOWN 13,607 12,480 52,879 
NAT. TOTAL 5,187,151 81,104,357 2,941,156 3,153,887 2,408,966 14,054,569 
CHAPTERll 
THE STATE VERSUS CUSTOM: 
REGULATING PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S TIMBER INDUSTRY 
RooTAYLOR 
Background 
A unique feature of the Constitution of Papua New Guinea (PNG) is its 
recognition of custom. Custom is defined (in Schedule 1) as 'the customs and 
usages of indigenous inhabitants of the country existing in relation to the matter 
in question at the time when and the place in relation to which the matter arises, 
regardless of whether or not the custom or usage has existed from time 
immemorial'. Except where it is inconsistent with statute law, custom forms 
part of the underlying law along with adopted principles of English common law 
and equity. Through custom, local kinship groups own 97 percent of PNG's 
land mass and most of its natural forest resources. 
PNG's commercially accessible timber volumes are concentrated in 
lowland and coastal areas with low population densities. In these areas, people 
generally practise shifting cultivation within well-defined pockets of secondary 
vegetation (Alien 1993). Through kinship groupings, they claim customary 
ownership of the large tracts of natural forest, between their gardening areas, 
that contain the timber resources targetted for industrial logging. 
At Independence, PNG inherited two very different forestry laws - the 
highly interventionist Forestry Act and the laissez-faire Forestry (Private 
Dealings) Act. Under the Forestry Act, only the state could acquire timber rights 
from customary landowners. 1 The state purchased these rights under a standard-
form Timber Rights Purchase Agreement. Landowners received royalties at a 
prescribed rate, and had no legal say over which logging company held the 
timber permit, what infrastructure was built, or the rate at which the timber was 
harvested. 
The Forestry (Private Dealings) Act permitted customary forest landowners 
to sell their timber privately. The usual practice was for a 'landowner company' 
to acquire timber harvesting rights from landowners and then on-sell the rights 
to a foreign logging company. Provided the Minister assented to the 'dealings', 
the logging company could operate without a timber permit and with minimal 
state supervision. 
1 The term 'landowners' is used in PNG to describe groups or individuals with customary rights 
to land and resources. The term covers resource rights, as well as land rights, and masks the 
distinction between group ownership rights and individual use rights (see Fingleton 1993 :43). 
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In 1989, the Commission of Inquiry into Aspects of the Forest Industry 
(Barnett 1989c) documented an 'out of control' timber industry characterised by 
pervasive corruption, transfer pricing, and reckless logging practices. The new 
National Forest Policy (approved in 1990) and the new Forestry Act (passed in 
1991 and gazetted in 1992) responded to the Commission's call for increased 
state control and planning in the forestry sector. The new Act incorporated the 
PNG Forest Authority and vested it with responsibility for timber industry 
regulation under the guidance of the National Forest Board. 
Under the new Forestry Act, the state has reserved to itself a monopoly on 
the right to enter into a Forest Management Agreement with landowners. If they 
cannot strike an acceptable deal with the Forest Authority, landowners are barred 
from arranging industrial-scale logging on their land.2 If a Forest Management 
Agreement is concluded, it is the National Forest Board, not the landowners, 
which selects a forest industry participant to implement the agreement and 
recommends to the Minister that a timber permit be granted.3 
The Act also calls for the formulation of a National Forest Plan and requires 
all forest development to accord with it (Section 54). The Plan is intended to 
comprise a policy statement, the National Forestry Development Guidelines 
('the Guidelines'), a development programme, and a statement of annual 
allowable cut (Section 47). While the Guidelines were approved 'in-principle' 
in 1993, the Plan itself did not make its first public appearance until May 1996 
(see Filer, this volume). 
The new Act saved all projects and agreements approved under former 
legislation, but gave the new National Forest Board power to make variations to 
bring them into line with the new regime (Section 137). As late as February 
1996,4 the Board had not yet exercised this power nor issued any permits under 
the new Act. All current projects were operating under arrangements that 
predated the new regime. 
Environmental Protection Measures 
Strategic Land-Use Planning 
The Forestry Act (Section 54) requires all forest resources to be developed in 
accordance with the National Forest Plan. According to the Forest Policy 
2 No timber permit over customary land can be granted unless landowners have entered into a 
Forest Management Agreement with the Forest Authority (Section 55). Logging can be carried out 
under a Timber Authority without a Forest Management Agreement, but the timber harvested 
cannot exceed 5,000 cubic metres per year and cannot be exported in round log form (Section 87). 
3 It is possible for landowners, through the terms of their Forest Management Agreement, to 
insist that the selected industry participant be contracted to a permit-holding landowner company 
rather than hold the permit itself. 
4 The first draft of the present chapter was completed in February 1996, and the remainder of the 
text makes very little reference to subsequent events. 
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(PNGMOF 1991 :5), the Forest Authority should help provincial governments to 
identify forest areas for long-term timber production or protection for ecological, 
cultural, or environmental reasons, or clearance for other uses. 5 These 
classifications are to form the basis for Provincial Forest Development 
Programmes within the National Forest Plan (ibid:13-14). 
Forest classification, as proposed in the National Forest Policy, has proved 
difficult to implement. First, political friction between national and provincial 
governments has constrained provincial input.6 Second, the Forest Authority's 
part in coordinating the process called for close management and enormous 
technical input at a time when its attention was focussed on internal 
reorganisation and unresolved policy issues. But perhaps the major obstacle to 
completion of this exercise has been growing doubt over its ability to win the 
respect of landowners.7 The view came to prevail that landowners would reject, 
outright, any lines drawn on maps, at the whim of government officials or 
politicians, which purported to tell them what they could or could not do with 
their resources. The alternative of country-wide consultation with all landowner 
groups was simply not feasible. 
Despite the lack of progress and widely-held suspicion that forest 
classification is an exercise in futility, no alternative basis for the Forest 
Development Programme has been agreed. A National Forest Plan remains a 
key component of the Forestry Act. Without a plan in place it is questionable 
whether permits can be legitimately granted, given the stipulation in Section 54 
that forest resources can only be developed in accordance with the Plan. 
5 The policy allowed provincial governments to defer a land-use decision by classifying an area 
as a 'reserve forest'. 
6 Increasingly, provincial and national politicians saw themselves as competitors for control over 
the distribution of resources and delivery of government services. In the early 1990s, the national 
government considered a series of reform proposals clearly intended to undermine the political 
base of provincial governments (Axline 1993). The Bipartisan Select Committee on Provincial 
Government reported to Parliament in March 1993, recommending replacement of the existing tier 
of provincial politicians with provincial authorities. These were to comprise national government 
members from the province and local government leaders. The recommendations formed the basis 
of reforms that became law in 1995. 
7 The unofficial demise of the classification endeavour can be traced through successive drafts of 
the Guidelines. The first draft presented to the National Forest Board in April 1993 merely 
acknowledged some slippage in the time needed to complete the task, nominating April 1994 as a 
'realistic target'. The version approved by the National Executive Council in December 1993 
omitted the whole chapter on preparation of the Forest Plan and made no reference to forest 
classification or land-use zoning. 
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Logging Practice Standards 
Nearly all commercial forestry operations in PNG's natural forests are 
conducted under a 'selective logging' regime.8 Beyond this common ground, 
current timber permits, logging agreements, environmental plans, and forest 
working plans contain piecemeal, and often contradictory, controls on logging. 
The lack of consistent and comprehensive standards, combined with poor 
compliance monitoring, has resulted in excessive canopy removal, damage to 
residual trees, soil erosion, and siltation of rivers and reefs (see Cameron and 
Vigus 1993). 
In August 1995, the Forest Authority and the Department of Environment 
and Conservation circulated a final draft Logging Code of Practice 
(PNGFA/DEC 1995). The two agencies intend for the code, once it is finalised, 
to be brought into force through regulations under the Forestry Act.9 The 
proposed regulations will give the Forest Authority power to enforce the code 
against all commercial logging projects, including those within Local Forest 
Areas that currently operate outside its jurisdiction. ID 
The draft code prohibits logging on steep slopes, permanently inundated 
land, karst country, and mangrove areas. Thus the code will operate as a land-
use planning instrument, but one that is more manageable and less 
confrontational to landowners than a nationwide forest zoning strategy of the 
kind already described. The code sets clear and unequivocal standards for 
protection ofwatercourses and coastlines, curtailing soil disturbance and damage 
to residual trees, managing waste, and operational planning. If it can be 
enforced, the code should substantially reduce the environmental impacts of 
logging. 
8 Exceptions are clear-felling operations for plantations, road-lines, and so on. In selective 
logging projects, the common bottom-line constraint is the prohibition on felling trees of less than 
50 cm in diameter at breast height (dbh). It could be argued that the form of selective logging 
practised in PNG is determined purely commercially, due to the wide dispersion of commercially-
valued species within the forest (Louman and Nicholls 1994: 160). 
9 According to the preface to the draft, comments are to be considered before a final draft is 
prepared and presented to the relevant ministers with a recommendation for adoption and 
implementation. 
I 0 Operations in a Local Forest Area are conducted in accordance with a private agreement 
(usually between the resource owners and a 'landowner company') approved under the now 
repealed Forestry (Private Dealings) Act. With no permit to enforce in these areas, Forest 
Authority officers have had no direct role to play in monitoring logging operations. As it moves to 
bring logging operations in Local Forest Areas under its control, the Forest Authority may face 
considerable resistance to its intrusion. In-principle resistance to new controls might be avoided if 
forest landowners are given the option of bringing their operations under the code rather than 
having it forced on them. 
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Local Impact Assessment and Planning 
Before the Forest Authority can sign a Forest Management Agreement with 
landowners, it must arrange a Development Options Study over the area 
concerned (Forestry Act, Section 62). According to the Guidelines (PNG 
Ministry of Forests 1993b:6), the study should assess social, economic, and 
environmental considerations in the area to identify possible uses of the forest 
with the potential of offering 'viable and sustainable development'. For uses 
acceptable to landowners, the study should make 'a preliminary assessment of 
their likely socioeconomic impact'. This information will be presented to 
landowners 'in order that they can make an informed decision on the nature of 
the project to be established'. 
After landowners have signed a Forest Management Agreement, the 
screening process for issue of a timber permit requires the submission of an 
environmental plan for approval under the Environmental Planning Act. In 
preparing the plan, the project proponent is required to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment. 
Landowners are the clients of the development options study, with 
responsibility for its completion falling to government. By contrast, the 
environmental plan is prepared by the private sector proponents of a project for 
consideration by government consent authorities. The government's record in 
fulfilling its obligations under either process is poor. With development options 
studies, the Forest Authority has failed to carry out any form of study resembling 
that described in the Guidelines with respect to the Forest Management 
Agreements it has made so far. As for environmental plans, the under-resourced 
Environment and Conservation Ministry has accepted poor-quality plans and 
undertaken monitoring on an ad hoc basis only (Hedemark and Sekhran 
1994:341). 
Sustained Timber Yield 
Poore (1989: 12) defines sustainable forest use as the practice of maintaining the 
forest's potential to provide a sustained yield of certain products while also 
maintaining the forest ecosystem in a desired condition. The National Forest 
Policy adopts 'sustained yield management' as a 'guiding principle'. If we 
assume that the 'forest condition' component of sustained yield needs to be 
addressed through the environmental protection measures examined in the 
previous section, we are still left with the problem of controlling harvest rates. 
The Forestry Act (Section 47) requires the National Forest Board to prepare 
a yearly statement of the allowable cut for each province. This statement forms 
part of the National Forest Plan, and its purpose, according to the Act, is to 
ensure that designated production forests within each province are 'harvested on 
a sustained yield basis'. The Act provides no definition of 'sustained yield'. 
According to the National Forest Policy (PNG Ministry of Forests 1991 :5), it 
means 'continuous production on a provincial basis with the aim of maintaining, 
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at the earliest practical time, desirable net growth at least in balance with 
harvest'. 
The National Forest Policy proposes that the allowable cut for each 
province be set initially by dividing the estimated volume of merchantable 
resources zoned for production by an assumed cutting cycle of forty years. 
Statements of allowable cut are thus predicated upon the designation of 
production forests through the currently-stalled forest classification exercise. No 
official statements had been made by the end of 1995. 
The National Forest Policy proposes a reduction in the 'permitted harvest 
volumes' where they exceed a province's allowable cut, 11 but is silent on the 
vexed issue of how to fairly apportion the reduction between existing projects. 
Any apportionment will need to take account of the poor correlation between 
permitted, actual, and sustainable cut levels. Another issue which has not been 
addressed is whether landowners and logging companies in existing projects 
should absorb the entire cut to the exclusion of those seeking new project 
approvals. 
The Guidelines make no reference to allowable cuts by province. Instead, 
they introduce the notion of a 'sustainable unit', being an area 'large enough to 
provide a viable operation on a sustained yield harvest basis'(PNG Ministry of 
Forests 1993b: 11 ). To achieve this, they propose a review process in which 
existing permitted cuts will be reviewed, as necessary, to achieve a sustained 
yield within each unit. 12 So far, the National Forest Board has not reduced the 
permitted cut for a single project on sustained yield grounds. 
Capture, Distribution, and Investment of Rent 
The state, landowners, landowner companies, and logging companies are m 
competition for the economic surplus from timber extraction. The state 
appropriates its share through the tax laws. The remaining surplus is distributed 
11 Presumably, such reductions could be effected under Section 137(2) of the Forestry Act. This 
transitional provision gives the National Forest Board power to vary any condition in an old permit 
or agreement that, in its opinion, is 'at variance with the provisions of [the] Act to an extent which 
makes it unacceptable'. 
12 The state faces possible legal challenges if it moves to reduce current permitted cuts. 
Landowners could claim that such reductions amount to unjust deprivation of their property rights 
in breach of Section 53 of the Constitution. In defence, the state could argue that landowners have 
contractual rights to receive royalties, but not a right to sell timber at a set rate, and thus will not be 
deprived of property rights through a cut reduction. Second, Section 53(5)(t) of the Constitution 
exempts property acquisitions reasonably necessary for the preservation of the environment - and 
arguably, sustained yield reductions can be characterised as environmental preservation measures. 
Alternatively, foreign logging contractors may challenge the reductions on the grounds that these 
will breach their investment guarantees under the Investment Promotion Act. In defence, the state 
could argue that any adjustment of permitted harvest rates does not comprise an expropriation 
because permits do not confer property rights, or because the 'creeping expropriation' through 
regulation is not protected by the guarantees against expropriation. 
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according to private agreements between the parties. Under existing contractual 
arrangements, the proceeds of log sales accrue to the logging contractor, who is 
then required to make distributions to landowners and, under more recent 
agreements, to the landowner company. The landowners' share has usually 
comprised an agreed package of infrastructural development plus payment of a 
kina amount per cubic metre of timber extracted. Landowner companies have 
usually received an unconditional payment known as premium and special 
purpose levies (Shedden Agribusiness 1991 ). 13 
Nearly all current agreements were made before the new Act commenced, 
and thus reflect the low log prices that prevailed up to 1992. Because landowner 
entitlements are inelastic to log prices, landowners were largely denied a share 
of the increased surplus when timber prices rose dramatically in 1993. 14 
The new Forestry Act (Section 119) calls for a new 'forest revenue system' 
of prescribed royalties and other charges. Few constraints are imposed on the 
charges that can be levied (see Section 121 ). The Guidelines proposed that these 
provisions should be used to install a comprehensive new revenue regime that 
would override existing contractual arrangements. 
Draft Guidelines presented to the National Forest Board in May 1993 
(PNGMOF 1993a) proposed payment of a set stumpage fee direct to individual 
landowner clans, plus an additional stumpage fee (essentially a share of the 
surplus on log sales) into a 'project area development trust'. This trust was to be 
managed under government rules, with application of trust account funds 
confined to 'economically sustainable enterprises - on a loan basis' or 
'construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure- by way of conditional 
grants'. Given the high prices prevailing at the time, this proposal would have 
diverted a significant share of the proceeds of log sales away from logging 
companies and into the trust accounts. 
Not surprisingly, the Forest Industries Association was highly critical of the 
proposal. Yet the strongest protests were voiced by the PNG Forest Resource 
Owners Association (PNGFROA), a body whose membership comprised the 
directors and senior management of landowner companies. The PNGFROA's 
motives were as mixed as the conflicting allegiances of landowner companies. 
The revenue proposal made no provision for landowner companies, and severely 
restricted their capacity to continue to secure premiums from contractors, given 
13 The agreements typically earmark the levies for 'agricultural' or 'community infrastructure' 
development, but are otherwise silent on how the levy funds should be administered and applied. 
This means a great potential for misuse of the funds, which are often not held in an account 
separate from the operating funds of the landowner company. 
14 In some projects, landowners and landowner companies achieved more favourable 
arrangements by renegotiating these arrangements during the 1993 boom. The average f.o.b. price 
per cubic metre of mixed logs from PNG stayed within the US$50-80 range from 1987 to 1992. In 
1993, prices boomed to a peak of US$200 before slowly declining to around US$1 00. In 1994, 
prices peaked again at US$150 then declined to a new plateau of around US$11 0, where they 
remained up to the end of 1995 (ITTO 1995: 113 ). 
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the large rental share which was now due to go to the new trust accounts. 
PNGFROA members also relayed the concern of landowners in general at 
having their money locked up in trusts. PNG experience suggests that money set 
aside for a common purpose is likely to be spent wastefully, if not 
misappropriated, by those entrusted with its management. Landowners had an 
understandable desire to see the money in their hands rather than in a remote 
trust account. PNGFROA members were also inextricably linked with the 
logging companies. Not only were landowner companies dependent on logging 
companies for their income stream, but some also shared offices, fax numbers, 
and even bank accounts with them (Whimp 1995: 16; also Filer, this volume). 
As much as anything else, feelings of indignation drove the PNGFROA's 
protests. Many landowner company principals saw themselves as enterprising 
proponents of self-help. Where the state had failed to deliver even basic social 
services to their respective areas, landowner company principals, in negotiating 
the logging agreements, had procured roads, cash incomes, and economic 
activity. Landowner company principals considered that they had justly earned 
their prominent positions through the role which they had played in brokering 
progress. They were outraged by the state's complete failure to acknowledge 
their past efforts or current status. This emotion was compounded by the fear 
that the proposals would expose them as having bargained poorly on the 
landowners' behalf. As Simpson (this volume) observes, any public show of 
weakness or uncertainty on the part of landowner company directors would have 
opened the door to rival aspirants to their positions. 
Proposed controls over additional stumpage were substantially revised in 
response to the PNGFROA-led protest. The final version of the Guidelines, 
approved in principle by the National Executive Council in late 1993, proposes 
that additional stumpage be paid to 'a representative body appointed by 
landowners in each project area'. Thus the Guidelines left open the possibility 
of landowner companies securing the additional stumpage by gaining 
recognition as representative bodies. However, these concessions were not 
enough to win the PNGFROA's endorsement. In the face of continuing 
opposition, the state abandoned the original revenue proposals in 1994, yet 
alternative models that would override existing contractual arrangements 
remained under active consideration (Whimp 1995), and a modified revision of 
the fiscal regime was actually introduced at the end of 1995 (see Filer, this 
volume). 
In the meantime, the state moved swiftly to secure a better revenue share 
for itself. It made two successive increases in export duty on round logs in 
November 1993 and March 1994, but no intervention was made on behalf of 
landowners. Their share of rent continued (until 1996) to be determined 
contractually under arrangements which predated the timber boom, while their 
potential to negotiate a larger proportion of the economic rent was constrained 
by the hike in export duty. 
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Justifying State Intervention 
So far, this paper has chronicled the PNG government's forestry reform efforts 
across diverse objectives- environmental protection, sustained timber yield, and 
equitable rent sharing. On all three fronts, implementation has faltered over 
reforms that threaten the right of customary landowners to exploit their forests as 
they see fit. The state's waning commitment suggests growing doubt, on the 
part of politicians and bureaucrats, that the proposed forestry interventions are 
warranted. 15 
A state usually claims protection of the public interest as the justification 
for its private sector interventions. In the language of economics, the state 
intervenes in the market to correct or prevent negative externalities. In legal 
terms, the state exercises common property rights in order to restrict private 
property rights. In political terms, the elected government has a mandate to curb 
private interests in the public interest. 
Another possible justification for state intervention in PNG is paternalistic 
protection of customary landowners. Given that customary systems have 
generally evolved to serve subsistence and barter economies, those systems, and 
people who control natural resources within them, are newly exposed to the 
intricacies, technology, and scale of commercial industry. Arguably, state 
intervention is justified, at the interface between custom and commerce, to 
protect customary landowners who are vulnerable because of their inexperience. 
This justification is founded on the questionable belief that landowners will do 
better under the state's benevolent guidance than if they are left to make their 
own naive choices. 
The Local Public Interest 
Under the PNG Constitution, customary authority and state authority coexist. 
Locally at least, the two forms of authority are in competition for the right to 
govern community affairs. State intervention on public interest grounds thus 
raises a threshold issue of whether customary authority or the state should divine 
the local public interest. Intervention grounded in paternalism raises a similar 
issue. If the state assumes the right to decide what course of action best serves 
the interests of local landowners, will it be better placed than customary 
authority to do so? The state's options are to: 
• make its own judgment of the local interest; or 
• accept the preference of those who claim customary authority. 
15 This trend is evidenced by the state's policy rhetoric. The National Forest Policy makes the 
bold assertion that 'overall responsibility of ensuring that the country's forests are managed and 
replenished will rest with the state' (PNG Ministry of Forests 1991 :7). Only three years later, the 
state's official stance had softened. According to the Guidelines, 'Responsibility for forest 
management will be allocated between landowners and the [Forest] Authority according to the 
terms ofthe forest management agreement' (PNGMOF 1993b:12). 
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Principles of Self-Determination 
At one extreme, it can be argued that customary processes command automatic 
respect because they have been honed by the wisdom of the ages and underpin 
community life. The counter view is that the state should judge customary 
systems on their merits, and support only those that meet reasonable standards of 
governance. The Constitution suggests a course somewhere between the two. 
Its fifth goal calls for development 'primarily through the use of Papua New 
Guinean forms of social, political and economic organisation'. Yet under 
Schedule 2.1, custom is not recognised as part of the underlying law if it is 
'repugnant to the general principles of humanity' or inconsistent with state-made 
laws. 
A developing body of international law supports the view that customary 
leaders should self-determine the development paths of their constituents.• 6 In 
the PNG context, respect for these principles would require the state to defer to 
customary authority rather than define the local public interest itself. The state 
could intervene to protect and strengthen customary decision-making processes, 
but its objective should be to support, rather than supplant, custom. 
Would state definition of local priorities be respected in any event? As 
Jackson (1992:82) notes, 'clans or other localised forms of loyalty are of far 
greater importance to most Papua New Guineans than are loyalties to the state'. 
Technical Capacity 
The state might lay claim to the right to define the local interest on the ground 
that it has technical skills and resources which rural landowners lack. While 
landowners may have direct knowledge of local ecosystems, social relationships, 
culture, and aspirations, they may lack the capacity to assess impacts beyond 
their experience. Without first-hand exposure to large-scale logging operations, 
landowners are likely to underestimate physical and social impacts. Even after 
logging commences, there is a time lag before long-term effects on subsistence 
lifestyles, such as contaminated water supplies, loss of bush foods and 
medicines, decline of fish stocks on silt-covered reefs, and increased malaria due 
to ponding, become apparent. 
16 The draft United Nations Declaration of Indigenous Peoples' Rights sets a contemporary 
standard for state relations with indigenous peoples (UNWGIP 1993). Article 26 describes a right 
of indigenous peoples to 'own, develop, control and use' their traditional lands and resources. 
This includes the right to full recognition of their 'laws, traditions and customs, land-tenure 
systems and institutions for the development and management of resources' and the right to the 
benefit of 'effective measures by States to prevent any interference with, alienation of, or 
encroachment upon these rights'. These rights are buttressed by Article 30, which describes the 
right of indigenous peoples to 'determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development 
and use oftheir lands and resources'. This includes the right to 'require that States obtain their free 
and informed consent' before approving projects affecting their lands and resources. Article 31 
asserts a right of 'autonomy or self-government' in relation to a range of matters including 
'economic activities, land and resource management, environment and entry by nonmembers'. 
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Yet the skills base of the state is heavily concentrated in urban centres, and 
notoriously absent in the sparsely populated rural areas where large tracts of 
natural forest are found. Problems of mismanagement, waste, incompetence, 
corruption, disruptive political conflict, over-government, and neglect further 
constrain the state's ability to make efficient use of its resources (Axline 
1993:5). In forestry, the state has a poor record on technical input to help define 
the local interest. It has not managed to arrange a single development options 
study, and its scrutiny of environmental plans has been poor. 
Even if the state is better equipped than landowners to make technical 
assessments, the weight attached to these assessments is ultimately a matter of 
political judgment. The state can make its assessments available to landowners 
as readily as it can to its own politicians. The state is not a disinterested party-
its self-interest as a rent-seeker undermines any claim to neutrality. If 
landowners are armed with technical information as well as local knowledge, 
they are arguably in a better position than the state to judge the local interest. 
The proposed code of logging practice neatly demonstrates these issues. 
While preparation of the code is clearly an efficient use of state expertise, the 
code is ultimately a value judgement on the merits of competing environmental 
and commercial interests. Landowners may or may not agree with that 
judgment. If landowners are to define the local interest, they should have the 
option of adopting the code, adjusting it to local circumstances, or rejecting it. 17 
To ensure that the code is not rejected out of ignorance, the state will need to 
educate landowners on how it works. 
If landowners adopt the code, the real challenge will be its enforcement. 
The state might best deploy its resources to train landowners to do their own 
monitoring, rather than field its own massive inspectorate. Landowners should 
be very effective in enforcing the code, given their local knowledge, proximity 
to operations, and self-interest motivation. 
In summary, on grounds of technical capacity alone, the state cannot make 
a stronger claim than custom to the political task of defining the local interest. 
The state can deploy its technical capacity to supply landowners with resource 
management expertise and knowledge, yet refrain from imposing its judgment of 
how their commercial, social, and environmental concerns should be balanced. 
In adopting a supportive rather than coercive role, the state is more likely to 
mobilise landowners to monitor the timber industry themselves. In doing so, it 
should greatly reduce the pressure on its own resources of having to field 
inspectors for every logging project. 
Political Capacity 
The local interest in a logging project needs to be defined at two levels. First, a 
single landowner group needs to decide whether, and on what conditions, it 
17 The code, or elements of it, might nevertheless be imposed on national interest grounds. 
Processes for reconciling the local and national interest are discussed later in this chapter. 
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should exploit its timber resources. Second, the collective interests of the 
various groups within the catchment or catchments affected by the logging need 
to be reconciled. 
Under most customary systems in PNG, the landowning group or clan is the 
basic social and political unit (Power 1994:3; Lakau 1994:80). Clan leaders are 
well-practised at making decisions at the clan level, though seldom with as much 
at stake as when a logging project is proposed. 18 Traditional Melanesian forms 
of political organisation seldom extended to broader levels than the clan or 
village. Thus, in agreeing to take part in logging ventures that covered many 
clans and villages, most landowners were acting in concert on a scale beyond 
traditional experience (Hide 1990:17). It is at this level that custom's ability to 
steer events in the direction of the local interest is most open to question. 
Yet generalisation on custom's sway over events across a catchment is 
difficult. For example, in some areas, bush groups may get away with approving 
logging that damages the reefs of saltwater groups, but without compensating 
them. In other situations, a saltwater group may use a bush group's dependence 
on continued access to marine resources as leverage to persuade the bush group 
to restrain logging that would harm the local reef ecology (Hviding 1992:6). In 
some areas, non-assertive marginalised clans will be unable to enforce claims 
against dominant clans. In other situations, a clan that is excluded from a 
logging agreement that purports to cover its resources will be able to invoke 
custom - or perhaps a state-sponsored mechanism for resolving customary 
disputes - in order to be instated as a party to the agreement or to exclude 
logging in its area. 
One method of testing custom's effectiveness at a catchment level might be 
to explore the question of whether it ranks the competing factional interests 
through some form of due process. However, the flaw with this approach is its 
assumption that customary systems should only be relied upon to define the 
local interest if they conform to external ideals of fairness. Customary systems, 
even when not distorted by new pressures of scale and urgency, are unlikely to 
meet such criteria. Filer ( 1990) debunks the romantic notion that Melanesian 
customary societies typically choose their leaders by consensus, settle arguments 
by compromise, or ensure that everyone enjoys the same condition of 
'subsistence affluence'. While authority derives from popular consensus, 
leaders have traditionally won power through competition, and have often 
wielded it autocratically (Lawrence 1971: 14). Tradition often excludes women 
from important village meetings. Customary resource rights tend not to be 
matters of fact capable of objective identification and protection, but the 
outcomes of constant, and often aggressive, assertion and counter-assertion 
(Wolfers 1992:246). Thus, if the state expects custom to meet standards of 
participatory democracy, custom is likely to fail, not just within the context of 
18 Some local residents may not be members of any landowning group. However, they will 
derive their land occupation rights from the landowning groups under custom, and thus be 
incorporated within the customary tenure system. 
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logging negotiations, but generally. Unless the state is prepared to intervene 
systematically, wherever custom fails to require procedural fairness, then it 
should not do so over forestry issues alone. 
A second approach is to accept custom's systems as having inherent 
legitimacy, and not evaluate them against external criteria of good governance 
and equity. Assessment of custom's ability to resolve the local interest across a 
catchment would then become an investigation of whether negotiations with 
logging companies occur within customoray systems or outside them. The 
difficulty is in identifying what is and what is not a custom-sanctioned action. 
Custom is unwritten, constantly evolving, and differs from place to place. 
Customary authority is not administered by discrete and accessible institutions, 
but pervades all facets of village life. Traditionally, rules were manipulated to 
provide 'elbow room' for political manoeuvring (Lawrence 1971: 16). 
Where custom is confronted with issues of a scale and complexity beyond 
its traditional experience, innovative and opportunistic behaviour can equally be 
diagnosed as a breach of custom or as a healthy adaptation to modern times. A 
thin line separates anarchy and progressive adaptation. Ward and Kingdon 
( 1995: 15) suggest that many practices evolving to meet new conditions in the 
Pacific are 'neither traditional, nor customary, nor legal'. 
Experience with landowner companies illustrates the complexity of these 
issues. On one view, the landowner company is the vehicle that has evolved to 
take custom into the new territory of project-wide cooperation. Landowner 
companies can claim political and commercial legitimacy through having 
received legal or de facto endorsement from landowners.I9 Privileges enjoyed 
by landowner company principals (salaries, housing, travel, vehicle use, and 
'entertainment') might be regarded as custom-sanctioned rewards for initiative 
and leadership. The community of right-holders under custom could be seen as 
having consented to logging and its internal distributional inequities. If less 
assertive clans were not consulted, or did not secure a share of royalties, these 
are custom-sanctioned outcomes of competitive claim making. Custom always 
has been responsive to 'pressure of circumstances and dominant interests' 
because of to the general lack of a superior neutral body charged with its 
administration (Harding 1972:606). 
The counter view is that landowner company directors and executives, in 
concert with foreign logging interests, have unfairly exploited custom's inability 
to control events at the scale and pace of a logging project. In operating beyond 
the reach of traditional customary checks and balances, they have pushed 
personal and factional interests with little regard for the local public interest. 
19 Under the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act, the legal expression of this endorsement was the 
making of the Dealings agreement with the landowner company, rather than directly with a logging 
company. Where landowner companies secured permits over Timber Rights Purchase areas under 
the old Forestry Act, the endorsement is not so obvious, but can be traced through the fact of 
formation of a landowner company and unchallenged lobbying of the Minister to grant it the 
permit. 
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From this viewpoint, a catchment or project area can be regarded as a plurality 
of individuals and factions which is not effectively constrained by custom, and 
whose self-interested behaviours generate externalities. Because customary 
authority cannot be asserted at this level, the local public interest is unprotected. 
Conflicts of interest, and apparent lack of accountability, of landowner 
companies and clan agents support this view. Both landowner company 
principals and clan agents may have conflicting loyalties to the logging 
contractor that helped to install them in the process of setting up the project. 
Individual landowner company shareholders are rarely bound by any trust deed 
formally requiring them to act on behalf of their clan. Legal requirements, such 
as lodgement of company returns and calling of general meetings, are often not 
understood and are poorly enforced. Landowner company headquarters are 
often located in provincial capitals rather than the project area. Clan agents are 
largely unchecked in their distribution of royalties. 
Future projects have better prospects of achieving project-wide 
representation for landowners through bodies with greater formal accountability 
than existing landowner companies. The Forestry Act (Section 57) encourages 
landowners to form 'land groups' under the Land Groups Incorporation Act 
before entering into a Forest Management Agreement (see Holzknecht, this 
volume). Through this device, clans become legal corporations which are run 
according to customary law. These land groups can then become building 
blocks for larger representative bodies with commercial or welfare objectives. If 
future landowner companies can be encouraged to incorporate along these lines, 
they will be less susceptible to allegations of unrepresentativeness than the 
current models. 
Assessment of whether custom can cope with the events surrounding a 
logging project will also depend on whether a short-term or long-term view is 
taken. A snapshot analysis presents a gloomy picture. Timber resources have 
been sold cheaply, and to date only a small portion of the proceeds have been 
reinvested productively. Reckless logging practices severely diminish the 
capacity of the forest to supply clean water, halt erosion, and regenerate 
commercial timber. Pressures of change and the influx of cash have escalated 
alcohol abuse and associated violence (particularly against women) and have 
heightened internal tensions (for example, between land claim disputants, 
saltwater and bush clans, landowner companies and 'splinter groups'). 
Yet a dynamic analysis may yield a conclusion that is less bleak. 
Involvement of landowners in the timber industry so far can be viewed as one 
stage in a longer-term process of self-determination. Landowners have retained 
their land, have generally not been displaced from their traditional villages, and 
are not under immediate threat of encroachment by new settlers. Past mistakes 
and negative impacts might serve as important, though expensive, lessons for the 
future. Evolution of landowner companies, despite the initial impetus provided 
by foreign logging companies, might result in the development of corporate 
experience that can serve local communities in the mid to long term. 
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It is too early to judge whether landowners will emerge from the landowner 
company experience in a stronger position to advance their own welfare. An 
important test will come with the cessation of logging. Some groups may have 
squandered too much of their 'wealth' through consumption spending, 
environmental damage, and delinquent social behaviour. The greed or apathy of 
the current generation may seriously disadvantage future generations. Other 
groups may take remedial action before it is too late. They may negotiate a 
better resource rent, or establish agricultural enterprises and other investments to 
provide for the years between logging cycles. They may make their contractor 
employ less destructive logging practices. Their landowner company may 
evolve into a socially responsible organisation which reinforces custom by 
helping it to adapt to the times. 
National, Future, and Global Interests 
The National Interest 
If the state is to trust in the open-ended processes of custom to decide local 
preferences, it will need to play a role in reconciling those preferences with the 
national public interest. 
The sustained yield issue shows this very clearly. Existing logging 
agreements show that the combined preference of landowners and logging 
companies favours rapid, rather than sustained, timber extraction. For logging 
companies, the high portability of equipment, the cost of maintaining roads, 
economies of scale, and uncertainty of tenure due to the prospect of land 
disputes, are all incentives to harvest as quickly as possible. Most operators 
have not invested in substantial milling facilities, and thus do not require a 
steady timber supply over the life of the milJ.20 
Sustained yield may also run counter to the financial interests of 
landowners. If mature timber in a forest is regarded as a fully grown crop, 
landowners have an incentive to harvest the crop as quickly as possible, in order 
to take advantage of economies of scale and allow production of the next 'crop' 
to start sooner. Provided the same selective logging practices are used in both 
cases, the harvest rate should have a neutral effect on the forest's capacity to 
regenerate the desired mix of timber and to supply subsistence services. Both 
logging companies and landowners may want flexibility to increase production 
when market demand is high, and reduce production when demand is low. 
However, from a national perspective, sustaining the timber yield offers 
clear advantages. For the national economy, continuous timber production 
provides a constant revenue flow, encourages installation and maintenance of 
permanent infrastructure, and offers lasting employment. These national 
20 Even if a mill is installed, this will not necessarily create pressure for a sustained yield - if the 
plant is to be written off over fifteen years, for example, the operator may prefer a higher wood 
flow for that period than a permanent supply at a slower rate. 
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interests may be reinforced by external pressure. For example, the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank require the national government to adopt 
sustained yield policies as a condition of the current structural adjustment 
programme. 
Future Interests 
The state has a constitutional duty to protect future generations from the self-
interested actions of the current generation. The Fourth National Goal requires 
that natural resources are 'conserved and used for the collective benefit of all 
[Papua New Guineans] and replenished for the benefit of future generations'. 
All government bodies are under a duty to pursue the goal, though the duty is not 
enforceable through the courts.2I 
Future generations of landowners have an interest in maintaining their 
inheritance of natural, financial, and manufactured resources, yet lack a direct 
voice in today's market. Their preferences are external to current commercial 
dealings, except to the extent that the current generation is concerned with their 
welfare. Arguably, the Constitution gives the state a mandate to curtail the 
decisions of current customary leaders on grounds of intergenerational equity. 
Global Interests 
According to neoclassical economics, the global interest in the biodiversity and 
anti-greenhouse values of rainforests should only concern rational landowners to 
the extent that it offers a potential 'in situ' market for their forest resources. The 
market in these global values is generally weak because of the 'free-rider 
syndrome'. People in faraway places cannot easily be excluded from enjoying a 
rainforest's 'option' and 'existence' values or its carbon sequestration 
services.22 
Sekhran ( 1994) investigates the potential of various mechanisms to reward 
PNG landowners for global benefits derived from the maintenance of 
biodiversity within their forests. The problems and countervailing pressures that 
have been identified suggest that short-term prospects for successful application 
of such mechanisms are poor. 
Foreign interests are increasingly imposing their environmental concerns 
through the demand side of the timber market. According to the International 
Tropical Timber Organisation's Target 2000, all exported tropical timber is to be 
sourced from 'sustainably' managed forests by the year 2000 (ITTO 1990:i). 
Environmental pressure groups and government timber purchasing policies in 
21 See Section 25(2) of the Constitution. The Ombudsman Commission can investigate alleged 
neglect of the duty, but can only recommend, not order, remedial action. 
22 
'Existence value' refers to the non-consumption benefits derived from the mere knowledge 
that a thing exists. 'Options value' refers to the benefit in keeping future use options open by not 
destroying a thing (for example, the undiscovered uses of existing species). 
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developed countries have prompted timber trade associations to develop 
sustainability criteria and audit systems which enable 'eco-labelling' of timber. 
Yet the prospect of these measures taking hold has provided landowners with a 
perverse incentive to harvest their forests as quickly as possible in order to beat 
the Year 2000 deadline. 
Where global interests in maintaining PNG's forests fail to establish real 
markets for landowners, the state may need to intervene to protect the national 
interest insofar as it is aligned with these global interests. The nation may have 
an interest in honouring commitments under environmental conventions, 
avoiding the consequences of global warming, and capturing donor funding 
which is conditional on forest conservation efforts. 
Reconciling Local, Future, National, and Global Interests 
While a strong argument can been made that custom should define the local 
public interest, non-local interests which are external to the market require 
protection through state intervention. The state could intervene unilaterally as a 
regulator (for example, through mechanisms such as the National Forest Plan, 
provincial harvest limits, and statutory revenue system). Alternatively it could 
seek to negotiate contract-based outcomes with the other stakeholders (for 
example, through Forest Management Agreements with landowners, and project 
agreements with landowner and logging companies). 
Under the latter approach, the state could retain its monopoly power to 
make Forest Management Agreements with landowners as its negotiating base. 
Landowners would also negotiate from a position of strength due to their 
property-based veto over logging. Where agreement is not reached, no logging 
could proceed. The state's fragile rule over remote areas would serve as a 
pressure against its adoption of belligerent negotiating positions. The alternative 
of restricting landowners with detailed regulations and nationwide plans is 
flawed by the state's inflexibility and poor enforcement capacity. Customary 
autonomy and resource rights would face the threat of creeping regulation, with 
landowners having no comeback other than to defy the imposed rules. 
Protection of the right of landowners to bargain in their own interest is 
particularly important, given the government's limited accountability to the 
electorate. In PNG, political success depends primarily on maintaining support 
in the local electorate, and has little dependence on party politics. Politicians, 
including ministers of state, derive personal legitimacy from delivering goods 
and services to their electorates, and have little interest in the wider legitimacy 
of government (Jackson 1992:82; Oh 1995:10). The Westminster systems of 
executive responsibility and parliamentary democracy are thus less able to check 
government actions. Landowners need property rights derived from custom as a 
means of checking the government where the ballot box fails to do so. 
Whereas regulations tend to be inflexible and insensitive to local 
circumstances, negotiation can be a 'quick, flexible and less adversarial means' 
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of managing land-use conflicts (COA 1993:1 02). The conflict generated by the 
state's proposal to impose a statutory revenue system illustrates this point. Had 
the state and the PNGFROA (or individual landowner companies) sought to 
negotiate new revenue arrangements, they might have found an acceptable 
compromise on the issue of landowner company accountability, while advancing 
their mutual interest in extracting a higher share of rent from the logging 
companies (see Simpson, this volume). 
A negotiation process could help landowners to acquire political, 
administrative, and technical skills. Landowners should also have better 
awareness of environmental safeguards and enforcement rights if they have had 
to negotiate for them. 
In a contractual framework, landowners would also negotiate with logging 
companies.23 Yet past experience confirms the vulnerability of landowners in 
dealing with logging companies. By playing a prominent role in setting up 
landowner companies, foreign logging interests were able to 'install' 
sympathetic directors and clan agents (see Wood, this volume). They used 
various inducements and advances to compromise the ability of landowner 
representatives to negotiate at arm's length. They were able to exploit the 
volatility of local politics to push quick agreements with landowner leaders who 
were keen to entrench their prominence while they had the chance. Some 
landowner representatives were illiterate, many had no business experience, and 
nearly all had very limited knowledge of the logging industry and the 
complexities of legal contracts. 
To avoid these problems, the state could take steps to improve the 
bargaining strength of landowners, without attempting to bargain on their behalf. 
Measures to strengthen landowner negotiation capacity could include: 
• publication of model contract provisions; 
• legislation providing for court review of manifestly unfair contracts; 
• redirection of government planning and enforcement resources to landowner 
capacity strengthening; 
• finance arrangements where landowners can borrow against future income to 
pay for preliminary investigations and professional advice; and 
• founding a non-government negotiation service for landowners (perhaps 
funded by international donors).24 
However, in any system where the use and management of forest resources 
is resolved through negotiation, landowners will ultimately have to look after 
23 Under the current Forestry Act, Forest Management Agreements can be crafted to give 
landowners the right to hold equity in the operating entity or a say in the selection of a contractor. 
24 Some steps in this direction have recently been taken by the GTZ-funded Landowner 
Awareness Project, which is part of the National Forestry and Conservation Action Programme. 
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themselves. In the end, they will be negotiating against the state. The state's 
recent moves to raise export tax without raising royalties shows very clearly that 
it is a competing stakeholder, not a benefactor. As Wolfers (1992:244) notes, 
'interests which [rural landowners] might wish to oppose have little reason to 
help them to express or organise themselves'. 
Conclusion 
Proposed PNG timber industry reforms have faltered over the issue of control of 
forest resources on customary land. The state has shied away from 
implementing reforms that challenge the right of landowners and landowner 
companies to manage and exploit these resources as they see fit. This paper 
questions whether the reforms were justified in any event. 
Where custom can divine the local public interest, it displaces the need for 
state intervention. Given custom's resilience and pervasive influence, the state 
should be cautious in assuming its demise. Emerging institutions such as 
landowner companies should not be dismissed as aberrations of custom simply 
because they are not egalitarian, whether judged against fantasies of how custom 
once operated or against introduced ideals of participatory democracy. Where 
custom seems to be failing, the state should not presume that it can do what 
custom cannot. The state's inability to deliver services and leadership to remote 
forest areas is what sparked the rise of landowner companies in the first place. 
In addressing local resource management issues, the state might achieve 
more by supporting customary authority rather than usurping its role. The 
stalled forestry reforms are a failed attempt to do the latter. 
The state can legitimately claim a role in balancing local interests with the 
national interest, although the forestry experience suggests that it lacks the 
political confidence and enforcement capacity to impose its will over customary 
land. Negotiated resolution of national and local interests would seem to be a 
more realistic and sensitive approach. Only through negotiation, with all its 
perils to novice participants in the timber industry, can landowners hope to 
achieve the capacity to protect their interests in the long term. The alternative of 
unilateral state regulation leaves landowners exposed to the dictates of ministers 
who lack accountability beyond their own electorates, and urban bureaucrats 
who tend to favour national or provincial concerns over local ones. 
These conclusions suggest that the state should abandon nationwide land-
use zoning through forest classification, statements of provincial allowable cut, 
and inflexible statutory controls over distribution and investment of the 
landowners' share of logging revenues. These reforms are all based on the 
flawed assumptions that the state is the best judge of the public good and can 
readily enforce its will. Environmental protection, sustained yield, and revenue 
distribution objectives should, instead, be balanced against conflicting interests 
through project-specific negotiation. For new projects, the state, landowners, 
and logging companies could rely on forest management and project agreements 
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to set the terms on which logging is conducted. If the state is less absorbed in 
nationwide planning and policing work, it should be more able to resource the 
conduct of development options studies and scrutiny of environmental plans, 
such that they serve as useful components of the negotiation process. For 
existing agreements, the parties can rely on periodic review clauses and the 
transitional review power in the Forestry Act (Section 137) to negotiate project 
reforms. The code of logging practice will serve as a useful standard for 
incorporation in new or revised agreements. 
The role of the state would thus change from that of a regulator to that of a 
stakeholder. The state could offer extension services to ensure that landowners 
are sufficiently organised and informed to participate effectively in project 
negotiation and enforcement, again deploying resources formerly-allocated to its 
regulatory function. Yet, given the state's conflicting interests, landowners 
could not count on such assistance, or accept it without question. 
CHAPTER12 
SMALL-SCALE COMMUNITY-BASED FORESTRY: 
Introduction 
ISSUES IN THE CONSERVATION OF 
PAPUA NEW GUINEA'S BIODIVERSITY 
RoNMARTIN 
This chapter sets out some of the issues involved in small-scale, community-
based, environmentally sensitive timber extraction from natural forests. Any 
discussion of the sustainability of community-based forestry businesses must 
take cognisance of the widest sense of the term 'sustainability' - that is, 
encompass its ecological, economic, and social parameters. This discussion 
examines those parameters in a general way in an attempt to place ecotimber1 
extraction in the context of biodiversity conservation in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), in order to outline a direction which the fledgling industry might take, 
and to point out some of the implications for planners in this area. The 
comments made here reflect the author's observations and experience which are, 
in the main, confined to Morobe Province. 
The idea of operating a small business, owned by oneself, in which the 
rewards come from one's personal endeavours is well-established in Western 
societies. It has found a place in Papua New Guinean societies in the towns and, 
to a lesser degree, in rural communities. The trade stores of the villages, PMV2 
services on both land and water, small coffee, cocoa and betelnut plantations, 
and family fishing ventures all bear testimony to rural Papua New Guineans' 
interest in establishing such small businesses to capture the cash which they feel 
they need. 
Small-scale forestry businesses, owned and managed by Papua New 
Guineans, are a relatively new phenomenon, driven by a multitude of forces, 
many of which differ from those that have given rise to other forms of small 
business. The nature of the chain from production to market, the capital cost of 
the production equipment, the lack of prior similar experience, and a need for 
operating capital and outside extension services, together render the problems to 
be faced of a different order to those faced by the other types of small business 
previously mentioned. 
l The term 'ecotimber' will be used throughout this chapter to mean timber extracted from natural 
forest with one goal being the maintenance of the ecological integrity of that forest. 
2 Public motor vehicle. 
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Nevertheless, many small sawmills have been introduced to the forests of 
PNG. This number is certainly in excess of 700 (Henderson 1994b: 1 0) and 
perhaps as high as 2,000 (Bun 1996:5), of which less than half are intermittently 
producing at any one time (Arentz and Holzknecht 1991; Mamun and Konabe 
1992; Senn 1993 ). The vast majority of these sawmills are not individually 
owned but are the property of church organisations, or village or clan groups. 
In recent years, small numbers of small-scale, community-based sawmillers 
have formed the nucleus of an attempt to model, in conjunction with other 
income-producing ideas, a way of providing development options that allow the 
ecological integrity of PNG's forests to be retained. Small-scale forestry, 
indigenously owned and managed, offers a theoretical potential for diverse 
interest groups to realise their objectives in cooperation with each other. The 
motivations of these interest groups are partly economic and partly social, and 
are directed both to conservation and self-fulfilment. If a self-sustaining small-
scale forestry industry is to eventuate, the positive conjunction of these 
motivating factors is required, and that requirement, in turn, has significant 
planning implications. 
A Short History of Small-Scale Forestry in Papua New Guinea 
Small-scale timber harvesting operations using low-cost portable mills have a 
short history in PNG. From initially fulfilling the function of providing sawn 
timber to missions and plantations in remote areas, they have recently been 
adopted as community projects by local villages or clan groups. 
Small-scale production of sawn timber was originally introduced to PNG by 
church and mission groups that were seeking to provide building materials in 
places of difficult accessibility. The lumber that has been produced has mostly 
been for community projects in which labour has been donated as a community 
service (sweat equity), or cash payments have been of a minimal nature. The 
trees used have not been harvested with the ecological integrity of the forest in 
mind. Rather, they have been the by-product of garden clearance, or have been 
chosen for other pragmatic reasons such as proximity to the site of application. 
Mechanisation, in the form of portable or transportable, low-production and low 
capital-cost mills, only began in the mid-1970s with the importation of this type 
of mill from Germany, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States 
(Henderson 1994b: 1 0). 
The ownership of portable sawmills which are capable of reasonably 
accurate dimensioning of timber was opened up to a wider group with the 
beginning of local production of the 'Wokabout Somil' by Natequip (or rather 
its predecessor) in Lae in 1986. This machine was much cheaper than imported 
models, and in several ways simpler in design, and thus more suitable to PNG 
operating conditions. Concern that the skills required to operate the machines 
were limited, and that the potential existed for destructive forestry techniques to 
be used, induced the directors of Natequip to decide to sell training along with 
their machines. They employed Sasa Zibe Kokino, a forester with a strong 
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conviction in favour of retaining the forest resource base, to carry out this work. 
However, many people who bought Wokabout Somils did not purchase the 
training package along with the machine. Later, Sasa Zibe established the 
Village Development Trust which, although separate from Natequip, continued 
to carry out its training programme, but also involved itself in awareness raising 
activities in an effort to contain the activities of industrial logging companies, 
especially in Morobe Province.3 
Other embryonic attempts at influencing the harvesting practices and 
general forestry behaviour of small-scale sawmillers appeared in the early 1990s. 
In Milne Bay Province, a number of people using chainsaw mills were organised 
to supply a cooperative which was attempting to export to 'green' consumer 
markets on the western coast of the United States. In East New Britain Province, 
a private initiative by a plantation manager, Max Henderson, to diversify into 
small-scale forestry led to the establishment of a community-based 
'ecoforestry'4 project by the Bainings people. Later again, the Pacific Heritage 
Foundation was created, with Max Henderson as its Executive Director. The 
Foundation is involving itself in awareness raising campaigns in several parts of 
PNG, assisting with the establishment of small-scale forestry programmes with 
low ecological impacts, and progressively improving the operations of existing 
small sawmill operations, with a view to having them certified under Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) guidelines. The last two years have seen other non-
government organisations (NGOs) supplement the provision of education or 
awareness about the conduct of ecologically sensitive forestry, with the 
establishment of forest management plans which are designed to preserve the 
general structure of the forests being worked in the long term (with 30-40 year 
rotations), and to make the business ventures economically self-sustaining.s 
The shift to a self-sustaining commercial orientation for ecotimber 
production has coincided with changes in the technology of portable sawmills 
which have brought greater accuracy, better portability, and higher rates of 
production with lower labour requirements. 
Accommodating Ecological Sustainability 
Donor organisations are beginning to apply pressure for ecological 
accountability, and the documentation of management plans and monitoring 
3 Awareness raising campaigns aim to raise the consciousness of rural villagers to the long-term 
unsustainability of industrial logging operations and the short-term nature of the benefits returned 
from entering into partnerships with logging companies. Small-scale ecoforestry is offered as an 
alternative. 
4 The term 'ecoforesty' refers to any collection of human uses of natural forest which have, as 
one of the goals, the preservation the ecological integrity of that forest. In the context of this 
chapter, one of those uses is the production of ecotimber. 
5 These initiatives have included those of the Village Development Trust in Lae, the World Wide 
Fund for Nature in Kikori, and the Foundation for Peoples of the South Pacific in the Sepik region. 
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techniques is gathering pace. A few small-scale sawmill businesses are working 
to management plans which can be considered ecologically sensitive. Their 
managers, operators, and the NGOs assisting them are gaining experience with 
time, but they lack proven knowledge and harvesting techniques which can 
guarantee that the ecological systems of the forests in which they work will 
remain intact. However, their forestry practices are aimed at limiting damage 
and leaving the forest ecosystems unchanged if possible. From a biodiversity 
conservation viewpoint, this is preferable to other forms of forestry being 
practised in PNG, given the dearth of scientific knowledge available. 
Ecotimber Production in Context 
Of the small-scale portable sawmills currently operating, only a small 
percentage are working to well-defined forest management plans that focus on 
harvesting timber in ecologically sensitive ways. Senn (1993) has referred to 
thirty-eight mills which are practising some kind of sustainable yield forestry 
management. Sustainable yield is not necessarily ecologically sensitive forestry 
that has been designed to conserve biodiversity. The author of this paper 
believes that this was an overestimate, given his knowledge of the operations 
referred to by Senn. Those which are able to meet the criterion of following 
management plans with an ecological conservation focus may well be less than 
half his estimate. What can be said is that the intermittent nature of individual 
operators' work schedules has meant that the impact of small-scale sawmilling, 
in the majority of cases, has been slight when viewed in the context of the 
damage being done by large industrial logging operations, and the size of PNG's 
remaining primary forest. 
At this point in time, the author is aware of eleven small sawmill operations 
that could reasonably lay claim to detailed forest management plans which have 
been designed to cater for the long-term ecological sustainability of the forest. 
Of these, only one project in the Bainings area, consisting of three portable and 
one transportable mill, has had its operation tested under Forest Stewardship 
Council guidelines (personal communication, Wesley Watt,6 29 October 1996). 
However, there are quite a number of other groups with portable mills, or on the 
point of obtaining them, which are in various stages of developing management 
plans that purport to allow for the long-term viability of forest ecosystems. 
These include mills in West New Britain that are funded by the European Union, 
and some twenty mills to be introduced in the Huon Peninsula by the Lutheran 
Development Service and funded by a German donor. 
The Precautionary Principle 
Conserving biodiversity requires the integrity of ecological systems to be 
sustained. This can only be guaranteed if tropical rainforest ecosystems are not 
subjected to the pressures of increasing human intrusion, or of those 
6 Wesley Watt is a forester with the Pacific Heritage Foundation. 
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environmental changes which are external to the forest but are part of larger 
systems which incorporate the forest ecosystem. The scientific evidence simply 
does not exist to quantify what levels of human impact, or other forms of impact 
for that matter, the biodiversity of the forest can sustain while remaining intact, 
or at what new biodiversity levels the systems will stabilise, given certain forms 
of intrusion (Louman and Nicholls 1994:155,162, 165). While considerable 
research is being done in tropical forests to determine growth rates of 
commercial trees and the structure of the forest for future commercial timber 
extraction following industrial logging of whatever type (selective, clear-fell, 
shelterwood, and so on), there is little evidence of significant research into the 
ecological changes wrought by this exploitation (ibid: 165). 
The precautionary principle, given such a context, would dictate that the 
forests be left alone until the necessary scientific knowledge has been 
accumulated. This is impractical in PNG, given the aspirations of rural resource 
owners for cash and 'development', government demands for revenue to meet 
social and political objectives, and external pressures such as the 'need' for 
foreign exchange. The lack of central control over the forest resource, and the 
fragmented nature of land and resource ownership, which is constitutionally 
guaranteed, is without precedent elsewhere in the world, and means that new 
solutions have to be sought. 
Accountability 
Small-scale forestry ventures, using low-cost portable or transportable mills, 
have offered those whose primary objective has been the conservation of 
rainforest ecosystems a possible alternative in their battle against the destructive 
practices of large-scale logging. In the past, the output of around 0.5 m3 per day 
per mill has meant that the impact on the forest at large is extremely limited, yet 
the potential income to rural villagers holds out the hope that their aspirations 
for cash can be met, and that some forests at least might thus be denied to 
industrial logging companies. A consequence of this has been that donor 
agencies with conservation or social agendas, or both, have been prepared to 
fund a considerable number of these small-scale ventures by direct donation or 
revolving loans. The anxiety of such agencies to prevent the rapid loss of 
representative examples of unique ecosystems, or to capture a reasonable portion 
of the value of the forest for the indigenous resource owners, has meant that the 
actual nature of the small-scale forest harvesting has been only superficially 
dealt with. The provision of a mill, along with appropriate training in technique, 
and sometimes awareness education in conservation needs, has not previously 
been accompanied by definitive forest management plans or any checks and 
balances on the type of forestry being practised. 
The exposure of PNG's forests to industrial logging has continued apace. 
Small areas of forest (insignificant in the larger national context) have been 
temporarily 'saved' from large-scale logging by the provision of portable mills 
to some communities. The need to build markets, produce commercially viable 
businesses, and convince donors that their money is not going into a bottomless 
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pit, and that rainforest ecosystems are indeed being preserved, has led to 
pressure for more accountability, and thus for the production of forest 
management plans and an examination of ways of monitoring compliance. 
Compromise with Social and Economic Realities 
Changes in harvesting practices, and forest management practices in general, are 
discernible as commercial and social realities impinge on conservation criteria. 
In essence, early attempts at management plans sought to minimise openings in 
the forest canopy, avoid compaction of the soil, avoid residual damage to 
surrounding trees, and regenerate species in ways which maintained the original 
species structure of the forest. This included cutting trees in rough proportion to 
their distribution in the forest. An example of a set of guidelines for the 
production of management plans can be found in joint proposals by the 
Rainforest Information Centre and the Village Development Trust to the 
Australian International Development Assistance Bureau (RIC 1991 ). 
A comparison of actual practice with these guidelines reveals a number of 
differences and reflects certain social, economic, and educational realities. In 
one area, where a sawmill had been operating for some years, there were 
instances of only rosewood being harvested in some extensive sections of forest. 
The elements of the ecoforestry harvesting plan were being adhered to, except 
for cutting in proportion to the species mix in the forest (author's observation 
near the Waria River). This was a reflection of the lack of infrastructure to shift 
lower valued timbers to Lae and still make a profit, and to the lack of a local 
market for lower valued timbers. In another instance, a mersawa tree had been 
cut only fifteen metres from the bank of a river. In addition, vines had not been 
cut prior to the tree being felled, with the result that two other quite large trees 
had been brought down with the felling, thus opening up an unacceptably large 
gap in the forest canopy (author's observation, central southeast Morobe coast). 
When this was pointed out to the sawmill operators, there was consternation as 
to what their trainer from the Village Development Trust would say when he 
discovered it. In fact, education had been provided on areas to avoid and on 
proper preparation by eliminating larger vines prior to a felling, but it had not 
been effective in this case. Other fellings in the area had met the guidelines in 
the 'Trainer's Manual' provided by the Village Development Trust. In training 
small-scale operators, mistakes like this are bound to be made. However, it does 
emphasise the need for a lengthy period of extension training and regular 
monitoring. 
Another aspect that impinges on the conservation of the forest relates to 
compaction of the soil and damage to residual trees. The small-scale harvesting 
guidelines referred to here required the sawn lumber to be carried out of the 
forest on the workers' shoulders. In this way, compaction of soil and damage to 
residuals is slight. However, this has proven too difficult to achieve. Villagers 
have been unwilling to carry the lumber more than short distances (generally 
less than 1.5 kilometres in the author's experience, and more often only a few 
hundred metres), and human carrying capacity has limited the dimensions of the 
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lumber that can be cut. This latter situation has meant that market requirements 
and production realities do not always complement each other. 
The Bainings Ecotimber Group in East New Britain Province did not start 
with such rigorous criteria. Transportable mills (carried on the back of, or towed 
behind, a truck) and snigging trails were used initially. The mill was located in 
one position for several months, a small bulldozer was used to construct tracks, 
and a tractor and jinker used to transport logs to the mill. After operations in an 
area are completed, the tracks are replanted (the author noted good regeneration 
of forest at the milling sites and snigging trails, but not on the access track 
constructed to service the milling sites). Henderson estimates that compaction 
and damage to residuals is limited to 9 percent of the area worked, while in the 
average export logging operation 'up to 70% of the ground area is trashed by 
machinery' (Henderson 1994b:20). The Pacific Heritage Foundation is now 
recommending much lighter and more portable saws, so it may be possible for 
them to reduce the area of damage to below 9 percent in the future. 
Experiment and Experience 
The Village Development Trust has been very reluctant to move to 
mechanisation to overcome the problem of removing timber from the bush. It 
has been experimenting with the use of water buffaloes, 7 pulling either a small 
sled or trailer. While this experiment is in its early stages, the response of one. 
'ecoforester' interviewed by the author has not been promising for the use of 
such animals. This small-scale forester is working an area that contains some 
swamp forest and hillside forest. He finds that neither is suitable for the buffalo 
and is reluctant to use his employees to regularly work the animal (personal 
communication, Kiliki Asunu,8 14 October 1996). Buffaloes must be worked 
almost daily if they are to retain their training, and thus their efficiency. They 
also need to be rested for several hours during the hottest part of the day. The 
owner-manager of this operation was anxious to dispose of the buffalo, and 
indicated that he needed a small tractor and permission to construct some trails 
in his hill areas if his transport problems were to be overcome. The forest 
management plan for this area already makes allowance for some roading into 
the hill area (VDT 1996a: 12). 
The remaining significant problem with ecological sustainability relates to 
the period of rotation. In the case of operations sponsored by the Village 
Development Trust, this has been set at 30-40 years. The two management plans 
examined by the author (Puseka Logging Area and Masing Logging Area) 
provide 800 hectares and 1,000 hectares respectively of commercial forest area, 
with the latter being worked by two portable mills. Although there is 
considerable variation in the topography and in the vegetation from hectare to 
7 These animals are bred in Madang, provided with training, and the castrated animals then sent 
to the field sites. 
8 General Manager of KDN Enterprises. 
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hectare, the yearly worked area will be approximately 20-25 hectares under a 
'cut and leave for 30-40 years' regime. The minimum harvest to make the 
business commercially viable is of the order of 20 m3 of sawn lumber per month 
(personal communication, Bill Girard,9 2 October 1996). This translates to 240 
m
3 per year for the Puseka management area, and slightly more for the Masin~ 
management area. 10 This would suggest a recoverable harvest of at least 10 m 
per hectare. It seems to the author that this is at the high end of the scale, given 
a recovery rate of 40 percent, and can lead to fairly large gaps being created in 
the canopy, given the nature of the forestry to be practised. There are different 
cutting regimes that may reduce this problem, although it can, over time, lead to 
an overall change in the density of very large trees in the forest. 
The Solomon Western Islands Fair Trade (SWIFT) project uses a system 
whereby forest is classified into nine categories depending on the number of 
large trees greater than 60cm dbh 11 per hectare and the number in the range 30-
59cm dbh per hectare. 12 Each class has a maximum number of trees greater than 
60cm dbh per hectare which can be cut in any five-year period. As trees are cut, 
a hectare plot may move 'down' in the class hierarchy, giving rise to a lower 
allowable cut in the next five-year period. This can continue until a point is 
reached where the forest is at Class 9, in which cutting of further trees is 
disallowed. The harvest is thus spread out, and depends on the state (or health) 
of the forest in any five-year period. This method has resulted in resource 
·owners continuing to show a strong interest in one-hectare blocks over time, 
regularly inspecting them and measuring the growth rates of trees. Thus it is 
proving of educational value in improving resource owners' knowledge of the 
dynamics of their forest (personal communication, Will em Quist, 13 29 October 
1996). 
The point made in the two previous paragraphs brings discussion back to 
the question of the knowledge base from which these 'ecoforestry' groups are 
working. Insufficient knowledge exists on the structure of forests, their 
regeneration, and the effects of various forms of timber harvesting, including 
those practised by groups marketing their product as ecotimber. Both the 
Village Development Trust and the Pacific Heritage Foundation, as examples of 
NGOs promoting forestry of this sort, have included record-keeping practices in 
9 Director, Planning and Development, of the Village Development Trust. 
I 0 The primary mills in both areas are new Lewisaws, while the second mill in the Masing area is 
a reconditioned Wokabout Somil previously owned by the clan working the area. 
11 Diameter at breast height. 
12 In this scheme, Class I forest has more than 35 trees >60cm dbh/ha, and trees in the range 30-
59cm dbh are not counted ( 4 trees per hectare >60 cm dbh can be cut in a five-year period). Class 
5 forest has 20-24 trees >60cm dbh/ha and less than 15 trees in the range 30-59cm dbh (2 trees per 
hectare >60cm dbh can be cut in a five-year period). Class 9 forest has <15 trees >60cm dbh/ha 
and <15 trees in the range 30-59cm dbh. No cutting is allowed in this class. 
13 Senior forestry officer of SWIFT. 
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their management plans, with the intention of building a database which can act 
as an indicator of change in the forest over time, and sampling plots which will 
be measured and evaluated annually to determine forest growth rates and, 
hopefully, any ecological changes occurring (PHF 1993: 12; VDT 1996b:7, 14). 
Despite working on the establishment of small-scale, environmentally 
sensitive forestry for several years, relevant NGOs, their donor organisations, 
and community-based groups with sawmills are short on experience and 
knowledge in the techniques best suited to achieving their goal of conserving the 
forest resource, and the criteria to be assessed in determining their degree of 
success. 
Accommodating Economic Sustainability 
Even with the assistance of NGOs, community-based ecotimber producers have 
only been established in places where competition from large-scale logging 
companies has been non-existent or minimal. Nevertheless, their commercial 
viability requires that costs of production are met, and that there is sufficient 
profit to cover rural villagers' aspirations for cash. NGOs are following a 
strategy of reducing costs through achieving economies of scale and some 
reprocessing of lumber, along with improvements in productivity and quality 
control. The attitudes generated in cash-poor but time-rich societies are an 
obstacle for developing the Western business-centred approach that is implied 
by the strategy, and demanded by the size of the loans needed to purchase 
modern equipment. 
Refocussing Goals 
Without its commercial viability being successfully tested, this type of forestry 
cannot be a positive contributor to the preservation of the ecological systems of 
PNG's rainforests. Commercial viability requires the cost of operations to be 
met, along with the aspirations of the resource owners for an improved quality of 
life. Much has been written about the short-term nature of those aspirations (see 
Brooks 1996). The attitudes encompassing them are open invitations to the large 
industrial logging companies to meet their immediate concerns in the Asian 
marketplace, and reinforce short-term profit-taking endeavours at the expense of 
long-term goals that are more suitable to the preservation of natural forest 
ecosystems. 
The biggest task facing the NGOs, in the short term, is to demonstrate that 
their rhetoric can be realised in a practical way by meeting rural villagers' 
aspirations. Part of that task is to refocus those aspirations on medium- to long-
term goals. This is not proving easy. Wherever small-scale forestry has been 
offered as an alternative to income generated by large-scale logging, the latter 
has been preferred. This has been true, even when large sums of money have 
been spent on promoting alternatives, and when that alternative has been 
medium-scale, reduced-impact logging rather than small-scale logging, as for 
example in the Lak Integrated Conservation and Development (ICAD) project in 
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New Ireland Province (McCallum and Sekhran 1996:6). The greater size of the 
return in the short term, the ability to distribute some of the returns across a 
community, and the lack of any need for physical labour to extract that return, 
have been far more attractive than the work required to service a loan for a 
portable mill, the business of arranging to market a product, and the prospect of 
disputes arising from the lack of any means to redistribute the resulting income 
with some degree of equity around the community. 
How the refocussing is to be achieved is still very much an open question 
and the subject of some current debate (see Orsak 1996c ). Part of that process is 
itself long-term, in that it involves the improvement of general education levels 
in rural communities. Another part involves the establishment of successful 
alternative models. There are plenty of examples of the lack of benefits which 
rural communities derive from entering into partnerships with the large logging 
companies, and these can be the subject of awareness 'tours' which form part of 
a re-education process. However, this raises other perceptual problems, such as 
when a rusting steel roof atop a frame of offcuts from a large sawmill nearby 
somehow equates with 'progress'. Some reasons for optimism may be found in 
the small proportion of the young educated elite who are choosing to return to 
village life and form the focal point for information dissemination and resistance 
to short-term solutions to the problems of cash-poor societies, as in the Maisin 
community of Collingwood Bay in Oro Province (personal communication, 
Larry Orsak, 14 14 September 1996). 
Opportunities for Establishing Ecotimber Businesses 
Where small-scale operations have been set up, they have often been in 
conjunction with large-scale logging, such as when the small-scale sawmillers 
use logs that have been discarded by the logging company because of defects, or 
simply because they were overlooked. In other cases, the operations are in areas 
that are under little or no pressure from logging concerns. These areas may have 
been logged in the past but only specific species taken (as at Puseka); or else a 
physical impediment has raised the cost of extraction by large-scale logging 
methods (as at Masing); or the species structure of the forest has simply made 
other areas far more attractive (as at Kamiali). The point here is that small-scale, 
community-based ecotimber projects are generally found in areas where other 
opportunities to generate cash income are rare. 
This scenario may be starting to change slowly, as evidence of the short-
term duration of income provided by large-scale logging, and the lack of change 
in peoples lives over the medium to long term, becomes transparent. This 
appears to be the case on the southeast Morobe coast, where responses to the 
author's questions in Kamiali were heavily laced with descriptions of what the 
people to the south of them had not achieved after twenty-one years of logging 
(eighteen years by South Pacific Timbers and three years by Timber Products 
14 Director of the Christensen Research Institute in Madang. 
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Marketing Corporation). For instance, it was difficult to see any gains of 
significance in the village of Kui, in whose forests a logging company had 
operated for only three years before depleting the resource and moving on. 
There is some evidence that more garden land was opened up along the logging 
road which was rapidly deteriorating (author's observation, March 1996). 
However, from a biodiversity point of view, this is hardly a gain. 
Becoming Cost Effective 
Whatever the impediments to large-scale logging, which have led to some 
villages or clans seeking the support of NGOs to start small-scale forestry 
programmes, there is still a need to demonstrate some measure of short-term 
economic return from the ecologically sensitive harvesting methods being 
proposed, as compared to the benefits of extracting timber in non-sustainable 
processes. This has led to attempts by the Pacific Heritage Foundation and the 
Village Development Trust to secure some advantages of scale, and seek to 
guarantee producers some returns on a wide range of species through the 
development of central buying centres, a local market, and an export market. 
Part of an examination of the commercial aspects of a sustainable 
ecoforestry industry has involved looking at the strategy adopted by the Village 
Development Trust in developing a cooperative of small-scale ecotimber 
producers in Lae. This NGO is attempting to reach a situation in which full 
account is taken of the costs of the small-scale operator. These costs include 
burdens not previously borne by those who have operated mills in the past. In 
the past, there has been plenty of donor funding to cover the cost of extension 
services, and these have been supplied by Village Development Trust foresters 
free of charge. It is planned for the services of Village Development Trust staff 
to be gradually incorporated into the cost structure. Ten percent of the sale price 
to the buying centre is to be put aside for these purposes. Initially, while the 
number of sawmillers in the cooperative remains small, this I 0 percent 
surcharge does not cover the costs of the services being provided. The Village 
Development Trust estimates the break-even point at about six millers. When 
the number of millers is more than six, the intention is to refund the difference 
between the charge and the cost back to the sawmillers. At this stage, the actual 
costs cannot be determined with sufficient accuracy to make predictions and set 
firm values into the future. For instance, it is expected that the costs of carrying 
out inventories of commercial tree species in the forests will fall with experience 
and as techniques of accurate sampling are developed. As a greater pool of 
trained operators becomes available, the time which foresters spend on training 
may also decline. However, it is too early to predict what manpower will be 
necessary, and at what rate these costs will fall. 
The Value ofTime and the Value of Cash 
At this early stage, the embryonic cooperative is extremely vulnerable to a wide 
range of competing interests. One of the attractive aspects of the strategy is the 
creation of a central buying point which guarantees to take all the timber 
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produced by the cooperative's millers. Timber derived from a wide variety of 
species is bought in three grades at a fixed price for each grade - Kl80/m3, 
K250/m3 and K350/m3. Higher prices can be obtained by sawmillers for a few 
selected species of furniture grade timbers (up to K450/m3) by dealing directly 
with furniture manufacturers, and occasionally for construction timbers as well. 
This requires the sawmill operator to spend time searching around for a buyer. 
If the search is successful, a higher price is obtained, but if the few buyers in the 
market already have sufficient stocks of timber, then the miller is left with 
lumber on his hands and must wait until demand picks up again. More often 
than not, the actual milling ceases while the owner/manager seeks a market for 
the timber, and if it is not immediately found, then the operation remains closed 
down until stocks are sold. This shutdown is often necessitated by the lack of 
sufficient cash to pay the workers. 
The theory upon which the Village Development Trust is basing its 
organisation is that consistent production, promoted by a guaranteed market for 
the product at a timber yard, will produce, over time, a higher cash return than 
intermittent production for which higher prices are paid. This is not proving an 
easy concept for sawmill managers to understand or come to grips with. Their 
experience is generally limited to cash-poor communities, in which the marginal 
value of cash is higher than the marginal value of the time put in to obtain that 
cash; that is, where there is a shortage of cash but no shortage of time, then time 
will be expended freely in order to obtain extra cash. An example of a distorted 
version of this notion in the small-scale forestry sector came to the author's 
attention recently, when an operator in Madanf found that he could obtain 
K400/m3 for his kwila in Lae, but only K300/m in Madang. The timber was 
then trucked to Lae at a price in excess of K50/m3, but in the meantime, the 
operator's mill lay idle while he made the arrangements and located a buyer. A 
greater profit per unit of time was available if the mill had kept operating and the 
timber had been sold at K300/m3, even if a greater profit per cubic metre was 
available by trucking it to Lae. The total amount of cash generated within the 
community would clearly be greater in the first instance, as the workmen would 
still be receiving wages, and it is questionable whether the owner/operator was 
financially better off, given the lost production. At the village level, examples 
abound of time sacrificed for a larger cash return. In these cases, though, the 
time sacrificed would either have been spent on the production of subsistence 
goods, social activity or sindaun nating ('sitting around doing nothing'), and not 
in alternative cash-generating activities. For example, in the village of Kamiali, 
the fresh fish project periodically collapses as the costs outweigh the returns 
because of the inconsistent amounts of time spent on fishing. One of the 
contributing reasons for this is that dried fish bring slightly higher prices in the 
Lae market than fresh fish bring at the buying point in Kamiali. No account is 
taken of the fact that much more time is spent in drying fish, taking it to market 
and selling it, than would be spent on catching and selling fresh fish. 
The capacity to have a longer-term perspective of a business operation 
seems limited at present, and will only be overcome with education gained 
through experience. A challenge for the Village Development Trust is to hold its 
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cooperative together long enough for this experience to be gained, and for some 
economies of scale to enter the equation. One operator, with a history of several 
years of production resulting in sales of the order of K40,000 to K70,000 a year, 
said that he was thinking of getting a bank loan to pay off his loan from the 
Village Development Trust and then going it alone. Two reasons were 
m~ntioned - the 10 percent levy to cover the services of the NGO, and the 
prospect of obtaining higher prices elsewhere. 
The higher prices are generally obtained for a limited range of species. 
This may encourage the overharvesting of such species in certain areas of forest 
and thus change its character to a greater extent than allowed under the forest 
management plans, whose aim of preserving the species constitution of the 
original forest depends on a wide range of species being selectively harvested 
over a fixed area. 
In light of comments made to the author by rural villagers who are engaged 
in small-scale ecoforestry, the local commitment to sustainable forestry, in an 
ecological sense, must be questioned; or perhaps one might say that an 
internalised understanding of what forestry practices are necessary to achieve a 
situation approaching ecological sustainability must be questioned. For the 
NGOs involved, the pressures to compromise ecological standards in order to 
meet economic and social realities are ever-present. 
Changing the Orientation of Community Ecotimber Groups 
The establishment of a sawmillers' cooperative supplying timber to a central 
buying/processing centre has a number of objectives, but these are ultimately 
dependent on the commercial viability of the operators and the timber yard. Part 
of this viability involves becoming competitive in the local market, and this 
requires economies of scale to reduce costs. Production of timber in ways which 
can be described as ecologically sensitive (or sustainable) incorporates direct 
costs which are externalities for the large logging companies, and consequently 
do not show on their balance sheets. Part of that difference can be accounted for 
by eliminating profits going overseas, while part can be found through 
government intervention in the market which gives preference to indigenous 
small-scale operators (though past history suggests that this is unlikely in the 
short to medium term). The remainder must be made up by the owner/operators 
reducing their own costs. 
In order to reduce these costs, the small-scale sawmill operators need to 
move much closer in their orientation to Western business practices, and their 
adoption of a long-term perspective, than has been the case in the past. Past 
practices have been directed at meeting relatively short-term goals, even for 
those purporting to operate on a commercial basis. Cash generated by the 
business has tended to be spent in the short term, both for necessary consumer 
items and for the creation and maintenance of social networks. As a 
consequence, there has often been insufficient operating capital or monies set 
aside for investment in new equipment, even where the original equipment was 
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largely donated by external sources. Loan repayments have frequently not been 
met, which has led to a reluctance by banks to finance small-scale operations 
generally (Farley, Gladman and Martin 1993 :58). The value of the business is 
often not recognised, only the cash left in the pocket after the direct costs of 
wages, fuel, and so on. As a consequence, the physical assets of the business are 
often not maintained with a long-term operation in mind. 
The idea of only working for cash when you need it (a practice that is well-
established in rural PNG) does not sit well with the maintenance of an effective 
business. It is conceivable that a situation could exist where a large number of 
sawmillers, each producing intermittently, could provide the economies of scale 
required for a small-scale industry to develop, especially if the cost of the 
production equipment was not too high in relation to wages and the return on the 
timber. In the past, this was the case with early models of the 'wokabout somil' 
and chainsaw mills. It may still be the case with chainsaw mills. However, the 
need for quality in the export grades, in particular, has meant that a new 
generation of portable circular mills offering greater accuracy, speed, and lower 
manpower needs has made an appearance. A substantial increase in price has 
accompanied the introduction of these new machines. While K4,000 to KS,OOO 
was required to set up a Wokabout Somil operation only a few years ago, the 
price is now around K30,000 for a machine (such as a Lewisaw) and its 
accompanying equipment, and another K6,000 to Kl 0,000 in operating capital, a 
total approaching K40,000. The proportion of the production costs that must be 
allocated to servicing the loan has risen, and a consistent and appreciable 
quantity of timber must be produced. 
Accommodating Social Sustainability 
As the preceding two sections illustrate, it is impossible to consider the 
components of sustainability in isolation from one another. Many socially 
relevant issues are raised in those sections, and complement some of the 
following discussion. 
Two groups, with differing characteristics, form the basis of a future 
ecotimber production industry. The point at which the two groups separate is in 
relation to the infrastructure that is available for the marketing of their product, 
and in the orientation of their producers to consistency of supply. One of these 
groups will, for some time into the future, produce intermittently, with its 
operators heavily engaged in the subsistence activities of their communities. 
The part-time nature of their contribution will warrant a different approach in the 
provision of NGO support than will that of the full-time producers with modern 
equipment and 'modern' loans to service. This latter group faces problems in 
adapting to practices consistent with full-time production, and with putting 
together extractive areas of sufficient size to guarantee the ecological 
functioning of the forests. Communities are not being prepared for the rapid 
social changes resulting from sudden and relatively large inflows of cash. 
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Part-Time Ecotimber Producers 
In an examination of five portable sawmill operations that are claiming 
ecoforestry status in southeast Morobe, it was clear that the mills were used to 
service local community needs such as the construction of community buildings, 
churches, school guesthouses, and so on. They operated only when materials 
were required. They were not commercial ventures, and were not organised in a 
way which would make them commercially viable in the future. One mill was 
generating cash income on occasions by milling high value timber, such as 
rosewood, and selling it in Lae for K450/m3• The profits were used to cover the 
costs of a club which, on occasion, visited festival sites around the country to put 
on performances. The young men who were members of the club gave their 
sawmill services free in order to raise the money to attend these festivals and 
perform. Resource owners were paid in timber, not cash, for lumber extracted 
from their land. 
The use of sawmills only when there is a definite need for cash or materials 
in a community is a common story. It is made possible by the initial donation of 
capital costs, which removes the necessity to undertake consistent production to 
service a loan. Because the cash costs are relatively small, labour is donated, 
and access to markets is limited or information on marketing unavailable, such 
operations are not seen by the villagers themselves as an alternative to the 
income that is generated when their timber resource is sold to large-scale 
logging companies. This is the case even though the mills may have originally 
been donated as an incentive to refuse the offers of logging companies. 
In a rural community, the demands on people's time for subsistence needs 
and for social activity within the community are high, irregular, and in many 
cases immediate - such as a death in the village, the destruction of pig fences, 
the arrival of schools of fish, and so on. Even though many villagers have 
experienced the time demands and constraints of wage labour while working in 
the towns, the social and subsistence demands in the village place such labour in 
a quite different context. Nevertheless, there is considerable potential for the 
many 'older' portable sawmills in these villages to become cash-generating 
options, and thus acceptable alternatives to large-scale logging, if they could be 
brought into the commercial strategy in some form. The point to be made is that 
this type of production is likely to remain intermittent because of the social 
context in which the producers operate and the nature ofthe sawmill's history. 
Full-Time Ecotimber Producers 
The need for those groups using modern equipment, and with ready access to a 
major centre, to produce consistently has been canvassed in the section on 
economic sustainability. There is another question about the ability of producer 
groups to obtain the rights to sufficiently large sections of forest to operate in an 
ecologically sustainable fashion. In the two examples given earlier (Puseka and 
Masing Management Areas), the production forests were at the very bottom of 
the size range for ecological sustainability, given the harvest demands placed on 
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them. In one of these, the usage rights were dependent, to a significant extent, 
on the standing of the manager in the community, his past contributions to the 
community, and his donation of one day's sawmill production per week to the 
community (personal communication, Kiliki Asunu, 14 October 1996). In the 
other, the usage rights were more firmly held by the clan owning and operating 
the sawmill, yet there was still an unresolved land dispute on one boundary of 
the extractive area (personal communication, Bill Girard, 2 October 1996). In 
both of these cases, expansion of the business depended on making arrangements 
with adjoining landowner groups to use the resources on their land, and reaching 
an agreement on royalty payments or the sharing of profits. From an ecological 
perspective, the larger the units that can be put together, the greater the chances 
of retaining the area's biological diversity. However, the incorporation of 
sections of land owned by different groups under one sustainable management 
plan poses a whole range of problems and future uncertainties. 
The problem of interruptions to production, due to social obligations or the 
demands of families for help in subsistence activities, is a major problem for the 
full-time producers. There are expectations of, and strong pressures on, a 
manager to employ workers from amongst his or her own family or clan group. 
Meeting these pressures exacerbates the production problems because death, 
marriage, or festivals can result in the related group all attending, and production 
ceasing for lengthy periods of time. In the Puseka Management Area, the 
manager has overcome these problems to a large extent by employing workers 
from a number of clan groups. In this way, he hopes to avoid interruptions but, 
initially at least, seems to have paid a price for this by having an oversized 
labour force for his mill. 15 He has been using two teams of six men and a 
female book-keeper, but is currently trying to reduce this number. The tree-
felling, the operation of the Lewisaw, and the stacking of timber can be 
adequately handled by three or four men per team. 
Social Accounting 
The introduction of a small-scale forestry business, especially one which is 
producing consistently, can mean a relatively large increase in cash flow from 
wages and profit when compared to the previous experience of a rural village 
community. This increase may in fact double the income of a village and bring 
with it the same sorts of problems and social dislocations that are observable in 
villages absorbing the income derived from large-scale logging. While the 
increased cash may spawn new businesses in the village, and thus lead to further 
redistribution of the wealth created, it is inevitably an uneven redistribution. 
The community is faced with rapid changes in income differentials between 
families, and with changes to its social structure. These are changes that are 
unexpected, and the villagers generally lack the means for dealing with them. 
The preparation of villagers for a sudden shift from a largely subsistence 
economy to a mixed subsistence and cash economy is not being addressed any 
IS This solution to the problem is unique in the experience of the author. 
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better in ecoforestry initiatives than it has been in areas where there has been an 
introduction of income from large-scale logging. The NGOs involved in 
promoting small-scale, community-based ecoforestry need to put more of their 
resources into preparing village communities for change in their societies in 
order to alleviate the need to deal with unforeseen consequences. 
Directions for an 'Ecoforestry' Industry 
The general strategy for the development of an ecotimber industry involves the 
development of markets and the creation of central buying and processing 
centres which are able to guarantee the purchase of all the timber that is 
produced by community-based groups. The central buying centres and the 
actions of overseas 'green' consumers are controlling agents for adherence to 
forest management plans. Certification of ecotimber seems to be a direction to 
pursue, but there are many problems to be overcome and a need to deal with 
future uncertainties created by changing attitudes and involvement of the regular 
timber trade. 
The two distinct groups of ecotimber producers identified here have to be 
incorporated into the commercial strategy of NGOs that are involved in this 
business, and the fledgling ecotimber industry has yet to see itself in a wider 
context where it is integrated with other small-scale, community-based or 
regionally-based income producing activities. 
Strategies for Developing a 'Cottage' Industry 
A direction is being set for the future development of a small-scale sawmilling 
industry with a charter that includes the conservation of primary forest 
biodiversity. This direction is being shaped by forces both within and outside 
the country. It is by no means certain that it will survive with its charter intact. 
Also, it is important to recognise that it is a minuscule industry in comparison 
with the large-scale logging ventures which are currently being undertaken in the 
country, and that it is very much an experimental industry, with a multitude of 
problems yet to be solved in each of the three relevant areas of sustainability -
ecological, economic, and social. 
The general strategy of the main players is to create markets which can 
guarantee the purchase of all the timber being produced by small-scale millers, 
and to make the sale of the timber to central buying points attractive enough to 
act as a controlling factor in the type of forestry being practised. The initial 
development of a local market is to be followed by the development of an export 
market to 'green' consumers in the 'overdeveloped' countries such as Australia, 
the United States, and those in Europe. The export market is to apply pressure 
for adherence to ecologically sensitive harvesting practices and to reduce the 
vulnerability of the industry locally to attempts by large-scale competitors to 
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flood the market with cheap sawn timber.I 6 It is also necessary to create a 
diverse export market, because the small-scale ecoforesters will be able to 
produce more than the local market requires in the short term, if current plans by 
the NGOs assisting in the creation of cooperatives and the central buying centres 
are realised. 
Markets 
At present, the only markets that are willing and able to take a wide range of 
grades are those in Europe, where there is a clearly defined and sizeable 'green' 
consumer segment of the market, and construction grade timbers have 
considerable value. Other markets exist, but they tend to be far more selective 
because the 'green' consumer group is less developed, or because there is a 
plentiful supply of construction grade timbers at low prices. While there may be 
a small premium for ecotimber, it is not large enough to make anything other 
than furniture grade timbers competitive in Australia, where there is a good 
market which is willing to take certain species in small quantities because of the 
nature of the furniture trade (Martin 1996:9-11 ). The west coast of the United 
States also seems to fit this latter category. 
In the medium to long term, markets in Asia need to be developed for 
ecotimber. The potential there is unknown, as little in the way of market 
research has been carried out, and the voice of 'green' consumer groups is 
muted. Some recognition of the need to address the potential of this area for 
ecotimber was evident at the 'Consultative Meeting on Sustainable Timber' in 
Rabaul in September 1996. Given the focus of this meeting on the European 
market, and the Netherlands in particular, practical ways of addressing the issue 
were not developed. 
Certification 
Timber merchants in both the United Kingdom and the Netherlands who have 
been dealing with sustainably produced timber, such as the Ecological Trading 
Company in the UK and Swift Hout in the Netherlands, have been struggling to 
make themselves viable businesses. However, the interest of the general timber 
traders has been increasingly focussed by the notion of certification, 17 and the 
demands of an increasing percentage of their clients for timber sourced from 
well-managed forests. These merchants are also preparing to import large 
quantities of certified timbers. For example, one timber merchant in the 
Netherlands intends to import several thousand cubic metres a year from a 
certified timber operation in Brazil, which is large-scale and has considerable 
16 At present, the ecoforestry industry is small enough to be ignored, but this may not always be 
the case. 
17 
'Certification' refers to an auditing and monitoring system that assures buyers of the timber 
carrying the certificate that they are getting what they pay for in terms of it coming from well-
managed 'sustainable' forests. 
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investment in mills using laser technology (personal communication, Igor 
Mousasticoshvily, 18 25 September 1996). Certification would appear to be a 
direction in which the fledgling ecoforestry industry in PNG must go. At 
present, this matter is complicated by a number of competing certifiers and 
certification schemes, by the power of the large producers, merchants, and 
retailers to contain their costs and their markets, and by the appreciable cost of 
the certification and monitoring process itself. At present, the cost of obtaining 
certification under FSC principles is prohibitive, except for large cooperatives. 
Current certification carried out in the Solomon Islands and in PNG has, to date, 
been accomplished with the generous help of international donors. 
Accommodating Part-Time and Full-Time Producers 
While the organising NGOs concentrate on assisting a group of small-scale 
sawmillers to reach standards of consistency and quality which ensure that the 
requirements of the various markets are met, and the loans on new generation 
mills are serviced, there remains a large number of sawmillers, mostly in areas 
remote from the large towns and ports and easy means of access to these, who 
want to work their forests to capture some cash income. These sawmillers, who 
obtained their equipment some time ago, do not have the loan obligations of the 
former group. Due to circumstance and social organisation, they are not able or 
willing to produce large quantities of lumber consistently, but they still require 
extension services and help in constructing management plans in accordance 
with the long-term preservation of their forests. As a group, they give rise to a 
different set of problems from the sawmillers working their machines and forests 
in a full-time manner, and thus require different approaches to the solution of 
those problems. 
A major problem lies in transporting sawn timber, in excess of local 
community needs, to the central buying points and reprocessing plants. The 
southeast Morobe coast provides an example where a number of community 
owned and operated sawmills are producing intermittently, but in excess of 
village requirements. The owners of the mills have focussed on finding ways of 
transporting their product to Lae. In one case, the subclan that is managing the 
mill is attempting to build a man- a large coastal canoe capable of carrying up 
to five cubic metres of sawn timber.19 Another case which illustrates the 
situation can be found in the vicinity of the Waria River, where a manager has to 
wait for an indeterminate time until a suitable ship is in the area (on another 
purpose) to carry several cubic metres of timber to Lae. 
A solution would seem to lie in convincing these intermittent producers to 
build local drying yards for their product, and in arranging for them to accept 
payment for their timber at fixed points in the year, when a single ship can be 
18 Forest economist at the Instituto Socioambiental, Brazil. 
19 In this case, the villagers have shown considerable initiative in attempting this solution to their 
problems, as the construction represents new technology and new techniques to be learned. 
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sent to service all the local drying and storage yards in a section of the coast. In 
short, the full-time sawmillers would supply the central timber yard and 
reprocessing plant with the certainty of meeting orders and delivery dates 
demanded by the export market and some larger local users of the timber, while 
the intermittent producers could contribute to the remaining sales. 
Small-scale, Community-Based Forestry in Context 
Given a history of commercial utilisation of forests by large logging 
companies,20 it comes as no surprise to find small-scale ecoforestry being 
defined rather narrowly, in the minds of the stakeholders, as the production of 
sawn timber. Even where there are other income-producing forest activities 
being conducted in the same general area as ecotimber production, the mind-set 
is one which views them in isolation. The areas set aside for different activities 
may even be geographically separated, without an accompanying economic 
rationale, although there may be social reasons based on the existence of 
subclans and their differential land ownership or usage rights. 
While the term 'integration' in the concept of Integrated Conservation and 
Development (ICAD) is generally understood by community members as a 
linkage between conservation and development (even if they do not internalise 
it), it is not so well appreciated when it comes to integrating the returns from 
various forest activities into a single concept of benefit. This is particularly true 
of ecotimber production outside of ICAD projects. Being community-based and 
operated means that ecotimber production has to be linked into other services 
which are available in the community, and that some of the costs of production, 
which cannot be captured locally in the case of industrial logging operations, 
will circulate as cash in the village communities. Mutual benefits from the 
integration of forest activities, leading to a conservation of labour and material 
costs, are also possible. A maximisation of the integrated benefit to the 
community, and an accurate and comprehensible estimate of its value, offers a 
more attractive comparison with returns from the industrial logging of the forest 
than what appears to be the piecemeal approach taken at present. The author's 
observation is that 'projects' are initiated by, or proposed to, communities in 
isolation from each other, without the interactions and linkages elaborated, and 
often in a generally ad hoc way which helps underscore the tendency to assess 
their value in isolation from each other. 
This approach reinforces the perception that the immediate quantity of cash 
generated, or the provision of a physical asset, should be the measure of a 
project's worth, instead ofthe project or activity being seen in the context of the 
opportunities it creates for other business activity and cash flow through a 
community. An example of this was recently demonstrated in the Kamiali 
community's dismay at finding that they did not 'own' the training centre being 
20 The activity of these companies is confined to the extraction of logs and, in some cases, their 
processing into sawn timber or woodchips. 
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built (with portable sawmill timber) on a leased section of their land. Only with 
considerable difficulty was the idea conveyed that benefits could flow from its 
presence in the area. Even then, one village delegate to a meeting, which was 
trying to resolve the community's closure of the construction site, expressed his 
belief that wages earned at the site were not a benefit because they had to be 
worked for (author's journal, 11 October 1996). 
A challenge exists for the NGOs that are conducting awareness and 
education campaigns, which are designed to convince rural communities to 
develop their resources themselves in environmentally sensitive ways, rather 
than hand their resources over to large multinational companies, to incorporate a 
consciousness of the wider or more 'integrated' benefit of their own initiative. 
Planning Implications 
There are four groups to consider at this point in time: 
• the communities making the choice to follow a line of development that 
includes 'ecoforestry'; 
• the NGOs providing information, education, and skills that are lacking in the 
communities (and for the time being acting as middlemen between the 
producers and the timber merchants who are supplying the markets); 
• the international donors; and 
• the PNG government at its various levels. 
Up to the present, the government and the commercial timber industry have 
largely ignored small-scale, community-based ecoforestry. It has not proven to 
be a serious competitor for the resources sought by the large logging companies, 
since its production levels have made it uneconomical for the trade to take much 
notice of, or for the government to become concerned with, its revenue-making 
potential. Nevertheless, the rising demand for certification of the production 
history of timber imported to 'overdeveloped' countries, the continued interest 
of international institutions concerned with quality of life issues for rural Papua 
New Guineans or the preservation of the biodiversity of tropical forests in 
funding new ecotimber extraction operations, and the improving organisation 
and scale of the cooperative ventures promoted by national NGOs, may change 
this situation. 
Governments 
Governments and their relevant departments need to address small-scale portable 
sawmilling generally, but especially the activities of those groups lying outside 
the umbrella of the few NGOs that are promoting ecologically sensitive 
management plans. Since these mills allow landowners to harvest pockets of 
forest left behind by other timber extraction operations, or to work terrain that is 
too difficult for the large-scale logging companies, the potential exists for them 
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to add to the damage done by the earlier industrial logging. Current legislation 
allows small timber operations, which are producing less than 500 m3 of sawn 
timber for non-commercial use, to work without any permit, authority, or licence 
(Van Helden 1996:97). While trees are rarely cut on steep-sloping land, there 
are plenty of instances of portable mills operating in swamp forest, close to 
rivers, and in a follow-up to large-scale loggers. 
There is also a need for the government to take a more contextual view of 
the benefits to be obtained from various forms of log or timber extraction from 
forests. The relative benefits of the sort of large-scale logging which is 
promoted at government levels, and that of less ecologically intrusive forms, 
need to be rigorously compared and critically assessed in their social, economic, 
and temporal dimensions, including the sort of attitudes to self-fulfilment which 
the nation wants to inculcate in its people, before one sort of timber industry is 
promoted at the expense of another. 
Meeting the nation's goals for intergenerational equity, as outlined in its 
Constitution, also warrants government intervention to ensure that representative 
and viable examples of the nation's ecological systems are preserved. The 
achievement of this goal would seem to suggest, in the opinion of the author, a 
need for the government to smooth the road for those activities which positively 
reinforce biodiversity conservation. In the context of PNG, where the locking up 
of large tracts of forest is difficult, if not impossible, this would suggest that 
ecoforestry should be considered as one of those activities. While this does not 
mean giving preferential treatment, it may mean taking account of the 
externalities that give an advantage to the large company sawmills in the 
domestic scene. It may also mean providing protection to ecotimber producers, 
if the large company sawmills decide to saturate the market with cheaper 
timbers. 
Donor Institutions 
Most international donors, whether government or non-government, have still to 
come to grips with the commercial realities of the long-term viability of an 
ecotimber industry. There appear to be significant amounts of money available 
for building the capacity of national NGOs, for training purposes, and for 
hardware such as portable sawmills, in cases where there is not an obvious 
commercial component. While this assistance is helpful at the production stage, 
it is the putting together of a viable marketing chain that will produce the 
successful models which are likely to be followed by others. While attempts 
have been made in the past to demonstrate that a marketing chain really can be 
put together, these have been restricted by the lack of economies of scale, by a 
general unwillingness of the commercial trade to take the risks inherent in 
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becoming involved, and by the inexperience and non-commercial orientation of 
the NGOs, both national and internationai.21 
A consultative meeting on sustainable timber, held in Rabaul in September 
1996, and funded by the Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation, 
attempted to address the issues involved in setting up such a marketing chain. It 
is the author's considered view that there was a gap between the producer and 
the importer which is at present enthusiastically but inadequately filled by the 
NGOs which are mainly involved in developing the production end of the chain. 
The presence and input of commercially oriented middlemen with a sound 
knowledge of Melanesian social organisation and the realities of marketing, both 
locally and internationally, seems to be needed at this point in time. 
National Non-Government Organisations 
While scale and consistency of supply remain the biggest hurdles to overcome, 
the strategy of the national NGOs, such as the Pacific Heritage Foundation and 
the Village Development Trust, in developing central buying and processing 
points, seems sound. Financial support from donor organisations for these 
centres in the short term, in order for them to develop their potential as 
commercially viable operations, is warranted. Commercial viability means costs 
being met, and so the support, wherever possible, should be in the form of loans 
rather than gifts in order to encourage efficiency leading to self-sustainability. 
This same argument applies to the provision of finance for the purchase of the 
means of production in village communities. The planning of support for 
ecoforestry ventures should also include a rigorous accountability component. 
An efficient ecotimber industry needs not only training in the skills of small 
business operation, but the experience of having to plan to meet future 
contingencies and costs. It is with monotonous regularity that one finds small 
business groups in rural villages, whether engaged in forestry or other ventures, 
seeking repeated 'start-up' funding for the continuation of their businesses. 
Community Ecoforestry Groups and Communities 
While the raising of community awareness about the implications of various 
income-producing activities, including ecoforestry, are questions of planning for 
'outside' groups, local communities also need to prepare for the changes in their 
lives that will be brought about by the introduction of these activities. There is a 
need for community members to clearly define the objectives behind an 
increasing cash flow, and to decide what aspects of their traditional lives they 
want preserved or isolated from the effects of the shift to a mixed subsistence 
and cash economy. The question of unequal income distribution, and the ways 
in which redistribution will occur in the village, are examples of issues for which 
preparatory thought needs to be given at the local level. Planning for change and 
2l For a description of an attempt to build a marketing chain to Australia, see Farley, Gladman 
and Martin (1993). 
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the mitigation of undesirable aspects is an important element of preparation, if 
there is anything to be learned from the lessons of disrupted social life in the 
industrial logging areas. 
Conclusion 
The government has largely ignored small-scale, community-based forestry to 
this point in time. However, the numbers of portable mills that are operating, 
and their potential for environmental damage, suggest that regulation in 
warranted. The achievement of constitutional goals for intergenerational equity 
and the redistributive and self-fulfilment aspects of ecotimber production are 
issues for the government to consider in depth. 
Donor agencies and institutions need to take on board the viability of the 
marketing chain from producer to consumer if they are to meet their objectives. 
The manner in which funds are supplied is also relevant in developing a 
commercially viable industry. 
NGOs that are working for development of the industry need to rigorously 
account for their expenditure of donor funds in terms of outcomes, and to make 
the costs of production transparent, if they are to shift small-scale producers to a 
commercially competitive position. 
Finally, village communities that are embarking on ecoforestry ventures 
need to prepare for the social changes inherent in the choice which they have 
made, and to plan to mitigate any undesirable consequences. 
CHAPTER13 
THE POLITICS OF LARGE-SCALE 
TIMBER CONSUMPTION IN JAPAN 
ANJALIGHT 
'I don 't want to live in comfort while others suffer at my 
expense. We Japanese are being made to live barbarously 
without even knowing it. I hope that you, as the leader of Japan, 
will be the first to realise this. ' (Message from a Japanese 
citizen to the Prime Minister of Japan as part of the Japanese 
tropical timber campaign.) 
Introduction 
The fate of Papua New Guinea's (PNG's) forests and people lies not only in the 
hands of decision makers in PNG (whether they be in the village or the national 
parliament), but in the hands of policy makers, corporation bosses, and average 
citizens in timber consuming countries. 
No country consumes more imported tropical timber than Japan. Effecting 
change in Japanese national politics or in the practices of multinational 
corporations to ensure their support of ecologically sustainable and socially 
equitable forest management has been extremely difficult. What has been more 
productive to date is the growing grassroots movement to effect a change in 
Japan's timber 'over-consumption' habit. A reduction in demand for tropical 
timber and an increase in demand for domestic sources in Japan can only have 
positive effects on the world's forests, increasing their economic value and 
recognising their priceless value in sustaining life. 
A challenge to those of us on the 'outside' of Japan is to try to understand 
Japanese culture before hoping to change the practices of the Japanese 
government and corporations through international pressure. Japan has risen 
from complete military defeat four decades ago to become the world's most 
economically powerful nation. Six of the world's ten largest multinational 
corporations, as measured in terms of sales, are Japanese. The powerful sago 
shosha ('general trading companies') deal in almost every commodity in almost 
every country. Japanese government policies support processes of industrial 
expansion and resource development that are very often carried out by these 
sago shosha. 
But, as we are all aware, material wealth does not always bring well-being. 
Japan's own people have little choice in what these multinational corporations 
do; rather, they are almost completely dominated by them. It comes as a 
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surprise to many that the decline of Japan's own plantation timber industry has 
caused hardship to local communities in Japan, and that continuing exploitation 
of Japan's scarce remaining primary forests is strongly opposed by the 
indigenous people of Japan, the Ainu. 
In the first part of this chapter, I shall look at the current trading trends and 
the history of tropical timber consumption in Japan, with a focus on PNG. The 
second part introduces Japan's domestic forest situation and its relation to timber 
imports, and studies the stages and impacts of grassroots campaigns to reduce 
consumption and waste of tropical timber. In the final, part I discuss the tactics 
that local campaigners have used to influence local government policies, and 
give some examples of typical responses from the national government of Japan. 
The information presented is drawn largely from the research of Japanese 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in particular the Sarawak Campaign 
Committee (SCC) and the Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JA TAN), in 
addition to my own personal experience in seven years of forest campaigning in 
Japan. 
Consuming Passions 
Tropical Timber Imports 
With only 2 percent of the world's population, Japan is the world's largest 
consumer of tropical timber, accounting for some 30-40 percent of the world's 
trade (see Table 13.1). Imports account for 75 percent of Japan's overall timber 
consumption of 110 million cubic metres per year. 1 There are two major 
reasons why the Japanese are the biggest consumers of tropical timbers. Firstly, 
the wasteful use of timber and timber products, excisable waste, and a 
throwaway mentality that seems an inexorable part of any economic boom, 
perpetuate the seemingly insatiable demand for more logs. Secondly, the 
structure of the Japanese economy makes the exploitation of domestic timber 
sources more expensive than imports. 
1 Taiga Rescue Network, 1995, 'The Taiga Trade' 
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Table 13.1: World trade in tropical hardwood logs, 1991. 
Importing countries 0/o share Exporting countries 0/o share 
Japan 39 Malaysia 74 
China (incl. Taiwan) 18 Papua New Guinea 5 
South Korea 14 Gabon 4 
Thailand 5 Cameroon 3 
France 3 Burma 3 
India 3 Liberia 3 
Hong Kong 2 
Other 16 Other 8 
Source: FAO Yearbook 1991, reprinted in SCC 1994. 
Papua New Guinea exported 1.5 million cubic metres of logs to Japan in 
1995. They were used, like most of the tropical timber which Japan imports, 
largely as a sort of waste product. More than 75 percent of tropical logs are 
converted to plywood, of which half is used in the construction industry (see 
Table 13.2). Around 20 percent of plywood is used as mouldings for concrete 
formwork, and used only once or twice before being thrown away. Other uses 
for tropical plywood include cheap furniture (called 'colour boxes') and packing 
crates. It is common to see plywood used to 'protect' other materials - like 
concrete walkways or the interiors of lifts - while construction work is taking 
place. Another Japanese phenomenon is the use of plywood boards during 
elections to display the posters of the various parties. During the national 
election for the House of Councillors in the summer of 1992, poster boards were 
set up in 343,000 locations nationwide. The amount of plywood needed for this, 
if stacked vertically, would have made a pile 14 kilometres high. It was reported 
that 80 percent of the poster display boards remained empty the day after the 
election period started.2 
Table 13.2: Consumption of tropical timber in Japan. 
Form Constr'n Furniture Packaging Flooring Other Total 
Plywood 39% 27% 8% 3% 75% 
Sawn wood 11% 6% 4% 4% 24% 
Woodchips 1% 1% 
TOTAL 50% 33% 12% 4% 4% 100% 
Source: SCC 1994. 
Compounding the consumption problem is the short lifespan of 
constructions in Japan. Japanese houses and buildings are torn down and rebuilt 
after an average of 20-30 years, resulting in tremendous overconsumption and 
waste, not only of tropical timber, but of many other resources. Housing starts 
averaged 1.61 million during 1987-1991, exceeding those of the United States 
2 Yomiuri Shimbun (Japan), July 1992, in Mori No Koe, March 1996. 
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every year during this period, even though Japan's population is only half that of 
the USA.3 Japanese rainforest groups rightly point out that promoting 
alternatives to tropical timber without addressing these examples of planned 
obsolescence will merely transfer the problem of unsustainable resource 
management to other timber-supplying countries. 
There are two common misconceptions about Japan's role in forest 
destruction. One is that the use of disposable chopsticks is a major cause of 
tropical forest destruction. While disposable chopsticks do represent a 
conspicuously wasteful use of timber in Japan, they account for less than one 
percent of Japan's overall timber consumption and are not primarily sourced 
from tropical hardwoods. The second misconception is that Japan purposefully 
protects its own forests while overexploiting overseas forest resources. In fact, 
large imports of cheap timber have been disastrous for Japan's forests. Japan's 
own forest industry, as a result, is in financial strife. This means that jobs are 
lost and plantations cannot be properly maintained, so there is a decline in the 
quality of the timber they supply. According to Professor Minori Kumazaki, 
who teaches forest management at Tsukuba University in Tokyo, domestic 
plantation forests can provide enough timber for Japan's needs but they cannot 
compete economically with the cheaper imports.4 
Campaigns to reduce tropical timber waste in Japan have been effective, 
both in real terms and in raising general awareness about forest issues. At the 
same time, organisations in Japan point out that much more needs to be done to 
ensure that: 
• Japan's own plantations are sustainably utilised as a timber source; 
• policies to reduce timber waste are vigorously adopted; 
• research into, and adoption of, ecologically sustainable alternatives to 
tropical timber are both increased; and 
• any imports are sourced from independently monitored sustainable forestry 
operations. 
Basic Trading Trends 
Japan's 1995 tropical timber imports totalled 11,695,000 cubic metres (see Table 
13.3). Over the past few years there have been increases in imports of tropical 
plywood, particularly from Malaysia, while there has been a gradual reduction in 
hardwood log imports. Since the 1980s, there has been a general downward 
trend in tropical timber imports. What is not so clear is the extent to which this 
3 Kazuko Matsue, Report to Conference on Sustainable Forestry, New Delhi, April 1994. 
4 Email conferences, 1995, 'Environment-Japan: Wood Imports Soar as Local Forests Flourish', 
by Suvendrini Kakuchi. 
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is due to a reduction in supply, a reduction in overall demand, or increasing 
substitution of temperate timbers. 
Table 13.3: Japan's tropical timber imports, 1988-1995 (in millions of cubic 
metres). 
Form 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Raw logs a 11.7 12.6 11.1 10.1 9.9 7.4 6.8 6.5 
Sawn woodb 1.2 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Plywoodc 1.8 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.8 3.7 4.0 
TOTAL 14.7 17.3 15.1 14.2 13.9 12.6 11.8 11.7 
=RWEt1 17.9 22.6 19.8 18.9 18.5 18.6 17.8 17.9 
Notes: 
a Tropical hardwood log import data prior to 1995 do not include statistics from Africa. 
b Data for 1995 tropical sawn wood imports are totals for January-November 1995 from 
Nihon Nanyozai Kyogikai (Japan South Seas Timber Council) January 1996 statistics. 
Data for other years are for the full year and are from Nikkan Mokuzai Shimbun. 
c Tropical plywood import data for 1988-1992 are for imports from Indonesia only 
(which constituted more than 95 percent of the total), whereas data for 1993-1995 are for 
imports from Indonesia and Malaysia. 
d Roundwood Equivalent (RWE) is a measure of the 'underbark' log volume which 
would have been necessary to obtain one unit of volume of the processed product. 
Statistics for roundwood (volume) equivalents have been calculated on the basis of the 
conversion coefficients (1.82 for hardwood sawn wood, and 2.3 for plywood) used by the 
FAO (1991). 
Source: Compiled by SCC from the Nikkan Mokuzai Shimbun, 25 and 27 March 1993; 
26 May 1994; 6 February and 8 March 1995; 15 February and 1 March 1996; and Japan 
Lumber Reports, 2 April 1995. RWE statistics calculated by SCC. 
Log imports from PNG increased by 10.1 percent to 1.9 million cubic 
metres in 1994, but then decreased by 17.9 percent to 1.6 million cubic metres in 
1995, while imports from the Solomon Islands increased by 12.8 percent to 
338,000 cubic metres in that same year (see Table 13.4).5 
5 Mori No Koe, publication ofthe Sarawak Campaign Committee, Issue No. 8, March 1996. 
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Table 13.4: Sources of Japan's tropical hardwood log imports, 1992-1995 (in 
thousands of cubic metres). 
Source 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Sarawak 6,363 4,922 4,463 3,902 
Sabah 2,064 293 0 6 
Papua New Guinea 1 '161 1,754 1,932 1,586 
Solomon Islands 309 346 338 381 
Laos 13 13 40 30 
Burma 13 76 22 17 
Africa 0 0 0 531 
Other 46 30 5 0 
TOTAL 9,969 7,438 6,802 6,455 
Source: As for Table 13.3. 
The History of Japan's Tropical Timber Trade in Asia and Papua New 
Guinea 
Japanese trade in tropical timber dates back to the second decade of this century. 
Many Japanese companies were already involved in logging operations in the 
Philippines in the 1930s. There was a hiatus after the Second World War, but 
from 1950, the trade resumed in earnest, far surpassing pre-war import levels. 
By 1960, imports had reached 4.5 million cubic metres, and this amount had 
more than doubled by 1966. Japan's own forests were severely depleted during 
the war effort and imports were an essential factor in the country's 
reconstruction. Tropical timber was one of the fuels of the post-war recovery, 
and then of the rapid economic growth of the 1960s. However, during these 
processes, intensive logging in the Philippines, which was the main source at 
this time, put that country's forests almost beyond recovery, and many Filipinos 
were marginalised through the loss of their traditionalland.6 
The Japanese timber industry foresaw that log supplies from the Philippines 
would soon run out and, using resource development funds from the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, as well as other sources of finance, they 
targeted Kalimantan and Sumatra for future timber supplies. 
The forests of the Philippines were virtually logged out in the 1960s and 
Japanese trading companies moved on to Indonesia through the 1970s and early 
1980s (see Table 13 .5). An Indonesian ban on log exports from 1980 to 1985 
forced Japan to seek new sources and it set its sights on the dense dipterocarp 
forests in the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Sabah instituted a similar 
ban on log exports in 1993, and since that time, the major suppliers of logs have 
been Sarawak, PNG, and the Solomon Islands. 
6 Yoichi Kuroda, cited in Mori No Koe, April 1993. 
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Table 13.5: Japanese imports of logs from tropical timber producing countries, 
1950-1989 (in thousands of cubic metres). 
Year Philippines Malaysia Indonesia Other Total 
1950 111 8 0 1 119 
1955 1,846 160 18 0 2,024 
1960 3,475 1,145 17 3 4,682 
1965 5,632 3,471 104 99 9,306 
1970 7,542 6,020 6,091 585 20,238 
1975 2,853 6,660 7,298 522 17,333 
1980 1,073 8,580 8,639 663 18,955 
1985 510 11,293 138 1,001 13,001 
1988 33 10,621 0 1,001 11,655 
1989 52 11,323 0 1,184 12,650 
Note: 'Other' refers to PNG, the Solomon Islands, and so on. 
Sources: Statistics for the period 1950-65 and 1988-1989 are from 'A History of Timber 
from the South Seas' (Japan South Sea Lumber conference), and those for 1970-1985 are 
courtesy of the Japan Plywood Manufacturers Association. 
Sabah' s ban on log· exports, and a one-month moratorium on logging in 
Sarawak (the largest supplier of tropical logs) in December 1992, have both 
shown that supply restrictions can result in increased prices. The price of 
meranti logs from Sarawak jumped from US$172-180/m3 in October 1992 to 
US$400-430/m3 in March 1993.7 This may be important to note when assessing 
the impact of any restrictions on the export of PNG timber to the international 
market. 
The general attitude of Japanese traders, when faced with dwindling 
supplies from any one source, is summed up in comments made by the head of 
Mitsubishi's Environmental Affairs Department. When asked what would 
happen after his company's Malaysian concession ran out of logs, he said: 
'Probably we would like to seek another source' (EIA 1996). 
In recent years, Japanese companies have increased their imports of 
temperate timbers and have set up operations in Siberia and North America. 
However, it is likely that they will continue to purchase tropical timbers from 
Malaysian transnational logging companies who have recently been expanding 
their operations into Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Zaire, Cameroon, Guyana, 
Surinam, and Brazil, as well as the Pacific region. 
The impact of large-scale industrial logging in the countries which have 
supplied Japan's tropical timber habit to date have been devastating. The 
Philippines has experienced major floods which have killed thousands of people 
and devastated their farmlands. Disruption of weather patterns has affected 
traditional planting of crops and compounded the destructive effect of wild fires 
7 Gekkan Mokuzai Joho, April 93. 
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in Kalimantan. Losses of biodiversity are incalculable, and the impact on the 
role of forests as a carbon sink will have global implications. More than five 
hundred tribal people in Sarawak have been arrested since the late 1980s for 
erecting peaceful blockades on logging roads in attempts to prevent their lands 
from being logged. 
Japanese Logging Companies in PNG 
Japanese logging companies featured prominently in the Barnett inquiry into 
logging in PNG. Some companies have since pulled out of PNG. However, 
Japanese corporations are still buying timber produced by companies highlighted 
in the report for their unsustainable and corrupt practices. The corporations take 
little responsibility for ensuring that the timber they buy is sourced from a 
sustainable logging operation. 
Japanese companies were among those which Justice Barnett found to be 
ignoring measures to lessen the impact of logging. Gaisho, for example, ignored 
every one of the environmental clauses of its permits, causing rivers and streams 
to become blocked or silted with eroded soil (see Barnett 1989b). Mitsubishi 
also featured through United Timber, a front company created entirely through 
its loans. Mitsubishi had concealed profits of US$1.5 million through 
undervalued purchases from United Timber (Barnett 1989c ). This company has 
recently pulled out of PNG. Stettin Bay Lumber Company, a subsidiary of 
Nissho lwai, claimed in 1994 to be a 'model company', but, according to PNG's 
National Alliance of Non-Government Organisations (NANGO), it is causing 
serious environmental and social problems.8 Representatives from NANGO and 
the Solomon Islands-based Development Services Exchange met with Nissho 
lwai on 1 March 1994 in what was described as a 'very heated' discussion.9 
Case Study: Jant and Action in Japan 
The most infamous Japanese operation in PNG is undoubtedly the Japan and 
New Guinea Timber Company (JANT), which is controlled by the Honshu Paper 
Company. It operates in the Gogol-Naru area in Madang Province, PNG. For 
over seventeen years it has been logging and chipping virgin rainforest to make 
cardboard boxes. The local people claim they have been paid only K 1.25 per 
person per year in royalties. 
Jant's operations began in Madang in 1973 on a 67,000 hectare concession. 
Plans to replant the area covered only 6 percent of the area which had been 
clear-cut and entailed a monocrop of eucalyptus (see Montagu, this volume). 
The company is alleged to have conducted a number of illegal activities in PNG, 
8 These problems were raised in an open letter from NANGO to Japanese trading, plywood, 
construction and housing and furniture companies which import or use tropical logs from PNG 
and/or the Solomon Islands. 
9 Trip Report, Visit to Japan in March 1994 by Environmental NGOs from PNG and the Solomon 
Islands, Chronology of Activities, JATAN. 
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including continuing to log after its contract expired in August 1991, cutting on 
areas with slopes steeper than 30 degrees, and felling trees within 50 metres of a 
nver. 
In 1990, more than 2,500 of the 3,000 villagers living in the Gogol-Naru 
area signed a petition addressed to the Jant company and the PNG government, 
stating that their 'sacred grounds are no longer visible [,] ... the top layer of the 
soil is beyond repair [and] ... fresh meat for the daily diet is a luxury that is now 
no longer entertained in the huts of the Gogol-Naru peoples ... '. When their pleas 
for compensation for the damage to their lands were ignored, local landowners 
took to blockading Jant's operations for five days in November 1990. They 
ceased their blockade in good faith, on the understanding that the company 
would keep to its newly made promises for compensation. However, the 
company stalfed and delayed any action on these promises, and was accused of 
using bribery and threats to wear down the resolve of the people. 10 
In May 1991, the people of Gogol-Naru took their case directly to the 
Honshu headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. James Jogamup, representing the people 
of Gogol-Naru, joined members of the Rainforest Information Centre and 
JATAN outside Honshu's head office in a colourful demonstration. James 
Jogamup toppled a three metre high tower of cardboard boxes bearing Honshu's 
name in Japanese and English. The delegation also presented the company with 
2,500 signatures as evidence of the people's dissatisfaction with the company's 
operations. After initially refusing to speak with Jogamup and his colleagues, 
four executives of Honshu Paper finally agreed to meet. The discussion was 
disappointing - the executives refused to offer any compensation, and 
maintained that the demands by the Madang landowners were unreasonable. 
With respect to consumer awareness and political pressure on Japan's 
international forest policy, the action contributed greatly to knowledge ofPNG's 
forest situation and the role of Japanese logging companies. Some fifty Japanese 
people joined the demonstration - the biggest ever in Japan on this issue. The 
story was covered by eleven national and international television stations. 
Jogamup's comment after pushing over the mountain of cardboard was: 'These 
boxes come from my people's forests, what an incredible waste!'11 This was 
heard by millions of people around the world. 
Forest Politics 
'As NGOs we are to keep a watch on government and industry while being a 
voice for the citizens and environmental victims.... The ideology behind the 
concept of sustainable development implies the use of non-violent, conservation 
10 Asples Madang Press Release, 12 May 1991. 
11 PNG Post-Courier, 20 May 1991. 
302 The Political Economy of Forest Management in Papua New Guinea 
oriented techniques of using resources and producing goods on the one hand and 
restrictions on wasteful consumption on the other. '12 
Forests in Japan 
Forestry in Japan is in trouble in many ways - financially, socially and 
ecologically - according to the Sarawak Campaign Committee, Consumers 
Union of Japan, Friends of the Earth (Japan), and other Japanese citizens' 
groups. These groups issued a joint statement in response to the comments of 
the Director-General of the Japanese Forestry Agency, Takahisa Tsukamoto, at 
the Fifteenth Session of the International Tropical Timber Council. He had 
stated that 'the Japanese government has continuously carried out sustainable 
management of Japan's forests'. The truth, according to the above-mentioned 
groups, is that Japan's Forestry Agency is fighting a snowballing US$24 billion 
debt that grew by US$1.5 billion in 1992. The government is drastically cutting 
workers to reduce this deficit, with their workforce of 72,000 people in 1973 
dropping to just 20,000 in 1994. Without enough labour input, the plantations 
are not being managed properly, and the timber they produce is poor in quality. 
At present, only 25 percent of Japan's forest stock is cut each year. 
Two-thirds of Japan is covered by forests. Fifty percent of these are 
plantations of Japanese cedar or cypress. Despite this, Japan's scarce remaining 
primary forests are still targeted as a timber and pulp supply. It is estimated that 
70 percent of Japan's terrain has been damaged by logging or other human 
activities. 
Table 13.6: Japanese consumption, production and trade in industrial wood, 
1888-1985 (in millions of cubic metres). 
Year Consumption Production Exports Imports 
1888-92 6.4 6.4 0.0 0.0 
1903-07 11.6 12.1 0.6 0.1 
1918-22 17.3 16.8 0.6 1.1 
1933-47 24.2 22.0 1.1 3.4 
1948-52 37.8 37.7 0.2 0.2 
1960 54.8 49.0 1.8 7.5 
1970 101.6 46.2 1.1 56.4 
1980 108.1 34.6 0.8 74.4 
1985 92.5 33.1 0.4 59.8 
Source: Abstract prepared by the SCC, from a paper prepared by Dr Minoru Kumazaki 
(Professor of Forestry, Tsukuba University), published in Mori No Koe (SCC newsletter), 
1993. 
12 Statement from the second Asia-Pacific NGO Environmental Conference, Seoul, 28 March 
1993. 
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It is Japan's primary forests that provide the main wildlife habitat. 
Exploitation has decimated populations of species such as the Tsukinowa bear, 
and very little of what remains is protected. Out of 7.62 million hectares of 
national forest, a mere 1.43 million hectares (3.8 percent of Japan's land area) is 
off-limits to logging. While national parks cover 14.1 percent of Japan's land 
area, logging is still allowed in all but 5.12 percent . The few remaining islands 
of natural forest are already fragmented by roads, railways, towns, tree 
plantations, and golf courses.13 
Indigenous people in Japan are still fighting to protect the remaining 
primary forests in Japan's north. The Ainu, who have demonstrated the 
sustainable use of their forests for thousands of years, are still struggling to be 
recognised as a distinct people in Japan. Oji Paper, linked to the Honshu parent 
company of Jant and the giant Mitsui corporation, have ravaged huge tracks of 
forest in Hokkaido. The Ainu people, represented by Tadashi Kaizawa, have 
appealed to the Mitsui Corporation to return the mountain forests in the area of 
Nibutani to the Ainu people.14 
The harvesting of primary forests is something like a mining operation. In 
the first extraction, you can easily make quick profits. If you have to spend time 
and money maintaining a plantation or regrowth, with thinning and proper 
management and long-term planning, the profit margin decreases. Around the 
world, virgin, old-growth forests are the preferred source for trading companies 
because their product is usually cheaper. 
Forest Campaigns in Japan 
In September 1986, at the world's first international NGO meeting on the crisis 
of tropical forest destruction, 15 Japanese representatives revealed the extent of 
Japan's involvement in the destructive tropical timber trade. In 1989, Nectoux 
and Kuroda published their book, Timber from the South Seas: An Analysis of 
Japan 's Tropical Timber Trade and Its Environmental Impact, which further 
informed the world about Japan's complicit role in global forest destruction. 
The Japan Tropical Forest Action Network (JATAN) was formed out of the 
Japanese branch of Friends of the Earth in Tokyo. Its aim was to raise 
awareness on global tropical forest issues, put pressure on Japanese corporations 
involved in the timber trade, and provide information about Japan's role in 
global forest exploitation to the rest of the world. 
Since that time, other groups have formed, including the Sarawak 
Campaign Committee (SCC), which focuses on campaigns to lower 
consumption of tropical timbers. The Japan Catholic Commission on Peace and 
13 Kengou Furubayashi, Tokyo University of Agriculture and Industry, cited in SCC's Mori No 
Koe, March 1996. 
14 Takeda Shigenori, Green Earth Network, Shisamu Tsushin, Vol. 32. 
15 'Tropical Forest Crisis in the Third World', held in Malaysia. 
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Justice has been active on issues specifically relating to the situation of PNG and 
the Solomon Islands. One way that they have raised awareness to influence 
policy in Japan is by inviting representatives from affected areas to bring their 
message directly to the people of Japan. In March 1994, Marius Soiat, the 
Environment Committee Chairman of NANGO, and Moses Sylvester Bariri, the 
Environment Training Officer of Development Services Exchange (DSE) of the 
Solomon Islands, were invited to tour Japan by JATAN and the Japan Catholic 
Commission on Peace and Justice. They met with their Japanese NGO 
counterparts, Japanese government officials, and Japanese companies which are 
importing or using timber from PNG or the Solomon Islands. They also 
conducted a number of lectures in Japan to inform citizens of the situation facing 
their forests. During their meetings, it became apparent that there was a very 
low level of awareness about PNG and Solomon Islands forestry issues. At one 
meeting, with the Japan Department Stores Association (which sells furniture 
made from tropical timber), executives stated that they were not aware of the 
problems in PNG and the Solomon Islands, they did not know the origin of the 
wood in the furniture which they sell, nor that forestry is an important industry 
for tropical countries.I6 
Trading Houses 
Japanese companies are mutually linked through complex corporate structures, 
known as keiretsu. At the core of these industrial groupings is usually a bank 
and an insurance company. They operate at all levels of the international trade 
in tropical timbers. They supply the logging companies with machinery to build 
roads and bridges and to cut and transport trees. They also ship logs and process 
them. Others provide engineering and business expertise on various aspects of 
the logging industry. For instance, Sumitomo Forestry and Marubeni have 
invested in joint ventures with Malaysian firms to establish plywood factories in 
Sarawak. 
Early campaigns in Japan boldly confronted major corporations involved in 
the logging and importation of tropical timber, using street theatre and other 
colourful actions. These demonstrations were well covered by the Japanese 
media, and brought information to the general public. In one action, the 
President of Marubeni was lured to the front entrance of his corporation's 
building to collect an award from the Japan Tropical Forest Action Network. 
The award turned out to be a giant chainsaw marking his company as Japan's 
principal destroyer of tropical forests. In 1991, a 20-metre long 'Godzilla', 
emblazoned with the corporate logos of the ten largest tropical timber traders, 
wove its way through the streets of Tokyo. It stopped at the head offices of each 
of these corporations, spitting out pieces of tropical plywood with messages to 
end the unsustainable trade. 
16 Open letter from NANGO (PNG) to Japanese trading, plywood, construction, housing and 
furniture companies which import or use tropical logs from PNG or the Solomon Islands. 
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In the late 1980s, international organisations around the world initiated a 
campaign which focussed on Japan's major timber trading houses. Soon after, 
almost every major corporation set up its own environment department. The 
US-based Rainforest Action Network still runs a 'Boycott Mitsubishi' campaign 
- exposing Mitsubishi' s involvement in temperate, as well as tropical, forest 
d~struction. Unfortunately, major corporations have, in the main, responded to 
international concern through extravagant 'greenwashing' techniques and by 
taking steps to try to hide their trail of destruction. In a classic case of corporate 
propaganda, Mitsubishi produced their own comic book in 1991 and distributed 
it free of charge to every school in Japan. It erroneously portrayed tribal people 
as the major rainforest destroyers through their traditional swidden farming 
techniques, while Mitsubishi (a major importer of Sarawak logs) was shown to 
be helping protect the forests through replanting schemes (later revealed to be 
entirely inadequate). The Sarawak Campaign Committee immediately launched 
a successful campaign to recall the comic books from schools. 
Some campaign efforts in Japan have focussed on forcing major 
corporations and aid agencies to make their activities transparent and open to 
public scrutiny, as the government of Japan claims that it does not have any real 
control over the activities of these corporations. In recent years, Japanese 
corporations have withdrawn their own logging companies from many countries, 
including PNG, Sarawak, the Philippines, and Russia, but continue to buy their 
timber. One could speculate that this has been in response to the international 
spotlight on their activities. It appears that Malaysian logging companies have 
taken their place, expanding their operations to many countries and maintaining 
the supply of timber to these Japanese trading companies. 
In 1992, campaigners took to the streets hoping to encourage the Marubeni 
Corporation to disclose the details of its tropical timber imports from Sarawak. 
After a hunger strike and a nine-day vigil by ten people outside their head office 
in downtown Tokyo, Marubeni finally released their import figures. Other 
major corporations soon followed suit. Some of the hunger strikers managed to 
meet with executives from the timber trading department. Their general 
response to our concerns (about their buying massive volumes of timber from 
sources known to be causing suffering to indigenous people and destroying 
irreplaceable forests) were typical of other corporation's positions: 
What can we do? Japanese people want to buy the timber and we, as 
good corporate citizens, are making a product available to them. If 
people want to buy it, then we have a duty to supply it. It is up to the 
country to manage its resources. 
Bringing the message about why rainforests are being destroyed directly to 
the people of Japan, and asking them to reduce their personal consumption of 
tropical timber products, has been an ongoing activity of JA TAN and the SCC. 
Indigenous representatives from affected areas have visited various cities in 
Japan on many occasions. Volunteers from the Australian based Rainforest 
Information Centre (RIC) have helped carry out two nationwide multi-media 
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'Rainforest Roadshows' to raise awareness and, in particular, to encourage the 
formation of rainforest action groups to work locally for a reduction in tropical 
timber consumption. 
Local Government Campaigns 
In 1994, there were over sixty groups or individuals throughout Japan working 
to protect tropical forests. Since 1991, they have been meeting on a biannual 
basis to exchange information and discuss future actions. Most of them have 
actively lobbied their local governments for a reduction in the use of tropical 
timber in public works. Sarawak government officials have complained that 
these campaigns have contributed to a reduction in demand for Sarawak timber. 
Some of the highlights of the ongoing efforts to lobby local governments to 
reduce tropical timber use include: 
• January 1994: The Japanese Ministry of Construction published a paper 
outlining guidelines for addressing environmental concerns. For the first 
time ever, the Ministry clearly stated that reduction in the use of tropical 
timber was a policy objective and called for the adoption of explicit reduction 
goals. 
• July 1994: The SCC sent a questionnaire regarding tropical forest protection 
to all 761 Japanese Diet (Parliament) members. As of 20 September 1994, 
170 had responded, of whom 85.3 percent said they 'intended to take action 
for tropical forest conservation'. 
• August 1994: The SCC met with the Environmental Conservation Bureau of 
the Tokyo Government to discuss progress in the implementation of the 
tropical timber use reduction policy adopted by Tokyo in June 1993, which 
called for reduction of tropical timber use to 50 percent of 1993 levels by 
1996 and to 30 percent by 1998. The Bureau informed SCC that 52.5 percent 
of the plywood panels used for moulding concrete in Tokyo's public 
constructions were made of nothing but tropical timber and that these panels 
were used an average of 1.8 times. 
• April 1995: The citizens' group JATAN-Ehime mailed letters of appeal for 
tropical forest conservation to seventy local governments in Ehime 
prefecture. As of September 1995, seventeen had responded, and five said 
that they were making efforts to reduce tropical timber use. 
• October 1995: The Housing Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
announced that it would make efforts to reduce the use of tropical timber, not 
only for kon pane (concrete formwork panels), but also for interior finish 
work. 17 
17 See Mori No Koe, Issue No. 8, March 1996. 
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The experiences of a local network of rainforest groups in the Kansai area 
highlight the challenges inherent in changing policy in Japan, yet also indicate 
the success that can result through persistence. Osaka city in the Kansai area 
followed Tokyo's lead back in 1991, when Tokyo first announced that it would 
reduce tropical timber use. As of February 1994, a total of seventeen out of 
forty-five local governments in Osaka Prefecture had begun some kind of effort 
to accomplish this goal. The group known as 'Hutan' had also initially targetted 
the major trading companies with visiting delegations of indigenous people from 
Sarawak, writing letters and making other attempts to negotiate- all to no avail. 
They consequently shifted their focus to targeting local governments with the 
rationale that they were more accessible to the average citizen and that this type 
of campaign had been effective in Western countries. Reactions from local 
governments ranged from claims that they had no knowledge about tropical 
forests, that diminished use of tropical timber would put people out work, that 
the forest grows back quickly after harvesting, and that slash-and-burn farming 
is destroying tropical forests. Later, officials began to say that they would 
follow the lead of the national government if the latter made guidelines first. 
Finally, the mayor of Osaka responded to a letter from the mayor of Osaka's 
sister city, San Francisco, calling for a halt to tropical timber use. In January 
1992, the mayor of Osaka announced a reduction policy to the media 
(incidentally without having informed the 'Hutan' group). 
Yoshio Nishioka of 'Hutan' says that there is a kind of peer group pressure 
to which governments react: after a number of policies have been passed, it 
seems that local governments start to worry about being 'left behind. He lists 
some lessons about lobbying local governments in Japan: 
• when approaching assemblies, it is important to try to get widespread support 
and not become too dependent on particular assembly members; 
• technical constraints make a total ban on tropical timber highly unlikely- it 
is much easier for local governments to take action to reduce use; 
• instead of just criticising, present alternatives; 
• it is best to target prefectural (state) governments first, and if you are 
successful, municipalities will follow suit; 
• if you hit a wall, use the external pressure of letters from sister cities overseas 
and the internal pressure of letters and requests for negotiations; 
• get information to the media, politicians, and so forth; 
• provide officials with data; 
• once reduction efforts are started, push for clear reduction goals and 
requirements in specifications; and above all 
• NEVER GIVE UP! 
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One of the main arguments that the groups use when convincing local 
governments to implement tropical timber policies is the availability of 
alternatives, particularly in the case of the concrete formwork panels which 
make up around 20 percent of the tropical timber use in Japan. They are 
commonly used only once or twice before being thrown away. A study group 
was formed in Tokyo that includes the expertise of architects and others 
involved in the construction industry. There are a range of options which can be 
used instead of tropical plywood for concrete form work panels, including the use 
of pre-formed concrete made with steel forms which can be used indefinitely, 
the use of plantation softwood species for plywood, and painting the surface of 
the timber so that the forms can be used many times over. 
Responses of the Central Government 
When the then Prime Minister of Japan, Mr Muruyama, was asked at the G7 
meeting in 1992 about Japan's implementation of its obligations for tropical 
forest protection following the Rio Earth Summit, he responded with the fact 
that Japan was a signatory to the International Tropical Timber Agreement 
(ITTA), and that, through this forum, Japan was helping developing countries to 
achieve their goals for sustainable forest management. 18 In the meantime, the 
policies of the International Tropical Timber Organisation (which was the 
organisation formed from the ITT A) have been repeatedly and soundly criticised 
by international NGOs. 
In 1993, members of the Rainforest Information Centre and the SCC met 
with representatives of the Japanese Forestry Agency to discuss the 
government's response to the demands of a petition entitled: 'Petition for the 
Protection of Tropical Forests and the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples'. 
The first demand was to establish an immediate moratorium on importation of 
tropical timber from Sarawak, Malaysia, and other regions where sustainable 
forestry management has not been achieved and logging has resulted in severe 
human rights violations against indigenous peoples. The Forest Agency position 
(in brief) was as follows: 
• Both conservation and sustainable utilisation are needed to realise the 
maximum potential of tropical forests as an economic and environmental 
resource. 
• Japan is working towards achievement of the ITTO's goal to limit the 
tropical timber trade to timber from sustainable sources by the year 2000. 
• The Japanese government must respect Malaysia's sovereignty. 
• The Japanese government will have to wait for the formation of an 
international consensus to judge whether human rights violations and 
18 Personal question to the Prime Minister asked at a press conference at the G7 summit in 
Munich. 
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environmental destruction can be considered sufficient to warrant measures 
that overstep Sarawak' s sovereignty. 
• The Sarawak government is carrying out logging in a systematic manner on 
the basis of its forestry plans. 
In August 1993, another series of meetings was held with government officials 
from the Forestry Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Environment 
Agency. There was little change in their response. The SCC, which organised 
the meetings, reported that it was unable to persuade the government to take any 
concrete measures on tropical forest issues. 
The government of Japan is extremely reluctant to take any action which 
may disrupt a profitable trade in tropical timber or in their international relations 
with trading partners. The overall policy is to stick with the process of the 
ITTO. The ITTO is a commodity agreement between forty-three nations which 
jointly control the vast bulk of the tropical timber trade. Voting power within 
the ITTO is proportional to the country's level of production or consumption of 
tropical timber. Therefore, most power is held by Japan (as the major tropical 
timber consumer) and by Malaysia and Indonesia (as the largest producers). 
When the ITT A came into force on 1 April 1985, Japanese and international 
NGOs were cautiously optimistic and sent representatives to observe meetings. 
By 1995, they had almost completely abandoned the process and called for an 
end to its existence, since it was proving to be 'worse than useless' in protecting 
tropical forests. It is hard to believe that an organisation dominated by the 
countries with most profit to gain from the timber trade will ever sincerely 
implement practices that may restrict logging rates. 
The ITTO has made much of its claim to meet a deadline for sustainable 
forestry in the year 2000. ITTO's own 1995 mid-term review revealed that only 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Ghana were likely to meet this target. Most 
international NGOs would hotly contest the view that any of these countries are 
on the path to sustainability. 
Most NGOs have transferred their efforts back to campaigns for lowering 
timber consumption. In addition, they have supported steps for the independent 
monitoring and certification of logging practices through organisations such as 
the Forest Stewardship Council, and have supported small-scale community 
forestry projects as models for future forestry practices. 
It appears that Japan is not playing a prominent role in discussions on 
timber certification, despite the fact that, as the largest importer, it should be 
making the greatest effort to be able to reassure its citizens that its imports are 
sustainable. A representative of the Forest Ministry of Japan at the International 
Conference on Certification in Brisbane, Australia, in May 1996, had little to say 
about his country's involvement or interest in this issue. It appears that the main 
impetus on this front is coming from European countries. 
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Conclusion 
In the words of Yoichi Kuroda of JATAN: 'By altering business and trade 
policies, passing legislation and informing the general public, the Japanese will 
be accepting the responsibility that an economic power of its size must bear.' 19 
However, actually convincing the government of Japan and Japanese trading 
companies to take responsibility is a mammoth task. If they can be persuaded to 
shift their enormous economic power from destructive trade practices to sincere 
efforts to sustain not only the timber 'resource', but its myriad of other 
functions, it will be one of the best hopes for the forests and people ofPNG. 
I have attempted to present some of the campaign methods that have been 
employed by groups in Japan to effect change in policies regarding the tropical 
timber trade, but there are, no doubt, many which I have missed. It can only be 
hoped that further momentum will be added to their progress, and that there will 
be more creative ideas to influence policy and stronger links between NGOs and 
indigenous peoples in Japan and PNG. 
This movement in Japan would not exist if it were not for a handful of 
exceptionally dedicated, talented, and courageous individuals working in 
minimally funded non-government organisations. I believe that one of the best 
ways in which this policy debate can move forward is to support their efforts in 
any way possible. 
Let me conclude with part of a message delivered to the Prime Minister of 
Japan as part of the Japanese tropical timber campaign: 'The age of thinking 
only about oneself is over. It is important to think about where something has 
come from before one buys it. If the forests disappear, the people making a 
profit from logging will not be able to live either.' 
19 Paper from the Biennial Conference on the Fate and Hope of the Earth, Nicaragua, June 1989. 
CHAPTER14 
THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
IN P APUA NEW GUINEA 
JOHN MILLETT 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the economics of sustainable development in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) forestry. It investigates the concept of 'sustainable development' 
itself and such associated concepts as 'constant capital stock', 'irreversibility' 
and 'the precautionary principle'. The remainder of this section introduces the 
principal stakeholders in the enterprise of sustainable development and the 
principal activities in that enterprise. A simple descriptive social system model 
is then outlined and sustainable forestry positioned within it. Next, relevant 
aspects of the global environmental debate are canvassed briefly, as is forest 
policy in PNG, before consideration is given to the economics of sustainable 
development. 
In PNG the forests are owned by the people. Owing to the country's late 
entry into the modern era - some centuries later than its Southeast Asian 
neighbours - it has a small, scattered population, and ten times the land area per 
capita (70 percent of it still forested) than neighbouring Asian countries which 
are also home to substantial tracts of moist tropical rainforest. 
Particularly since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, moist tropical rainforests 
have become a major subject of interest to international environmental 
movements concerned with global warming and biodiversity issues. The 
Government of Papua New Guinea discharges its international responsibility and 
authority with respect to environmental management and resource development 
in the context of private customary ownership of the resource. Just one and a 
half million hectares of a total forested area of 36 million hectares have been 
logged. For many landowners the forest is an obstacle, and its exploitation a 
quick method of access, to development. Their needs are simple, modest and 
consistent - roads, schools, health centres and economic opportunities to earn 
money which retains its purchasing power over time. Government failure to 
deliver related services has led them to exploit their forests to meet these needs. 
Forest owners in PNG and international environmental non-governmental 
organisations are thus very differently motivated. 
In this triangle of stakeholders, the national government sides with the 
resource owners for fiscal as well as political reasons. Reflecting the nation's 
economic youth, the demand for infrastructure, health and education services far 
exceeds government's capacity to finance their delivery. Realising the economic 
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rent potential of the forest is a quick way to ameliorate the chronic fiscal 
deficit. 1 
Resource owners will look beyond timber values, to the alternatives 
advocated by environmentalists, for ways to benefit from their forest only when 
the alternatives are put to them in comparable financial terms. But markets for 
non-timber forest values are not well formed, particularly in the case of 
conservation for biodiversity or recreational uses. Conservation strategies imply 
a non-production subsidy and hence raise the question of who pays - producing 
resource owners, PNG's taxpayers, or the international community (see Taylor et 
al. 1994: 15)? Furthermore, eco-forestry (see Martin, this volume) has yet to 
demonstrate its financial viability, while downstream processing on a large 
scale, as a substitute for raw log exports, has the same drawback despite its 
popular appeal. In any event, export logging will be the opportunity benchmark 
for evaluating alternative strategies. 
Social Systems and Forestry 
Society is served by four types of organisations: productive (or economic) 
organisations, maintenance organisations, adaptive organisations, and 
managerial-political organisations (Katz and Kahn 1966). Productive 
organisations are concerned with providing goods and services, and include 
producers in the mining, farming, forestry, manufacturing, transportation and 
communication sectors. Maintenance organisations are concerned with the 
socialisation and training of people for roles in other organisations and in the 
society at large. Schools and churches are the major examples of maintenance 
organisations. Adaptive organisations are intended to create new knowledge and 
innovative solutions to problems. The research laboratory is the prototype of 
such organisations, and universities (as research organisations rather than 
teaching organisations) would also belong in this category. Managerial-political 
organisations have to do with the coordination and control of people and 
resources, and with adjudicating among competing groups. The national state 
and the agencies of government at local and provincial levels provide the major 
examples of this category, although community groups, labour unions, business 
groups, and other special interests would also be classified as managerial-
political organisations. 
The boundaries between the four systems are sometimes blurred. For 
example, education is increasingly seen as the formation of human capital, an 
activity analogous to the way the productive system forms physical capital. 
Both forms of capital are essential for development; and without either of them, 
natural resources will not deliver development. This point is particularly 
relevant to a 'late starter' like PNG. The country's endowment of natural 
resources is always and often remarked upon by leaders and policy analysts 
alike. But only rarely and reluctantly do they recognise that half the nation's 
1 See Filer (this volume) for comparison with the fiscal potential of the non-renewable resource 
sector. 
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primary school age children are not in school. This apparent confusion of cause 
and effect in the process of development may explain much of the pervasive 
disappointment with the rate of development. Natural resources are created 
rather than given- a point taken up later, in some detail, in the case of forestry. 
The productive system must put out more than it takes in. The surplus is 
necessary for the operation of the maintenance and adaptive systems on which 
the productive system itself depends. The managerial-political system allocates 
the nation's resources among these systems, including some to itself. How well 
does it allocate the nation's resources? Does it absorb too much of them itself? 
These are not trivial questions. On the contrary, it is fashionable today to talk 
about governance as a resource. Good government is as important to a country's 
socio-economic success as are its natural resource endowment and the 
productivity of its economic organisations. PNG's productive system is 
operating far below potential, and its managerial-political system is absorbing 
much of its output. Together, these weaknesses have put pressure on the forestry 
sector to expand, raising questions about sustainability. The opportunity to 
expand has come from increased export demand for logs as other countries in the 
region have banned log exports. · 
Harvesting old growth forest yields an economic rent. Since nature itself 
cannot collect the rent, the managerial-political system must do so, and then 
distribute it amongst the stakeholders, including nature. This attracts politicians, 
as well as businessmen and professional advisers, to the opportunities for 
immediate gain, thereby expanding the number and range of stakeholders 
beyond the primary three: resource owners, loggers and the state. Some of these 
extra stakeholders have a global perspective. 
The Global Context 
The world is not about to run out of wood, although a few low-income countries 
do face shortages of wood which they use for fuel and shelter. Forests still cover 
three and half times as much of the earth's surface as cropland (Cairncross 
1991:12). Four-fifths ofthe forests that existed at the dawn of the industrial era 
remain today. The losses occurred mainly in the temperate forests of Europe 
and North America. However, as a consequence of the passing of the steam age, 
there are more trees in these parts of the world now than there were a century 
ago. 
Today's deforestation occurs in tropical countries. According to Vincent 
and Binkley (1991 :99), for example, 62 percent of Peninsular Malaysia was 
forested in 1972, and 58 percent of the forest was old-growth. By 1982, both 
proportions had declined to 52 percent. Over this period old-growth forest was 
depleted at the rate of 2.8 percent per year. 
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Rich Man's Lament 
Rich countries worry about tropical deforestation because it raises the world's 
temperature and lowers its biodiversity. For the poor countries who own the 
forest, deforestation is a way of converting natural physical capital into human 
capital and human-made capital and, hence, into rising living standards. But, 
say the mainly rich-country conservationists, preserving forests guarantees a 
better living than converting them. 
Why? Because, according to the conservationists, poor-country 
governments typically exaggerate the economic gains from conversion and 
ignore the costs of it. They exaggerate the gains by not capturing for their 
countries enough of the economic rent derived from logging for export. They 
ignore the costs by not enforcing good practice and by allowing fragile soils to 
be exposed to erosion which has the effect of silting up waterways, mangrove 
swamps, and coral reefs. They ignore the opportunity costs of conversion by not 
knowing the economic values derivable from intact forest. 
PNG has some basis to claim at least partial exclusion from this stereotype. 
With its resolve stiffened by the assistance of the World Bank and the donor 
community, the government's new forest revenue system of progressive export 
taxes and royalties captures a fair proportion of the economic rent (see Filer, this 
volume). Furthermore, in 1996, the industry adopted a new Logging Code of 
Practice, though it is too early to say how well it is being complied with. 
Is the World Really Warming Up? 
Whom should we believe - the 2,000 scientists who make up the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or the twenty-four scientific 
dissenters whose book, The Global Warming Debate, finds fault with the IPCC's 
work?2 Does it make sense, ask the dissenters, to measure global temperatures 
with mainly land-based thermometers when oceans make up two thirds of the 
earth's surface? Which are right - terrestrial thermometers which record rising 
temperatures since 1979 or satellite thermometers which show no warming 
trend? 
Even if the world is warming, is man responsible or are sunspots? Carbon 
dioxide and methane gases trap the heat the earth receives from the sun, but 
otherwise would reflect, preventing the earth from freezing like its neighbour 
Mars - a natural greenhouse effect. Modelling this effect with predictive 
accuracy has proved difficult. Like these gases, sulphates are also released into 
the atmosphere by burning fossil fuels, but as aerosols with the opposite effect-
reflecting incoming radiation and cooling the earth. Including this 
countervailing effect has wrought a better fit between the IPCC model and 
reality. Yet the dissenters say it is a fudge. Other scientists say that this 
2 See the debate in The Economist, March 23-29, 1996, page 91. 
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century's shortening of sunspot cycles, which have been tracked since the 
sixteenth century, is what has warmed up the planet. 
Even if the world is warming and man is responsible, putting an end to the 
logging of moist tropical rainforests would not make it cooler. The best that a 
halt to tropical logging in poorer countries could achieve would be to slow the 
warming rate. Growing more trees in the richer countries with temperate 
climates would achieve the same result. Offsetting the warming effects of 
emissions from fossil fuels would require continual additions to the forest stock 
-a practical impossibility (World Bank 1992: 163). 
A Not-So-Fragile Environment 
In contrast to the conventional belief that living matter is passive in the face of 
threats to its existence, James Love lock ( 1995 :9) explores the theory that the 
earth's air, oceans, and land surfaces form a complex system which has the 
capacity to keep Earth a fit place for life. 
Life first appeared on the Earth about 3,500 million years ago. From 
that time until now, the presence of fossils shows that the Earth's 
climate has changed very little. Yet the output of heat from the sun, the 
surface properties of the Earth, and the composition of the atmosphere 
have almost certainly varied greatly over the same period. 
The chemical composition of the atmosphere bears no relation to the 
expectations of steady-state chemical equilibrium. The presence of 
methane, nitrous oxide, and even nitrogen in our present oxidising 
atmosphere represents violation of the rules of chemistry to be 
measured in tens of orders of magnitude. Disequilibria on this scale 
suggest that the atmosphere is not merely a biological product, but 
more probably a biological construction: not living, but like a eat's fur, 
a bird's feathers, or the paper of a wasp's nest, an extension of a living 
system designed to maintain a chosen environment. Thus the 
atmospheric concentration of gases such as oxygen and ammonia is 
found to be kept at an optimum value from which even small 
departures could have disastrous consequences for life. 
The climate and the chemical properties of the Earth now and 
throughout its history seem always to have been optimal for life. For 
this to have happened by chance is as unlikely as to survive unscathed 
a drive blindfold through rush-hour traffic. 
How Much Biodiversity Does the World Need? 
The economist Malthus, writing at the end of the eighteenth century, warned that 
it was man's destiny to starve since he would run out of land to feed himself. 
Almost two centuries later, in 1972, the world's population having trebled and 
average living standards having increased five-fold in the interim (UNDP 
1996: 12), the Club of Rome proclaimed that the world would run out of essential 
commodities within a hundred years. But the prices of these commodities 
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continue to fall, signalling relative abundance, not scarcity. The concern most 
often expressed now is not with the planet's capacity to provide human beings 
with raw materials but its capacity to absorb their waste and maintain its own 
biodiversity. 
Biodiversity is good for humanity. It is the source of the wild strains that 
plant breeders introduce into domesticated crops as insurance against the pests 
and diseases which are encouraged by genetic uniformity. It is also the source of 
some life-enhancing medicines and drugs. But how much of it does the world 
need? The low price that rich countries are presently prepared to pay poor ones 
to preserve the biodiversity values in their moist tropical rainforests suggests 
that the world has more than it needs. Perhaps humanity does not yet understand 
the true value of biodiversity. Perhaps this ignorance presents a marketing 
opportunity for PNG to raise biodiversity awareness and the non-timber value of 
its forests. Current policy, however, is geared almost exclusively to realising 
timber values; and, on the basis of this brief canvassing of relevant aspects of the 
environmental debate, properly so. 
Policy Overview 
PNG forestry pursued a processing policy until 1979. A very large increase in 
statutory minimum wages between 1972 and 1975 reduced industry 
competitiveness. Faced with a shrinking industry, government changed its 
policy to promote landowner participation in log exports. The Barnett Inquiry in 
1988 and 1989 revealed an industry in a policy vacuum with corrupt 
interventions, operating to poor environmental and financial standards. 
As a result of this inquiry, the government placed a moratorium on the issue 
of timber permits and once again adopted a processing policy. Government also 
breached the moratorium on several occasions, most notably just prior to the 
1992 elections. Consequently, the permitted cut is far in excess of the 
sustainable cut. In 1993, assisted by sharply rising prices, the actual cut also 
exceeded the sustainable cut. At the same time, however, the National Forestry 
and Conservation Action Plan (NFCAP), a K50 million multi-donor aid 
programme, was helping PNG to regain control of its forestry sector. NFCAP's 
major and most urgent challenge is to reduce the permitted cut to the sustainable 
level and raise operational standards to best practice (Taylor et al. 1994: 13). 
Under a structural adjustment programme and economic recovery loan 
coordinated by the World Bank, the PNG Code of Logging Practice was adopted 
in 1996, while a new revenue system was adopted in two stages - a progressive 
export tax in November 1995 and a progressive royalty in July 1996. The 
industry claimed incapacity to pay the extra royalty. 
The forest revenue system in PNG comprises royalties, export taxes, 
specific-purpose levies and contract-specific premiums. Until November 1995, 
royalties and export taxes varied with species groups. Royalties were charged 
on volume and export taxes on value. Stimulated by rising log prices and fiscal 
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pressures, export tax rates which were 10 percent, 20 percent and 30 percent in 
1992, had risen, by March 1994, to 26 percent, 36 percent and 46 percent 
respectively. The second and largest of the two incremental increases occurred 
after prices had peaked and were declining. The 1996 budget changed the 
royalty and export tax schedules to a progressive ad valorem basis applying to 
all species (see Filer, this volume). 
Two other revenue systems have been suggested for PNG- stumpage and 
auction. The stumpage system was proposed by the National Forest Authority 
but never accepted by the National Executive Council. Gill is ( 1992: 144) 
considers that the conditions necessary for feasible auctions prevail in few 
countries with sizeable tropical forests, and that many of the benefits of annual 
auctions may be secured without auctions. Duncan (1994:5) describes the 
annual auction system as superior to all the others, mainly because it provides an 
incentive, lacking in other systems, for loggers to compete amongst themselves 
on cost, maximise log prices and hedge price risk, and because it could also help 
to break down the high degree of concentration of ownership of logging activity 
evident in PNG. The putative disadvantages of the export tax are that: it forces 
an income transfer from landowners to domestic users of logs or to government; 
it devalues trees, and therefore forest conservation, in the eyes of the landowner; 
and it encourages landowners and loggers to collude in illegally shipping logs 
(AusAID 1995:40). 
Sustainable Development 
How well are PNG's forest policies geared towards sustainability? Let us begin 
by considering the pursuit of 'integral human development', the first of the 
National Goals and Directive Principles enshrined in the Constitution. Though 
complex, this is held to embrace, at least, material living standards rising above 
the level of mere subsistence- the stable state that has existed for 10,000 years. 
Sustainably rising living standards or consumption levels require some 
investment - that is, foregoing some current consumption. Government is 
required to undertake the leading investment, for example, in physical 
infrastructure and in human capital formation. 
PNG's fourth national goal deals specifically with the environment and 
places a constraint on development: 
We declare our fourth goal to be for Papua New Guinea's natural 
resources and environment to be conserved and used for the collective 
benefit of us all, and to be replenished for the benefit of future 
generations. 
Analysis across countries and over time reveals that development is 
characterised by pervasive structural change in the economy and society. 
Among the more important trends are the transitions from rural to urban and 
from agricultural to industrial society, and from an economy dominated by the 
self-employed to one in which employee status dominates. Second, only a small 
portion of the growth in per capita output may be explained by the growth in per 
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capita inputs. Third, trade is not the main engine of growth, although it is 
important. Fourth, the fundamental engines of growth appear to be 
technological and institutional change - that is, the capability to derive more 
than ever before from the resources at hand. The generation and productive use 
of new technologies and new institutional arrangements are both intimately 
related to investments in the capabilities of human agents -the process of human 
capital formation. By their nature, technological and institutional changes are 
unlikely to proceed incrementally but in quantum jumps. 
The environmental load generated by development comes from increasing 
numbers of people, rising consumption per person, and the cost per unit of 
consumption of using the environment as a raw material source and a waste sink. 
Environmentalists worry that the global environmental load will soon exceed its 
capacity. Do they worry unnecessarily? Consider plausible trends in the three 
components of the environmental load. First, developed world population is 
projected to stabilise around the middle of the next century, global population a 
century later. Second, there are biological and psychological reasons for 
believing that mankind's material needs are entirely satiable. Third, technology 
tends to reduce the environmental load due to a unit of consumption. These 
three trends together imply that the global environmental load will stop growing 
at some time and then decline. The sustainability question is whether 
environmental capacity will allow the peak to be reached or whether global 
development needs to be truncated. If the world does face truncated 
development, enforced by an environmental constraint, questions of 
distributional equity across nations and between generations arise. 
The degree of truncation would depend on the nature of the constraint. 
Beckerman (1995:128) notes 'strong' and 'weak' concepts of sustainability in 
the literature. The strong environmental constraint is enshrined in the 1987 
Brundtland report: 
The loss of plant and animal species can greatly limit the options of 
future generations; so sustainable development requires the 
conservation of plant and animal species. 
According to Beckerman, keeping open future options in this way, at the 
expense of alleviating acute poverty today, is 'morally repugnant, as well as 
totally impracticable'. The weak concept of sustainability allows for the running 
down of natural resources to be compensated by the building up of other 
resources, including man-made capital. Because the acceptability of the 
substitution is judged in terms of sustaining human welfare, Beckerman finds 
that 'weak sustainability' is no different from the economist's concept of 
optimising welfare. 
Both of these constraints are, in fact, man-made ones, and are not imposed 
by the limits of environmental capacity to either supply man's material needs or 
dispose of his waste. 
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A stable world population and per capita consumption- that is, zero growth 
of global consumption - would require the environment to yield raw materials 
and dispose of waste at constant rates. This holds out the theoretical prospect 
that, as a waste sink, environmental capacity need not truncate human 
development. Recycling technologies, which act to reduce both these rates, 
enhance that prospect. Recycled materials, instead of adding to the disposal 
load, reduce the raw material load. But, unless recycling technology can achieve 
100 percent efficiency, the environment would have to yield a positive flow of 
raw materials, even at a constant rate of global consumption - something which 
a finite planet could not sustain in perpetuity. However, truncating development 
by achieving zero global consumption growth at a lower level of global 
consumption would not change this condition - it would merely lengthen 
inescapably finite life. Nor is there an obvious moral basis for favouring 
longevity over quality of life. 
One's preference between conventional goods and services, on the one 
hand, and environmental quality, on the other, depends also on how much of 
each one has. Poorer people's incentive is to favour more goods and services 
over the environment in general. In the same way, poor countries would be 
foolish to sacrifice economic progress in the longer-term interests even of their 
own environment, let alone of the world in general. Nor does it make sense for 
the developed countries to grow more slowly in order to leave resources 
available for the growth of the developing countries. Their growth is essential to 
provide the expanding markets for the exports of the primary producers. 
As people get richer, as their basic needs for food, water, clothing and 
shelter are satisfied, they attach importance to other ingredients in total welfare, 
including the environment. Accordingly, communities will be more willing and 
able to allocate resources to this purpose. The changing pattern of output in 
advanced countries reduces the relative burden on the environment. At higher 
levels of income, industry accounts for a smaller share of GDP, whereas 
relatively non-polluting services increase their share. Industry itself experiences 
a shift away from highly polluting heavy industries towards those which employ 
relatively more skilled human capital and use relatively less energy or raw 
materials. Policies to combat pollution have been introduced mainly in richer 
countries, since they have the resources to implement their shift in priorities. 
Consequently, higher incomes are clearly associated with environmental 
abatement. 
Even if the developing countries themselves do not see the threat of climate 
change as warranting the cost of reducing their emissions of 'greenhouse gases', 
the greatest potential to do so rests with them. This is because of their high 
population growth and low, but rising, levels of per capita energy consumption 
compared to the developed countries. By contrast, the developed countries have 
the resources to take effective action to moderate global warming, but less 
incentive to do so, given the small share of agriculture in their national products. 
A global solution to the problem, if indeed it is one, would require a transfer 
from the developed countries to the developing ones. 
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Economic Concepts of Sustainability 
Economic concepts of sustainability cannot be divorced entirely from other 
concepts of it, such as social and ecological ones. The well-being of a society 
depends on more than the consumption, production and investment activities of 
households and businesses. The good society is concerned not only with the 
aggregate of material well-being that a sustainable economic system may bring, 
but also with how it is distributed amongst its members. It is concerned, 
particularly, with alleviating poverty amongst those of its numbers who are 
unable to participate fully in the economic system. This is not to suggest, 
however, that economics concerns itself only with growth and efficiency, and 
not with equity. Economics is driven by both of these principles, and by the 
interaction between them. Growth provides a better basis than non-growth for 
equitable distribution of both the inputs and the outputs of the economic system, 
while equitable distribution in turn provides positive feedback for sustainable 
growth. 
Just as the good society is concerned with the social impact of a strong 
economy, so it is concerned with its ecological impact as well. The economic 
system takes raw materials from its bio-physical environment and puts back 
waste. At different times, economists have worried about the capacity of the 
biosphere to yield the quantities of raw materials needed for the economic 
system to maintain the living standards of a rapidly growing population. Today 
the concern is more with its capacity to absorb waste from the rising living 
standards of a growing population without threatening its own health and 
sustainability. It would be wrong-headed, however, to associate environmental 
damage only with high-technology modern industrial economies. It is rather the 
case that technology twice blesses society. First it enhances the capacity of the 
environment to supply raw materials to the economic system; second it cleans 
the waste that the economic system disposes to the environment. Nor are 
subsistence economic systems, at the other end of the technological spectrum, 
ecologically neutral. Instead, they are often the chief cause of deforestation. 
Economic growth and development in such societies, which requires capital 
formation, can reduce their demands on the forest. 
Constant Capital Stock 
Three economic concepts are particularly relevant to the idea of sustainability: 
constant capital stock, irreversibility and the precautionary principle. 
Maintaining constant capital stock is a limiting case of the general condition in 
capitalist economies of accumulating capital stock. Only when populations stop 
growing and reach a steady state, and all needs are being met, may the capital 
stock also stop growing. Although no economy has yet reached this stage, it is a 
plausible global condition. 
The law partially protects the capital stock owned by corporations from 
diminution. For example, company directors may normally distribute to 
shareholders only profits made after providing for replacement of the capital 
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stock used up in producing the output and associated profit. Similarly, the 
authorities may levy income tax only on such profits. In order to maintain 
constant capital stock, the company must replace consumed capital. In order to 
accumulate capital stock, directors normally distribute as dividends only part of 
the profit, retaining the remainder in the company to finance future capital 
formation. 
Whereas the law protects the capital stock from diminution through income 
tax, it does not do so with respect to other forms of taxation. For example, 
royalty and export tax constitute input costs to the logging industry, not 
contingent taxes on profit. It is conceivable, therefore, that particular 
combinations of market prices and input costs could result in negative profit, 
hence a diminution of the capital stock of the logging industry - a condition 
which is currently said to exist by the industry in PNG. 
Such an unsustainable and unstable condition may be remedied only by the 
loggers reducing the costs over which they have control, or by the resource 
owners and government reducing the costs over which they have control, or 
both. The currently situation in PNG is that the loggers are doing all of the cost 
reduction. Inevitably, they claim, part of this reduction will be in the capital 
stock, which means less royalties to resource owners and less taxes to 
government in the future. Log export volumes in 1995 were 15 percent down on 
the previous year; but for the first three quarters of 1996, they were 4 percent up 
on the same period in 1995. It is not easy to tell the extent to which these 
changes in output were due to weather conditions, to landowner disputes holding 
up operations, or to withdrawal of capacity from areas made unprofitable by 
excessive tax rates. 
Whereas the law and economic managers pay close attention to what 
happens to the man-made capital stock, they are less concerned about the natural 
capital stock - a form of myopia of great concern to environmentalists. In old-
growth forest, in which mortality equals net photosynthetic activity, any harvest 
rate will exceed growth, and the timber stock will decline. To see that this is so, 
imagine clear-felling a long strip of uniform width in an extensive forest. If the 
harvest rate in the old-growth forest equals the growth rate of secondary forest, 
then, when the first of the secondary forest is reaching old-growth density, the 
average timber stock in the strip, now all secondary forest, is approximately half 
the original old-growth stock, in quantity if not in quality or value. It is 
important, therefore, that the financial proceeds from liquidation of natural 
physical capital such as old-growth forest is used to finance the accumulation of 
man-made capital - physical infrastructure, directly productive assets, and 
human capital - as the means for raising standards of living for society. 
Measuring the capital stock and how it changes over time is a necessary starting 
point. 
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Stocks and Flows 
A man-made asset is valued in two ways: first, at the cost of creating it or, more 
correctly, of replacing it; and second, at the present value of the future periodic 
income flows that it generates. 
The first method is the more certain one, simply because it relies on more 
reliable past or present information, whereas the other relies on less reliable 
present information about the future. But it is also the less relevant one, because 
the principal reason for creating an asset is to enjoy the future flow of benefits it 
generates. This is why value is said to rest in the eye of the beholder. Some 
beholders deal with uncertainty by varying the discount rate that links future 
income flow value with present asset stock value. Others vary the value of the 
income flow. The second way is the more rational one, because it is the flow 
whose measure is uncertain, not the discount rate. It is also a less risky way, 
because a negative flow value, which we might wish to avoid, would not escape 
detection, whereas it might do so if uncertainty were dealt with by varying the 
discount rate. Today's forecast measurement of a future economic variable is 
more properly represented, not by a single number, but by a probability 
distribution of numbers. The distribution, at a minimum, would be specified by 
a measure of central tendency and another of dispersion. Negative values which 
would be revealed in the measures of dispersion could be concealed in the 
measure of central tendency and cause unwanted future surprises. 
Discounting the Future 
Individuals generally would rather receive a benefit now than in the future. 
Conversely, they would rather face a cost in the future than now. The more 
time-distant the benefit or the cost, the less its significance to the individual 
now. This behaviour may simply reflect impatience or, to use the more 
scholarly term, 'time preference'. It may also reveal the understanding that 
capital is productive; that a benefit received and invested today will generate 
increasing benefit in the future. Both behaviours discount the future. The rates 
at which they do so influence the allocation of resources in an economy. 
Theoretically, for an individual, the two rates are identical, but taxes and 
imperfect markets make them different in practice. Furthermore, they would 
vary from one individual to another. Smil (1996: 16) cites a poll of 2,600 people 
which revealed implied discount rates of 7.4 percent per year over 25 years 
reducing to 4 percent over 100 years. The government uses a 1 0 percent 
discount rate in evaluating its public investments. 
Economic growth raises the discount rate. The more an individual expects 
to have in the future, the less willing will he be to make sacrifices today in order 
to obtain even more at a later date. But poverty also raises the discount rate. 
The satisfaction of immediate needs for food is more compelling than the 
assurance of long-term food security. Much of the literature argues that high 
discount rates work against the environment: they lead to faster depletion of 
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exhaustible resources and more intense harvesting of renewable ones (but see 
Pearce, Markandya and Barbier 1991: 143 ). 
In the Eye of the Beholder 
PNG's forests are vastly more difficult to value than any of its man-made 
physical assets. On one hand, using the cost approach to asset valuation, it 
might be argued that, since the forest cost PNG nothing to create, it has no value. 
It could also be said that this is the main explanation for the unsustainable 
harvesting observed in parts of the country. On the other hand, the prices 
loggers pay in royalties, levies and export taxes puts a value on the forest. In 
recent years, government has raised those prices and that value. Loggers claim 
government has made some forests so 'valuable' that it is too costly to harvest 
them. If loggers are efficient and their claim is true, then such forests would 
have no timber value because they would generate no future timber incomes. 
Value increases until it crashes to zero! 
When man arrived on the part of the earth's crust which has been called 
Papua New Guinea since 1975, the forest was already here, and perhaps in much 
the same condition as it is now. The forest yielded food, shelter and fuel to the 
hunter-gatherer, and also some spiritual and aesthetic values. In time, the 
hunter-gatherer learned how to be a farmer of plants and animals, and thus to be 
a more efficient economic unit. This transition reduced the value of the forest, 
and increased that of the soil, to its human occupants. As population increased, 
cropland displaced forests. 
Recently, the autarchic farmer became the trader engaged with the rest of 
the world. This engagement created potential values for both competing forest 
and cropland. The rest of the world wants wood, biodiversity, eco-leisure, a 
carbon sink. Does the change from a closed economy to an open one therefore 
warrant a world market valuation of PNG's forests at K76 billion (Sekhran 
1994b:34) or K100 billion (Henderson 1996a:131)? Clearly not. The rest ofthe 
world has to pay for these things before value is created. An income value to 
PNG of K3 billion is more relevant and realistic, as detailed later. 
Diversity is not only characteristic of PNG's forest ecology, but also of the 
analyst's assessment of the sustainable rate of harvest, and hence of the value of 
the productive forest. At one stage, the World Bank (IBRD 1965: 143) reckoned 
that about a quarter of the forest (some 10 million hectares) had commercial 
potential. It called for the annual log harvest to increase from 200,000 cubic 
metres in 1962-63 to 750,000 cubic metres in 1969-70. At a later date, the 
World Bank (1989:21) estimated the sustainable harvest at 3.6 million cubic 
metres annually from six million hectares of net utilisable forest. The Australian 
government (PNGADCP 1993: 1) has estimated an annual sustainable harvest of 
three million cubic metres from three million hectares, after allowing for 
conservation and agricultural conversion.3 Interestingly, the most recent of 
3 Before these allowances the sustainable cut would be 6.4 million cubic metres. 
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these estimates comes close to the 2.6 million hectares assessed as far back as 
1970 by Mclntosh and Granger for a viable processing industry (World Bank 
1989: 16). 
The World Bank's later estimates were based on natural regenerative 
growth of 0. 75 centimetres per year in stem diameter at breast height (db h) and a 
mean annual increment of 0.6 cubic metres per hectare. White ( 1976:9) 
provides sample survey data on five forests. These data and the natural dbh 
growth rate imply annual merchantable volume growth (stems 50 cm dbh and 
larger) of 2.3 percent. Nadarajah ( 1993 :38), citing data provided by the PNG 
Forest Authority, reveals that a grand total of 4.76 million hectares have been 
allocated for harvest at approximately 25 cubic metres of merchantable logs per 
hectare. 
Of the total area allocated, about 60 percent remains unlogged, providing, at 
current harvest rates, a further 20 to 25 years of old-growth logging. Provinces 
such as West New Britain, where harvesting rates far exceed the average, face 
much shorter logging lives. The process of allocating the remaining 20 percent 
of the productive forest began with the government's simultaneous call for 
expressions of interest in six new areas.4 Upon allocation of the total productive 
forest, an annual harvest of more than 3.5 million cubic metres would exceed the 
natural regenerative growth rate. 
Currently the rest of the world is paying about K450 million f.o.b. per year 
for PNG's logs. Sales value exceeds natural capital value by the cost of 
generating sales. These costs include operating costs, consumption of the man-
made capital employed, and normal profit on that capital. Natural capital value 
comprises royalty, export tax, other charges by the state and resource owners, 
and profits in excess of normal profit. The industry says there are no excess 
profits. Royalty, export tax, and other charges would account for approximately 
one half of sales value. Sixty percent of the allocated portion remains to be 
logged and 20 percent of the estate remains to be allocated. The current harvest 
rate is 2.5 percent per year of the allocated area, implying a weighted average 
remaining life of 27 years of old-growth merchantable stock. At an 8 percent 
discount rate, this would be valued at K3 billion, equivalent to annual per capita 
income ofK70. 
The very large difference between this value and the larger ones cited 
earlier is explained as follows. The largest one is the current purchaser's value 
to an overseas processor or, equivalently, the sales value to a foreign logger in 
PNG of the entire stock in 15 million hectares of operable forest carrying 32 
cubic metres per hectare of merchantable stems. This approach assumes, 
impractically, either instantaneous liquidation of the entire stock or a zero 
interest rate. Thus the higher value relative to the lower one will be 3. 7 times on 
4 This was done in the week after Parliament gave effective control of the National Forest Board 
to the Minister, thus breaching a position agreed with the World Bank under the economic reform 
programme- a decision which has since been reversed. 
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account of area, 1.3 times on account of stocking rate, 2.0 times on account of 
price, and 3.6 times on account of timing. 
Will nature replenish the K3 billion of merchantable wood stock? 
Selective Logging's Broken Promise 
Photosynthesis makes wood grow, driven by the sun's radiation. Wood is 
estimated to grow in the moist tropics at a rate up to 1.5 cubic metres per hectare 
per year. Harvesting of mature trees at no greater rate would leave the stock of 
wood per hectare unchanged - constant working capital stock in perpetuity! 
This is the alluring idea behind sustained selective logging. Yet practically 
nowhere does it work in practice. 
The International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO) reckons that only 
about one-tenth of one percent of tropical logging is conducted on a sustainable 
basis. Fraser (1982:75) reports on Thailand: a teak forest, inventoried in the 
early 1920s and harvested according to a management plan, was re-inventoried 
at twenty-year intervals; each measurement showed a 20 percent reduction in 
stock and a steady reduction in mean diameter. 
Sustainable selective logging might work if it could be done with the 
precision of the surgeon's scalpel. But it will not work when heavy equipment, 
incompletely skilled operators, and weak regulatory enforcement leave 70 
percent of stems mortally wounded and unable to survive the ensuing ten years 
(Cameron and Vigus 1993, cited in Sehkran et al. 1995: 163). Vigus 
recommends in PNG that not more than 25 percent of the canopy be open, and 
that any opening be no more than 300 square metres in area. 
Tropical forest is the most species-diverse ecosystem in the world, making 
it hard to use for both timber and non-timber products. This is one of the 
reasons why people want to cut it down and replace it with a single-species 
ecosystem (Prance 1994: 179). Single-species plantations may yield ten times as 
much wood as the natural forest, but they may also take 30-50 years to achieve 
such yields. More than 1 0 percent of the forest would therefore have to be 
replaced by plantations to sustain, say, a twenty-year cutting cycle. Fraser 
(1982:56) reports for Solomon Islands that conversion of 45 percent of the 
natural forest to plantations of native species would be necessary to replace 
volume and (because of lesser mean diameters) 65 percent to replace value. 
The failure to realise selective logging's promise of sustainability stems 
from collateral damage more than from excessive harvest rates. This means that 
there are three remedial options: 
• invest in the human skills that will eliminate collateral damage; 
• adopt a harvesting technology that won't cause the collateral damage; or 
• replace parts of the natural forest with plantations, thereby increasing the 
capital stock. 
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It would seem that investment in human capital formation would yield a very 
high return, and would serve to advance the other options as well. Alternative 
logging technologies such as aerial ropeways and helicopters do not appear to 
have been widely adopted. The higher productivity of plantations may be 
appealing but, being a very long term investment, it requires land tenure rights 
which have proven difficult to secure under customary law. This raises the 
crucial point about forestry in PNG: the central issue is not the question of 
whether the logging rate is sustainable; it is the absence of a clear land use 
strategy. The economic concept of irreversibility is relevant to choices about 
land use. 
Irreversibility 
Faced with the combination of commitment (or irreversibility) and uncertainty, 
the business executive may well feel the need to keep his options open. This 
common concept is the basis for elaborations of two fundamental 
microeconomic principles: operationally, expand production until marginal cost 
equals price; and in capital formation, invest where the present value of the 
future benefit flows exceeds that of costs, where both future flow streams are 
discounted by the cost of capital. 
A price-taking firm that could produce and sell an extra widget at a cost 
which is less than the price of widgets, would sensibly produce and sell it. If the 
firm reckoned that next year widget prices would rise, it would not postpone 
some current production until next year, when higher profits could be available; 
it would maximise profit this year and next year as well. If the firm reckoned 
that widgets were being replaced by thingummies in consumers' preferences, it 
would begin reshaping its capital stock to produce thingummies. During the 
product transition, it would produce each product to the quantity which equated 
price and marginal cost. There is nothing in the theory of the firm which says 
that you should put off until tomorrow production that can be sold profitably 
today. 
Replace widgets with trees in the moist tropical rainforest of PNG. What 
differences between a tree and a widget would make the logger behave 
differently to the widget-maker? The empirical evidence says that old-growth 
forest is non-renewable under existing production technology and practice. That 
is to say, a particular forest has a finite life as a source of old-growth wood. But, 
just as the thingummy may replace the widget as a value to mankind, another 
form of valuable land use, perhaps a wood plantation, may replace the trees (but 
not the biodiversity) of old-growth forest. 
In this sense, logging the old-growth forest is in itself a mining activity. 
The difference between logging and mining is that the logger's capital stock may 
be replaced in situ, in value though not in physical quality, whereas the miner 
has to find another existing ore body in another location. Policy in PNG, 
however, has made loggers more like miners because it cannot give them tenure 
over the land and, therefore, after logging out one forest they move onto another. 
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Confronted in this way with a finite resource, the logger knows that the last 
tree felled today will not be there to be felled tomorrow. If tomorrow's prices 
will be higher than today's, would it pay the logger to leave the tree standing 
until tomorrow? Yes, if the rate of price increase exceeded the interest rate. 
This means that the marginal cost, in the textbook rule which says 'expand 
production until marginal cost equals price', should include the opportunity cost 
of foregone profit as well as direct cost (Salant 1995 :95) The higher the interest 
rate, the lower the opportunity cost of foregone profit, and the more likely that 
the logger will fell the tree today. 
The weights of irreversibility and uncertainty are greater in making 
decisions about investment than about production. Once the capital stock is 
installed, it cannot be put to new uses without incurring a substantial economic 
cost. For example, dedicating a forest to timber production in practice virtually 
precludes the opportunity to use it for its biodiversity values. These values, 
being uncertain, create value in delaying the commitment to logging or, in other 
words, keeping the logging investment option open, or creating a 'logging option 
value'. Therefore the decision to commit to logging would be taken when 
benefits exceeded costs, including the option value. This point is central to the 
issue of downstream processing. 
Adding Value? 
Many people say that PNG should not permit the export of logs, only processed 
timber. But it is not possible to assert, a priori, that this would be good for the 
forest or the people. On the contrary, limiting the range of markets for a product 
would tend to reduce its price. Opting out of the log export market and into the 
processed timber export market, hypothesising that this would generate higher 
incomes, could in practice reduce the value of the forest. It would also probably 
increase the rate of harvest, and hence the rate of damage to the forest or 
deforestation. This condition stems from the relatively higher level of 
investment required to generate a unit of output in processing than in logging. 
It is straightforward in principle to test the hypothesis that timber generates 
higher incomes than logs do. It would entail comparing two operations with 
identical logging capacity and operating conditions. One operator hauls the log 
harvest to an export ramp and bulk log ship, and pays wages to Papua New 
Guinean workers, royalties (including reforestation and development levies) to 
the resource owners, and export taxes and company taxes to the national 
government. The other operator hauls the logs to a sawmill and produces sawn 
timber or plywood which is then hauled to a conventional wharf for sale 
domestically or overseas. It makes the same range of payments as the log 
exporter. The operation generating the higher sum of these payments would be 
the one producing greater benefit for the economy. 
Finding two such operations for direct comparison could be difficult. 
Summing the payments for a sample of operations in each sector, and computing 
the amount per unit volume of log harvest, would be easier in practice. Whereas 
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direct comparisons of payments for royalties and for taxes can be made between 
the two sectors, employment comparisons are more complicated. Processing 
seems likely to generate both more employment directly, and a higher 
employment multiplier, than log exporting. However, there are reasons to 
believe that the higher payroll generated by processing would come at the 
expense of lower royalties to resource owners and taxes to the state; and that 
total national income per unit of log harvest would be lower under processing. 
This condition stems from the less integrated nature of the PNG economy as 
compared to those of Japan and Korea, our principal markets. A sawmill or a 
plymill in these countries is able to sell into secondary markets a significant 
proportion of a log for which a mill in PNG would have to incur the cost of 
disposal in an environmentally sound way. 
The result of such a test is not obvious a priori. The presumption in favour 
of processing is based on a different comparison, namely that of unit sales value, 
not income per unit of log harvest. A feasibility study to be carried out as part of 
the current structural adjustment programme should reveal the best strategy for 
PNG to follow in developing its wood resource. 
Precautionary Conclusion 
Sound scientific doubts remain about whether the world is warming up and 
about whether, if it is, man can prevent it rising further by switching to new 
technology. What counsel does the precautionary principle offer the world's 
politicians in this circumstance? First, it would say that the issue here is the risk 
of world catastrophe, and that scientists can say neither what the level of risk is, 
nor whether the proposed course of action to reduce the risk will succeed. 
Second, it would say that action should nevertheless be taken. 
This still leaves some flexibility on the method of switching technologies. 
First the new technology, though less environmentally expensive than the old 
one it is replacing, will reduce existing living standards. Second, reducing living 
standards hurts poor people more than it does rich people; and there are more 
poor people in poor countries than in rich ones. These two points suggest that 
the developed economies should lead the way, allowing less developed 
countries, by delaying the switch, to reduce the income gap between themselves 
and the richer countries. But reducing the income gap requires developed 
economies to continue to grow and generate demand for poorer countries' 
exports. Delaying the switch in developed countries would be sensible, too, if 
the cost of the new technology were responsive to research and development 
expenditure. 
Globally, the precautionary principle would seem to favour increasing 
technological research and development over reducing economic growth as the 
appropriate response to the global warming concern. How PNG develops its 
forest resource has very little bearing on this matter. 
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The precautionary principle carries a message for Papua New Guinean 
leaders, just as it does for world leaders. As they create a vision to motivate and 
guide the country's development into the new century, they might ponder on 
what the forest would be like in the year 2020 under a continuation of existing 
practice. Forests would still cover much of the land surface. But none of the 
valuable select species of today would be in them. These would have been 
harvested (or destroyed as a result of harvesting), and exported either as logs or 
as sawn timber or plywood if government decides to subsidise large-scale 
industrial processing. Very little of the K3 billion of liquidated forest value 
would have been transformed into other forms of capital. The nation would have 
experienced a significant diminution in its capital stock. 
To avoid this outcome, PNG badly needs a land use strategy which will 
create man-made capital, for example tree crop farms including wood as a crop, 
as the natural forest stock is depleted. Biodiversity need not be a victim if 
arrangements can be agreed with the developed countries for conservation of 
part of the forest estate. 

PART THREE 
CONSERVATION AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
IN PRACTICE 

CHAPTER 15 
BIOPHYSICAL PARAMETERS FOR SUSTAINABLE 
UTILISATION OF P APUA NEW GUINEA'S FORESTS 
BASLOUMAN 
Introduction 
During the 1992 UNCED Conference in Rio de Janeiro, many organisations 
expressed their concerns for the continued existence of forests and the negative 
impact which their disappearance may have on local communities, watersheds, 
coastal areas, future development, and the global environment. The resulting 
agreements stimulated governments all over the world to develop principles, 
criteria, and indicators of sustainable forest management as tools for the 
planning and evaluation of forestry operations. Thus evolved the Helsinki 
process in Europe and Russia, the Montreal process for North America and parts 
of the South Pacific, the Tarapoto process involving the Amazon basin countries, 
and the Lepaterique process in Central America. These processes attempt to 
standardise the definition and evaluation of sustainable forest management 
practices on a regional and national scale, leaving sufficient space for national 
adaptations of these criteria and indicators. 
During preparations for the Rio Conference, a working group was formed to 
develop a 'blueprint' for sustainable use of Papua New Guinea's (PNG's) forests 
(henceforth called the PNG Blueprint). The working group developed a set of 
criteria and indicators of sustainability of forest use in PNG. These criteria and 
indicators are based on the assumption that sustainable utilisation requires us to: 
• understand and maintain ecological processes and functions within the 
forests; 
• maintain species and genetic diversity; 
• maintain aesthetic and cultural values; 
• ensure that resources are appropriately managed m order to provide both 
market and non-market benefits; 
• maintain the productive potential of renewable resources; and 
• contribute positively to global environmental quality and ecosystem 
functioning (CSIRO 1992:7). 
The requirements are still under review (Unua 1995). 
Parallel to these processes, the Forest Stewartship Council (FSC) also 
developed a set of principles and criteria, which are basically meant to guide the 
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process of certification of forestry operations in natural forests and plantations 
(FSC 1995). So far, the FSC is the only acknowledged accreditor of certification 
processes. In 1996, the FSC asked representatives of stakeholder groups in the 
PNG forestry sector to look at a set of internationally acceptable principles, 
criteria, and indicators for PNG's forest use, based on the general principles and 
criteria developed by the FSC. 
The principles, criteria, and indicators are meant to assist in the evaluation 
and monitoring of current forest policies and practices. As such, they will play 
an important role in determining whether such policies work for forests and 
people. To be able to function as intended, parameters should exist which 
describe them, and which are easily detected, recorded, and interpreted (CIFOR 
1995). 
This paper focusses on the biophysical parameters that can be used to 
describe the criteria and indicators of the PNG Blueprint (CSIRO 1992). 
Parameters are understood to be the value of the indicators and/or verifiers 
which are characteristic of a population (in this case the forest ecosystem) in a 
certain condition at a specific time. An overview of commonly used parameters 
is followed by a brief discussion of what we do and do not know about these 
parameters, based on the availability of data in the environmental plans of 
forestry projects. Some suggestions are given on which parameters are easily 
detected, recorded, and interpreted, and on what needs to be done in the short 
term and the long term to make effective use of the PNG indicators relating to 
biophysical aspects of forest management, be it those already developed in the 
PNG Blueprint or those developed in its revision. 
Criteria and Indicators Proposed in the 'Blueprint' 
The criteria and indicators developed by the working group mentioned 
previously have been directly derived from PNG's constitutional goals and 
directive principles. They also take into consideration the principles of 
sustainable forest management outlined by the International Tropical Timber 
Organisation (ITTO). The most relevant criteria and indicators for current 
purposes are: 
1. The general criterion of environmental quality, whose indicators are: 
• declining population pressure on forests; 
• improved or stable water quality and soil condition; and 
• status of APEX indicator species. 
2. Arrangements to enhance conservation practices, whose relevant indicators 
are: 
• publication of a national conservation strategy that includes criteria for the 
selection of different classes of conservation areas; 
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• an increase in the area of land defined as a Biosphere Reserve, World 
Heritage Area, national park or similar area; 
• increased data on the distribution and density of PNG flora and fauna; 
• an increase in activities which monitor the impacts of logging on forest 
systems; and 
• information on wildlife use, including the extent of illegal exports. 
3. Research efforts to assist in development of the economic, ecological, and 
social sustainability of tropical rainforest use, whose relevant indicator is an 
improvement in the database on forest ecological production and socio-
economic information. 
Biophysical Parameters Relevant for Evaluating Sustainability 
Observations of scale and sampling method and design should always be 
considered in selecting the parameters to be measured in investigating whether 
the different forests in PNG maintain their environmental quality. In this 
section, I shall discuss the importance of scale and sampling method and design 
for the interpretation of data before entering into an overview of potential 
parameters for each of the relevant criteria of the PNG Blueprint. 
The Importance of Scale 
In contrast to most of the parameters of socio-economic and policy criteria and 
indicators, those used to evaluate biophysical impacts can readily be used at 
different levels of administration. In the first instance, they may be evaluated at 
the local level, after which the results of such evaluations in different locations 
can be combined for use in the assessment of impacts on a regional, national, or 
even international level. 
It is at the local level that we collect most or all of our data. We match 
these to regional, national, or even international criteria to see whether these 
criteria are met. When they are met, we consider the environment to be 
'healthy'. When they are not met, we try to restore the environment to a 
'healthier' state. As long as such discrepancies between the value of the 
indicators and the regional, national, or international guide values occur at the 
local level, we may be able to restore the local ecosystem. If they happen on a 
larger scale, recovery will be slower (Kelly and Harwell 1990), and above the 
regional level, changes may very well be irreversible: the change over larger 
surfaces is greater than the sum of the changes at a local scale. 
If, for example, we clear a patch of forest for traditional farming, the values 
of the parameters commonly used to describe the forest (such as basal area) 
immediately decline. Once the garden is abandoned, however, trees will grow 
back because of the seeds in the soil, resprouting of stumps, and seeds naturally 
entering the garden area from adjacent forest patches. If we do the same for an 
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area of several thousand hectares, recovery will be slower. This is not only 
because the greater distance of the source for new entries makes it harder for all 
species originally removed to re-enter the area, but also because of the changed 
micro-climate, with an increased exposure to sun, wind, and rainfall, and thus a 
less favourable environment for the establishment of new plants. 
In ideal cases, where much of the information is gathered in detail at the 
forest management unit level, scale does not influence the type of parameter we 
need to monitor, but rather changes the interpretation of the results that have 
been obtained from monitoring these parameters. 
In PNG, however, this situation does not exist, and only few data have been 
gathered that can be used for reliable local interpretation. On a larger scale, data 
collected through remote sensing techniques and interpretation of aerial 
photographs, for example, in combination with field validation of the data, can 
well be used as guidelines for national and provincial planning purposes. The 
PNG Resoruce Information System (PNGRIS), and more recently the Forest 
Inventory Mapping System (FIMS), are based on this type of information 
(personal communication, John McAlpine, 1997). While these are currently the 
best (and perhaps the only) available tools to assist planning at the forest 
management unit level, extreme care should be taken with their extrapolation to 
smaller scales, since local variations are rarely shown, and some of the 
information is based on outdated maps and photographs. 
The discussion in this paper, while recognising the importance of the 
PNGRIS and FIMS, is directed towards improving the currently existing 
database to the point where it can later be used for local-level planning, as well 
as to update and improve the information that forms the basis for these other 
information systems. 
Sampling 
Sampling method, intensity, and design influence the value of the data collected. 
To obtain valuable results from monitoring activities, we need to adjust the 
characteristics of sampling to the objectives of the monitoring activities and to 
the parameters being measured. 
In small-scale, local studies of easy accessible forests, random samples will 
give more representative results than systematic sampling, without increasing 
the costs of sampling due to the time that one needs to spend locating the sample 
plots. Randomness in the timing of sampling may be very effective in the 
monitoring of water quality near polluting plants, although a form of 
stratification may be necessary because of the seasonality of weather conditions. 
Sampling the vast PNG natural forest areas is a different matter. First, one 
needs to consider the different types of forest. The PNGRIS recognises over one 
hundred different types. Even then, one deals with very large areas, usually of 
difficult or extremely difficult access. Locating oneself in such forests is very 
difficult, thus making random sampling a lengthy exercise with almost 
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prohibitive costs. In areas that do not have the infrastructure to facilitate access, 
or at least geographic positioning, systematic sampling is common. Statistically, 
this would make it very difficult to calculate the sampling error, because the 
method does not fulfill the requirements for correct calculation. In practice, 
however, the difference between systematic and random sampling in forest 
inventories is not significant (Ferreira 1994, cited in Carrera 1996), so that the 
advantages of systematic sampling become determinant - less manpower is 
required, and it is easier to perform on a long-term basis because of ease of 
location, as well as the usefulness of systematic designs for mapping purposes. 
Most monitoring work in forests with difficult access is systematic rather than 
random (Lamprecht 1990). The construction of systematic, as opposed to 
random, samples places a greater demand on prior knowledge of the topography, 
hydrography, forest types, and other special characteristics of the landscape of 
the area being investigated, which themselves may have a systematic occurrence 
and need to be considered in the layout of systematic samples. 
Sample and Plot Size 
The design of the sampling plots (size, shape, orientation, and so on) usually 
involves finding the right balance between efficiency and accuracy, and depends 
very much on the objectives of the monitoring exercise. To monitor changes in 
the forest biomass of a relatively homogeneous forest, as measured by the basal 
area, for example, many small (say 0.25 hectare) plots will usually give 
statistically robust data on general forest growth. Once we start measuring 
larger and/or less homogeneous forest areas, the sample size (that is, number of 
plots) or plot size will have to increase in relation to the statistical variation 
between the plots, expressed as a percentage of the average parameter values 
(the coefficient of variation). 
On the other hand, if we want to monitor changes in biodiversity, say by 
counting the number of different plant or animal species in a large natural forest 
area, the size of the plots should depend on local species-area curves. In Central 
America, for example, it was found that the species-area curves for trees became 
strongly asymptotic with plot sizes greater than one hectare: one-hectare plots 
contained about 94 percent of the species encountered in two-hectare plots. For 
forest biomass assessments in similar forests, using the coefficient of variance as 
the measure of variability, optimum plot sizes of 0.6 hectares were found 
(Carrera 1996). 
Marmillod ( 1982) studied a species-rich Peruvian Amazon forest area in 
order to determine the optimum sample size for different parameters. The 
objective of this study was principally to compare different forest sites. He 
found that for species counts of trees from I 0-60 centimetres diameter at breast 
height (dbh), one-hectare plots were sufficient, but for trees with a dbh greater 
than 60 centimetres, one would need at least five-hectare plots. To determine 
proper local species-area curves on which to base adequate sample size, one 
should enumerate the species in an area of fifty hectares. Synnott ( 1980) 
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suggests that, in general, one-hectares plots are the most practical for studying 
the effects of silvicultural treatments. 
Parameters relating to the dynamics of the forest (such as changes in 
frequency distribution per diameter class after disturbances) should be studied in 
small plots, each representing specific development stages of the forest. 
Marmillod ( 1982) suggests that this should be done by studying larger areas in 
great detail, after which the forest can be subdivided into units in different 
phases of development. These phases are determined by average height (classes 
from zero to six metres) and dbh (for species with a total height above six 
metres). Unit sizes are determined by canopy openings after tree fall. 
Marmillod found them to average about 200 square metres in size. Ground 
cover for smaller plants, and basal area and frequency per species for plants 
above six metres, should be studied in each of the recognised development units. 
Because of the dynamic nature of the humid tropical forest, and the 
presence of many phases of development in adjacent areas, it is necessary to 
establish plot sizes which average out the influence of individual development 
phases, if one intends to describe (changes in) the status of the forest. For the 
humid tropical forest in Peru, Marmillod (1982) suggests that plots should be at 
least one hectare in size. With increased size in regeneration areas, however, 
plot sizes may decrease. For statistical comparison of the units in the humid 
forest, one would need at least 3-5 units of each phase per sample, resulting in 
sample sizes of 3-5 hectares. 
In general, plot size will also vary according to the size of the plants to be 
investigated: for herbs plots, they may be much smaller (four square metres is 
common), while for trees of commercial sizes, plots will have to be greater. In 
PNG forest inventories, plot sizes are usually 0.2 hectares for trees greater than 
40 centimetres dbh, and 0.1 hectares for trees from 10 or 20 centimetres dbh to 
40 centimetres dbh. These sizes give better statistical results, but require careful 
sampling design and layout, with a relatively dense network of sampling lines, to 
ensure that the data are representative of the forests, and that the sampling error 
remains at acceptable levels. However, forest inventories are directed at giving 
a static picture of the currently harvestable trees in the forest. Data obtained 
from such inventories in tropical countries are usually insufficient to determine 
the dynamics and health status of the forest. 
Marmillod (ibid.) indicated that tree height should be added to dbh as a 
factor influencing plot size. In order to get a fair impression of the vertical 
structure of the forest, he suggests that we need a minimum of 0.25 hectares for 
plants with a total height below 15 metres, and two hectares for plants up to 38 
metres in height. 
Plot Design 
Circular plots restrict the outside influence on the plots, and restrict the area to 
be allocated as border areas or buffer zones - they have a smaller periphery than 
rectangular plots. However, in the tropical rainforest, it is a major problem to 
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identify the exact boundaries of circular plots. In addition, since circular plots 
usually have only one permanent mark in the centre of the plot (which is clearly 
an economic advantage), it has been difficult to relocate the plots for subsequent 
measurements. Rectangular plots with four corner marks are more easily 
relocated. 1 
Parameters that Indicate Environmental Quality 
For the first criterion of the PNG Blueprint, environmental quality, and its 
indicator of population pressure on the forest, relevant biophysical parameters 
are firstly the size, type, and class of the forest areas, and secondly those 
parameters that help to establish changes in the quality of the ecosystems, such 
as number of species (flora and fauna), distribution of these species (flora and 
fauna), size distribution per species and for all species (flora), and age 
distribution (fauna). In forest ecosystems, the quality of the system depends 
very much on the health status of the forest. The following discussion therefore 
deals in more detail with parameters that describe forest health. 
Conventional Parameters to Describe Forest Health 
In relation to forest health, McKenzie et al. ( 1992) have briefly reviewed the tree 
parameters required to monitor forest health in their book on ecological 
indicators. Conventional indices are the correlation between tree age and size 
(height and diameter), indicating how size changes with time and how well the 
forest grows. Development of basal area over time is also an important indicator 
of forest health. For even-aged forests, plotting basal area per unit area against 
time would normally give us an S-shaped growth curve up to the maturity of the 
stand, after which point in time the basal area per hectare (ba/ha) will decline. A 
decline in ba/ha before maturity is an indication either of human intervention 
(thinning, for example) or of health problems. 
However, the forests of PNG are mainly natural, uneven-aged forests. If 
these have not yet been interfered with, they can be considered as mature forests, 
and if healthy, should not show any basal area decline. An increase in the ba/ha 
of such forests usually is an indication of past human or natural interventions. 
For this parameter, in particular, scale is important. A mature, healthy 
natural forest is a mosaic of smaller units, each of which may be in a different 
phase of development because of local and natural disturbances. If we measure 
a decline of the ba/ha value in one hectare, then we know something has 
happened in that hectare. Unless this is also recorded in many other parts of the 
same forest, such a decline need not indicate an unhealthy forest. 
The conventional parameters used in forest health monitoring, as previously 
mentioned, are based on changes over time. This may be a serious constraint to 
1 This is one of the reasons why the PNG Forest Research Institute, for example, has recently 
changed from a circular to a rectangular plot design for the continuous forest inventory in its newly 
established permanent sample plots (personal communication, Forova Oavika). 
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monitoring the forests of PNG, where we do not have the infrastructure to 
implement regular, widespread monitoring of the forest. Nor do we have 
adequate data from the past which would enable us to objectively measure the 
incidence or extent of any changes that may have occurred in the forest. 
New Tree-Based Parameters to Describe Forest Health 
New parameters developed are, for example, the amount of leaf area, tree growth 
efficiency (amount of stemwood produced per unit of foliage area), and root 
biomass (which is difficult to measure) (McKenzie et al. 1992). 
The previously described conventional parameters used to describe forest 
health can also be used to derive parameters to describe the diversity of a forest, 
which, in itself, is an indicator of forest health (see Debinski and Brussard 
1992). The advantage of diversity, as an indicator of forest health, is that it is an 
index, summarising the relation between two or more conventional parameters. 
Holdridge ( 1965, cited in Lamprecht 1990:49) developed an index of complexity 
(IC) which should be roughly constant across forests in the same ecological life 
zone.2 The index is particularly helpful in comparing forests of known health 
status with unknown forests whose health status has yet to be determined. 
Lamprecht warns, however, that the size of the plots used to calculate the IC is 
relatively small, and that the indicator multiplies different units of measurement. 
It may, therefore, give inaccurate results (Lamprecht 1990). 
Other parameters related to diversity are based on the concept of dominance 
- the relative space that certain species or families take up in the forest. The 
occurrence of highly dominant species usually indicates low diversity, and vice 
versa. Balslev et al. ( 1987) followed Curtis and Mclntosh ( 1951) in using a 
number of related indicators to determine the ecological importance of species: 
1. relative density (that is, number per species over total number of sample); 
2. relative dominance (that is, basal area of species over basal area of sample); 
3. relative frequency (that is, number of sampling units containing a species 
over the sum of all frequencies); 
4. relative diversity (that is, number of species in a family over total number of 
species); and 
5. an Importance Values Index (lVI) for each species (the sum of Indices 1, 2, 
and 3) and a separate index of Family Importance Values (FIV) (the sum of 
Indices 1, 2 for family, and 4). 
They argued that stands in which specific indicator species had the same 
ecological importance could be considered as closely positioned to each other in 
2 IC = 10"3 * hbds, where IC is the index of complexity, his the mean height of the forest, b is the 
basal area of all trees with a dbh greater than 1 0 cm, d is the number of trees measured, and s is the 
number of tree species. 
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what Curtis and Mclntosh (ibid.) called a 'vegetation continuum' - a series of 
vegetation units adapted to slightly different environmental conditions and 
without clear boundaries between them. Of the indices listed here, (1 ), (3), and 
(4) can readily be used for both timber and non-timber plant species, while for 
(2) and (5), a different measure of dominance than basal area needs to be 
established in order to make the indices applicable to plant species other than 
trees. For herbs, ground cover could be such a parameter. Marmillod's remarks 
on plot size are important here, since he found that the Peruvian tropical humid 
forest which he studied needs at least one hectare to develop a spatial 
distribution characteristic of the site, determining the ecological importance of 
the different forest components (Marmillod 1982). In addition, the disadvantage 
of the Holdridge formula (multiplying apples and pears) also applies to this 
method. 
Other tree-based parameters to measure forest health are crown depth, 
crown diameter, and exposure of the crown to direct sunlight to determine 
(potential) vigour. In particular, the latter is relatively easily detected and 
recorded, and should be (Lamprecht 1990), and has been (Hutchinson 1993) 
incorporated into standard forest assessments. Visible signs of plant 
deterioration can also give useful information on the health of the forest, and is 
usually used when assessing forests for damage due to air pollution. 
Non-Tree-Based Parameters 
Since trees are generally the dominant plants of the forest ecosystem, they 
feature prominently in most forest ecosystem status assessments. Yet they may 
not always be the most appropriate indicators of how healthy the environment is. 
Their disappearance always means change, usually for the worse, but once 
ecosystem imbalances cause forest degradation and/or deforestation on a larger, 
easily noticeable scale, it may be too late to intervene and restore the health of 
the ecosystem. It is therefore necessary to be able to monitor ecosystem health 
by monitoring ecosystem components that are susceptible to change. These 
could indeed be (certain species of) trees, especially because these are usually 
easy to monitor- they do not fly or run away when people approach, are usually 
widely distributed, and can readily be measured and identified. However, there 
are other reasons to avoid the use of tree species for this purpose: 
• Many species of trees are quite tolerant of variations in soil and climatic 
conditions (for example, the range of sites in which Pometia occurs). 
• They are often exploited by people, so their abundance is likely to be 
influenced by human activity. 
• They have long generation times, which may postpone the recognition of 
environmental changes that have negative effects on their offspring, such as 
the genetic degradation which follows from cutting the best trees and leaving 
the sick and slow-growing trees for future generations. 
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• One tree often grows through a wide range of habitats, from subsoil through 
soil, herb layer, shrub layer, and subcanopy to canopy and, at times, 
emergence. As a result, the health of the whole tree will not always be 
affected by changes in one of these habitats. 
It is therefore imperative that we identify some other indicator species or species 
groups that are easy to monitor, have a wide distribution, and can be easily 
measured and identified. Debinski and Brussard ( 1992) found that small birds 
and butterflies were useful species groups in assessing ecosystem health, through 
biodiversity assessment in a national park in the USA. In many sites covering a 
range of habitats, they only measured species occurrence, since this allowed 
them to sample more sites per unit of time, gave them a good indication of 
qualitative differences in the species composition of the sites, and is a parameter 
whose measurements can be obtained with greater objectivity than others (such 
as the relative abundance of the species). 
Researchers from the Dutch Research Institute for Forests and Nature (IBN-
DLO) have been able to establish a relationship between the occurrence of a 
certain group of bird species and other measurable characteristics of the forest, 
of which the most important were tree diameter distribution, the number of dead 
stems per hectare, the presence of different forest development phases, the 
presence of native tree species, and the development of the bush layer (Hekhuis, 
de Molenaar and Jonkers 1994). Research undertaken in PNG, following the 
methods of Debinski and Brussard ( 1992), could establish similar relationships. 
While this would not directly help in monitoring forest activities, such 
relationships would definitely facilitate the planning and management of forest 
use. 
The composite non-tree parameters which may be used as indirect measures 
of forest health include indicators of chemical change and the monitoring of 
associated resources (such as stream chemistry, water quality, soil conditions) 
which are influenced by forest health. In particular, the nitrogen cycle and its 
'leaks' appear to be greatly influenced by forest health, and vice versa. Ulrich 
and Bredemeier ( 1992) indicate that one of the main driving forces behind 
changes in the chemical state of aerated soils is a depletion of stored soil 
nitrogen through the leaching of nitrate. Other cations usually leach out of the 
soil with the nitrate, causing chemical changes that lead to impoverishment and 
acidification of the soil. Logging activities in the forest often increase the 
leaching of nitrate. The nitrogen status of the biomass and soil, or the amount of 
nitrogen leaching out, may therefore be good indicators of forest health. The 
same authors also indicate that, in temperate forests, the ratio between the 
concentration of nutrient cations and the presence of acidic and/or phytotoxic 
species has proven to be an ecological indicator with respect to the functioning 
of the root systems. 
Ulrich and Bredemeier' s article is of particular relevance to us because it 
shows that an ecosystem is not just a function of the current, easily measurable 
status of the system, but also of the processes, such as nitrogen leaching, that 
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occur within the system. Unfortunately, we still do not know enough about the 
natural forests to come up with one or a few easily measurable parameters that 
reflect such processes. 
Parameters to Measure Water Quality and Soil Conditions 
Some parameters to measure water quality are turbidity, dissolved oxygen 
content, eutrofication (N and P content), and drinkability (especially coliform 
content). However, the monitoring of these physico-chemical parameters of 
river quality may not adequately guarantee the health of the forest ecosystem. 
Biological processes and aquatic organisms also play an important role in water 
quality, and may be seen as giving an indication of the sum of the physico-
chemical components. They may also be better indicators of those temporary 
changes in water quality which might not occur at the time of sampling, and 
which can hardly be detected by conventional sampling methods. The size of 
certain aquatic populations, for example, may have been influenced by the 
occasional drainage of foreign matter into a river (Seager, Milne and Crane 
1992). 
In addition, chemical concentrations may measure up to human standards, 
but may not be applicable to water organisms, especially if they occur for long 
periods of time. Such concentrations may cause biological changes with grave 
future consequences, without being detected in analyses of the chemical 
composition of water (ibid.). The same authors used a combination of 
monitoring of stress reactions of fish (gill ventilation), macro-invertebrate 
community status indices, and conventional monitoring methods while 
investigating water quality. They found strong relationships between different 
ways of monitoring the quality of river water, and equally strong relationships 
between different methods applied in the laboratory. The incidence and 
significance of causal relationships need further study. 
For soil conditions, we need to measure parameters such as soil fertility 
(content of macro- and micro-elements, carbon-nitrogen ratio, cation-exchange 
capacity, base saturation, soil acidity), soil water absorption capacity, water 
infiltration rate, erodibility, and erosivity (slope gradient, length of slope, aspect 
of slope, structure and texture of soil, and amount, distribution, and intensity of 
rainfall). 
APEX Indicator Species 
Of particular relevance for this indicator are data on population size, population 
distribution {spatial and per age class), movements, feeding habits, mating 
patterns and frequencies, and household size. Of these data, population 
distribution is probably the easiest to measure for non-plant species. The other 
parameters will increase in utility and importance with diminution in the scale to 
which monitoring is applied. It is known, for example, that many bird species 
move from one place to another as a result of changes in weather patterns and 
the related availability of food sources. If, through the conversion of forests into 
other vegetation types, one or more food sources disappears from the chain, this 
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may mean the extinction of the bird species. The smaller the study site, the more 
likely it is that the species being studied depends on food sources or breeding 
places outside the area of study. Restricting the study to certain parameters, 
such as species numbers within the study site, will not necessarily give an 
adequate picture of the significance of the site for the survival of the observed 
species. 
Parameters that Indicate Arrangements to Enhance Conservation 
Practices 
For the second criterion of the PNG Blueprint, arrangements to enhance 
conservation practices, biophysical parameters are essential to determine the 
size, shape, and type of a conservation area. Such parameters would include 
data relating to the population sizes, movements, and social behaviour of 
existing species. In addition, resource inventories that record information on the 
biophysical parameters which have already been discussed in relation to the 
criterion of environmental quality, describing site and forest health, will be 
required in order to establish the value of potential conservation areas. Of 
particular relevance may be data on basal area per hectare, the size distribution 
of the tree species, the number of dead trees per hectare, species counts of small 
birds and butterflies, and changes in these parameters over time. 
To select relevant areas for the establishment of Biosphere Reserves, World 
Heritage Areas, national parks, or other conservation areas, we need data on 
biodiversity, preferably per geological or resource map unit. As well as data on 
the parameters already mentioned (relative density, relative dominance, relative 
frequency, relative diversity, and Importance Value Indices) at the species level, 
data would also need to be collected on ecosystem diversity and genetic 
diversity -the origin of, and relation between, species and individuals. 
Parameters that Indicate Research Efforts to Assist Development of 
EESSTRU 
For the third criterion of the PNG Blueprint, research efforts to assist in 
development of the economic, ecological and social sustainability of rainforest 
use (EESSTRU), it is the availability of values for the biophysical parameters, 
rather than the actual values themselves, which is indicative of the level of 
achievement. 
Parameters that Can be Used to Determine the Values of Other Criteria 
and Indicators of the PNG Blueprint 
A number of criteria and indicators do not directly require biophysical 
parameters for their assessment, but such parameters may still be necessary for 
the identification of forest areas and their primary functions, in order to 
formulate management plans and monitor forestry operations, and to improve 
education and training. More specifically, these parameters can be used to 
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evaluate the impact of various activities on the forest environment, and the scope 
for continuing the same type of forest use. 
The parameters which are especially relevant for planning purposes are 
those which allow us to calculate the growth of trees as a source of timber ( dbh, 
height, volume, or basal area per hectare) or of plants which are a source of non-
timber products (for example, fruit production, fruiting frequency, latex 
production). These parameters help us to determine the sustainable level of 
periodic harvests. Data on forest structure are also relevant - both those which 
relate to the horizontal structure (species composition, diameter distribution, and 
development class) and those which relate to vertical structure (vertical 
distribution of species and development classes). The continued occurrence of 
indicator species, or species with special commercial, cultural, religious, or 
aesthetic value, should also be recorded. For determination of future land and 
forest use, it is also important to record climatic data (rainfall, temperature, 
evaporation, relative humidity, and extreme weather conditions) and their 
regular and irregular changes, as well as data on the soil condition in the area 
(drainage, fertility, slope, and erodibility). For PNG, many of these data are 
currently available at the Resource Mapping Unit level within the PNGRIS. 
However, the scale at which the information is presented may not be adequate 
for effective use of the data in monitoring environmental impacts at the level of 
the project or management unit. 
The State of Knowledge on Relevant Parameters in PNG 
The tool for environmental management and monitoring in PNG at present is the 
environmental plan. These plans should ideally provide the resource or 
environmental manager or management team with sufficient biophysical 
parameters for the purpose of comparing the situation before, during, and after 
the operations. 
Table 15.1 shows the extent to which environmental plans have done this in 
the past. It compares a selection of nine recent environmental plans of timber 
concessions, from different parts of PNG, in respect of several biophysical 
parameters whose values should be known before the commencement of tree 
harvesting operations, if the impact of the operations on the forest environment 
is to be monitored effectively. It should be noted that most of the information 
indicated as being (partially) available in these environmental plans is in the 
form of lists, but without any clear indication of how these lists have been 
compiled, or to what extent they actually are applicable to the project under 
investigation. Thus 'availability' need not imply relevance (selection of 
sampling sites) or reliability (sampling method, intensity, and size). For most 
environmental plans, these are unknown. In this respect, it would be timely to 
start formulating guidelines for the preparation of environmental plans which not 
only indicate the required content of each plan, but also the methods of data 
collection required under different circumstances, as well as the degree of 
relevance and reliability expected of the data. 
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From Table 15.1, we can derive a number specific topics under which more 
data need to be collected in order to be able to use the previously mentioned 
parameters to monitor the sustainable use ofPNG's forest. 
Table 15.1: Biophysical parameters that have been measured as part of nine 
recent environmental plans for tree harvesting projects in different parts of 
PNG.3 
GENERALFEATURESOFPLAN 
Scale of investigations 
Sample: 
method 
intensity 
size 
shape 
BIOPHYSICAL PARAMETERS 
Biomass: 
basal area/ha* 
volume/ha* 
Complexity: 
size distribution per species* 
number of species per hectare* 
number of families per hectare 
species distribution 
forest typology 
age class distribution (fauna) 
Forest health: 
forest growth: 
- height growth 
- dbh growth 
- basal area growth 
- volume growth 
leaf area 
tree growth efficiency 
root biomass 
Project: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
a 
p p p p p p p p p 
a 
p 
p 
p p p 
a a a a a a a a a 
p p p p p p p p p 
p p p p p p p p p 
3 These were environmental plans for projects in the following provinces: (I) East New Britain, 
(2) Oro, (3) Morobe, (4) Madang, (5) New Ireland, (6) Milne Bay, (7) Gulf, (8) Western, and (9) 
Milne Bay. 
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Table 15.1 (continued). 
diversity: 
- relative density 
- relative dominance 
- relative frequency 
- relative diversity 
- Importance Value Index 
(potential) vigour: 
- crown depth 
- crown diameter 
- crown exposure 
visible signs of plant deterioration 
indicator species or species groups p p p p p p p p p 
N-cycle or other processes 
physico-chem. water qual. parameters* p 
biological water quality parameters 
soil fertility parameters p p p p p p p p p 
erodibility parameters p p p p p p p p p 
erosivity parameters p p p p p p p p p 
APEX indicator species: 
population size 
population distribution 
population movements 
feeding habits 
mating patterns and frequencies 
household size 
Ecosystem diversity: 
ecosystem types* p p p p p p p p p 
Genetic diversity: 
origin of species 
Non timber forest products: 
presence p p p p p p p p p 
production 
Notes: a = data available~ p = data partially available (often based on literature rather 
than field research); * = enough data exist elsewhere in PNG to start using these 
parameters for monitoring purposes. 
Source: PNG Department of Environment and Conservation. 
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The Scope for Using Biophysical Parameters for Monitoring 
Sustainable Utilisation of Forests in PNG 
Table 15.1 clearly shows that, although some data are available to the resource 
or environmental manager, most of these are related to the existence of species 
rather than the quality and quantity of that existence, while parameters directly 
relating to forest health, APEX indicator species, genetic diversity, non-timber 
forest products, water quality, and soil conditions are hardly touched upon at all 
in the environmental plans currently being drawn up for forestry projects. 
This does not necessarily mean that policies aimed at maintaining or 
improving variables such as water quality will not work. We know very well, 
for example, how to minimise the impact of road construction on water courses, 
and can monitor this achievement by setting road construction standards, as is 
currently happening through the development of a logging code in PNG 
(PNGFA/DEC 1995). Furthermore, we already know enough to be able to 
adhere to the established international (general) criteria and indicators of bodies 
such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). 
On the other hand, it does mean that it will not be possible to establish 
realistic costs of non-adherence to such guidelines, nor shall we be able to tell 
how much tolerance aquatic ecosystems have for disturbances, and at what point 
irreversible damage occurs. The possible result is that governments and 
environmental agencies will put as much effort into monitoring water quality, 
soil conditions, and biodiversity as appears to be justified by their own 
subjective perceptions of the cost of environmental degradation. This may be 
too much effort, where the actual impacts of operations are perceived to be much 
higher than they are in reality, or too little in those cases where the full extent of 
environmental damage is not realised. 
It is therefore imperative, if environmental management and monitoring is 
to become more effective, that serious efforts are devoted to the collection of the 
values of at least the most relevant biophysical parameters. For the moment, 
these will have to be the more conventional parameters described earlier, despite 
their shortcomings. The costs of this data collection should be borne by those 
who, in the long term, will benefit most- the government, as the party primarily 
responsible for the management of the environment, the project implementers, as 
the party responsible for the impacts and therefore liable for future 
compensation claims, and also the local people, as those directly affected by 
potentially hazardous environmental changes. 
At the same time, studies should be initiated in order to investigate the 
values of the other parameters mentioned in our discussion, and their sensitivity 
to different forest uses and environmental changes. Such data will help us to 
achieve a better understanding of the forest, and they can also be used to identify 
those parameters which will give us an earlier warning of impending changes, 
other than the one which we obtain by measuring losses in forest growth and 
composition. 
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Before embarking on a biophysical parameter crusade, however, it is 
necessary to identify more accurately the parameters that can effectively 
contribute to our store of knowledge about the environment. 
Essential Biophysical Parameters 
Looking at the FSC principles and criteria (FSC 1995), we see that those related 
to 'environmental impact' (Principle 6), 'management plans' (Principle 7), and 
'monitoring and assessment' (Principle 8) contain important biophysical 
components. Of these, Principle 6 covers the criterion of 'environmental 
quality' in the PNG Blueprint, adding to it guidelines for the use of chemicals 
and exotic plant and animal species. In addition, it stresses the need for 
guidelines that aim at controlling erosion, minimising forest damage during 
harvesting, road construction~ and all other mechanical disturbances, and 
protecting water resources. Principles 7 and 8 provide guidelines for the 
planning, implementation, and monitoring of forest management. 
The Centre for International Forestry Research study mentioned in the 
introduction (CIFOR 1995) was aimed at formulating a minimum list of criteria 
and indicators of sustainable forest use in several countries, considering their 
relevance to the local situation, their ambiguity, their reproducibility, and their 
ease of detection, recording, and interpretation. The preliminary result of their 
study, based on a project in Indonesia, came up with a list of three criteria- the 
resilience of the forest ecosystem is maintained, the structure and diversity of 
forest ecosystems resembles those of the original forest, and ecosystem function 
is maintained. They also produced thirteen indicators directly related to the 
biophysical components of forest management (the principle of maintaining 
ecosystem integrity), and a number of indicators for the (sub)principle of 
'sustainable yield and quality of forest goods and services', with criteria which 
they listed as 'availability of comprehensive forest management plans, effective 
implementation and control of forest management, and secure continuity of 
resource flow', all of which also require biophysical parameters for their 
assessment. 
The CIFOR criteria and indicators are directed, not so much towards 
assessment of the forest, as towards assessment of the measures taken to prevent 
damage to the forest. As such, they only require the measurement of a few 
biophysical parameters - number of species, frequency per species, 
age/development stage of trees, occurrence of specific (indicator) species, basal 
area per hectare, and canopy surface (which is a function of crown diameter and 
competition). While these criteria and indicators will help to reduce the negative 
impact of harvesting on the forest ecosystem, and are based on what we already 
know of the forest and its reaction to human interference, they do not give us an 
idea of whether the forest ecosystem is actually maintaining itself, and whether 
our activities are sustainable. For that, we would need to investigate an 
additional range of variables relating to forest health (such as diversity and 
actual growth), as well as water and soil quality. 
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Comparison of the FSC principles and criteria, the CIFOR study, and the 
criteria and indicators of the PNG Blueprint does not yield any biophysical 
parameters beyond those which have been listed in Table 15.1. Nor is it 
possible, at this stage, to strike out any of the biophysical parameters as being of 
minor relevance, because we do not have enough information to assess the 
respective roles of these parameters in forest ecosystem assessment. 
Those parameters marked with an asterisk in Table 15.1 are those for which 
records already exist in PNG (in environmental plans of mining operations, in 
some forest management plans, or from FRI studies), for some of which norms 
could be established, and which could therefore be used for monitoring purposes 
without further delay, even if additional information needs to be collected in 
order to improve on the relevance and accuracy of these norms. Records for the 
other parameters are totally inadequate for immediate use in the monitoring and 
assessment of sustainability. 
For the time being, indirect methods of assessment will need to be used, as 
when we assess the damage caused by mechanical operations, such as harvesting 
and roading, by looking at the extent to which standards and codes are being 
implemented, this postponing the assessment of the relevance and correctness of 
these standards and codes under variable local conditions until better data are 
available. 
Conclusions 
While many studies need to be done to improve our knowledge of the forest 
ecosystems in PNG (see Table 15.1 ), we can already use the knowledge we have 
to carry out basic monitoring programmes that meet the general criteria and 
indicators of the FSC and CIFOR, and focus on monitoring or mitigating 
measures rather than measuring impacts directly. In these programmes, the 
PNGRIS and the FIMS can be used to classify relevant physical resource 
parameters for each forested area (such as slope, flooding, soil depth, and so on) 
in terms of likely constraints on sustainable production (personal 
communication, John McAlpine, 1997). This exercise can then be followed by 
an evaluation of the degree to which these factors have been taken into account 
in the forestry activities. In this process, it is necessary to keep in mind the scale 
at which the data were collected and their reliability. Additional knowledge of 
biophysical parameters is especially relevant for the task of improving the 
current database, and for making direct assessments of the status of the forest 
ecosystem, and thus for deciding whether we have taken sufficient measures to 
mitigate the negative impacts on that ecosystem. 
The environmental plans of forestry operations, considered as depositories 
of biophysical parameters, have not served that purpose in the past. They are 
almost completely inadequate as a basis for timely assessment of actual changes 
in the forest environment. Monitoring of environmental impacts will require 
more detailed environmental plans, the costs of which should be carried by all 
potential beneficiaries. 
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In collecting field data for the specific parameters, the objective and scale 
of the use of the parameters should be kept in mind, and sampling method and 
design should be formulated accordingly. More specific guidelines or standards 
for data collection need to be developed in order to improve the usefulness of the 
environmental plans. 
In environmental planning and monitoring activities, special attention 
should now be paid to the production of systematic species counts of both flora 
and fauna, identifying species per habitat and species distribution. It is already 
possible to incorporate adequate physico-chemical water quality data and make a 
start with biological quality assessments, while soil descriptions could and 
should be given in more detail. Finally, we ought to start looking at the 
interactions and processes that take place in the forest. 
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Postscript: Comment by John McAipine4 
The discussion in Chapter 15 is based on a 'blueprint for the sustainable use of 
PNG's forests', and an assessment of those biophysical parameters relevant to 
such use. The conversion of the PNG Blueprint to an operationally useful body 
of knowledge would entail a costly and difficult research exercise which, by its 
nature, could not produce results for a number of years. 
Given the current rate of logging and conversion of forest areas to other 
forms of land use, it is essential to develop an immediately available tool to 
assess the likely environmental consequences of significant logging operations, 
especially in terms ofregrowth and sustainability. 
A system has been developed, using the physical resource inventory 
information held in the PNG Resource Information System (PNGRIS) to classify 
relevant physical resource parameters (such as slope, flooding, soil depth, soil 
drainage, and soil fertility) for each forested area, insofar as these constitute 
likely constraints to sustainable production. The necessary data are available for 
the whole country, and the assessments, being computer based, can be rapidly 
adjusted to take account of changing intensities and practices in logging 
operations. The assessments, when linked to the Forest Inventory Mapping 
System (see Filer, this volume), provide the National Forest Service with a 
means of indicating, to resource owners and the forest industry, the likely 
outcome of forestry operations in specific areas with regard to long-term 
sustainability. 
At the time of writing (March 1997), the assessment procedures are being 
extended to include biological data. In particular, these will include forest types 
in special need of preservation. The PNGRIS already contains all of the 
Conservation Needs Assessment material developed by the Department of 
Environment and Conservation (see Alcorn and Beehler 1993). 
Perhaps the best way to explain the use of the system is by example. The 
assessment of the physical resource parameters associated with the Gogol Valley 
forest indicated significant areas of drainage constraint if the forest was to be 
removed - that is, the areas would no longer be part of a well-drained alluvial 
plain, but would become a swamp. This assessment could have alerted 
managers to the need for caution or, in the event that the forest was still being 
felled, of the need for reforestation to take account of this fact in the process of 
selecting the species to be replanted. A similar assessment of the dry evergreen 
forests of Western Province would indicate that logging of this forest type would 
probably result in permanent conversion to grassland and loss of wildlife habitat. 
Conversely, an assessment of the physical conditions in areas of forest growing 
on deep volcanic-alluvial plains indicates that this environment is robust, and is 
probably able to withstand intensive logging operations. 
4 Team Leader, Forest Inventory Mapping System project. 
CHAPTER 16 
GOVERNANCE, LAW, AND SOVEREIGNTY: 
ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL OBJECTIVES 
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
KATHYWHIMP 
Background 
In a democratic state, environment protection objectives are achieved by 
balancing public and private interests through land and resource management 
regimes. Although the sanctity of private ownership of land is a cardinal 
principle in democratic systems (Sackville and Neave 1975: 18), it is also 
accepted that the state is entitled to interfere with those private rights for the 
common good. 
A resource management regime consists of legal and political relationships, 
laws, practices, and understandings shared by participants in the system, which 
allow the state to regulate the exercise of private property rights in the public 
interest. In recent times, this public interest imperative has expanded beyond the 
borders of individual nations. There is now an expectation that state stewardship 
of natural heritage will take into account the global interest in sustainable use of 
a country's resources and maintenance of its biodiversity. As a result, regulation 
of private property rights in most Western countries has increased significantly 
during the last two decades. 
Much of Papua New Guinea's land and resource management regime has 
been inherited from its former colonial administrator, Australia. 1 While there 
have been recent reforms in forestry, fishing, mining, petroleum, and physical 
planning laws, the legal and social concepts which underpin the legislation are 
still founded in the system of Westminster government which Australia 
inherited, in turn, from the power which colonised it, Britain. 
Resource and Land Use Management in Australia 
In Australia (as in most developed democracies), regimes for the control of land 
and resource use have evolved over several decades. In the last decade, as 
consciousness of environmental issues in the international community has 
increased, there has been growing pressure on all countries to ensure that 
1 The Constitution provides that the underlying law of Papua New Guinea (PNG) is based on the 
English common law as it was on the date of Independence. However, in practice, many of the 
statutes still in force in PNG were based on Queensland and Commonwealth statutes which were 
used as models for pre-independence ordinances and some post-independence laws. 
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resources are used responsibly. The Australian land and resource management 
regime is now a relatively complex scheme of laws and administrative 
arrangements incorporating the following elements: 
• land use planning at state and local government levels, with enforcement 
through zoning and development permission requirements; 
• processes for planning the use of Crown (government-owned) land; 
• environmental impact assessment at state and federal levels for major 
projects; 
• works approval and emission licensing at state level; 
• industry codes and emission standards at state and federal levels; 
• catchment management for important catchments such as the Murray-Darling 
Basin, and sensitive environments such as coastal areas and the Great Barrier 
Reef; 
• water use management, including regulation of riparian rights; 
• government ownership of subsurface minerals and petroleum, and licensing 
of exploration and extraction; 
• government ownership of a large proportion of natural forest, and control of 
harvesting through planning, licensing, and codes of practice; 
• protection of natural and cultural heritage, including Aboriginal heritage; 
• protection of biodiversity through control of native vegetation clearance, and 
regulating dealings with endangered species; and 
• establishment of reserves and control of activities within reserves. 
Over the past two decades, Australian state and federal governments have 
sought to better integrate planning, development, and environmental· approval 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, there are many different rules which substantially 
restrict the use of private land, and detailed procedures for obtaining approval 
for activities as simple as building a garden shed on a suburban block. These 
rules are generally followed, despite the relatively small amount of enforcement 
activity. In other words, there is a general acceptance in the community of the 
state's right to interfere in private land use in this way. 
Land Use and Resource Management in Papua New Guinea 
A large number of laws comprise the Papua New Guinea (PNG) land 
management regime. They can be loosely categorised under the following 
policy areas: 
• disposition and use of land (Land Act and associated legislation, Physical 
Planning Act); 
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• regulation of the use of particular resources (Mining Act and associated 
legislation, Petroleum Act and associated legislation, Forestry Act, Crocodile 
Trade Protection Act, and Fisheries Act); 
• regulation or protection of the use of the environment generally (Water 
Resources Act, Environmental Planning Act, Environmental Contaminants 
Act, Prevention of Pollution of the Sea Act, Dumping of Wastes at Sea Act, 
Public Health Act, Quarantine Act, Animal Disease and Control Act, and 
Plant Disease and Control Act); and 
• conservation of particular environmental resources or specific areas (Fauna 
(Protection and Control) Act, National Parks Act, and Conservation Areas 
Act). 
While PNG has many of the same laws as those which form the basis of the 
Australian land and resource management regime, they are not nearly so well 
entrenched. Many development activities in both urban and rural areas appear to 
ignore planning, development approval, and environmental control 
requirements, and there is virtually no enforcement activity. As Taylor notes 
elsewhere in this volume, the state has failed, at least in the forestry sector, to 
impose its reform agenda on dissenting customary landowners. The community 
in PNG appears generally to accept the legitimacy of protests, often violent, by 
which landowners regularly defy the wishes of the state in relation to the use of 
their land. 
This paper suggests that PNG's land use history forms a large part of the 
explanation for the state's failure to achieve its conservation objectives. Land 
use and resource management laws in PNG have been drawn from a very 
different social context in which the role of the state is well established. In 
particular, they fail to properly accommodate the very different nature of 
customary land ownership. The ineffectiveness of these laws is compounded by 
the relative incapacity of the state to assert its will through conventional 
bureaucratic means. These observations have relevance for any future efforts to 
secure a priority for protection of the environment in the development of PNG's 
rich and largely undeveloped natural heritage. 
The Role of the State in Resource and Land Use Management 
Australian land and resource management laws are based on the English system 
of property law, which was incorporated into the law of the Australian colonies 
at settlement. Since the Norman conquest, it has been a basic tenet of English 
property law that the Crown (the state) is the ultimate owner of all land within 
the geographic boundaries of any nation over which it is sovereign. Subjects of 
the Crown (state) hold their title to land as tenants, but they do not own the 
physical substance of the land; rather they own a bundle of rights known as an 
'estate', which itself comprises a property right. In the case of an estate in fee 
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simple (the primary land estate under English law), the ownership is for all 
practical purposes the same as ownership of the land itself.2 
The underlying ownership - the Crown's radical title - provides the basis 
for the state's alienation of interests in the land, for example by compulsory 
acquisition, by reservation of sub-surface rights to the Crown, or by 
extinguishment through subsequent grants of other titles, in the case of the 
original native title of original inhabitants. 
The sovereignty of the state over the land within its domain provided the 
historical basis for state intervention in land and resource management. 
Originally, the state took on the role of adjudicating disputes between 
landowners arising from activities conducted by one landowner which affected 
another's enjoyment of her or his land. Gradually, statutory control of land use 
activities in the public interest has replaced the more parochial interests 
protected by common law actions for negligence.3 
The state is itself also a landowner with significant power. Much of 
Australia is still Crown land, leased for specific uses to pastoralists, farmers, and 
miners. Resources beneath the surface of privately owned land have generally 
been treated as public property. The state licenses the extraction of these 
resources in return for a resource rent usually known as a 'royalty'. Water is 
also treated as a publicly-owned resource, subject to the riparian rights of 
riverside landowners (Bates 1992: 154 ). 
In PNG, land has a very different character. Ownership is defined 
according to custom, which may differ from group to group, and disputes about 
land ownership can be the cause of ongoing conflict between different tribal 
groups. James (1985: 183) describes traditional land laws as being concerned 
partly with defining and maintaining the rights of group members, and partly 
with working out the relationship of the landowning group and outsiders. Land 
ownership transcends the purely legal and economic arrangements which 
characterise Western relations with land. According to Burton-Bradley, land in 
PNG is, at a psychological level, 'an extension of the concept of self (cited in 
James, ibid.). 
The prominence of the social, rather than the economic, significan~e of land 
is also emphasised by Power (1994:3), who argues that landholding groups form 
the basic social unit across PNG. His views are given weight by the findings of 
the Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters (PNGDOL 1974), on whose· 
recommendations the Land Groups Incorporation Act was based. The Fifth 
National Goal set out in the Preamble to the Constitution calls for the 
2 Mabo v Queensland [No. 2] [1991-92] 175 CLR 1 at page SO, judgement of Justices Deane and 
Gaudron. 
3 Note, however, that the common law does not only protect private interests. The law of public 
nuisance aims to maintain a balance between competing interests in land use and development 
(Bates 1992:37). 
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maintenance of traditional villages and communities as viable units of the 
national society. Unlike many other colonies in Africa or Central and South 
America, colonisation generally did not disturb traditional tenure. Customary 
land still accounts for over 97 percent ofPNG's land mass. 
Customary Ownership and State Sovereignty 
State sovereignty is a social and political artefact of modern society, as well as a 
legal one. Owners of private property in Western countries have, for a long 
time, accepted the 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1991) of which they are 
members, and the role of the state in arbitrating conflicts between individuals 
and exerting its power over private citizens. 
In contrast, customary society is stateless; it cannot be described as a single, 
unified body politic (Berndt and Lawrence 1971 :3). Rather, individual groups 
see themselves as sovereign in their own right. Traditional socio-political 
systems in PNG continue to function and regulate most aspects of everyday life, 
and indeed exert considerable influence in national life (ibid:27-9). Many 
villagers probably find it difficult to accord any legitimacy to the new 
institutions of the state, particularly if it has little impact other than the 
intermittent provision of goods and services. In these circumstances, it is 
difficult for the state to find a basis on which to establish its right to interfere in 
the exercise of customary land rights. 
Indeed, the history of state intervention in PNG may give many landowners 
cause to doubt whether the state is really acting in their interests (see 
Holzknecht, this volume). The pre-Independence administration afforded little 
opportunity for customary landowners to participate in economic exploitation of 
their land. 
Under the 1973 Forestry Act and its predecessor, the Forestry Ordinance, 
the state purchased the right to harvest timber from landowners for a minor 
proportion of the royalties to be paid by the harvester. Even in 1976, the now 
independent state continued to presume its entitlement to receive most of the 
resource rent from forestry by legislating to transfer timber royalties to 
provincial governments.4 
Early mining agreements made provision for payment of compensation to 
landowners, but only for disturbance to subsistence activities and for occupation 
of land. Water resources legislation still forms the main legal avenue to pursue 
claims for compensation for environmental damage from mining.s Until 
4 See the Organic Law on Provincial Government, Section 67. 
5 Section 16 of the Water Resources Act empowers the Minister to determine compensation 
payments for deprivation of the use and enjoyment of land or water rights and damage to the 
surface of land, in consequence of the exercise of rights under a water use permit. This provision 
originates from provisions in Australian legislation under which landowners affected by mining 
can seek compensation for the disturbance to their enjoyment of land. It is suggested here that they 
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recently, mining agreements generally did not provide for landowners to share 
the royalty payments received by government for the minerals extracted 
(Connell 1992:3 7). Until 1989, landowners had no direct role in the negotiation 
of major resource development projects (Jackson 1991: 19). 
The national government's failure to adequately respond to landowners' 
demands for a share of the wealth of their land erupted in civil unrest in 
Bougainville in late 1988. Its inability to resolve the resulting seven-year 
conflict demonstrates the fragility of the state's grip on the maintenance of a 
unified polity. Since the mid-1980s, landowners have increasing challenged the 
state to accord them a greater role in resource development projects and to 
renegotiate revenue and compensation packages in their favour (see Simpson, 
this volume). The state has proved itself unable or unwilling to quell violent 
social protests over resource developments, particularly at the frontiers of 
capitalist penetration where these projects are located. 
A key issue in landowner disputes with the national government is the 
contest over ownership of natural resources. The newly-formed state based its 
right to receive the bulk of resource rent on its assertion of ownership of natural 
resources. As already noted, it even treated timber in this way, probably because 
forestry legislation had blindly followed the pre-Independence Australian model. 
Calls for the government to return natural resources to their rightful owners have 
increased along with landowner demands for increased revenue returns from 
resource exploitation. A prominent Papua New Guinean lawyer, Peter Donigi (a 
former President of the Law Society), has argued forcefully that the alienation of 
subsurface minerals to the state in PNG is unconstitutional (Donigi 1994). 
Speakers at a conference on constitutional issues in early 1996, including a 
former ministerial aide, echoed his views (Post-Courier, 6 January 1996). The 
issue here is not to decide whether they are correct, but rather to show that 
challenges to the state's power of interference in private property rights 
increasingly come from those quarters where the state would generally expect to 
find support for its position. 
Papua New Guineans now increasingly question whether the state is acting 
on behalf of the people (Wolfers 1992:253) and whether it has any legitimate 
claim to share in the economic benefits of resource development (Parkop 
1995: 118). In the face of growing and substantial opposition, the question of 
how the state can enforce its will over its citizens, particularly in remote areas, 
becomes critical. In Western countries, where the role of the state is accepted, 
this question does not even arise. 
were never intended to provide an avenue for multi-million dollar claims of the kind now made 
under the Water Resources Act. 
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Conservation and Development on Customary Land under Existing 
Laws 
Controls on development are unlikely to be achieved without state intervention. 
While local interests may be adequately protected at the local level with proper 
gdvice (see Taylor, this volume}, it is unlikely that other interests (including 
those of residents in affected catchments, as well as the national and global 
interests) will be properly protected unless the state intervenes. Furthermore, 
conservation objectives generally fare poorly when offered as alternatives to 
development, because they do not offer an obvious immediate economic benefit 
to the local area. It is unlikely that conservation will be achieved unless the state 
promotes or enforces it. 
State intervention might promote environmental protection objectives in 
two ways. Firstly, it might set aside areas to be protected from development, or 
in which only certain kinds of development might occur. Secondly, it might 
secure conditions for development which ensure that the environment is 
adequately protected to whatever extent can be reasonably achieved, and which 
prevent risky developments from proceeding. 
Protected Areas 
PNG has three laws which might provide a basis for establishing protected areas 
for conservation purposes. The National Parks Act provides for the 
establishment of conventional state-managed reserves. Parks can only be 
established on alienated (non-customary) land, and it is in any case an 
inappropriate model for conservation on customary land because it offers no role 
for traditional owners in management decision making. 
The Fauna (Protection and Control) Act allows the establishment of 
locally-managed Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs ), and has been 
successfully implemented in a number of areas. However, its purposes and 
limitations are not well understood. Activities within a WMA can be controlled 
only for the purpose of protecting fauna in the area. The Act has a strong focus 
on local management, and enforcement powers under the Act are weak; the 
maximum penalty for breaching a WMA rule is K20 (Section 17(5)). 
The Conservation Areas Act, enacted in 1978, is a more likely vehicle for 
the establishment of significant protected areas on customary land. However, it 
has never been implemented, and there are a number of potential problems with 
its implementation which have not been fully explored. 
To begin with, the Act is framed on the assumption that local landowners 
will seek a means to control and regulate development in their area. 
Conservation Areas are established under the control of a ministerially-
appointed local Management Committee. There is no provision for the state to 
set up a Conservation Area without local consent and active participation. In 
light of the foregoing discussion, this may be appropriate, since it is unlikely that 
the state could force a Conservation Area into existence against the wishes of 
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landowners. However, it offers little comfort where an environmental resource 
of national or global significance is threatened and local landowners do not share 
the state's concerns about its preservation. 
Secondly, considerable resources are needed to establish the infrastructure 
which is necessary to manage a Conservation Area under the model envisaged 
by the Act. The boundaries of the area must be surveyed. A committee of 
management must be selected. The committee manages in accordance with a 
Management Plan developed by them and approved by the Minister. Local 
landowners must be mobilised to understand the kinds of decisions involved in 
drawing up a management plan, and to make those decisions in an informed 
way. Their capacity to manage the area on an ongoing basis must be developed. 
Thirdly, the establishment of a body that is recognised by the state, and 
which has the power to control activities on customary land, is fraught with 
problems at a local political level. The powers of the Management Committee 
are likely to bring it into conflict with incorporated land groups, landowner 
companies, and local government in the area. It is not clear how these conflicts 
can be avoided or resolved, and they have the potential to deflect energy away 
from the business of managing outside development pressures and inwards on 
the local community. This has already been the experience of landowner 
companies in some parts ofPNG. 
Finally, the Act gives the Minister power to override the Management Plan. 
As is usual in PNG legislation, the Act does not specify any constraints on the 
Minister's powers. It would seem to be implicit that the Minister should only 
exercise this power in the public interest, but fears have been expressed that he 
may be compelled to exercise his powers for much less significant reasons. In 
these circumstances, the local Management Committee would be powerless. 
Environmental Approvals for Development 
In the case of most development activities, approvals are required under more 
than one regulatory system. These systems have quite different objectives. 
Mining, forestry, and fisheries projects require approval under industry-specific 
legislation aimed at ensuring the sustainable use of the resource and providing a 
mechanism for the state to collect resource rent based on the volume of resource 
extracted. Agricultural projects, however, are not subject to any kind of 
industry-specific approval as there is no licensing scheme for this kind of 
project. 
More general approval is required under planning and environmental laws. 
Development activities within town areas (generally industrial development) 
require planning approval, broadly intended to preserve the amenity of urban 
areas and prevent public health risks. Outside urban (physical planning) areas, 
no planning approval is required. 
In addition to planning approval, environmental approvals are required 
under the Environmental Planning Act for projects of a kind for which 
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guidelines have been issued.6 The Act establishes a comprehensive procedure 
for public scrutiny of environmental plans, and decisions by the National 
Executive Council (Cabinet) as to whether or not a project should go ahead. 
This procedure has never been formally invoked, apparently because it is 
considered too time-consuming and costly.7 Instead, use is made of a 'fast-track 
mechanism' which culminates in ministerial approval. Environmental plans 
(particularly for forestry and controversial agricultural projects) are regularly 
lodged after political approval for the project has already been given, and 
sometimes after work at the site has already begun. 
The Environmental Contaminants Act requires the licensing of all 
discharge, deposit, or emission of environmental contaminants. In 1988, 
regulations were passed to enable pesticide use to be licensed, but no other types 
of contaminants are currently subject to licensing. Despite cross-referencing 
between this Act and the Environmental Planning Act, suggesting that projects 
with approved environmental plans still require a contaminants licence, 
contaminants licences are not issued in these circumstances. 
Lack of a National Planning Framework 
In modern states, land use decisions- concerning the establishment of protected 
areas and the conditions under which development will be allowed to occur- are 
usually taken in the context of a wider range of issues than those which bear 
directly on the area or development in question. Planning (the process by which 
these wider issues are systematically considered as part of decision making) is 
therefore central to effective management of natural resources. Notwithstanding 
the plethora of legislation which offers avenues for environmental protection, 
PNG lacks a framework for integrated and comprehensive land and resource 
management planning. 
There is no centralised land use planning in PNG outside town areas 
declared as physical planning areas under the Physical Planning Act. Instead, 
sector-by-sector planning results in ad hoc outcomes. The Kikori Basin area in 
Gulf Province provides a case in point. During late 1994, a number of interest 
groups sought to establish priority for different land uses in the area. These 
included conservation interests as well as prospective forestry and agricultural 
developers. It was suspected that the agricultural proposal (for establishment of 
a large oil palm plantation) represented a backdoor means to clear-felling the 
valuable timber resource. In the absence of a structured mechanism to resolve 
these competing claims, the National Forest Authority succeeded in quarantining 
the area from other development options by signing up landowners in the area to 
6 So far, only guidelines for selective logging projects have been issued, and they have not yet 
been enforced in relation to environmental plans lodged for the same projects. 
7 In at least one recent large mining project, the proponent insisted that the full public scrutiny 
procedure should be followed, even though the environmental plan had not been formally 
requisitioned. 
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a Forest Management Agreement. By 'getting in first', it prevented the other 
land use proposals from proceeding. 8 
Integrated planning requires a multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral 
approach to be effective. Generally, legislation will prescribe a process where 
different agencies of government contribute to the decision-making process and 
some, safeguarding particularly important interests, may be given the right to 
veto a project. Filer and Taylor have described the process for preparation of the 
National Forest Plan elsewhere in this volume. At the time of writing, a 
National Forest Plan had finally been prepared under threat of invalidation of 
newly issued timber permits. Although it involved consultation with provincial 
governments, it is not at all clear that the interests of other sectors were properly 
taken into account. So long as planning still occurs only at a single-agency 
level, it is not surprising that there will continue to be conflicts over land use, 
and the outcome of these conflicts will be resolved in the political arena rather 
than through more deliberative and inclusive policy processes. 
Enforcement of Development Controls 
The enforcement of development controls, especially licence and permit 
conditions and environmental approvals, increasingly brings the state into 
competition with landowners and developers. Sometimes landowners request 
assistance from the state to enforce conditions; sometimes they are allied with 
the developer in seeking to undermine them. In either case, the state's inability 
to enforce the regulations it has laid down undermines its capacity to do so in the 
future. 
The reasons for poor enforcement are complex and interrelated. To begin 
with, the bureaucracy has little or no experience of prosecuting regulatory 
offences. There is no pre-Independence legacy of knowledge about how to 
prosecute for breach of environmental plan conditions. Indeed, the state appears 
to have some difficulty securing convictions in relation to criminal matters, in 
relation to which it has considerable experience. Problems with prosecutions 
include lack of adequate records to establish proof of facts on which the 
conviction would be based, lack of expert evidence, and lack of detail in the 
legislation about how, by whom, and in what court prosecutions should be 
commenced. 
Regulatory systems are also inadequately entrenched. Inadequate 
monitoring, poor record keeping, tolerance of breaches, and confusion about 
what the conditions actually are have contributed to bureaucratic inertia, so that 
it is difficult to determine which breaches are most serious, and whom to 
prosecute first. Much of the administrative resource available is absorbed in 
maintenance of the regulatory system itself - answering correspondence from 
8 Under the 1991 Forestry Act, clear-felling cannot take place inside a Forest Management 
Agreement area, so the agricultural project was effectively prevented. Arguments still continue 
about whether conservation objectives can be achieved concurrently with timber extraction. 
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approval holders and reviewing new applications for approval - rather than in 
monitoring and enforcement activities. 
Enforcement in most regulatory systems depends largely on the willingness 
of those to whom laws apply to obey those laws. In the case of large 
multinational foreign companies, there are usually considerable persuasive 
influences for them to submit to the regulatory system. The risk of adverse 
publicity outside PNG is too great to engage in outright disobedience of 
environmental conditions. 
However, where the rules of behaviour are ill-defined or ambiguous, there 
is often room for manoeuvre or renegotiation of the conditions of environmental 
approval. In the case of companies which are not vulnerable to public censure at 
home, confusion and overlap between different development approvals can 
provide large loopholes. Conflicts between the conditions of a logging permit 
and those of the environmental plan approval relating to the width of riparian 
buffers, for example, provide a company with a basis for defending an incursion 
into a buffer specified in an environmental plan approval. Officials sometime 
purport to relax conditions of ministerial approvals by letter, and companies rely 
upon these to justify non-compliance. While the government may well succeed 
in any action to enforce those conditions (on the basis that the official acted 
outside his power), the company only needs to arm itself with the basis for a 
half-credible argument justifying their default in order to fend off local criticism. 
If the threat of prosecution for non-compliance were a real one, permit-
holders and approval-holders might take more care to ensure that they were 
legally, and not just apparently, acting in compliance with conditions. But, as 
there has never been a successful prosecution under the Environmental Planning 
Act, they can assume that they are unlikely to be prosecuted as long as the breach 
is not outrageously flagrant. 
Political Forces 
A discussion of policy processes in PNG would not be complete without 
mention of the political activity which characterises many policy decisions. It is 
incorrect to suggest that the socio-political processes by which controversial 
land use decisions are made in PNG are not consensual. In many respects, those 
'at the grass roots level' have a greater say in political decision making than do 
ordinary community members in many other countries. 
However, the processes by which the views of some, and not others, 
achieve recognition in the political process serves to. illustrate the lack of power 
of the state in ensuring that its own interests (in safeguarding the long-term 
national interest) are represented. The continued influence of traditional 
political forces - the power of the big men and their ability to manipulate 
decision making in order to promote the economic and social advancement of 
their line - appear to weaken the power of the state to advance the interests of 
the nation generally. 
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Alternatives to Command and Control 
Lar-.k of bureaucratic infrastructure, the absence of policy cohesiveness which 
would lend strategic purpose to environmental decision making, and 
vulnerability to the political will of landowners combine to weaken the power of 
the state to impose its will by force in the face of opposition. 
In these circumstances, what options are open to the state to assert national 
and global interests in environmental protection objectives? Both Taylor and 
Simpson (this volume) have suggested that negotiated, contract-based outcomes 
are a more viable alternative to the imposition of regulatory mechanisms by the 
state. However, as Wolfers (1992:243) has observed, conflict is often the only 
means by which some people can make themselves heard. Even if negotiated 
outcomes are reached, there can be no certainty that they will be sustainable. 
Where restrictions on development will result in reduced income to the local 
area, there will always be ongoing pressure to renegotiate another, more 
favourable outcome. 
The proposal that agreements about policy objectives should be enforced by 
contract raises interesting questions about the capacity of the state to enforce 
contracts entered into with groups of landowners. Legal conflict in 
contemporary Western legal systems is highly individualised (Black 1989). In 
general, the law refuses to deal with groups of people unless they have formally 
adopted an incorporated structure such as a partnership, association or company. 
Once that structure has been adopted, the law treats the structure as having the 
legal personality of an individual for the purpose of involving it in legal 
decisions. Decisions are binding on members of the incorporated group, but 
only so far as they are members. 
An issue which reverberates through all resource development projects on 
customary land is the means by which the true wishes of landowners should be 
ascertained. On the one hand, principles of self-determination suggest that 
landowners should be able to decide that for themselves. On the other hand, an 
agreement entered into today by landowner representatives might tomorrow be 
challenged as being unrepresentative of the true wishes of the people. Such an 
uncertain foundation provides no basis for the investment of capital in a project 
-whether it involves conservation or exploitation. 
Since it is unlikely that all landowners will agree, how should the conflicts 
be interpreted by outsiders? It is not clear that Western notions of democracy 
are appropriate yardsticks of 'proper' and 'fair' decision making, nor that the 
complaints of some members of the group about the outcome are any indication 
that the decision-making process was improper. In the final analysis, the state is 
probably unable to make the judgement that a decision-making process 
undertaken by a landowner group has taken place within customary confines. 
It may be that some requirement for a formal structure with accountability 
outside its membership (as well as internally) is the only means by which the 
state can assure itselfthat its dealings are with a legal entity which represents all 
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landowners. The cloak of incorpmation demanded by the Western legal system 
then provides the state with some protection against the conflicts thrown up by 
dissenting members, who can be directed back to the representative structure to 
resolve these issues. 
While the incorporated structure will provide some certainty for outsiders 
dealing with a representative body, it provides no guarantee that the membership 
is representative or that decisions have been taken in a manner which reflects 
custom. Setting guidelines for incorporated bodies (Whimp 1995) may provide 
some safeguards, but it also risks an outside intervention with custom which is 
more harmful than helpful. 
Enforcement of Contractual Obligations 
In the final analysis, the existence of an incorporated body, or a contract to 
which it is a party, is no guarantee that the agreement reached will be honoured 
by the members of a customary group. Enforcement of contracts poses the same 
problems as enforcement of laws. Is there any reason to suppose that voluntary 
compliance will be greater where the desired outcomes have been negotiated 
rather than imposed? 
The foregoing discussion has focussed particularly on the powerlessness of 
the state to impose its will. However, political theories also emphasise the 
concept of exchange in social relations, drawing parallels with contracts and 
agreements which form an essential part of the exchange model of economics, 
and positioning the concept of exchange as diametrically opposed to the concept 
of power (Hyden 1992:9). While power involves the probability that the will of 
one person will prevail over the will of others, exchange assumes a relationship 
in which the actors are on an equal footing. 
Taylor's proposal (this volume) that resource development outcomes be 
secured by contract with local landowners fits squarely within this theoretical 
framework. Instead of occupying an authoritarian position in relation to the 
local community, the state descends into the arena and assumes a position equal 
to that of landowners, and then bargains an outcome in which all are winners and 
there are no losers. 
In a forestry project, it would at first blush appear to be a relatively simple 
matter to achieve a situation in which all parties are winners. The state takes a 
revenue cut and secures undertakings about the way logging will be carried out, 
while the landowners receive cash benefits from realising the economic potential 
of their forest. 
However, the position is complicated when one considers the amorphous 
nature of the body politic which represents the landowners as one party to the 
agreement. In order for a forestry project to be undertaken in a sustainable but 
economically viable manner, it is usually considered necessary to guarantee a 
wood flow over a long period of time. Will landowners who have long since 
received immediate cash benefits from the trees on their land (or their children) 
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continue to honour their obligation to permit the project to operate unimpeded, 
when they continue to suffer the environmental effects and social disruption it 
causes? 
It is likely that ongoing compliance with contract obligations will ultimately 
depend more on the relations between landowners and government than it does 
on maintaining a situation in which landowners continue to perceive that the 
greater benefits lie in adhering to the terms of the contract. Hyden' s theory of 
governance in developing states proposes that the intermediate concepts of 
authority and reciprocity provides a fruitful way to examine the interaction of 
state and society, while still drawing on classic ideas about power and exchange. 
He suggests that the improvement of political conditions in developing countries 
is to be sought in the realm of governance - the way in which government and 
the governed relate to each other. 
At the core of Hyden' s concept of governance, relations between state and 
society are characterised by reciprocity. Reciprocity is an ongoing relationship, 
whereas exchange is discrete and immediate. In a reciprocal relationship, each 
contributes to the welfare of others with an expectation that the others will do 
likewise (Hyden 1992). To establish a reciprocal relationship, actors must share 
a fundamental understanding about the unwritten norms on which their 
expectations of each others' behaviour are based. Such a relationship has much 
in common with the horizontal relationships in society - reciprocity is the 
predominant social logic in poor communities, where people must rely upon 
each other for survival (Hyden 1990). 
The concept of reciprocity provides a way of understanding how the state in 
PNG might exercise a form of authority over the behaviour of its citizens which 
is not based on force. However, as previously noted, there appears to be a 
decline in the political authority of the state in PNG, marked by an increase in 
citizen non-compliance with the government's laws and policies. The failure of 
the state's authority suggests that it has already breached the fundamental 
conditions of the reciprocal relationship. As Bratton and Rothchild (1992:272) 
observe in relation to Africa, political leaders entered into a social compact with 
their followers at the time of independence. In return for obedience, they 
promised an increase in mass living standards. Instead, elites violated 
reciprocal norms by taking arbitrary decisions, by failing to deliver goods and 
services, and by diverting public resources to private ends. The response of 
citizens was non-compliance, first by disengaging and retreating into informal 
activities, and then by re-engaging in political dialogue through social protest. 
If the state has already violated the norms of its relationship with its 
citizens, can there be any basis for assuming that a contract-based agreement is 
more likely to be obeyed than a law? Perhaps, finally, the effectiveness of a 
contract in securing environmental protection objectives is more likely to rest on 
the ability of the state to call to account outside parties, such as logging 
contractors, who rely on the contract to justify their own activities. Foreign 
companies are compelled by different forces to abide by the authority of the 
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state, even when there is widespread civilian non-compliance. Ultimately, it is 
these companies which provide resource owners with access to the means of 
economic exploitation - capital, equipment, technical knowledge, and access to 
overseas markets. Regulation of their activities may be a far more effective way 
of enforcing the state's interest in a contract. 
Conclusion 
In summary, it is apparent that the reasons for lack of state authority in PNG are 
structural and fundamental. The state will not increase its ability to impose its 
will on citizens overnight, by appointing more police officers or reorganising 
departmental structures. Rather, a much longer process of development is 
required in which citizens come to accept the legitimacy of the state and its right 
to control various aspects of the way they live. Indeed, the major issue may be 
to ensure that the state does in fact pursue that path, instead of short-term 
strategies which may have the effect of widening the gulf between state and 
society, and ultimately hastening the breakdown of democratic institutions. 
Central to this pursuit is the state's recognition that its authority rests on the will 
of its people. 
The preceding discussion has perhaps not done justice to Taylor' s proposals 
about the role of the state as a stakeholder in negotiated outcomes for forestry 
projects. His suggestion that the state should offer extension services to ensure 
that landowners are sufficiently organised and informed to engage in a 
negotiation process might be said to offer only a new form of patronage or 
paternalism rather than a bargaining process between equal participants. On the 
other hand, the restoration of reciprocal relations between the state and its 
citizens seems to be implicit in his argument. 
At a practical level, the lessening of the state's reach into civil society has 
diminished both its ability to act responsively to the needs of citizens and its 
relevance in their lives. By re-engaging with its citizens through active 
involvement in a process of identifying and securing specific objectives through 
overt agreement, the state may succeed in regaining the ground it has apparently 
lost. In this way, it might legitimate its role in safeguarding larger national 
interests, and secure the consent of its citizens to govern them accordingly. 
CHAPTER17 
PRO BONO PUBLICO? 
CONSERVATION AND APPROPRIATE RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA* 
HARTMUT HOLZKNECHT 
Introduction 
The title of this chapter - Pro Bono Publico? ('For the Public Good?') - is 
intended to indicate that a focus on conservation and related matters necessarily 
has to be seen within the broader context of resource management, because 
conservation is only one of a number of valid resource management strategies. 
Given the inherent customary resource tenure and resource use systems 
actively in place over almost all land and other resources in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) (Crocombe and Hide 1987; Ward 1997), such resource management must 
necessarily be activated by, and active at, the community level. Because of this, 
it must also be related specifically to a particular community or resource owner 
grouping. Such a context must be pro bono publico, for the public good, and yet 
questions inevitably arise concerning the levels at which such 'public good' 
should be defined and sought. Should it only be at the level of the resource 
owner and the resource owner group, or are there other levels at which this 
'public good' may claim equal priority? Discussion will return to this question. 
This chapter has been guided by several assumptions about PNG societies 
and their members' general attitudes to, and exploitation of, natural resources. 
Some of these assumptions have necessarily had to be generalised for this 
presentation, so that there may be some specific cases which do not conform to 
all of them. Nevertheless, I believe they have a broad validity. 
Assumption One is that the current customary resource tenure and use 
systems, operating differentially and locally across PNG, will continue for the 
foreseeable future. Some 97 percent of the country's land mass currently comes 
under one or other of these customary systems which ·are supported and 
protected by the National Constitution. The state therefore has no control over, 
and little to say about, these systems. However, it is quite possible that some 
changes may take place, in the future, in the frameworks within which these 
systems operate and in the ways in which they interrelate with the modern world 
and its activities. 
• The views expressed in this paper are my own. In particular, I wish to thank Nikhil Sekhran for 
detailed feedback on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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Assumption Two notes that, in the Melanesian world, there are no areas of 
the kind which are termed 'wildlands' in the North American context. PNG 
resource owners would state definitively that there is no area of their land which 
is not owned, which is off limits to everyone, or which does not have a purpose 
or cannot be exploited in some way. Although some areas may be remote from 
centres of habitation and may be visited only a few times a year, nevertheless 
they are neither ownerless nor 'wild' in the Western and modern sense of the 
word. If this term is defined differently then it may be acceptable in the 
Melanesian context. 
Assumption Three suggests that, in the PNG context, there is no 
conservation, if conservation means preservation for its own sake. It is evident 
from the reasons given by various groups of resource owners, when, for 
example, they apply to government to set up Wildlife Management Areas around 
the country, that their intention is not preservation as such, but better and more 
controlled management of their resources, and usually quite specific resources, 
within a particular area. In a customary context, this can also be achieved by 
general or specific 'taboos' being placed on such areas, sometimes on particular 
species or for certain periods of time. The more specific objective is also 
realised to a certain extent - in areas where these belief systems apply - by 
restrictions placed on an individual person's or a clan's 'totem' species. 
Another point to note in respect of this assumption is that utilitarian forest 
management, as locally practised, will almost inevitably conflict with a more 
general approach to biodiversity conservation, since only a small proportion of 
species within any given ecosystem will have a use, and therefore a value, to the 
human beings within that ecosystem. Any long-term emphasis on, and 
maximisation of, utility will tend to lead to the loss of biodiversity (personal 
communication, Nikhil Sekhran). 
Assumptions One, Two and Three lead to Assumption Four: that current 
resource owners, whether individually or in their customary groups, are seeking 
meaningful ways to re-establish and reinforce management regimes for their 
resources which everyone with rights to those resources will support, to which 
they will adhere, and from which they will all benefit. I In order to be successful 
and effective, such a search for re-empowerment depends on three additional 
factors: 
• effective structures built upon old and known customary structures and 
systems; 
• a community re-establishing its responsibilities and rights over resources to 
which customary groups have held and exercised a range of customary rights 
1 Assumption Four may be seen by some readers as a leap of faith. However, finding, adapting, 
and applying appropriate resource management strategies- including conservation- in the PNG 
cDntext requires not just incremental steps but also leaps, lateral or otherwise, which are based on 
facts - on knowledge of past and present systems as well as on likely possibilities for the future. 
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from precontact times, and have continued to do so down to the present day; 
and 
• access to relevant information on resource management and a capacity to 
integrate this information with a community's priority needs in order to 
develop and implement action plans. 
This process necessarily implies that a community can not only establish its 
goals, but also develop utilitarian and sustainable activity programmes and 
associated projects by which to achieve those goals. Assumption Three implies 
the probability of conflicts between this approach and the more general pursuit 
of biodiversity conservation. These matters will be discussed at greater length 
below, along with the formulation of effective strategies for working towards 
conservation and appropriate resource management. There is no single approach 
which, if properly applied, will 'do the trick'. Ideally, a number of different but 
overlapping approaches need to be used in concert in any one location. 
For community-level resource management - and especially for 
conservation in the modern and Western sense- to be effective in PNG, durable 
linkages have to be found between: 
• social or customary interests and personal or entrepreneurial interests; and 
• an improvement in community welfare or general living standards and the 
pursuit of personal prestige or monetary gain. 
It is only in this way that a trade-off between short-term development objectives 
and long-term, sustainable development objectives can be properly considered 
and developed. 
With this preamble in mind, I shall first present some relevant background 
information, then make a brief comment about theory and practice, and then 
present two contrasting approaches to planning and implementation. A 
subsequent discussion of institutional bases and appropriate structures leads into 
longer discussions of the incorporated land group process and community 
resource management strategies. Support mechanisms for community resource 
management are presented under four separate headings before I turn to specific 
discussion of the relationship between these management strategies and 
approaches to conservation in PNG. The final section attempts to bring together 
strategies and processes in community resource management, and provides some 
indications of what might be an acceptable and workable practice in the PNG 
context. 
Background 
A range of detailed background data on resources and their commercial 
exploitation in PNG is available in various publications for sectors such as 
mining, forestry, fisheries, agriculture and land (see Denoon and Snowden 1981; 
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Connell and Howitt 1991; Henningham and May 1992; Sekhran and Miller 
1995; Howitt, Connell and Hirsch 1996; Ward and Kingdon 1996). 
Customary resource tenure and resource use systems are widely known 
through the writings of human geographers and social anthropologists too 
numerous to list here. Such publications refer to many communities and wider 
entities across PNG.2 Although the processes which link these customary 
systems with large-scale commercial resource exploitation projects are not so 
well understood, nor clearly described at present, an understanding of at least 
some of these processes is critical as we work towards successful and 
appropriate resource management strategies and, through them, begin to address 
the problems ofbiodiversity and its conservation in PNG. 
Major aspects of customary resource tenure are set out elsewhere 
(Crocombe and Hide 1987; Holzknecht 1994b; Ward and Kingdon 1996). 
People living in any one locality will use and manage their resources, in most 
instances, according to those customary practices prevailing there, with these 
resources and their uses being viewed in integrated, holistic ways. All residents 
in a community use forested land to some degree, for example, for house 
construction timbers, bamboo for walls, flooring and many other uses, roofing 
materials, hunting of game, collection of wild foods, herbs and medicines of 
various kinds, and food gardens in areas of cleared forest. 
In any community, one person, some, or many people will also, to some 
degree, be involved in cash cropping. Depending on the altitude of the locality, 
this may mean the cultivation or production of copra, cocoa, or coffee. These 
two systems can generally coexist quite well in most parts of PNG, unless very 
large areas of land held under custom are taken over for cash crop production 
and are therefore no longer available for inclusion in a fallow cycle and 
subsequent re-use for customary purposes. Another factor mitigating against 
this coexistence is a high rate of population growth, which means increasing 
population pressure on all resources. Such impacts vary a great deal across 
PNG. 
A major current threat to biodiversity and conservation in PNG is the high 
rate of commercial forest exploitation. This threat is exagerrated by the kinds of 
commercial forest exploitation which are practised by foreign loggers, and by 
the resulting environmental and social impacts of these practices. Another threat 
results from the alienation of younger generations from traditional value 
systems, which is itself partly due to economic pressures from the inexorable 
penetration ofthe cash economy into every corner ofPNG. 
2 Much of this work is neither transparent in style nor in vocabulary because it has been written in 
jargon for a professional peer group and is therefore hard to use for practical purposes. 
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Levels of Theory and Practice 
In the PNG context, the issues of local community participation, self-reliance, 
and collective responsibility for a wide range of activities are of critical 
importance precisely because resource ownership and systems of resource use 
are not only locally based but also locally initiated, controlled, and practised. It 
is therefore at the local level that appropriate resource management strategies 
must be developed and implemented, and this is also the level at which major 
responsibilities for resource management and community development need to 
be accepted and addressed. 
In theory, the combination of customary resource ownership and the 
autonomy of local societies means that these responsibilities are already 
addressed by local custom. In practice, however, despite the legitimation of 
customary resource ownership by the National Constitution, the capacity to do 
so has been affected by a number of long-term forms of disempowerment which 
can partly be ascribed to the alienation and marginalisation of subject peoples by 
colonial authority. 
In response to colonialism, self-government, and independence, groups and 
individuals in PNG began to rearticulate their social, political, economic, and 
religious systems with each other and with the external forces of modernity 
(Carrier and Carrier 1991; Carrier 1992). Some groups and individuals 
responded to new opportunities much more quickly than others. In every PNG 
society, there is an inherent tension between community and individual interests, 
and the dimensions of this tension change over time. So the customary resource 
ownership and resource use systems currently operate quite well at some levels, 
but not at others. Some types of leaders, most especially the elected leadership, 
have exploited gaps left by the overlapping of different economic and political 
systems, and have thus bypassed the customary limitations on the control and 
use of some resources. In addition, as these customary systems are affected by 
the high rate of population growth, which in some areas threatens to overwhelm 
the regenerative capacities of natural ecosystems, so the general response has 
been to tighten up on the categories of persons who are given temporary access 
to a range of resources (Meggitt 1965). 
In practice, while there are a number of unifying factors at the local level, 
there are currently also a number of differentiated interests which work 
themselves out in a number of ways (some of which overlap) - through 
leadership contests, competition between customary groups for political 
ascendancy, and the breakdown of customary consultation practices. 
Planning and Implementation Approaches 
Many political and economic systems have developed what is basically a 'top-
down' approach to planning and the implementation of planning decisions. PNG 
has adopted this kind of approach since gaining independence in 1975. A great 
deal of planning work has been done at the centre, and plans and reports have 
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been produced in great numbers, but somehow the implementation phase has not 
worked well or has not worked at all. When the provincial government s'ystem 
was introduced after 1977, a range of planning activities was gradually taken 
over by each of the nineteen provincial governments, but these activities and 
their implementation phases most often exhibited the same kinds of problems as 
were evident at the national level. 
At both national and provincial levels, the assumption of a close articulation 
of systems which support both planning and implementation processes is clearly 
invalid. One of the major reasons for this false assumption is that only a very 
small proportion of land and resource ownership - perhaps 3 percent of the land 
area- lies within the control of the state, while the remainder continues to be in 
the hands of many small and autonomous resource-owning customary groups. 
Very little, if any, of the planning effort undertaken over the years since 
independence has involved any of the actual resource owners at any level or in 
any major way. Indeed, most planned programmes involving natural resources 
and geared towards economic development have depended to a large extent on 
legal avenues and extraordinary methods of subverting customary systems of 
resource tenure and use. Therefore, the programmes have often contradicted the 
systems which have existed since pre-contact times and which operate in the 
best interests of the majority of people holding rights to those resources. These 
programmes, implicitly at least, also often seek to regularise local practice under 
modern legal instruments (such as land leases or lease-leaseback arrangements) 
which are controlled by the state and therefore taken out of the hands of 
customary owners (see Lakau 1995). In such ways, foreign investors and local 
entrepreneurs have striven to acquire commercial and personal security over 
against the majority of customary resource owners. 
This type of conventional or 'top-down' planning, sometimes also called 
the 'blueprint approach' (Eyben 1991), can be summarised in the following brief 
points: 
• It is controlled by a state institution, in line with state priorities, and that is 
why it is a 'top-down' or 'blueprint' approach. 
• It is initiated, planned and implemented externally, and often facilitated 
locally by one or a few individuals. 
• It is non-participatory - the subject or target population of the plan is not 
involved in the process, but nevertheless is often required to approve the 
plan. 
• It involves a very circumscribed (if any) acceptance of a community's views 
and inputs, and so little local confidence in the plan is generated. 
• The main priority is to produce the plan and keep it going for the plan period. 
• This approach does not, by itself, enhance the capacity of local institutions to 
build other structures, create new programmes themselves, or maintain those 
structures or programmes which a blueprint approach builds. 
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One observer (Standish 1996) notes that this approach has been largely 
responsible for destroying the democratic basis of customary PNG societies and 
has made them much more dependent on state handouts and top-down state 
direction. 
This may be contrasted with a more appropriate planning and 
implementation process, sometimes called 'action planning' or the 'process 
approach' (Eyben 1991 ). This approach builds upon existing local structures 
and strengths, local knowledge, and strong local participation and involvement. 
This approach, which can cover a wide range of activities, may be characterised 
as follows: 
• The process is 'bottom-up', and may best be seen as an evolving expression 
of a community's needs and aspirations. 
• It is initiated and conducted by the people themselves, and therefore 
encourages self-reliance, according a central role to local institutions and 
populations. 
• This process is a participatory process between outsiders (who act as 
facilitators) and insiders (people from the community itself). 
• The approach supports, indeed encourages, 'empowerment' - giving people 
confidence in their own authority and the capacity to wield it in responsible 
ways. 
• The planning process in this approach is more important than the plan itself. 
A number of spin-off benefits from the process include leadership skills, 
increasing self-confidence, analytical and decision-making skills, and better 
ways to gain access to information. 
Progressively since independence, and especially in the last ten years or so, 
resource owners3 - particularly those living in rural areas - have expressed an 
escalating dissatisfaction with the increasing exclusion of themselves as 
individuals, groups, and communities from consultation and development 
processes within the country at both provincial and local levels. They feel that 
there are too many legal and administrative loopholes through which particular 
individuals are able to manipulate and cheat the majority of their people for their 
own individual benefit, using what are essentially group resources. A typical 
acerbic comment from one community representative is the following: 'The 
developers are foreigners and the State is only a concept. It is us, the 
landowners who represent real life and people' (quoted in Filer 1995:68). 
3 I have used the term 'resource owner' in virtually all my writings on these issues as a 
descriptive and relatively neutral term (for example, Holzknecht n.d. a). The other term often used 
in this context, 'landowner', besides being an inaccurate descriptive term (people as individuals or 
as a group or category own particular rights to land and other resources) also carries with it a 
multiplicity of levels of meaning which are used in the context of political and other current 
discourses (see Filer 1997a). 
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Some practical methodologies, which are applicable to conservation and 
other appropriate resource management strategies, and which are based on the 
latter local-level method of participatory planning and development, are set out 
and briefly discussed in the following section. 
Customary Institutional Bases and Appropriate Structures 
Let us briefly consider the ways in which customary institutions approach the 
problem of resource management in PNG (see Holzknecht 1994b, 1996a). In 
most PNG societies, a person is born into a clan (patrilineal or matrilineal, 
depending on the practice of following a male line or a female line) or a cognatic 
system in which each individual has his or her own kinship network. In most 
cases, this is the grouping with which people are primarily identified throughout 
their lives, yet there is still a great deal of flexibility and variability in the choice 
of one's place of residence and personal associates, in the distribution of 
loyalties, and in the manipulation of personal relationships for one's personal 
benefit. 
Being a member of a clan or other customary social group confers a number 
of actual or potential rights to different resources in a variety of contexts. In 
return, a person accepts the obligations or responsibilities which are linked with 
those rights. In customary practice, such an exchange does not produce 
complete and exclusive individual rights to a particular resource forever. One 
typically plants a garden and, when it has been harvested, this land returns to the 
general resource pool of the group. Social group membership is usually 
governed by descent from a particular ancestral line or, much less frequently, by 
some method of incorporating outsiders into a group. These members have what 
may be termed 'permanent' rights over a range of resources, and they pass these 
rights on to their descendants. Permanent rights to land can only be alienated in 
exceptional circumstances. 
A significant number of other people also make use of various resources 
belonging to any social group, but this access is most usually mediated through 
the holders of 'permanent rights'. Such 'temporary' use rights are usually 
limited to one particular resource, and may involve a single use of that resource 
or may last for the duration of a single 'season'. These temporary rights are 
usually not transferable to other individuals, and certainly not without the 
approval of the permanent owners. 
It should be noted here that, in some parts of the country, significantly 
higher rates of population increase (compared to precontact days) have affected 
the fallowing and regeneration cycle of natural resources, and therefore the 
sustainability of a subsistence way of life. Higher population densities mean that 
fallowing periods become shorter and shorter, and forest regrowth and the 
regeneration of soil fertility are dramatically affected. Many PNG societies have 
reacted to such a developing situation by imposing greater restrictions on the 
access rights of temporary users. 
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At present, and even under the very best circumstances, it would be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to record and codify every detail and variation of 
every right to every kind of resource for every individual in just one social 
group's domain, let alone cover the many thousands of patrilineal and 
matrilineal clans and cognatic networks across the whole country in a similar 
fashion. Nor are there valid reasons for undertaking such an all-inclusive 
exercise, since customary practice is quite capable, in virtually all situations, of 
taking care of such matters as they arise. The distinction between permanent 
and temporary right-holders is the main criterion by which group membership is 
determined, since the permanent right-holders are able to make major decisions 
about resource use and resource management without reference to one or more 
other persons. This distinction is neatly captured in an innovative Act of 
Parliament, the Land Groups Incorporation Act of 1974. This is an Act which 
can be used to assist the pursuit of appropriate resource management strategies 
by developing new institutions- 'Incorporated Land Groups' (ILGs)- which are 
still grounded in customary practice. 
No claim is made here that ILGs are the most important, let alone the only, 
answer to local resource management problems. But because rights to resources 
are owned, controlled, and managed locally, ILGs should normally be seen as a 
major part of any strategy which uses a number of different but complementary 
approaches to these problems. Since 'land groups' have not been much used by 
the state or developers in the context of local resource management until quite 
recently, and largely in a restricted way, I shall describe this approach at some 
length here. 
The Land Groups Incorporation Act 1974 
In a modem PNG context, customary resource ownership and resource use 
systems have some weaknesses. These include the following: 
• Customary social groups have no automatic recognition under modern PNG 
law, and therefore cannot represent themselves as they are. 
• They have also been excluded from modern business activities (such as 
forestry), but often find that their resources have been signed away by one 
person or a few individuals purportedly acting on behalf of all members. In 
other words, modern business activities have raised some very serious issues 
of leadership and representation which involve the transparency of dealings 
and the long-term stewardship of a group's natural resources. 
• There is widespread public determination that customary resource ownership 
and use systems in PNG must not become codified and commoditised 
because of the fear that each group's viability and links to ancestral lands and 
other resources might thus be frittered away or sold to the highest bidder. 
The Land Groups Incorporation Act came about as a result of a 
Commission of Inquiry into Land Matters (PNGDOL 1973) and builds on a 
knowledge of the ways that PNG social groups operate. These groups have 
Conservation and Appropriate Resource Management Strategies 377 
multiple roles and operate at different levels - individual, family, lineage, 
subclan and clan - all of which have their different but overlapping functions. 
One or other of these levels has the function of controlling the major rights to 
land and other resources - effectively constituting the 'land group'. A land 
group is that customary group of people who, by traditional right, can make 
fundamental decisions about their land and other resources without reference to, 
or approval from, any other group (Power 1994 ). The ideas of unity and 
sovereignty underlying this level of grouping are very powerful and are an 
important basis for building new structures. 
The Act itself builds on these strong customary groups because it gives 
them standing under PNG state law. This recognition is subject to certain 
conditions which involve the methods of incorporating, registering, and 
operating ILGs, and transparent decision-making, reporting and consultation 
practices. In particular, major decisions are valid only if they are made by 
meetings of group members and recorded as such. An ILG can govern as much 
or as little as a customary group wishes it to do, by specifying the subject matter 
and the level of detail which are inserted into the group's constitution. ILGs 
appear to work quite adequately in both patrilineal and matrilineal societies.4 
This is, by any standard, an innovative piece of legislation, but one which 
has not been much used until relatively recently, when some mining companies 
have used it to assist in identification of resource owner groups with which they 
have regular dealings, and also as a way to ensure that royalty payments reach 
all groups which have a right to them. The Act does not register customary land, 
but does recognise a land group's interest in 'property'. Such a recognised 
interest in the name of the land group does not restrict its use, but should rather 
make it easier for outsiders to negotiate agreements with land groups to use or 
'rent' land (or other resources) from them for particular purposes or a particular 
length of time. One likely outcome of the ILG process is the resolution of major 
land disputes, and this should also encourage various forms of development by 
providing greater safeguards for limited occupancy. Ultimate ownership, 
control, and management of resources still remain under customary practice or 
with the land group as part of its own 'birthright'. 
Anthropologists have long recognised the flexibility, variability, and 
adaptability of many structural principles as being characteristic of PNG social 
systems. In these quarters, there is some unease with proposals to list those ILG 
members who hold permanent resource rights because there is a fear that this 
would be a retrograde step which would rigidify and fossilise these flexible 
systems. There is also some concern about mapping 'land group' boundaries, 
this being an optional attachment to an ILG constitution. There may be an 
element of truth in such concerns, 5 yet it is important to note that, in many 
4 The ways in which cognatic societies in PNG are able to make productive use of this ILG 
approach, if at all, still need to be determined in detail. 
5 This concern, focussing as it does on the view that the mapping of land boundaries would 
exacerbate past and present local land disputes and lead to fighting and bloodshed, expresses a 
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areas, and often in response to development proposals, local groups are adapting 
their own systems by intent and of their own free will (see Fingleton 1985; Ernst 
1996; Filer 1997a). In many areas, some quite major aspects of resource tenure 
and use systems are becoming essentialised as groups adapt themselves- at least 
in particular situations- to what is happening around them.6 
The Act allows a group wishing to incorporate itself as a land group to put 
as much or as little detail into its constitution as it wishes. For example, if a 
minimalist approach is preferred, then most requirements, and the ways in which 
they are determined and practised, are consigned to remain within the realm of 
custom. Whatever approach is used, there will, in practice, always be a 
combination of custom and ILG constitution. The group's membership 
principles may be written into the constitution if members decide that this is 
desirable. Membership lists can be reviewed and revised annually. Finally, 
membership is by mutual recognition, so the group may retain processes for the 
incorporation of outsiders and for adaptation to changing needs and 
circumstances. 
The proposals contained within this Act are certainly no worse, and are 
often much better, than any of the other planned or unplanned methods of 
dealing with th~ problem at hand. Their strengths are that they build upon 
custom and need not emasculate or replace it. An alternative scenario would see 
the state legislating to take over ownership and control of all land and other 
resources from the present customary owners. This state control could express 
itself in a variety of ways. However, this alternative would act directly against 
the provisions of the National Constitution and, in addition, would fall foul of all 
customary resource owners in PNG. 
Community Resource Management Strategies 
Any community in PNG can resolve to adopt resource management strategies 
for its collective benefit, as well as the benefit of individual members. If the 
ILG strategy is adopted, this commits the community to a process of land group 
identification which begins with the identities of members holding permanent 
rights and with the details of a land group constitution. In addition, the 
boundaries and mutual relations of such groups are defined, a list is made of 
each group's 'property' and its contents checked with neighbouring groups, and 
a map may be drawn if this is desired (Holzknecht ed. 1995). What is then 
required is a process which not only brings the land groups in a community 
together, but also enables them to keep working together to establish the nature 
very valid point. On the other hand, most boundaries between 'land groups' are well-known and 
respected, especially where Land Demarcation Committees were active during the last years of 
colonial administration. Where a common boundary is in dispute, this area can, by mutual 
agreement of the groups involved, be set aside for later adjudication and resolution of claims. 
Such relatively minor issues should not by themselves block implementation of strategies which 
find broad favour. 
6 For similar developments in another Melanesian context, see Hviding (1993). 
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of the community's resources, wants, and needs, and thus establish priorities for 
community development. With these in place, a community can then seek 
development strategies appropriate to its natural and human resource base. 
As some authors have pointed out, the choices for many rural communities 
in PNG are relatively stark and very often quite limited (see Sekhran, this 
volume; Orsak and Sekhran n.d.). The choice than an individual or community 
makes between moral incentives for sustainable development and material 
incentives for immediate gain is, in most cases, no contest at all. Rural PNG 
societies have been geared for thousands of years to seeking benefits from what 
is available now and letting the future take care of itself. This opportunistic 
approach is certainly evident in the manner in which many communities have 
been drawn, by choice or circumstance, into large-scale logging developments 
across the country. 
At the same time, it is clear that circumstances in PNG are changing 
dramatically in some sectors. Population increases are impinging on the 
previously reliable natural cycles of fallowing and resource regeneration, and 
thus on the ability of many communities to look after and maintain themselves at 
reasonable subsistence levels. The state has virtually withdrawn itself from 
many rural areas. In spite of these developing problems, however, since natural 
resources in any given area are still largely under customary ownership and 
control, a concerted publicity and awareness campaign throughout the country 
would raise much interest in, and commitment from, communities to become 
involved in developing new approaches to these problems. These developments 
must take place at the community level because this is the level at which these 
resources are owned and managed. 
Readers will quickly point out some apparent flaws in this argument- some 
of them conceptual, and some related to practical problems of implementation. 
Some of the apparent conceptual problems have already been discussed. In the 
following discussion, I shall consider some of the problems of implementation, 
including facilitation processes, levels of cooperation within a community, the 
need for natural and human resource surveys as necessary starting points, and 
appropriate support systems for community resource management (CRM). 
Facilitation Training and Processes 
A number of necessary skills are required to support the development of 
effective CRM systems in any community. Facilitation skills and access to 
appropriate kinds of information and experience top this list. 
Environmental awareness programmes of all kinds, which stress the 
balanced requirements for sustainability, need to be developed and made 
available to the general public through as many kinds of media as possible -
radio, television, newspapers, mobile theatre groups, film, word of mouth, and 
speeches at public rallies (church conferences, for example)- at local, provincial 
and national levels. 
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Following such awareness campaigns, those communities or land groups 
which want to be involved in this process should select one or more younger 
persons with certain basic requirements (such as literacy and numeracy, good 
character, and commitment to the community) for training as facilitators. Such a 
training programme, proceeding from province to province across PNG, and 
including supervisory assistance on a regional basis, was proposed in an AusAID 
consultant's report in 199 5. However, this proposal has not yet been accepted or 
funded nationally. A facilitation training programme would prepare these 
selected community representatives in land group work, in the use of tried and 
true facilitation processes, and familiarity with frameworks within which such 
processes can be effectively implemented. Such trainee facilitators would also 
require detailed supervision and monitoring after their training is complete and 
they are back in their communities. 
Facilitation should begin after awareness-raising measures have been 
undertaken, or after a community has requested assistance in the creation of its 
own structure and processes in relation to appropriate CRM. Facilitation begins 
with the establishment of ILGs (where appropriate), the conduct of natural and 
human resource surveys (and interpretation of their outcomes), and the 
formation of cooperative relationships between the constituent land groups in a 
community. It culminates in an amalgamation of the data from each group's 
reflections on its own resource information, needs, and priorities into a 
community resource base. This is followed by the cooperative development of 
appropriate strategies to achieve their agreed aims. 
The successful selection and implementation of such strategies is 
dependent, to a very large extent, on access to relevant data. These can assist a 
land group or community and its facilitator by setting out the parameters within 
which a strategy can be useful - that is, the advantages and disadvantages of a 
particular approach, the implications behind it, and the various resource inputs 
which it requires (time, labour, transportation, processing, marketing, etc.). 
Some quite specific recommendations have been made about the provision of 
such services to resource owners across PNG (see Cotter and Wescott 1995; 
Holzknecht 1995b ), but no resources have yet been made available to act on 
them. 
Access to this information should also provide further opportunities to 
obtain specialist technical advice on other matters- to assess the timber value of 
part of a community's forest resource, for example, or utilise niche marketing 
expertise for particular non-timber forest products. Areas and groups developing 
CRM strategies will require access to financial, legal, organisational, 
conservation, and marketing specialists (see Taylor, this volume). 
It is important that trained facilitators do not work in isolation. Facilitators 
across PNG would face similar situations in their home areas and would benefit 
from regular links with other facilitators. They would all need to be able to refer 
contentious matters to an advisory panel or person for advice on how to proceed 
towards acceptable resolutions. Furthermore, local facilitators would not only 
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be answerable to their own communities, but also to a higher level of more 
experienced and technically capable persons operating on a regional or national 
level. 
This system of facilitation, and the associated emergence of recognised land 
groups and CRM structures, would result in a highly decentralised network of 
community-driven resource management groups in any one area. A likely point 
of contention is that such a system might be costly to administer, but this may 
arise from the assumption that such a network would require close central 
government administration and control. This assumption may be invalid 
because the process itself is likely to raise the energies and capacities of rural 
communities. 
Where resource development projects, for example, are already in existence 
and royalties are payable to the community, the constituent groups could agree 
to spend some part of these payments on initiating and supporting CRM 
strategies and systems in that area. Where value is being added at the 
community level, 7 part of the additional income derived from this process could 
also be devoted to the maintenance of such a system. Another avenue could be 
for local communities to devise policies and funding initiatives through the local 
government councils which are due to be strengthened as part of the current 
reforms of the provincial government system. Some creative and lateral 
thinking in each particular situation would find other such mechanisms. 
How would such a system articulate itself with existing government 
agencies and other institutions and activities? In essence, there need be no great 
conflict of opinion or practice. Recognition of community-level resource 
management systems and their constituent elements, the ILGs (or similar units), 
accepts in practice what is already recognised in theory in the National 
Constitution. Insofar as the discussion relates to natural resources, then 
government agencies and other bodies, such as the proponents of resource 
exploitation or conservation, would all need to submit their proposals through 
particular channels and agents at the local community level. This would ensure 
that all those with an interest at this level would be well-informed and involved 
in reaching decisions appropriate for them. The word or signature of only one or 
two people, arrived at in private and without public scrutiny, for example, would 
not be sufficient to permit commercial exploitation of a resource to proceed. 
Government agencies could obtain particular benefits from such a system. 
For example, a resource owner group could perform the function of monitoring 
logging projects on their land. In such a case, the monitors would report any 
breaches in the first instance to the PNG Forest Authority's locally-based project 
officers for immediate action. Conservation projects could proceed in the same 
manner, since resource owner groups have primary say over particular areas and 
resources. Such proprietary interests should be developed and built upon. 
7 For example, where wokabaut somils (Tok Pisin, mobile sawmills) are operating in a 
sustainable manner. 
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The Problem of Cooperation 
It may be argued that the friction which commonly exists within a community-
for reasons of history, personality, or custom (amongst others)- is such that any 
proposal which depends on cooperation between its component groups is 
doomed to failure. There is no denying the existence of differentiated interests, 
at both group and individual levels, in both modern and traditional contexts. On 
the other hand, there are usually very close ties of kinship and marriage between 
the clans and subclans within any one community or village, which do not 
automatically reduce the tension or conflict in any society, but which are still 
one mechanism for channelling them. In a customary sense, there is usually a 
great deal of cross-cutting cooperation (as well as tension) between these groups 
over a wide range of activities. 
If the groups which are involved see that it is in their separate and 
combined interests to work together for certain purposes (such as those 
discussed in this chapter), then there is no reason to suppose that such 
cooperation would not be forthcoming in the context of CRM. After all, it 
would be both a recognition and a continuation of what currently occurs (in a 
customary sense in relation to resources) from place to place across PNG. The 
main difference is that this practice would now be officially recognised, and 
could then be assisted to operate more effectively and self-sufficiently, though 
always through the CRM structure. Another difference would be that such 
cooperation would now be built upon a better knowledge of the community's 
resource base and more appropriate strategies for the pursuit of collective goals 
within a sustainable development framework. 
What is required for such an arrangement to be effective is agreement 
between all groups in any such community on the following points: 
• a framework for cooperation and coordination in resource-related activities; 
• an ongoing process of wide and regular consultation and joint decision 
making on a num her of matters; 
• a recognition by all participating groups of each other's equal status and each 
group's resource rights in that context; 
• basic agreement on the needs and priorities of the community arrived at 
through a common process; and 
• basic agreement on the strategies which need to be followed to achieve those 
goals. 
Arriving at such basic agreements can be seen as a major task of the facilitation 
process that has already been discussed. 
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Natural and Human Resource Surveys 
One thing about which members of a community will always know a great deal 
more than any outsider is their own natural environment- both specific elements 
within it and the way in which it functions at a general level (see Damon, this 
volume). In addition, they also know best how their community has adapted to 
this environment and its vagaries over a very long period of time. They may not 
know everything about this environment, or about the commercial value of its 
component parts, but they will still know more about such things as the soils, the 
weather, animal and bird behaviour, and the practical uses of various raw 
materials (see Majnep and Bulmer 1977). 
With many young people going away to school, or adults taking formal 
employment, the chains of communication which pass this customary knowledge 
from older to younger generations, and also the myths, legends and stories which 
ground a group's rights to land and other resources, have been damaged, if not 
broken, in many communities. For members of constituent groups within such a 
community, a continuing exercise to record and critically consider all elements 
of their environment, or at least those parts over which they have some control, 
has considerable benefits in addition to the primary search for sustainable ways 
of life. This exercise also links up with the activities involved in defining the 
boundaries within and between adjoining land groups, and thereby reinforces the 
transfer of vital customary information between the generations. 
The main aim of this survey exercise is for each land group to set out and 
consider for itself its own resources - human, natural, and supernatural, their 
critical interrelationships over time, and the ways in which changing human 
impacts can have dramatic and often negative effects. A clarification and 
understanding of the place of each land group within the community is critical 
for the operation and adaptation of the customary resource ownership and use 
systems which are protected by the National Constitution. Equally important is 
a better knowledge of the human resources within each land group, such as the 
kinds and levels of schooling or training which members possess, their work 
skills and experience, or their levels of literacy and numeracy. Many young 
people return home with new skills after leaving school or leaving a job, and 
these skills can be put to effective use in the long-term management and 
development of the community's resources. 
Mechanisms of Support 
In comparison with the options available to many Aboriginal communities in 
Australia whose members choose to manage and develop their own land and 
other resources (see Young et al. 1991), communities in PNG do not have access 
to a wide range of support systems or management programmes, provided by the 
state, on which they can draw for guidance and financial support. 
Given this lack of balanced and neutral government assistance, 
communities in PNG have very little choice but to draw on their own strengths 
and customary knowledge base as the foundations from which to fashion new 
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visions for themselves and search for the means of achieving that elusive 
'development' for which the whole country is searching. It is therefore little 
wonder that many rural communities have agreed to the major resource 
exploitation projects (especially timber projects) which are currently operating 
in PNG. They (or their representatives) have been operating on a very limited 
information base and have been subject to the blandishments of companies 
whose appeal lies partly in the gradual but inexorable withdrawal of government 
services and extension assistance. What little information people in these 
communities have received has been strongly biased in favour of commercial 
logging and other such large-scale commercial operations. This approach has 
been aided and abetted by local entrepreneurs and power-brokers who have been 
intent on short-term personal gains and the maintenance of unequal patron-client 
relationships (Holzknecht 1996b ). 
During the colonial and early post-independence periods, the state 
developed and maintained quite extensive extension networks, with officers 
based throughout the country. Resource owners, individually or in groups, could 
seek advice on agricultural matters, forestry, fisheries, and business 
development. Expatriate officers often served in management positions in 
cooperatives, and later, for a time, became advisers to indigenous managers. 
This system became too expensive to maintain and it gradually collapsed. 
Various provincial governments introduced and maintained extension officers 
based in districts within each province, but most officers lacked the funding and 
support required to properly carry out their tasks, and these extension systems 
have been progressively pared down or discontinued. 8 
As already indicated, CRM is highly dependent on access to information 
and the sharing of information between communities. This does not mean that 
communities or factions within them will necessarily always choose options 
which are the 'best' or most 'rational' - these are relative and culturally-
determined terms. Such decision making is highly contextual and depends on 
many factors, few of which may be economic. In the end, transparent decisions, 
whatever they are, made by representative bodies of resource owners and based 
on the best available information, have to be respected, since the resources 
involved are theirs to control and manage, and they are the ones who must bear 
the consequences of those decisions, both positive and negative. 
Conservation and Community Resource Management 
In global terms, it is very important to find suitable and acceptable strategies to 
further the sustainable preservation of biological diversity in regions of high 
biodiversity, such as Melanesia, and in areas of special value within this region. 
In the PNG national context, the relevant departments and centres also recognise 
8 An attempt was made in 1995, based on an earlier examination of possible mechanisms, to 
develop useful support systems to which resource owners would have access (Holzknecht 1995b ). 
In addition, Power ( 1994) also presents, in detail, a number of different but related management 
and organisational matters as guides specifically prepared for village communities. 
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the importance of this goal. Yet global and national concerns will have little 
impact on the prevailing systems of resource tenure and use without effective 
and meaningful strategies for dealing with development issues at a local level. 
At this local level, any strategies designed to promote the conservation or 
preservation of biodiversity must be part of a wider repertoire of strategies 
available to all CRM decision makers. In making decisions concerning the 
resources under their control, each CRM group and its constituent land groups 
and individual members would need to work through the available knowledge of 
relevant issues and factors.9 These local-level decision-making processes are 
bound to be manipulated, to some extent, by influential local leaders of various 
kinds, but a CRM approach of the kind previously discussed would at least 
temper individual choices with a process of group consultation and decision 
making in relation to major resource matters. 
In the introduction, especially in Assumption Three, I indicated that there 
can be no such thing as conservation for conservation's sake within a customary 
PNG context. Nevertheless, changing circumstances within the country require 
that more deliberate thought be given to ways of changing this assumption and 
to the collaborative development of a new environmental ethic at both local and 
national levels. 
Such changes require awareness. Awareness, in turn, requires access to 
more broadly accessible and meaningful information for the listener or reader. 
Awareness without any kind of back-up or follow-up information about resource 
management or development options leads to frustration and anger. Finally, 
appropriate local-level structures and processes, which have been developed 
from known customary ones, are likely to form the only reliable and long-term 
basis for the design and implementation of new ways of rearticulating each 
community's response to changing circumstances and of implementing its 
collective decisions in respect of group resources and individual patterns of 
behaviour. After a number of these structures are established, and are hopefully 
linked up at a regional level, they will develop dynamics of their own at this 
level, and eventually at the national level as well. 
If the prevailing ethic, whether or not it is aided and abetted by the state and 
its instrumentalities, does not support environmental care and constraint, then it 
is self-evident that the evolution of a new and more positive ethic will require 
new or untried methods and approaches. Just as icebergs can, with very little 
warning, suddenly turn upside down and disturb everything around them, so it is 
self-evident that neglect of the welfare and concerns of the majority of the 
population could have a similar effect in PNG. This condition of neglect and 
despair may seem to be an unreliable basis on which to design resource 
9 Issues and factors which are unknown to them cannot influence their decisions, even if they 
play an important part in the wider picture, especially for outside observers. Hence the importance 
placed in this chapter on access by resource owners and their groups to relevant information and 
advice. 
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management systems, but these conditions also present opportunities for lateral 
thinking to find meaningful structures and value systems on which to build more 
responsive ethical and practical systems of natural resource management which 
also respect customary practice. 
Such a new ethic need not focus only on the contrast between utilitarian 
forest management and biodiversity conservation, but it must come to grips with 
issues regarding the definition and application of 'the public good'. At the same 
time, no society can be expected to adopt a single approach to the management 
and maintenance of such a complex creation as the natural environment and its 
biodiversity values. 
Rural Malaise 
One result of many years of state neglect is that a major malaise has increasingly 
become evident in PNG's rural communities. 10 Like an iceberg, this malaise 
currently manifests itself in several forms, such as the drift of population to 
urban areas, the increasing levels of crime in rural (as well as urban) areas, the 
gradual withdrawal by the state of many basic services, the lack of new 
employment opportunities, tension and conflict over resource management and 
resource development issues, increasing disenchantment with current 
development initiatives, an ongoing crisis of leadership, and the rise of self-
interested elites. 
At a local level, many people strongly believe that they have been cut off 
and abandoned by the state in the race for 'development' (whatever that may 
mean in these contexts). They believe that their many problems go unheeded. 
They feel that their incessant and urgent calls for assistance, support, advice, and 
information are studiously ignored by the state. They feel the increasing lack of 
institutional support (for finance and business advice, for example) to promote 
business activities and community development in rural areas. They see that the 
questionable activities of a small number of mostly urban-based political and 
entrepreneurial leaders go unchallenged and, in many ways, are condoned and 
supported by other members of the urban and political elites. They can see their 
resources being sold out and removed from around them by this minority, for 
very little advantage or benefit to themselves, whether as individuals or as a 
community. On the other hand, they see that there is great benefit to the state 
itself (through forest levies, log export duties, etc.), to the foreign companies 
which have no long-term commitments to the area or its people, and finally to 
the small number of 'local people' who profit to the detriment of the majority. 
10 Urban bias is obviously part ofthe rural malaise. This includes an assumption by the state that 
the majority of rural villagers have been - despite much evidence to the contrary - fundamentally 
content with their subsistence way of life. This form of wishful thinking has encouraged the main 
thrust of infrastructural development, capital investment, and job creation to focus on urban areas, 
with a corresponding and increasing neglect of rural areas, especially when the state has undergone 
periodic financial difficulties. 
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Many of these visible 'iceberg' effects, and their hidden but ominous bulk, 
are themselves evidence of the long-term effects of unsuccessful top-down 
'blueprint' planning and implementation. They are also evidence of a long-term 
avoidance, by the state and other institutions, of the need to work constructively 
with existing customary cultural, social, and economic structures and 
institutions. 
In contrast to these 'head-in-the sand' approaches, CRM systems place the 
onus for directing and controlling a wide range of related activities squarely 
back where it properly belongs in the PNG context - in the hands of resource 
owners and their own communities. This is where customary resource rights are 
controlled and exercised, and it is here that responsibilities must be taken and 
exercised. Building on known strengths and customary knowledge at this local 
level, by putting in place an active and responsible 'process' approach to 
community development and sustainable resource management, can change 
power relationships in major ways as it strengthens or activates local 
participation and involvement. 
Such an approach may appear to be too piecemeal and localised, without 
sufficient state control, but if it is actively established, maintained, and 
supported across a province or a region (and especially at a national level), the 
cumulative effects are likely to be very dramatic within a relatively short time. 
For example, it could have very positive impacts on the operation of the new 
system of local government which is currently being introduced throughout 
PNG, where the effective use of local government funds will surely depend on a 
high degree of community participation across a range of activities - from the 
provision of infrastructure and community services, through the distribution of 
entrepreneurial benefits, to the general form of governance at a local level. 
It is only such active processes which can bring about the elements of 
continuity, commitment, and surety which are needed in a community before 
effective long-term resource management strategies can be developed for the 
benefit of all. Only in this way can communities make effective long-term 
decisions about the importance of conservation, whether for its own sake or in 
the form of controlled, low-key, adaptive forms of use. 
Effective Approaches 
Given the regional variation in systems of resource tenure and use across PNG, 
there can be no single approach which will serve to resolve all the various 
problems of resource management. It might be considered that this chapter has 
given undue emphasis to an approach based on 'incorporated land groups'. 
However, this approach alone, of those discussed here and elsewhere, is firmly 
based on known, preferred, and appropriate customary structures of resource 
management, even if there are bound to be some local contexts (as in cognatic 
societies) where this approach may not be applicable or effective. 
The ILG approach by itself, while subsuming a number of disparate 
elements (constitution, decision-making processes, membership criteria, 
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genealogies, 'property' lists, land boundaries, and optional map), needs to have 
ongoing linkages with other institutions and practices if it is to function 
effectively. There is a need for training programmes, awareness-raising 
measures, reliable record keeping, natural and human resource surveys, and 
access to various other kinds of information and technical expertise. This 
implies the further need for a wide range of approaches which address one or 
more of these supporting elements while adding to the process as a whole. 
Even within the general ILG approach, there could be as many variants of a 
basic ILG constitution as there are land groups wishing to incorporate 
themselves through this process. Other than a basic number of clauses, each 
group can include as much or as little detail as it wishes on a range of issues, and 
those which are not included will naturally remain to be arranged and resolved 
according to customary practice. Nevertheless, what such an approach does 
strongly promote is a return, under new conditions and pressures, to a more 
responsive ethic of self-governance and self-reliance at this local level. Such a 
new ethic would not only be responsive to the needs and demands of individual 
members, but also to the needs of community maintenance and development 
within the framework of the state. 
One form of consultation which has proved effective in the PNG mining 
and petroleum sector is that of the 'development forum' (West 1992). This type 
of forum brings together all the 'stakeholders' who have an interest in the 
development of a particular resource in order to negotiate a set of agreements 
relating to the development, including a 'benefit package' for resource owners 
and local communities. This approach could be modified for application in other 
sectors, such as forestry, or for the development of an appropriate environmental 
ethic to deal with various forms of resource development in a single catchment 
or other geographical area. 
Pro Bono Publico? 
The question raised in the title of this chapter is partly the question of which 
'public good' should take priority in determining the approaches or strategies to 
be promoted and implemented for better resource management. At one extreme 
is the idea that the state should assume ownership and control of all the relevant 
resources, and establish its own management and development priorities on this 
basis. At the other extreme is the idea that customary resource owner rights take 
precedence over all else, even if this means that one resource owner group 
collects all the royalties from a development project on its land, so that its 
members are comparatively wealthy, while a neighbouring group, having no 
commercial resources, receives no such benefits. The distinction is basically 
between the interests of the state (or society) as a whole and those of each 
customary group considered as a sovereign entity. 
Since customary practice and associated resource rights are recognised in 
PNG to the extent of covering some 97 percent of the country's land area, and 
these customary rights are enshrined in the National Constitution, the first of 
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these .extreme cases clearly does not apply. Indeed, any attempt by the state to 
take over customary rights or move towards individual tenure systems have been 
and will be fiercely resisted. 11 The tendency, since independence in 1975, has 
been to give increasing recognition to such customary rights and to bring 
resource owners, their constituent customary groups, and related commercial 
entities further into the negotiation of development projects, especially in the 
mining and petroleum sector. 
The middle ground between these two extremes, which takes account .of 
wider local, regional and national (even global) interests, remains largely 
unexplored and untried in the PNG context except (ideally) by the state. One 
attempt was made through the Forestry Development Guidelines, which were 
developed as part of a major restructuring of the state's bureaucratic control of 
the forest industry, which proposed that trust funds be set up to manage resource 
owners' financial benefits from logging projects, and so encourage prudent and 
economically productive use of such funds (PNGMOF 1993a, 1993b ). One 
aspect of this proposal was that part of this income should be used for the 
purposes of wider local or regional development programmes, thus ensuring that 
a wider population would benefit from a specific resource development project, 
and not only the members of one or more specific resource owner groups. 
Precedents for a similar approach already exist in the mining and petroleum 
sector, where the companies have recognised (perhaps reluctantly) that their 
development activities not only have an impact on communities in the 
immediate vicinity of a project, but also on communities much further away, 
especially those located downstream (for example, in the Ok Tedi and Porgera 
cases). In these cases, however, benefits to which these more remote 
communities have access are disbursed by the mining company or the state, and 
not by customary resource owners.12 
'The public good' must be contextually determined and reviewed from time 
to time on a number of different levels. A very strong argument can be 
presented, in the political, economic, and social climate currently prevailing in 
PNG, 13 for giving first priority to the establishment of effective local-level 
resource management structures and systems. This can also be seen as an 
important first step in the establishment of a new national environmental ethic. 
With these elements in place, and the renewed confidence and self-reliance 
11 There were riots in 1995 in a number of urban areas in response to proposals by the state (and 
supposedly by the World Bank) to explore new ways of registering customary land (see Lakau 
1995). 
12 It is important to note here that most of PNG's mineral resources, unlike the nation's forest 
resources, are legally the property of the state, and not of customary groups, even though the state 
has increasingly recognised the existence of a 'landowner' interest in their development. 
13 This is marked by a dramatic fall in state-funded and state-supported services and 
infrastructural development and maintenance in most non-urban areas, and by the non-
representative ways in which individuals have been signing away resource rights to developers 
without proper consultation and approval by resource owners as a whole. 
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which will be engendered in this process, the wider question of 'the public good' 
can then be tackled. A lead from the state and its instrumentalities through 
considered public stances on environmental and local development issues (and 
especially through the implementation of its notional commitment to a National 
Sustainable Development Strategy) would go a long way to providing guidance 
to local-level resource management initiatives. Since the state presently has 
control over such a small proportion of the resources within its boundaries, it can 
best lead by active example and persuasion. 
Conclusion 
If it is accepted that resource owners in PNG have the final say over resource 
management and development matters through their customary institutions, as 
this chapter argues is both necessary and beneficial, then resource owners must 
have the most important seat at the table in any discussions relating to 
conservation. 
The contrast between utilitarian forest management and biodiversity 
conservation is not necessarily appropriate when the real question lies in the 
value which resource owners place on their natural environment. The question 
must be focussed on 'their own' local environment and resources because those 
of another area belong to other people. Although utilitarian forest management 
may, in the long term, tend to lead to a loss of biodiversity (personal 
communication, Nikhil Sekhran), in the short term and in the PNG context, I 
believe it would lead to an increase in the values placed on indigenous 
knowledge systems which have been passed down by word of mouth from 
generation to generation, and on the search for locally developed ways of 
managing such resources so that benefits can be maintained over the longer 
term. In that event, the values placed on forests and their constituent species by 
resource owners will also increase markedly, and there will be a growing 
reluctance to sell off timber resources for large-scale commercial logging in 
return for a mere pittance. 14 Without such a change in local evaluations of these 
resources, there will be no future for conservation or for biodiversity. 
This chapter has presented a general case for appropriate resource 
management strategies in PNG, focussing, in particular, on local-level resource 
management. By focussing on this local level and on the importance of locally 
derived, but newly amended, customary structures, the chapter has attempted to 
bring the question of resource management and evaluation of all resources, and 
the allocation of rights and responsibilities, back to this all-important grassroots 
level, at which a new environmental ethic must take root if it is to be effective. 
14 In this respect, a range of research and development activities currently taking place in 
Amazonia (Holmes 1996a, 1996b; Holmes and Walker 1996; Walker 1996a, 1996b) may hold 
some important lessons for PNG. 
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PROCESSES FOR EFFECTING 
COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF PROTECTED AREAS: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE CRATER MOUNTAIN 
WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA* 
ARL YNE JOHNSON 
Introduction 
Community-based conservation which engages the participation of rural 
resource owners in sustainable management of their natural resources is 
presently seen as one of the most promising methods for protected area 
establishment, although little systematic analysis of the methods and 
effectiveness of this approach has been conducted (Brandon and Wells 1992; 
Western and Wright 1994). 
Brown and Wyckoff-Baird (1992: 14) describe the possible participation by 
communities in protected area management as a continuum which can range 
from 'limited input in decision-making and control, to extensive input into 
decision-making and ultimately stewardship of the resources'. Over the past two 
decades, the realisation that community participation was a significant variable 
in determining the success of rural development projects (Midgley 1986; Oakley 
1991) has also influenced the field of natural resource management in 
developing nations. Across the world, prior to 1970, protected areas were 
managed by national governments which denied access to traditional resource 
users, yet did not have the capacity to effectively manage the natural resources 
or, more importantly, to enforce rules to conserve the resource base (Wells and 
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Development (ICAD) Project over the years. They include Yerger Andre, David Bickford, Robert 
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Douglas and Anita Weisberger, Brian Wolcott and Deb Wright. The Crater Mountain ICAD 
Project is supported by funding from the Biodiversity Support Program - a consortium of the 
World Wildlife Fund, the Nature Conservancy and the World Resources Institute- with funding 
from the United States Agency for International Development, the John T. and Katherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation, the Wildlife Conservation Society, the Lix Claiborne and Art Ortenberg 
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Brandon 1992). Today, most efforts by developing nations to manage protected 
areas make some allowance for the importance of community participation in 
protected area management (Wells and Bran don 1993 ), but the form and 
intensity of participation in each case varies significantly (Midgley 1986; Paul 
1987; Oakley 1991; Wells and Brandon 1992). 
One widely-used definition which is used to describe 'community 
participation' in rural development projects (Paul 1987:2) states that it is 'an 
active process by which beneficiary/client groups influence the direction and 
execution of a development project with a view to enhancing their well-being in 
terms of income, personal growth, self reliance or other values they cherish.' 
Cemea (1985, cited in Wells and Brandon 1992:42), describes local participation 
in protected area management 'as empowering people to mobilise their own 
capacities, be social actors rather than passive subjects, manage the resources, 
make decisions, and control the activities that affect their lives'. 
The 'instruments' used to promote this participation fall into two categories 
-agents of change and institution building (Wells and Brandon 1992). Agents 
of change are those individuals associated with external agencies or within the 
communities whose presence catalyses local involvement in the development 
process (Paul 1987). The strengthening of existing community institutions, or 
the development of community organisation, is seen as a means which will 
provide for continuity of the process that has been established (Midgley 1986; 
Furphy 1994 ). 
The worldwide trend from traditional state control to increased involvement 
of communities in the management of conservation areas which border on, or are 
included in, their lands has led to coining of the term 'community-based 
conservation'. Western and Wright (1994:7) described this as an approach that 
'reverses top-down, centre-driven conservation by focusing on the people who 
bear the costs of conservation..... [C]ommunity-based conservation includes 
natural resources or biodiversity protection by, for and with the local 
community'. Little (1994:348) adds that community-based conservation has two 
outcomes - 'the maintenance of habitats, the preservation of species, or the 
conservation of certain critical resources and .. . improvements of social and 
economic welfare'. It is the additional development outcome which 
distinguishes this approach from traditional protected area management. 
Projects which are designed to link biodiversity conservation in protected areas 
with socio-economic development in adjacent communities are termed 
'integrated conservation and development' (ICAD) projects (Brandon and Wells 
1992; Brown and Wyckoff-Baird 1992). 
While attractive in theory, the actual mechanics of linking biodiversity 
conservation with rural development as well as encouraging community 
participation in the process has proven to be elusive, extremely challenging, and 
has yet to be realised in most cases which are characterised as community-based 
conservation projects (Brown and Wyckoff-Baird 1992; Wells and Brandon 
1992; Western and Wright 1994). 
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• It is not simply a matter of relying on the traditional conservation beliefs of 
indigenous residents within and near protected areas. Traditional practices 
alone are often not sufficient to sustain viable populations of flora and fauna 
under the present-day scenario of increased human population and pressure 
on the natural resource base (Brandon and Wells 1992; Western and Wright 
1994). 
• Community participation alone cannot be idealised as a given solution to 
conservation challenges. Midgley (1986:35), in a historical review of 
community participation, reminds us that communities are not homogeneous 
and that they 'suffer from conflicts, rivalries, and factionalism'. He states 
that 'a clearer understanding of these problems would allow a more realistic 
assessment of possibilities and prepare workers more adequately for the 
problems they will face'. 
• For many reasons, local participation is known to be time consuming and, in 
many cases, the threats to conservation of biodiversity are often imminent 
and urgent (Brandon and Wells 1992; Little 1994 ). The challenge of 
providing tangible community benefits which are derived from the 
conservation of biodiversity often takes time. In the interim, community 
participation may be limited. 
Given these considerations, it cannot be assumed that most communities 
will sustainably manage resources on their own (Little 1994) or that natural 
resources can be managed by the state through 'proclamation alone' (Bromley 
1994 ). The art of crafting the mechanisms which will provide for biodiversity 
conservation and rural development through community participation is the 
challenge facing today's conservation practitioners. Bromley divided the 
challenge into three parts: 
• to create the means or 'mechanisms' for discussing, reviewing and assessing 
the values of biodiversity conservation; 
• to permit those values to be expressed m policies which incorporate 
incentives for conservation; and 
• to implement enforcement procedures to provide assurance that conservation 
actually results. 
'A community-based conservation programme with any hope of success will 
contain all three elements' (ibid:345). 
The recognition of customary land tenure in Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
provides a unique policy environment where some degree of participation by 
rural communities is obligatory for the establishment and management of a 
protected area. In a survey of ninety-nine parks in thirty-eight countries around 
the world, there were only 21 percent in which local people had legal title to all 
or part of the reserve (Zube and Busch 1990). Traditional landowners in PNG 
retain guaranteed ownership of their land and maintain an unprecedented level of 
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control of the resources on their land. Successful conservation in PNG, more 
than anywhere, will have to rely on landowner management. 
This paper presents an analytical framework to assess the aspects of 
community participation which have been used in the effort to establish the 
Crater Mountain Wildlife Management Area in PNG. The results of the Crater 
Mountain case are compared to other community-based conservation initiatives. 
Lessons are drawn for conservation practitioners about the realistic use and 
constraints of community participation for establishing protected areas in light of 
the PNG experience. 
The Crater Mountain Wildlife Management Area 
Biological Significance 
The Crater Mountain Wildlife Management Area (WMA) encompasses 
approximately 2, 700 square kilometres, of which 98 percent is covered by 
primary forest ranging from the lowland rainforest of the Purari River (50 metres 
asl) on the Great Papuan Plain to montane cloud forest on the slopes of Crater 
Mountain (3, 100 metres as I). A diverse collection of flora and fauna indicate 
that the Crater Mountain biota is very species-rich and, as such, constitutes a 
natural resource of national and global importance (Alcorn and Beehler 1993). 
National Legislation 
Crater Mountain was gazetted as a national Wildlife Management Area on 14 
October 1994. The Fauna (Protection and Control) Act of 1976 provides for the 
establishment of WMAs to be declared by the Department of Environment and 
Conservation (DEC) upon request by the customary owners of the land. The 
landowners submit to the national government a legal description of the 
boundaries of the area to be gazetted as the WMA, a list of the clan leaders who 
will sit on the local Wildlife Management Committees, and the rules which the 
Management Committee establishes for use of natural resources in the WMA. 
The boundaries, committees and laws are reviewed by the DEC, and if not 
conflicting with any other national laws, are gazetted by the national parliament 
and recognised as the governing body and laws of the conservation area. 
Despite their title, WMAs can be more accurately described as multiple-use 
areas whose objectives are to encourage sustainable use of subsistence resources 
by customary landholders, protect biodiversity, gain formal recognition of tenure 
and resource ownership, provide sustainable opportunities for income 
generation, protect cultural values, and provide for scientific research and 
educational opportunities (Hedemark and Sekhran 1995). 
Given these objectives, PNG legislation does provide a fertile foundation 
for attaining the three elements for successful community-based conservation as 
identified by Bromley (1994). Communities can actually establish a protected 
area if they feel that the biodiversity which they own has some value to them if it 
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is conserved. Through their management committees, communities can create 
the policies which provide incentives to practise sustainable resource use, and 
they can prosecute individuals who violate the rules. However, given the 
heterogeneous nature of local communities, and the traditional lack of 
collaboration among clans over a large geographic area in PNG, how can we 
e~pect communities to be able to progress beyond the establishment of small, 
isolated protected tracts without further technical assistance? Will WMAs 
remain as 'paper parks', where gazettal takes place but no mechanisms are put in 
place to realise the conservation goal? Despite the existence of favourable 
legislation, it has been found throughout the world that most communities 
cannot be left alone with the expectation that they will be able to 'defend and 
conserve their resources in a sustainable fashion'(Little 1994:349). 
Community Profile 
Crater Mountain WMA covers the territories of two language groups, the Gimi 
and Pawaia speakers, and parts of three provinces - Chimbu, Gulf, and Eastern 
Highlands. Approximately 3,000 Gimi occupy the northern half of the WMA 
area, and are concentrated in an arc that runs through the villages of Herowana, 
Ubaigubi and Maimafu (see Map 18.1 ). The only road access is to Ubaigubi on 
the northern boundary of the WMA, with access to the remainder of the 
communities by grass airstrips. The southern half of the WMA is inhabited by 
approximately 600 Pawaians who have settled around an airstrip to create the 
village of Haia. 
Map 18.1: Crater Mountain Wildlife Management Area. 
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The Gimi villages in this area are traditional highland 'big-man' societies. 
Each clan has one or more 'big-men' who maintain their positions through their 
skills as politicians or fight leaders. The Gimi are subsistence farmers who 
practise shifting agriculture or swidden farming. The Pawaians are semi-
nomadic people whose primary subsistence is obtained through hunting and 
gathering with limited short-term cropping. Pawaian society is built around the 
immediate family. They are true forest-dwelling people, travelling around their 
land in small bands which usually number less than twenty. Crater Mountain 
landowners are responsible for their own land which may be days away from the 
airstrip where they are settled. Use of the forest is restricted to the principal 
landowner and his immediate family. Others require permission before they are 
allowed to cut, hunt or trespass. As with any village violations, cases are 
reviewed by a village court composed of community representatives who hear 
public testimony on the case, pass judgment, and verify the fines imposed on 
offenders. 
Approximately 80 percent of the men and 50 percent of the women in the 
WMA speak Tok Pisin. Only 30 percent of the WMA residents are actually 
literate in Tok Pisin, and less than 1 percent speak English (James 1996). 
Government-sponsored community schools have been present in Maimafu, 
Herowana and Haia for only the last two to six years, and may offer the standard 
grades from one to six if teachers and funding are available. There is a 
rudimentary aid post in each village and at least one tradestore which sells basic 
supplies such as salt, rice, candles and canned fish. Outside of the research, eco-
tourism, and handicraft enterprises, cash income is earned through the sale of 
coffee or the products of hunting. 
Threats to Biodiversity 
Land use impacts on biodiversity include sago plantings, sweet potato garden 
plots, and the cutting of wood for fuel or local timber use. Hunting for 
subsistence and commercial purposes has already extirpated some species of 
game species in some regions of the WMA. Cuscus and tree kangaroo 
populations are seriously depleted. Cassowary populations are still strong, but 
the high rate of removal of cassowary chicks suggests a significant population 
crash might occur in a few years with the death of the existing adult populations 
(personal communication, Andrew Mack, 1995). An increasing human 
population in the region will continue to have an escalating impact throughout 
the area. The delivery of community services (education and health) to rural 
areas in PNG is hampered by their remoteness and the corresponding lack of 
infrastructure required for socio-economic development. One of the few options 
which seems to exist for the satisfaction of community cash needs and the 
development of infrastructure in these areas is the sale of natural resources such 
as minerals or timber. Hence the need for alternative forms of cash-generating 
activity. 
PNG national government policies and rules regarding resource extraction 
in national protected areas could have a significant impact on biodiversity in the 
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area. The southern lowlands of the WMA, on the north side of the Purari River 
boundary, are included in the PNG Forest Authority's designation of Turama 
Extension Timber Permit TP2-12A, Forest Management Area (FMA) Block 3. 
Logging in this timber permit area is scheduled to begin in the near future 
(PNGF A 1996). In the northwestern quarter of the WMA, Exploration Licence 
1115 is the subject of exploration work by the Australian mining company BHP 
(Post-Courier, 30 August 1995, 15 February 1996). 
Crater Mountain !CAD Project 
The Crater Mountain Integrated Conservation and Development (ICAD) 
initiative informally began in 1982 with the first attempts to establish a national 
protected area while addressing the socio-economic aspirations of the local 
landowners through the development of environmentally sensitive enterprises. 
Since its initiation, the primary goal of the project has been the long-term 
conservation of biodiversity in the Crater Mountain area through the integration 
of conservation and development components to achieve the product of a 
functional national WMA as described under the national legislation. The 
Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), an international non-governmental 
conservation organisation within the New York Zoological Society, was the first 
conservation agency to sponsor researchers and fieldworkers in the project area 
as early as 1975. The WCS was also instrumental in the establishment of the 
national non-governmental organisation which is called the Research and 
Conservation Foundation of PNG (RCF) in 1986, and which now functions as 
the lead agency in the Crater Mountain project. Over the years, numerous 
national and international governmental and non-governmental agencies have 
provided financial and technical assistance to the RCF and the WCS in the 
implementation of the project. 
The effort to establish a national WMA had very informal beginnings which 
developed from contact between expatriate scientists and the landowners in the 
area. It is important to note that these personal relationships were, for more than 
a decade, the means by which gazettal of the WMA and establishment of 
fledgling eco-enterprises in research and eco-tourism developed. It was not until 
1993, with the achievement of formal gazettal of the Gimi and Pawaian lands as 
a national WMA, that the ongoing activities took on the official title of a 
'project' with the following documented objectives (RCF/WCS 1995): 
• to increase the average annual per capita income of clans (landowning 
groups) from the establishment of locally-owned research and eco-tourism 
enterprises in the WMA; 
• to increase the level and range of understanding and skills of community 
residents who work in the research and eco-tourism enterprises in the WMA; 
• to increase the number of decisions and actions which integrate the results of 
enterprise, biological, and socio-economic monitoring programmes in a 
WMA management plan; and 
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• to increase national involvement and human resource exchange within the 
WMA as teachers, trainers and consultants work towards conserving its 
natural resources. 
The first two objectives had been informally in place since the first discussions 
with the Gimi tribe in the 1970s. The last two objectives evolved later with the 
realisation that the establishment of environmentally-sound and sustainable 
businesses was not possible without a process for assessment and for increased 
national involvement at all levels. Today, the emphasis of conservation efforts 
in the Crater Mountain area is on building the capacity of local communities and 
their organisations to assume the principal role of managing the operations in the 
WMA. As such, the project is an ambitious effort to engage an extremely high 
level of community participation in management of the conservation and 
development components of the WMA. 
Agents of Change and Community Institutions in the WMA 
Field Researchers 
Expatriate scientists were among the first outsiders to spend extended periods of 
time with WMA communities. Their concern for the unique biodiversity and 
cultures of the area was the impetus for their ongoing informal dialogue with 
Crater communities about mechanisms for establishing and operating the WMA 
and the associated eco-enterprises. The length of stay and local impact of field 
researchers has varied over the last two decades; some have stayed only a few 
weeks or months, while others have developed long-term friendships with 
members of Crater communities, some returning for intermittent periods of up to 
twenty years. Most field researchers have shown respect for the cultures of the 
WMA and an obvious admiration and enthusiasm for the WMA's unique natural 
resources. Most have been diligent workers who have enthusiastically lived and 
laboured in their fieldwork alongside residents of the WMA who were their 
assistants, guides and companions. 
A significant example of such relationships is found in the involvement of 
an Australian photographer, David Gillison, who has worked with the Gimi 
tribes since 1973. In the early years of his work, he returned for consecutive 
seasons to his field site near Ubaigubi village, where his original interest in the 
recording of Gimi ritual theatre led him to the forest with Gimi men to document 
the displays of the birds of paradise from which they said that the cultural theatre 
had evolved (Gillison 1983). These interactions solidified a strong mutual 
respect and commitment between Gillison and community members, which gave 
rise to the first informal discussions with Gimi villagers about the status of these 
unique birds and the mutual concern for their physical decline and the loss of the 
associated traditions. 
A similar relationship between community and scientist evolved in the 
southern half of the WMA, where biologists Andy Mack and Deb Wright came 
to work on Pawaian land near Haia in 1987. In the process of building a 
research station and conducting five years of fieldwork, they engaged in ongoing 
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dialogue with Pawaian community members about the uniqueness of Crater's 
natural resources and the land use options which the Pawaians were considering. 
Along with Gillison, Mack, and Wright came numerous field assistants who later 
came back to do further studies of their own. In this way, a unique 'family' of 
scientists has evolved, who live and work with the Gimi and Pawaia on various 
studies of natural resources in their forests. 
Fieldworkers 
From 1984, the project began to place resident and intermittent fieldworkers as 
trainers in the WMA. They were both expatriate and national, and included 
biologists, teachers, small business development advisers, and rural community 
development workers. The focus of their work has been on providing technical 
assistance to village counterparts in business, community development and 
WMA management. Expatriates initially played a central role in project 
implementation at the local level, but as of 1995, they have been in volunteer 
and advisory positions only, with national staff or community counterparts 
directly responsible for field implementation. As with the scientists, most 
resident fieldworkers who have stayed for periods of two years or more have 
formed close friendships with Crater Mountain communities. 
Business trainers in the position of tourism lodge managers were first 
present in Ubaigubi from 1983 to 1986. In 1990, the project began to utilise 
United States Peace Corps (USPC) rural community development volunteers as 
field trainers. The USPC programme requires that the village provide bush 
material housing for the volunteer in return for the technical assistance which 
they receive. The volunteer is initiated into a development philosophy wherein 
his or her role is to train and support village counterparts, and not to lead and do 
work for the community that it does not want to do for itself. Since 1990, seven 
USPC couples have served in WMA communities, and volunteers are still 
working with the project in three of the five WMA villages. 
In 1993, the WCS placed the first resident field coordinators and scientists 
on the project staff in the WMA. While the USPC volunteers continued to work 
with small business and community service committees, the field coordinators 
were assigned to strengthen and assist the clan leaders who sat on the newly-
formed WMA management committees. The coordinators also live in village 
housing and spend much of their time in community meetings, as well as on the 
trails of the WMA. As the first field coordinator, Jamie James became known 
and admired by the communities for his capacity to briskly patrol the rugged 
country between all five WMA villages. James was followed by two national 
biologists, John Ericho and Robert Bino, who have been equally well received 
and respected as mentors to Crater Mountain communities. 
Community Committees/Institutions and Village Coordinators 
Community committees are composed of clan representatives whose selection 
and responsibilities vary with the function of the committee. The institution 
which governs the general operation of the WMA, and also the research and/or 
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eco-tourism business in each community, is known as the 'management 
committee' of that community. It is responsible for composing the laws of the 
WMA, enforcing the rules and assessing land use practices. The institution 
which governs operation of the handicraft businesses in Hero wan a and Ubaigubi 
is called the 'handicrafts business committee'. In some cases, community 
workers called 'village coordinators' or 'station managers' have been selected 
from or by the committees to carry out specified duties. These individuals are 
often community leaders who have originally volunteered for a leadership role 
or have previously worked with field researchers at the site. 
Methods for Assessing Processes and Outcomes of Community 
Participation in the Crater Mountain WMA 
In this section, I shall briefly describe the processes that have been used for 
engaging community participation and the resulting extent of participation which 
has been achieved in the Crater Mountain ICAD project from its informal 
inception in 1982 up to the present. To assist in this assessment, an analytical 
framework was developed (see Table 18.1 ). It is modelled after Shripton (1989, 
cited in Oakley 1991), who used the method to assess the community 
participation aspects of health care and nutrition projects. The framework 
identifies seven indicators which represent aspects of community participation 
which must be present to some degree in order to establish a functional protected 
area which is actually managed by the landowner communities. These are: 
• Needs assessment and action choice, which indicates the extent of 
community involvement in determining the need for, and the choice of, an 
action in some aspect of the operation of the WMA. 
• Training and agents of change, which indicates the extent of technical and 
management training which the community is receiving in order to build a 
capacity to operate some aspect of the WMA. Agents of change may include 
any external fieldworkers from an agency associated with the project area or 
community members from within the WMA who have been used to influence 
the level of community participation. 
• Organisational structure and institutional presence, which indicates the 
extent of development of community organisation and institutions involved in 
some aspect the operation of the WMA, and which also shows how well the 
organisation incorporates and represents the existing power structure of the 
community. 
• Leadership, which indicates the extent of community leadership (ranging 
from none to a few individuals to full community representation) which is 
active in the operation of some aspect of the WMA. 
• Management, which indicates the extent of management actions (assigning 
duties or coordinating the work of others) being conducted by community 
leaders and/or institutions in the operation of some aspect of the WMA. 
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• Resource mobilisation, which indicates the extent of funds or in-kind services 
which are being contributed by the community, its leaders and/or institutions, 
to the operation of some aspect of the WMA. 
• Monitoring and evaluation, which indicates the extent of community 
involvement in the collection, utilisation, and dissemination of information to 
evaluate the operation of some aspect of the WMA. 
With the exception of training, which is an indicator of external input, it is felt 
that all indicators of community participation must approach Level 5 if operation 
of the WMA is to be sustained over the long term without continued external 
inputs .I 
The framework is used to specifically assess and rank the presence and 
extent of community participation in two aspects of the operation of the WMA 
over the history of the Crater Mountain project. These two aspects are 
community involvement in: 
• WMA development, or management of the WMA itself, meaning the 
processes of establishing the WMA and its operating policies and procedures 
as related to natural resource use; and 
• eco-enterprise development, or management of the eco-enterprises, including 
handicrafts, research, and eco-tourism, within in the WMA, and the processes 
for starting and maintaining such economic enterprises. 
These two areas were selected for analysis as they represent the change over 
time in the level of community participation in the 'C' (conservation) and the 
'D' (development) components of the ICAD formula for establishing a 
functional WMA. A discrete analysis for WMA and eco-enterprise operations 
was conducted for each of the four principal communities in the WMA -
Ubaigubi, Herowana, Maimafu, and Haia. Each has a unique community profile 
and history of involvement in the development and management of the WMA. 
Because of the informal beginnings of the Crater Mountain project, indicators of 
participation were not predetermined and have not been formally monitored over 
the entire length of the project, as recommended (Oakley 1991 ). Descriptions 
and assessments of participation processes have been derived from the historical 
trail of written records, reports, minutes, and personal communication from 
community members and project staff. 
1 The conceptual framework ranks resident trainers as the most desirable (Level 5). While this is 
seen as desirable as a 'means' to community participation, it should not be viewed as the 'end'. As 
the community reaches high levels of participation in the other indicator areas (action choice, 
organisation, leadership, etc.), it is expected that community participation will provide for 
sustainable operation of the WMA, while the need for training correspondingly declines. 
Table 18.1: An analytical framework for judging community participation aspects ofiCAD projects. 
Indicator 
Needs 
assessment and 
action choice 
Training and 
agents of 
change 
Organisational 
structure 
Leadership 
Management 
Resource 
mobilisation 
Monitoring 
and evaluation 
1. Nothing/narrow 2. Restricted/small 3. Mean/fair 4. Open/good 5. Wide/excellent 
None 
Limited technical and 
management training 
for CC and CW(s) 
All done by outsiders 
with no community 
involvement 
Done by outsiders, but Assessment by 
discussed with community; outsider 
community helps in analysis and 
representatives action choice 
Community does 
assessment, analysis, 
and action choice 
Technical and Intermittent on-site Ongoing on-site Short local training 
management training at training and technical and courses plus regular on-
remote institutions with management training by management training by site training by resident 
little on-site training visiting trainers resident trainers trainers 
No organisational New organisational New organisational Active cooperation with Existing community 
structure present on site structure has limited structure has become existing comm-unity organisations involved 
to support activity links with community very active organisations in controlling activities 
One-sided CW(s) working indep- Organisational support CC active and taking CC fully represents 
organisational support endently of social inter- functioning under the initatives in variety of interests in 
dominated by project est groups or comm- leadership of combination with community and controls 
staff unity support structure independent CW(s) CW(s) CW(s) 
CW(s) supervised by CC present, but any CC self-managed but CC self-managed and CW(s) responsible to, 
outsider or project staff CW(s) independent of does not supervise involved in supervision and actively supervised 
No resource 
contribution by 
community; any CW(s) 
externally funded 
CC, and both depend- CW(s) ofCW(s) by, CC 
ent on project staff 
Funds and contribut- Funds and contribut- Funds and contribut- CC raises funds or 
ions collected, but CCs ions collected; CCs ions collected; CCs collects contributions, 
have no control over have control of have control of spend- and controls allocation 
spending, and CW(s) spending, but CW(s) ing; CW(s) voluntary or of money, including 
externally paid externally paid partly paid by cc payment of cw~ 
No formal information Information collected Information collected CC receives relevant CC disseminates 
system in place for by, or sent to, outside by CW(s) who are information from information so that 
evaluation of experts but not fed back monitoring CW(s), and is aware of community is aware of 
conservation and/or to CC conservation and/or project progress, project progress, 
development processes development processes problems, and benef~ts problems, and benefits 
Note: CC= community committee or institution identified to manage an activity in the community (e.g. protected area management, business management, 
etc.); CW(s) =community worker(s) (i.e. one or more community leaders who take action on a project activity independent of, or in collaboration with, a 
community committee or institution. 
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Results: The Crater Mountain Story 
Community Participation in Development of the WMA 
In this section, the processes for engaging community participation in the 
development of the WMA are described. The extent of community participation 
achieved in each WMA community by utilising these processes was ranked 
according to the framework (see Table 18.1) and is shown in Figure 18.1. 
Results are shown separately for each WMA village. The years of assessment 
for each community begin from the time of arrival of the first 
fieldworkers/researchers. 
Training and Agents of Change in WMA Development 
From 1982 to 1992, intermittent fieldworkers and researchers met with 
communities to introduce the WMA concept and assist in the establishment of 
WMA committees. David Gillison worked closely with the Gimi communities 
in the north, while researchers Andy Mack and Deb Wright were engaged in 
dialogue with the Pawaians to the south. The first resident fieldworker, Jamie 
James, arrived in 1992 to conduct ongoing on-site technical and management 
training in WMA development. In 1995 and 1996, the first national resident 
fieldworkers, John Ericho and Robert Bino, were placed in the WMA 
communities of Maimafu, Herowana, and Haia. Intermittent assistance from 
field researchers is still ongoing. 
Needs Assessment and Action Choice 
From 1982 to 1992, the process leading up to gazettal of the lands of Crater 
Mountain as a national WMA consisted of numerous meetings and conversations 
between the researchers and the landowners. For the most part, the need to 
protect the unique biodiversity of the area was an externally driven assessment 
which was discussed with local communities. The possible exception to this was 
in Ubaigubi village, where clan leaders volunteered the assessment that 
culturally important birds of paradise were declining because of overhunting by 
the young men. The leaders voiced this concern to Gillison who became 
instrumental in initiating talks with DEC and various international donors, which 
in turn led to the introduction of the WMA concept to the clan leaders. 
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Figure 18.1: Crater Mountain commuJlity participation in WMA development 
from 1993 (grey) to 1996 (black). 
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To engage communities in the planning process for the WMA, Gillison 
made numerous patrols to hold informal meetings in the men's houses and with 
individual families, as well as formal meetings with 'big men' from several 
Gimi clans. During these forums, the idea of creating a WMA was introduced 
and discussed. The neighbouring Pawaians heard of the meetings between 
Gillison and the Gimi, and discussed their interest in possible involvement in the 
WMA in conversations with researchers Mack and Wright. Based on the 
Pawaian interest, representatives of the RCF and the DEC made a brief 
helicopter visit to Haia to request the names of clan leaders who would be 
interested in serving on a WMA committee. When gazettal of the WMA was 
achieved, a resident fieldworker, Jamie James, was placed in the WMA to hold 
regular meetings with the newly-formed management committees to develop the 
laws and enforcement procedures. 
The result of this process has been that community participation in the 
choice to establish the Crater Mountain WMA has ranged from 'fair' (Level 3) 
to 'good' (Level4) (see Figure 18.1). What began as an external assessment of 
the need to establish the WMA later evolved into a community action choice to 
proceed, although the communities' reasons for taking this action were different 
from those of the RCF and the WCS. The reaction of most communities to the 
discussion about establishment of the WMA was that they hoped it would 
quickly bring development in the form of cash income, employment, and an 
improvement in services (health, education, and transportation infrastructure) 
which the government had still failed to deliver to these remote areas. Gimi 
landowners, worried about the encroachments of neighbouring clans, also saw 
WMA gazettal as a means to gain formal recognition of their land ownership. 
The Pawaians, with a much lower population density and isolated from the rest 
of the country, came to fieldworkers and researchers seeking advice about how 
to deal with the rumours of all sorts of 'development'. 
During the numerous meetings between fieldworkers and clan leaders in all 
parts of the WMA, the rhetoric from the RCF and the WCS was that they wanted 
to achieve the conservation of natural resources, but recognised the development 
needs and desires of the communities. For that reason, they proposed the 
adoption of the WMA multiple-use strategy, in which they hoped to be able to 
assist the communities to implement development activities that were also 
compatible with conservation of biodiversity. In general, there was, and 
continues to be, confusion and misunderstanding on the part of the communities 
about the substance and method of what the WMA will actually deliver in the 
form of cash income, employment, and community development. 
Organisational Structure and Institutional Presence 
The process of establishing WMA management committees began after clans 
indicated an interest in including their lands in the proposed WMA. Based on 
national legislation, a representative of each landowning clan must sit on the 
management committee. In community meetings with fieldworkers, clans were 
asked to nominate their representatives. No formal social mapping was 
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conducted by the RCF or the WCS. Identification of clans was volunteered 
during the meetings and through the acquaintance of field researchers with clans 
based on their years of affiliation with the WMA communities. The first 
management committee, representing seven Gimi clans, was organised with the 
assistance of Gillison in 1986. Committees were established to represent a total 
of twenty-one clans in all four WMA communities in order for official gazettal 
to take place, although there was still considerable confusion on the part of the 
landowners about what a WMA was, and what the role and responsibilities of 
the committee members were. It was recognised by the RCF and the WCS that a 
resident fieldworker was needed to assist the committees in their development. 
James worked with all the committees in the WMA by constantly patrolling 
between the communities over the next two years. The rugged terrain and lack 
of radio communication between sites meant that James could only organise 
meetings with committee members at each site once every three months. A 
significant portion of his work was done by informally talking with people while 
walking and living with them on patrol. With the lag in time between meetings, 
James found that committees did not function well, and were often at a stalemate 
over any action or decision prior to his return visit. Based on this assessment, 
the RCF and the WCS placed four resident field staff in the WMA, one in each 
of the major villages. John Ericho and Robert Bino have brought considerable 
cultural insight to the task of developing the capacities of joint clan committees, 
and they have worked with biologists Chris Filardi and Ross Sinclair, who have 
provided on-site technical support in protected area planning and management. 
At present, the twenty-one clans are represented by sixty-four members in 
four communities. The Gimi representatives are the 'big men' of each clan. 
Within clans, there are subgroups who have had to be consulted by the clan 
leader before land use decisions can be made. Originally, these individuals also 
sat on the committees until the latter became too large for effective decision 
making. As an alternative, each 'big man' selects a younger man from his clan 
to also be present at meetings. The younger man will normally speak Tok Pisin 
as well as the Gimi vernacular, and may have a wider range of experience in 
activities outside of the traditional life of the WMA. The Pawaians do not have 
traditional clan leaders, but elect two representatives of each landowning clan as 
voting members of the management committee. Since the Pawaians are semi-
nomadic, it often happens that the two representatives will not both be in 
attendance at the same time. 
The result of this process has been that community participation in 
management committees in Crater Mountain has moved from "minimal' to 
'restricted' (Level2) or even 'good' (Level 4) in some viJJages (see Figure 18.1). 
Only the Herowana committee could be categorised as becoming active when it 
hosted the first Annual WMA Meeting in 1993 and began to meet regularly with 
James. With continued technical assistance, the Herowana committee has 
assumed a more powerful role in the community and can now be considered as 
approaching Level 4. It has incorporated two female leaders of community 
women's groups onto the management committee and is considering inclusion 
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of representatives from community government, the school, and the health 
centre in order to strengthen connections to other community institutions. 
Other communities remain at Levels 2 and 3 in organisational development 
and continue to be quite dependent on field staff for assistance. All committees 
are holding intermittent meetings, are involved in designing WMA rules and 
enforcement procedures, and are involved in discussions over procedures for 
dealing with land use issues such as WMA entry fees and mineral exploration 
leases. Some have taken action to enforce WMA laws over the illegal harvesting 
of wildlife, access for research activity, and unauthorised mineral exploration. 
Leadership 
The process of fostering leadership in the development of the WMA was 
undertaken by field staff working with individuals who initially came forward 
with an expressed interest in WMA establishment. From 1982 to 1992, these 
were community members who had either worked for Gillison at his research 
site or became friends with him during his patrols to other Gimi villages. In 
Haia, they were individuals who had assumed leadership roles in fieldwork with 
Wright and Mack. Later, one or two from each village were jointly selected by 
the field staff and the community to officially serve as village coordinators and 
work with James on committee organisation and development after WMA 
gazettal. Initially, the village coordinators received a stipend from the RCF for 
this work, but they often had difficulty in securing community cooperation and 
support under this arrangement because of other people's jealousy, even though 
they were elected representatives of the committees. Stipends for coordinators 
were discontinued and some individuals ceased their involvement. For those 
who remained, traditional clan loyalties have hampered their capacity to 
effectively represent and work with the many clans present in each community. 
Even for individuals who have sincerely attempted to work with all clans, 
considerable suspicion by others in the community remains an obstacle. In 
Pawaian culture, the additional customary absence of 'big-man' leadership and 
formal organisation puts considerable stress on those individuals who stand out 
from the rest of the community. . 
The result is that community participation in leadership in WMA 
development relied on the intermittent external fieldworker in the early years of 
the project (Level 1) (see Figure 18.1). Two communities, Herowana and 
Maimafu, seem to be approaching Level 4 by having a management committee 
and a designated village coordinator who are beginning to work together in 
WMA operations. Because of cultural and historical differences, Haia and 
Ubaigubi still lack this unified leadership, and it is mainly individuals who play 
a prominent role (Level 2). 
Management 
The process of building the management capacity of the management 
committees had its beginnings in 1986, when Gillison worked with the first 
committee of Gimi clans to define their seven operating rules for the proposed 
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WMA. Discussion and implementation of the rules did not proceed further until 
the placement of James and the first WMA annual meeting of all twenty-one 
clans in Herowana. In the quarterly committee meetings that followed in each 
community, James would assist members with discussion about what actions 
needed to be taken by the committee on WMA laws or their enforcement, and 
with assigning the coordinator to take action on behalf of the committee. These 
procedures are revisited at each annual meeting, whose venue rotates among the 
WMA villages. With the placement of Ericho, Bino, Filardi, and Sinclair, most 
committees now meet on a monthly basis. With some assistance, minutes are 
kept and committee procedures are being practised and slowly understood by the 
members. Landowners have come up with a preliminary designation of land use 
zones for protection of biodiversity through restricted use, and for the practice of 
subsistence activities (James 1995), but these remain to be mapped and the 
conservation implications further discussed with the assistance of field staff. 
The result is that community participation in management is as yet 
'minimal' at most sites (see Figure 18.1). With the exception of Herowana, all 
management committees are still reliant on resident fteldworkers to advise them 
(Level2) when they conduct meetings. The Herowana Management Committee, 
which has benefited from more experience and training, is now capable of 
holding independent meetings and directing the actions of the coordinator at 
times (Level 4). Previously, the coordinator was working independently of the 
committee, as the members were not clear about their own roles or the means to 
direct his action. The Herowana Management Committee has collected fines 
over violations related to five of the seventeen WMA laws (see Appendix) since 
October 1995. In Haia, they have collected fines over one violation and taken 
action on two others. WMA laws remain in the early stages of development, 
they await review by the DEC, and some require modification where they violate 
existing national policies. 
Resource Mobilisation 
The process of encouraging resource mobilisation by the community for 
development of the WMA has been especially challenging. The costs of WMA 
operation have evolved to include stipends for coordinators and ordinary 
committee members, travel for members to conduct committee business, and the 
hosting of WMA annual meetings. Village coordinators in most WMA 
communities were originally externally funded by the RCF and the WCS, being 
paid a wage for work with researchers which indirectly compensated for their 
involvement in development of the WMA. To reduce this dependence on 
outside support, efforts were made by the RCF and the WCS to assist 
communities to generate funds internally. Since 1994, field staff have worked 
with management committees to develop mechanisms to collect fees to finance 
WMA operations. Funds are now collected through a 10 percent surcharge on 
all expenditures made by clients of WMA eco-enterprises (researchers and 
tourists who pay for accommodation, guides, carriers, and research assistants), 
WMA entry fees for researchers and tourists, and fines collected for violation of 
WMA laws by WMA residents or visitors. In addition, in-kind community 
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contributions of land, labour, or bush materials are requested before any external 
input is considered by the RCF for WMA infrastructure development. 
As a result of these mechanisms, management committees now have the 
potential to be self-supporting. The focus of training is now on guiding the 
committees in principles of financial planning and reinvestment so that all funds 
are not simply disbursed as stipends but are utilised for committee operation, 
maintenance of infrastructure, and socio-economic development in the 
community. This is being done by field staff in the regular meetings with 
committees as they discuss the implications and possibilities of each action and 
expenditure with the committee members. 
The result of this process has been that community participation in resource 
mobilisation in the form of funds or in-kind services which are being contributed 
by the community to the operation of the WMA has increased in all communities 
(see Figure 18.1 ). This began in 1994, when the committees began to control 
expenditures but village coordinators were still paid by external agencies (Level 
3 ). In 1996, the coordinators can be partially paid by the management 
committee or they can work voluntarily, but they are not subsidised by external 
funding (Level 4). None are currently paid by their committee, although some 
coordinators are also involved in management of WMA eco-enterprises from 
which they continue to receive some wage through the business, which offsets 
their current voluntary work with the management committee. 
Monitorini and Evaluation 
The process of engaging the community in the collection, utilisation, and 
dissemination of information to evaluate the operation of the WMA and the 
status of biodiversity conservation is still in an informal stage. Fieldworkers 
assist management committees to record minutes of each meeting. Decisions 
about WMA operations are documented and reviewed at each consecutive 
meeting. WMA laws have been translated into Tok Pisin and posted by each 
management committee to encourage review and comment. To involve 
communities in evaluation of biodiversity, resident fieldworkers and researchers 
in Haia worked with the community coordinator and community members to 
implement the beginning of the Trained Local Observer (TLO) programme. 
Landowners in the WMA can now receive certification in, and work as, 'trained 
research assistants' {TRAs) or 'trained local observers' {TLOs ). The former are 
qualified to work on a research project under the supervision of a guest scientist 
or student in the WMA, while the latter have been trained to a level where they 
can independently conduct simple repetitive monitoring of selected species. 
Fifteen TLOs have received preliminary training in the monitoring of selected 
mammals, birds, plants, and amphibians. Three are now monitoring amphibian 
populations in the southern end of the WMA as an indication of ecosystem 
health. Three others are involved in an orchid inventory project with the PNG 
Forest Research Institute. None of them have yet reached the stage of formally 
feeding this information back to the management committees, although this 
practice is expected to evolve. 
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The result of this process has been that community participation in 
evaluation of the operation of the WMA has grown from 'nothing' to 'fair' (see 
Figure 18.1 ). In 1992, resident fieldworkers and researchers began to 
consistently document the conservation status and operations of the WMA, 
although there was as yet no mechanism to involve community workers in the 
documentation process (Level 2). Since 1995, community members have 
become more involved in the collection and discussion of information related to 
the operation of the WMA and the status of its natural resources through the 
processes described (Level 3 ). 
Community Participation in Enterprise Development 
In this section, I shall describe the processes for engaging community 
participation in the development of eco-enterprises in the WMA. The extent of 
community participation achieved in each WMA community by utilising these 
processes has been ranked according to the framework (see Table 18.1) and is 
shown in Figures 18.2 and 18.3. Results are shown separately for each WMA 
village and each business. As in the previous section, the years of assessment 
for each community begin with the time of arrival of the first trainers. 
Figure 18.2: Crater Mountain community participation in handicraft enterprise 
development from 1992 (grey) to 1996 (black). 
(a) Herowana 
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(b) Ubaigubi 
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Figure 18.3: Crater Mountain community participation in tourism and research 
enterprise development from 1992 (grey) to 1996 (black). 
(a) Herowana 
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(b) Haia 
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Handicraft businesses have been established in the commumttes of 
Ubaigubi and Herowana, beginning in 1990 and 1992 respectively. They 
specialise in the production of traditional New Guinea highland products, 
including fighting shields, spears, bows, stone axes, mumu bowls, hilum string 
bags, and more. These are marketed domestically and internationally through 
village stores and mail order. Research and/or eco-tourism businesses have been 
established and tested in three WMA communities. They have included the 
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Ubaigubi Eco-tourism Lodge ( 1984-1986), the Ubaigubi Rutanabi Guesthouse 
(1995-present), the Crater Mountain Biological Research Station (CMBRS) at 
Wara Sera near Haia (1989-present), and the Crater Mountain Biological 
Research Station (CMBRS) at Herowana (1992-present). All facilities feature 
permanent structures with cooking and accommodation for three to ten visitors. 
Research clients include scientists in the natural and social sciences, both 
expatriate and national, from student to professor. Tourism clients are typically 
bushwalkers or natural history enthusiasts, including birdwatchers and orchid 
specialists, as well as generalists. Marketing is still informal and primarily 
conducted by word of mouth from previous visitors. 
Trainini and Aients of Chaoie 
Rural community development volunteers from the United States Peace Corps 
(USPC) were engaged to conduct on-site resident training in Ubaigubi from 
19.90 to 1995 . The USPC model for small business training was transferred to 
Herowana in 1992 to establish the Herowana handicrafts business. Additional 
training workshops have been organised with the assistance of handicraft buyers 
in Port Mores by and Goroka. 
Methods of training in eco-tourism and research have been highly variable. 
In Ubaigubi, resident expatriate lodge managers initially provided community 
guide, cook, and manager training. Training ceased from 1986 until 1989, when 
USPC volunteers arrived to provide training for the handicrafts enterprise, some 
of which was applicable to the potential eco-tourism business. In Herowana, 
some training was provided by the USPC volunteers, but most was dependent on 
fieldworkers assigned to other tasks, such as biological research or work with 
WMA management committees. These staff provided on-site and short local 
training courses for selected community members as eco-tourism guides and 
research assistants, and in eco-tourism product development. At the CMBRS at 
Haia, field researchers served as the resident trainers by providing Pawaians 
with experience as research assistants. Additional training workshops in the 
WMA have used Awareness Community Theatre techniques for role-playing 
tourism and research scenarios. Outside of the WMA, selected community 
members have attended workshops in eco-tourism product planning and study 
tours to guesthouses, research stations, national parks, museums, and 
herbariums. 
Needs Assessment and Action Choice 
Handicrafts. The process resulting in establishment of the Ubaigubi handicrafts 
business was initiated by Gillison, who was seeking alternative forms of income 
generation for WMA communities after the collapse of the eco-tourism lodge in 
Ubaigubi in 1986. The idea was introduced by USPC volunteers Steve and 
Kristi Booth, and was embraced by a community committee which worked with 
the Booths and later volunteers to develop the business. Other WMA 
communities assessed the successful business activity in Ubaigubi and 
approached the RCF with a request for assistance to establish a similar venture. 
The RCF responded with the placement of USPC volunteers in Herowana in 
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1992, and in Haia and Maimafu in 1996. The result of this process has been that 
community participation in the choice to establish the handicrafts enterprises in 
the Crater Mountain WMA has been quite high (see Figure 18.2). 
Research and eco-tourism. The process of initiating the first eco-tourism lodge 
venture in the WMA in the early 1980s was also based on an assessment by 
Gillison, along with representatives from the WCS and private entrepreneurs in 
Goroka who met with community representatives to discuss plans for the 
business. In Haia, the CMBRS was established by Wright and Mack in 1989 
with the permission of the Pawaian landowners, through external financial 
support and assessment of the need for such a station. The Pawaians were 
pleased with the employment, and requested external assistance to further 
develop the enterprise when Wright and Mack completed their studies. As with 
the handicrafts, the surrounding communities heard of the business activity and 
approached the RCF and the WCS with similar requests for more activity. In 
response, the CMBRS in Herowana was initiated in 1992, and some 
accommodation units are in the planning stages at Maimafu. The result of this 
process has been that community participation in the choice to establish (and 
discontinue) these businesses has been quite high (see Figure 18.3). In 
Ubaigubi, the lodge proved to be financially non-viable after three years of 
operation, as it was dependent on external marketing and management, and 
transportation was costly. Community capacity was not sufficient to maintain or 
even downsize operations when the external institutions withdrew subsidies for 
the operation in 1986. The community elected to disassemble the lodge and 
discontinue the business despite outside advice that they should reconsider some 
aspects of the operation. 
Or~anisational Structure and Institutional Presence 
Handicrafls. The process of establishing the Handicraft Business Committees 
was undertaken by field staff who asked each clan to nominate a representative 
to serve on the committee. The committee then underwent a five-year period of 
training in which they met once each week with USPC volunteers to practise and 
design systems for obtaining and pricing products from artisans in the 
community, and to conduct bookkeeping, banking, and communications with 
clients. Volunteers were largely responsible for locating the initial markets for 
the products. As the capacity of the committee to carry out these tasks has 
increased, field staff have gradually reduced their involvement in the operations 
each year. The result has been that community participation in the committees 
has ranged from 'restricted' (Level 2) to 'fair' (Level 3) (see Figure 18.2). In 
Ubaigubi, the committee disbanded in 1995 after internal conflict over 
misappropriation of funds by a committee member. The Herowana committee 
continues to be very active (Level 3 ). Both businesses market handicrafts from 
most households in their respective communities. Over 190 artisans from all 
seven clans participate. 
Research and eco-tourism. The process of establishing the institutions for 
managing eco-tourism and research businesses in the WMA began only after the 
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enterprises were operating for some time. All were operated by fieldworkers or 
researchers until 1994, when an effort was made by the RCF to begin to transfer 
management of these businesses to the WMA management committee present in 
each community. The result of this process has been that community 
participation in an institution responsible for operating the research and eco-
tourism enterprises is still very limited (see Figure 18.3) and remains heavily 
dependent on external assistance. 
Leadership 
Handicrafts. The process of fostering leadership in the handicrafts businesses 
was undertaken by field staff working with the community-selected committee 
to develop their collaborative capacity to operate the business. Every committee 
member was trained in all tasks that the committee must perform, so that all 
tasks could be performed equally well by all members of the group. When a 
dominant clan leader on the committee misappropriated funds from the Ubaigubi 
business, a system of checks and balances was built into the Herowana financial 
accounting system such that three or more members must be involved at some 
point in each transaction. When the procedures of the Herowana committee 
have been questioned by the community, field staff have assisted the committee 
in determining and practising appropriate responses. 
The result of this process has been that community participation has been 
good (Level 4) in Herowana where the committee members exhibit confidence 
in their capacity to understand and operate their business systems (see Figure 
18.2). In Ubaigubi, the committee has dissolved but the single manager is 
apparently competent to operate the business (Level 3). 
Research and eco-tourism. The process of developing community leadership in 
these businesses is just beginning, as management functions are transferred from 
project fieldworkers and researchers to community members. Field staff are 
now holding meetings with the management committees and their coordinators 
in each community to define and develop appropriate systems for operating the 
business. The result is that community participation remains restricted (Level 2) 
(see Figure 18.3). Businesses that were once externally run are now run 
collaboratively with individual community leaders on the management 
committees, and only recently expanded to involve others on the management 
committee in Herowana in 1996 (Level 4). 
Management 
Handicrafts. The process of building the management capacity here required 
that volunteers be present on site to provide weekly lessons in basic English and 
Tok Pisin so that orders could be read and processed, in the basic arithmetic 
required for accurate accounting, and in elementary banking procedures, letter 
writing, phone calling, pricing, and product development. Additional workshops 
in pricing and quality control have been provided by artefact dealers from Port 
Moresby and Goroka. The result has been that management in Herowana has 
progressed from its original dependency on project fieldworkers (Level 2) to 
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primarily self-management with intermittent assistance (Level 4) (see Figure 
18.2). All external technical assistance for the Ubaigubi business was 
withdrawn in 1995, and the business continues to function under community-
level management. 
Research and eco-tourism. The process of building the management capacity of 
community leaders or institutions in the operation of the WMA research and 
eco-tourism enterprises has involved a variety of training methods. Random 
community members have been elected to attend workshops in and outside of 
the WMA in eco-tourism product planning, and have participated in project-
sponsored study tours to guesthouses, research stations, national parks, 
museums, and herbariums. Selected individuals have also completed elementary 
courses for research assistants and tourism guides offered by staff and 
researchers in the WMA. The management committee in each community 
governs the work of researchers in the WMA by vetting the letters of request 
from each scientist who wants to work in the WMA. The committee reviews the 
research protocol and grants permission for the selected procedures and time of 
visitation. A concerted effort is now under way to identify and strengthen the 
core group of clan representatives who are establishing the procedures to better 
manage the finances and logistics of this business. The result has been that 
community participation in management remains restricted (see Figure 18.3). 
Although workers have received training, the management of the business is 
theoretically conducted by committees, but is actually reliant on a single 
community worker who maintains the structure and coordinates eco-tourism 
guides, research assistants, and other visitor services in the village. The 
community worker is often not working closely with the committee and is 
dependent on project staff for assistance (Level 2). 
Resource Mobilisation 
Handicrafts. The communities achieved an encouraging level of resource 
mobilisation without start-up funds from the RCF or the WCS. The committees 
initially worked on a voluntary basis, and proceeds from the first sales were 
sufficient to cover their subsequent costs of operation. Proceeds from sales are 
managed by the committee with the help of the volunteers, and are used to pay 
artisans, committee stipends, business expenses, and contributions to a 
community fund. Sales in Herowana have increased substantially, with proceeds 
in the last year equal to the total of the first three years of operation. The 
Ubaigubi handicrafts business is also self-sufficient financially. Community 
participation has been excellent (see Figure 18.2) because funds were 
immediately available to compensate committee members and artisans for their 
work. 
Research and eco-tourism. In these businesses, the process of resource 
mobilisation has been more difficult since start-up and maintenance costs are 
much greater. Fees for the use of research stations and guesthouses were first 
collected by the management committees at rates determined by each respective 
community. Community workers who coordinated the businesses and 
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maintained the stations were paid a wage by the RCF and the WCS. In 1995, 
uniform pay rates and laws for eco-tourism and research activities for the entire 
WMA were ratified and documented at the WMA annual meeting by 
representatives of each management committee. The formalised protocol for 
fees and laws now provides the instruments which each committee uses to 
collaboratively govern the eco-tourism and research enterprises of the WMA. 
The subsidy for community workers by the RCF and the WCS is being 
withdrawn over a two-year period, and station and guesthouse managers will 
become volunteers or will be paid by the management committee. Community 
participation in resource mobilisation has increased as they have had funds from 
the business to do this (see Figure 18.3). 
Monjtorini and Evaluation 
Handicrafts. The level of community participation in evaluation has been 
dependent on the capacity of the business committee's members to be engaged 
in the maintenance and analysis of the business records and feedback from 
buyers. Originally, record keeping was primarily done by the volunteers, but the 
responsibility has gradually been assumed by the committee members or (in the 
case of Ubaigubi) by the sole manager of the business. In Hero wan a, the records 
have been used over the last two years to respond to community criticism and 
concerns over the distribution of benefits or destination of proceeds, and 
handicraft buyers have been brought in to meet with artisans and managers. The 
result of this process has been that community participation in evaluation has 
risen from 'restricted' (Level 2) to 'fair' (Level 3) or 'excellent' (Level 5) (see 
Figure 18.2). 
Research and eco-tourism. Community participation in evaluation of this 
business is accomplished through financial records and feedback from visitor 
evaluations. The involvement and capacity of community members to assist 
with maintenance of accurate records for this business has been limited because 
of lack of technical assistance from field staff, which is only now beginning to 
be provided. Each tourist or scientist who visits the WMA is asked to write an 
informal evaluation of WMA facilities and services. These are returned to the 
fieldworker at each site, who presents them for discussion at the management 
committee meeting. The result has been that community participation, originally 
dominated by external review (Level 2), has been expanding over the last two 
years to involve individuals and committees (Level 3) (see Figure 18.3). 
Discussion 
Action Choice 
Customary land tenure in PNG precludes the rating of the action choice indicator 
to be anything less than fair (Level 3). Some community involvement will be 
obligatory before any actions related to land use can be implemented. As shown 
at Crater Mountain, community discussion alone seems to have little bearing on 
whether an action choice initiative will flourish (as shown in the history of 
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Ubaigubi Lodge and WMA establishment in the 1980s). We have found that the 
constraints of community conditions in Crater Mountain2 mean that 
considerable community education must take place before community 
assessment of actions, especially as related to business development, can really 
be practised. As in other remote sites in PNG, where limited government 
services and infrastructure are present, residents are normally very eager to elect 
for an action which they feel will result in socio-economic development, despite 
the fact that they probably have little understanding of the implications or 
requirements of the action (Sekhran 1996). 
Congruent with the recommendations of Midgley (1986), undue haste in 
constructing facilities for an eco-enterprise or a physical base of WMA 
operations does not guarantee further community involvement. Even though 
community representatives participated in the original discussion of the action 
choice, they have not had the technical capacity to continue their involvement in 
the subsequent steps of implementation without assistance. Not surprisingly, in 
other community-based conservation initiatives, if the technology being utilised 
or the maintenance demands of the initiative were beyond the capacity of the 
landowners, their participation dropped off (Little 1994 ). The history of the 
Ubaigubi Lodge is an illustration of this point. Local capacity was not sufficient 
to maintain the activity at the stage when external support was withdrawn. The 
results were misunderstanding, loss of confidence, resentment, and scepticism 
on the part of the community. 
Results at Crater Mountain do suggest that an initial affirmative action 
choice on the part of the community, followed by demonstration and years of 
discussion, may be necessary to result in community understanding of the action 
choice and a possible commitment to it. Even if the demonstration was 
unsuccessful, as in the case of the Ubaigubi Lodge, follow-up discussion of its 
story and the lessons learned by the action choice have been instructive to all 
communities around Crater Mountain which contemplate similar enterprises. 
Another demonstration site, the Crater Mountain Biological Research Station at 
Haia, though managed entirely by external field researchers, was a model for 
demonstrating what a research station is and how it operates. The extremely 
positive reaction of the Haia community led to their request for more research 
business. It is unlikely that this affirmative action choice meant that Pawaians 
then thought that they could manage the operation, but rather that they wanted 
this type of employment to go on being offered in the area. It will probably take 
much more time and fieldworker presence to build the confidence and capacity 
for significant community participation in operation of the station. This is 
consistent with the results of conservation initiatives in Africa, where a lengthy 
first phase of external management was necessary in the more complex 
operation of game reserves (Kiss 1990). 
2 That is, low to non-existent formal education and lack of experience in the modern cash 
economy outside of the WMA boundaries, resulting in 'cargo cult' tendencies and unrealistic 
expectations. 
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While the complexity of the action will dictate the length and intensity of 
external involvement, Uphoff ( 1985) suggests that, when working with 
communities which may not be accustomed to involvement in development 
programmes, as at Crater Mountain, it is necessary not only to discuss with the 
people whether a project activity will be undertaken or not, but also to engage in 
an ongoing dialogue about the specifics of how the community envisions itself 
participating in the proposed activity. Because actions at Crater Mountain, by 
this project and others, have involved external initiation and management, and 
local people still lack significant experience, we find that people are often 
'waiting for action', and still have considerable difficulty conceptualising their 
role in 'taking action'. 
A potentially relevant case from El Salvador involved communities in a 
dialogue which discussed the 'rights and obligations' of participants to prepare 
them for what to expect in the future of the project (Paul 1987). The discussions 
covered physical, financial, social, and organisational aspects of the proposed 
project. Although this is probably still too conceptual for direct use in projects 
like Crater Mountain, it provides a useful framework for the ongoing dialogues 
which discuss the roles of external agencies and the WMA communities. To 
increase community capacity for understanding the complexity of action 
choices, we have found that study tours, in which landowners travel outside of 
the WMA, are very influential. Where few people have travelled beyond their 
home village, a trip to talk with landowners in another part of PNG, about land 
use or eco-enterprise development, has removed misconceptions which field 
staff say might otherwise have taken much longer to achieve. This type of 
hands-on experience, including internships and workshops in technical and 
management skills, has proved invaluable in most rural development projects 
(Midgley 1986). 
Training 
Given the isolation and educational level of Crater Mountain communities, we 
feel that the investment we have made in training has been necessary in order to 
engage community participation as an 'end' to ongoing sustainable operation of 
the WMA. At this stage in WMA development, the intermittent presence of 
fieldworkers has not proven sufficient to assist in the development of the 
embryonic institutions in the WMA. During the lengthy absence of a 
fieldworker from a site in the WMA, confusion or conflict has arisen. The 
committees have lacked the confidence and experience to take action or to make 
rulings on topics related to the operation of the WMA or the eco-enterprise. 
This is complicated by the fact that collaborative management of the WMA and 
its enterprises requires cooperation between clans that may have been traditional 
enemies. A resident fieldworker must still be present to 'walk' most of the 
committees through the motions of conducting a meeting, delegating 
responsibility, identifying action, making a law, writing letters, or resolving 
conflict. 
Processes for Effecting Community Participation 419 
The potential impact of a resident trainer is reflected in the greater extent of 
community participation in the handicrafts enterprises as compared with the 
WMA eco-tourism and research enterprises (see Figures 18.2 and 18.3). This 
can partly be attributed to the greater complexity of these service industries 
when compared with small-scale manufacturing and trading, but it is also partly 
a reflection of the history of community training for each respective business. 
The ·usPC Rural Community Development model for community capacity 
building was used to establish the handicraft businesses. A committee was 
elected specifically by the clans to run each business and work as counterparts to 
the USPC volunteers. They meet regularly with the volunteers who have 
assisted them in developing a specific methodology for operating the business. 
Until recently, there was no designated resident small business or development 
trainer assigned to the eco-tourism and research businesses. These businesses 
have been run on a rather ad hoc basis by the management committee, which has 
not received any specific training as a business committee, but functions more as 
a governing body for policy and law in the WMA. The systems for record 
keeping, marketing, and managing the enterprise have been random and 
uncoordinated. These results indicate that an appropriate fieldworker must be 
assigned to any new community institution to help the members develop their 
capacity to operate the institution. This is consistent with the findings of Paul 
(1987), in a survey of World Bank projects, who noted that the selection of 
appropriate fieldworkers suited for specific training tasks was instrumental in 
successful community participation initiatives. When comparing the overall 
development of community participation in WMA operations, Herowana and 
Maimafu have made the most progress (see Figure 18.1 ), even though Haia and 
Ubaigubi have been 'involved' in WMA activities for longer. The constant 
presence of resident trainers in Herowana and Maimafu in the past two to four 
years, who have been assigned to working specifically with the management 
committees on WMA operations, may have had this impact. 
Although it is understood that fieldworkers are present only to demonstrate 
practices and to work alongside the committees, workers must constantly guard 
against the risk of encouraging community dependence on them. As confirmed 
in most rural development work (Oakley 1991; Wells and Brandon 1992; Uphoff 
1995), this has required the presence of field staff with considerable patience, 
sensitivity, neutrality, the capacity to listen, and to teach a task instead of doing 
it for people. As anywhere, the cooperation, trust, and respect of rural 
landowners at Crater Mountain has had to be earned through demonstrated 
commitment and long-term presence (Wright and Mack 1993). This has been 
one of the strengths of the Crater Mountain project to date, where a committed 
group of associated individuals maintains contact with each other and the 
communities during, and long after, their presence in the WMA. Despite 
internal successes and failures, and the comings and goings of individuals, there 
has been a consistent institutional presence through an RCF and/or WCS field 
representative for the past fourteen years. This has provided the environment for 
staff to work with communities to continue the dialogue about the successes and 
failures and to learn from the mistakes. 
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Organisation 
The management and business committees are new institutions in the Gimi and 
Pawaian cultures. Although most are based on traditional clan leadership or 
representation, the necessary collaboration of a large number of traditional clan 
enemies in the Crater Mountain WMA committees is a relatively novel and 
unprecedented phenomenon. It is only with the development of WMA airstrips 
in the last 10-20 years that clan groups have been clustered in such close 
proximity as to constitute villages. Suspicion and fear of personal harm from 
another clan in not uncommon. Pearl ( 1994:213), in a review of the 
conservation efforts at Crater Mountain, aptly described the situation as 'unruly, 
contentious, rumour-filled, open-ended, and slow - but broadly consultative, 
inclusive, and potentially, uniquely effective'. 
In addition to the challenges of new levels of organisation at Crater 
Mo~ntain, field staff also report the breakdown of the traditional authority 
structures, as has been documented in other developing societies (Kiss 1990; 
Bromley 1994). The older clan leaders are not always seen as competent in the 
ways of modern society, while younger people struggle, and are restless, for 
change. In some communities, this has further weakened the power of the 
management committees which, by tradition, have been comprised of older clan 
leaders. Amongst the Pawaians, the traditionally limited scale of cooperation, 
due to their semi-nomadic behaviour and low population densities in large 
expanses of forest, is an inherent problem. Given these constraints, it is not 
surprising that institutional development throughout the WMA has been slow 
and uncertain. 
Although committees for community management of protected areas have 
been set up in many parts of the world, few have yet demonstrated the capacity 
to act independently of external assistance (Wells and Brandon 1992). While 
this is not particularly encouraging for projects like Crater, where we are in the 
very early phases of institution building, it suggests that we will probably need 
to make a long-term commitment to resident assistance for the near future 
followed by intermittent field visits for a much longer period. 
Leadership 
We have seen that, as the tangible results of time invested in an institution and 
its activity materialise, the extent of community participation in the form of 
leadership does increase. Oakley ( 1991 ), in a review of rural development 
projects, found that participation often evolves in this manner. Businesses or 
activities which take a long time to reach fruition, and are very hard to get 
started and maintain, will require some degree of external leadership. This can 
be seen in the handicraft business, which has had the capacity to earn money 
almost immediately and where levels of participation grew quickly, while in the 
tourism and research business, growth is slow and requires considerable up-front 
investment. Establishment of the latter business has required more outside 
intervention before the community has gained the ability or desire to take an 
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active leadership role. Equally elusive is the concept of benefits derived through 
the long-term investment in biodiversity conservation. 
The indicators of leadership show that, in many activities at Crater 
Mountain, there have been independent leaders, rather than active groups or 
committees of people who have taken leading roles in WMA establishment. 
Most of the independent leaders work without the support of the entire 
community, which is not surprising in light of clan rivalries, and appear to have 
a variety of motives. For some, the ulterior motive is financial or political 
benefit, for the leader personally or for his clan, while for others it appears to be 
a sincere interest in the activity. In either case, the resulting commun.ity 
jealousy, leading to lack of involvement from other community factions or the 
dependency on just one individual to carry out any activity, has led to problems. 
In Ubaigubi, a charismatic individual was instrumental in dissolving the 
handicrafts committee, resulting in current management by a sole individual. 
While the business still functions, the reliance on a single manager places it in 
some jeopardy, as projects with single charismatic leaders are known to have a 
higher risk of failure (Midgley 1986). In Haia, the traditional lack of leadership 
in the culture has led to dependence on one young man for most WMA 
operations. 
To encourage involvement from a wider spectrum of the community in 
WMA operations, field staff have attempted to widen the dissemination of 
training and information opportunities. Because communities are not 
homogeneous, and traditional Melanesian authority structures can hoard 
information as a form of power, dissemination can be a challenge in its own 
right (James 1996). In Herowana, the longer and more extensive presence of 
resident staff has countered this constraint by encouraging the involvement of 
both young and old clan representatives on committees, by disseminating 
information through women's groups and female representatives on community 
committees, and by offering repeated training sessions in different areas of the 
village to provide opportunities for more clans to attend. This is consistent with 
Orsak's (1996a) recommendation for 'flooding' communities with information 
to reduce the tendency to restrict information flow. Amidst this complexity, the 
challenge remains to cultivate leadership while encouraging community 
participation without provoking jealousy. 
Management 
Although most community institutions are still dependent on project staff for 
assistance in carrying out their management duties, there is now a sufficient 
number of visitors coming to the WMA (approximately 250 in the last year) to 
raise the number of issues on which the committees must act. Each transaction 
or event provides another opportunity for the committee or the designated 
coordinator to practice management skills. This involves collection and 
distribution of revenues, record keeping, work assignments, enforcement of 
rules, and collection of fines. 
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This activity has engaged people in the practice of the WMA procedures, 
such that some are becoming familiar with the implications of the rules they 
have made for operation, and are beginning to question some practices. The 
annual WMA meeting has proven to be an invaluable forum, where 
representatives of each community can vote on changes in the standardised 
procedures of WMA operations and enterprises. The indication that people are 
questioning existing procedures is also an indication that they are being used and 
thought about; they are not merely symbolic. 
As the value of biodiversity is realised, the reasons and incentives for 
enforcement of management rules are becoming clearer for WMA residents. An 
example of this occurred in 1995 in respect of a rule which was made at the 
WMA annual meeting, that no biological materials could be taken out of the 
WMA by a non-resident without permission from the management committee. 
Later that year, a new species of orchid was discovered by one of the landowners 
involved in a parabiological orchid inventory project with the Forest Research 
Institute in Lae. The orchid was named after the landowner, who was obviously 
impressed that something previously undescribed by science was found in the 
Crater Mountain forests and may have the value to attract clients of the research 
and tourism enterprises. A trekker was later apprehended leaving the WMA 
with orchid samples which were confiscated by the local management 
committee. It is unlikely that landowners would previously have perceived the 
value or the threat in ways which would have resulted in disciplinary action. 
Management in the form of equal distribution of benefits such as training 
and revenue-earning possibilities are a constraint in all WMA procedures. 
Community institutions struggle to fairly distribute these benefits, despite the 
traditional clan nepotism which gives work and training opportunities to fellow 
clan members. This is still an area that requires careful external refereeing by 
the resident field staff. It may prove to be one of the biggest management 
problems for the committees, yet one that will be critical to providing 
appropriate incentives to sustain community participation if a sufficient quantity 
of land is to be involved in the establishment of a viable conservation area. 
The community dilemma over the distribution of benefits is not an issue 
which is unique to Crater Mountain. The revenues from community wildlife 
farms and lodges in Africa have been distributed in a number of ways, 
depending on community and enterprise profiles (Kiss 1990; Metcalfe 1994). 
Although the emphasis is often on equal distribution, one of the Campfire 
ventures in Zimbabwe distributed wildlife income in accordance with land area 
enrolled in wildlife protection. This model may have application to Crater 
Mountain. Business income is now distributed to the workers with a surcharge 
for committee managers and overhead costs. In the future, shares may be held 
by WMA residents in a community company portfolio of Crater Mountain eco-
enterprises. If eco-enterprises are dependent on the presence of biodiversity, 
should the number of shares in the Crater Mountain companies reflect the land 
area assigned to conservation, rather than to some other land use such as 
hunting, gardening, or coffee production? Because some residents (especially 
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the Pawaians) own larger blocks of land, these individuals would then secure a 
disproportionate share of revenues, but it is likely that viable populations of flora 
and fauna, and especially the seasonal movements of vertebrates, will depend on 
the existence of large contiguous blocks of undisturbed forest. 
Resource Mobilisation 
All community institutions associated with WMA operations or enterprises are 
now collecting revenues of some sort to finance their activities. The more 
complex businesses, such as the research stations, still receive subsidies from 
external agencies for manager stipends, although this practice will be 
discontinued as the income of the enterprise increases. Resource mobilisation 
has proven to be another big challenge for the Crater Mountain project. The 
communities in the WMA have only recently acquired their present identity, and 
all individuals identify with their clan or lineage instead of the village as a 
whole. Hence there is no tradition of pooling village resources to invest in a 
community venture. Compensation for labour, materials, or expertise is 
requested from any individual outside of the immediate family. Any favours 
granted are catalogued in a mental record of debts as favours owing. 
In this cultural environment, it has been difficult for field staff to initiate 
community contributions towards a collective action without some sort of 
compensation being given to the individuals involved. For the project to directly 
employ village members or provide monetary compensation for some action 
associated with WMA operations or enterprises, without any matching 
contribution from the community or the individual, goes against all mainstream 
development theory, which has shown that these actions are not sustainable, that 
they lead to dependency and tend to discourage local 'ownership' of the activity 
(McNeely 1988; Little 1994). For example, the successful Annapurna project in 
Nepal has required a minimal 50 percent community contribution to any project 
activity and has refrained from any cash compensation (Wells and Brandon 
1992). 
The earliest research activities in the villages of Ubaigubi and Haia were 
conducted prior to the organisation of an ICAD project initiative. WMA 
residents were employed in what were, essentially, externally managed 
operations. It has proved difficult to encourage community participation in 
protected area establishment by turning local people from labourers into 
business managers in the WMA enterprises. With the lack of experience in 
business and the cash economy, committees are not eager to part with a portion 
of their earnings on the maintenance or overhead costs of business or WMA 
operations. On the other hand, their frugality does have some participation 
benefits. As external agency subsidies for community research station managers 
have decreased, management committees have had to consider their capacity and 
need to assume some of these costs. As a result, their level of participation in 
management has increased significantly as they scrutinise the work of the 
manager for the justification of his wages as a share of their potential earnings. 
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In this way, the project has made shaky progress in evolving from a 
beneficiary to a participatory system. The most successful activities are those 
which are now actively generating revenues which can readily be used to pay for 
labour and other costs. Constraints still exist in enterprises such as eco-tourism, 
where a guesthouse must be built before revenues can be collected. Individuals 
are very reluctant to participate in construction without being paid for their 
labour, but there are insufficient funds to cover these initial costs. Contributions 
of labour are not readily offered, because direct returns to the individual cannot 
be seen or assured. In addition, Crater Mountain residents are still dependent on 
a demanding schedule of subsistence activities. A day spent on a business 
enterprise is a day spent away from gardening. In an effort to avoid direct cash 
payments, while making allowance for cultural constraints, the project must 
provide indirect incentives to break these stalemates. 3 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
The participation of local committees in monitoring their enterprises is fairly 
good, since all records are maintained by committee members. The handicraft 
enterprises have progressed to the stage of actua]Jy managing that data and 
utilising it to report to the larger community. Since jealousy and suspicion of 
neighbouring clans is a common problem, evidence of income and distribution 
of benefits is important to combat misunderstanding and misinformation. The 
records are also important because the provision of material benefits can be 
meaningless if the community fails to realise that they are growing (Midgley 
1986). 
The presence of the research enterprise at Crater Mountain for many years 
has provided a unique potential for selected community members to be actively 
involved in the collection of data on the presence of, or change in, biodiversity 
in the WMA. The interactions of communities with scientists has been 
important in community realisation of the uniqueness of their resources. Over 
the last two years, scientists and visitors to the WMA have been asked to submit 
comments on their findings and experiences to the management committees in 
an attempt to encourage feedback to the WMA governing body. 
The Trained Local Observer (TLO) programme (Sinclair 1995; RCF 1996) 
is the beginning of an ambitious effort to build local capacity to conduct 
biological and socio-economic monitoring, as required, to guide the management 
committees in WMA operation. While individuals still retain significant 
information about their natural resources, the limited level of literacy restricts 
the number of individuals who qualify to participate in the programme. 
Conclusion 
The Crater Mountain project is a combination of 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' 
initiatives (Hough and Sherpa 1986). The early existence of external 
3 One technique is to provide rice for lunch on workdays for community structures. 
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intervention was tempered by the obligation to involve the resource owners in 
the creation of the initial demonstration sites. The lessons learned from this 
creation provide the tangible evidence and incentives that fuel the fledgling 
participation of communities in all aspects ·of the WMA operations. In PNG, 
this is a delicate balancing act whereby all clans must take the lead and get some 
benefit in the negotiations which move them all towards a common goal. The 
process of engaging participation will necessarily be slow. 
The presence of twenty-one clans in neighbouring communities within the 
WMA has brought some benefits, though it has also been a challenge. We see 
that communities, and the clans within them, do learn from one another as they 
compete for the self-esteem which arises from improved performance. At the 
same time, through their annual meetings and collaborative training ventures, 
they are increasingly aware of their mutual dependence in the creation of a 
viable product. If cultural constraints do make themselves felt in one 
community, as they did in Ubaigubi, the project has not been obliged to 
withdraw from the area, since it can continue to provide technical assistance to a 
nearby community or clan, and wait for the invitation to return. 
Crater Mountain is a remote and far-flung site with high training needs. 
Paul ( 1987) identifies levels of complexity in . the three components of 
community participation- intensity, agents, and objectives. Based on his three-
dimensional framework, the level of commitment required to achieve the 
complex combination of empowering communities to eventually initiate action, 
as sought after in the Crater Mountain WMA, will require an extremely high 
level and lengthy commitment on the part of the external agencies involved. 
Such projects need high levels of investment in human and financial resources to 
provide the technical assistance which can facilitate community participation 
(Wells and Brandon 1992; Sekhran 1996). Once in place, the process requires 
commitment. ICAD projects which exist for less than five years without a 
secure source of funding, but which utilise taxing, innovative, and experimental 
procedures, have been shown to be ineffective in achieving their objectives 
(Wells and Brandon 1992). Funding constraints increase the difficulty of an 
already difficult task. While the government of PNG provides such unique 
legislation for the empowerment of local resource owners to establish national 
protected areas, it does not currently provide the technical assistance to 
landowners which would enable them to implement this ambitious agenda. In 
the most recent draft of the DEC Strategic Plan (PNGDEC 1996), this task is 
assigned to non-governmental organisations operating in the country. If NGOs 
are thus assigned the challenging task of providing technical assistance to 
develop a system of protected areas in PNG, and have demonstrated their 
capacity to do so, they should be considered for financial or logistical support 
from the government in order to carry out the mandate. 
Communities in the Crater Mountain WMA are balancing subsistence 
living with entry into the cash economy. Time available to participate in 
training, business, and WMA management is limited by the demands of 
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traditional subsistence and cultural obligations. The structure of businesses and 
governing institutions must take this into account. 
Community participation, as the 'means' to establish a protected area and 
the 'end' to sustain it, is only one facet of the challenge to achieving biodiversity 
conservation. Most protected areas, if established through community-based 
management, will only persist in a conducive national policy environment that 
does not undermine community efforts by providing incentives which decrease 
biodiversity value and encourage production versus conservation (Wells and 
Brandon 1992; Little 1994 ). The fledgling laws and systems which currently 
govern the Crater Mountain WMA are only beginning to address the internal 
threats from non-sustainable subsistence practices within the WMA. They are 
certainly not at a point where they can withstand the fragmentation that would 
result from the external threats of competitive land uses, such as large-scale 
extraction of mineral and timber resources. It will be imperative that national 
policy be aligned with the current community-based conservation initiative in 
the Crater Mountain WMA if it is to persist as a national protected area. 
This chapter comments only on the level of community participation in the 
operation of a national protected area. It does not attempt to answer the question 
of whether community participation will actually achieve the project's goal of 
biodiversity conservation. It is still a theoretical process and, to date, there is no 
proof that participation will enhance the achievement of conservation objectives. 
Yet in PNG, as in many other areas of the world, integration of conservation and 
development through community participation is accepted as the current means 
to protected area establishment (Brandon and Wells 1992; Little 1994). A 
monitoring and evaluation plan to collect quantitative data on the project goal 
and each objective of the Crater Mountain ICAD project was designed in 1995, 
and is currently being implemented (RCF/WCS 1995; Ericho, Bino and Johnson 
1996). When in place, the indicators will provide a more systematic assessment 
to answer this question. 
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Appendix: A List of Laws passed by WMA Management Committees 
at the Third Annual Meeting, 4-6 October 1995. 
The following seventeen 'laws' were passed by local management committees 
from the villages of Haia, Herowana, Maimafu, and Ubaigubi in the Crater 
Mountain WMA at a meeting held in Maimafu on 4-6 October 1995. The 
following rules apply to the entire area enclosed in the boundaries of the WMA 
unless otherwise stated. 
1. No hunting of Birds of Paradise. Few Birds of Paradise can be killed for 
special occasions only. Before birds are hunted permission must be granted 
by the appropriate Landowner [Management] Committee (MC). Fine for 
infringement: K40 or 2 months imprisonment. Fine is paid as follows: KJO to 
whoever reports the infringement, K3 0 to MC. 
2. The following species are unconditionally protected from all hunting and 
killing: (i) New Guinea Harpy Eagle; (ii) King Bird of Paradise; (iii) Ragiana 
Bird of Paradise. Fine for infringement: K40 or 2 months imprisonment. 
Fine is paid asfollows:KJO to whoever reports the infringement, K30 to MC. 
3. No-one may enter an area set aside for conservation for the purposes of 
hunting, food collecting, cutting, or gardening. No-one may remove plants or 
animals from these areas (except for the purposes of research and with the 
permission of the appropriate MC). No fine. 
4. No-one may enter another person's land for the purposes of hunting, food 
collecting, cutting, or gardening. People who pass through the land of others 
cannot leave trails. Fine for infringement: K50 or 2 months imprisonment. 
Fine is paid as follows: Kl 0 to informer, Kl 0 to MC, and K30 to landowner. 
Infringements are reported to the MC in the area it occurs. This MC writes 
to that of the infringer. It is the responsibility of the MC of the infringer to 
pursue the matter in court. 
5. All approaches to researchers and tourists concerning pay, conditions, fees, 
labour or any disputes must go through the appropriate coordinator. Fine for 
infringement: K5. Fine is paid as follows: K5 to MC. 
6. All sales of crafts must go through the Artefacts Committee. No fine. 
7. No-one can steal from a researcher or tourist. Anyone caught stealing must 
return the stolen goods and pay a fine. Fine for infringement: K50 or 2 
months imprisonment. Fine is paid as follows: KJO to informer, KJO to MC, 
K3 0 to researcher/tourist. 
8. No-one can lie to or mislead a researcher. Fine for infringement: K50 or 2 
months imprisonment. Fine is paid as follows: KJO to informer, KJO to MC, 
K30 to researcher/tourist. 
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9. People who are not traditional landowners in the CMWMA cannot do the 
following: (i) buy land; (ii) build a house; (iii) begin a business; (iv) hunt; (v) 
cut trees. 
10. All forms of mineral, oil and timber prospecting or exploration are banned in 
the CMWMA (except for land of the Kuasa Hauslain [near Herowana ]). 
11. No-one may hunt with slingshots, bows and arrows or shotguns near villages 
in the CMWMA. Fine for infringement: landowners Kl 0, outsiders K20. 
Fine is paid as follows: K5 to informer, K5 (Kl 0) to MC, K5 to landowner 
(in the case of outsiders). 
12. No-one can hunt with a home-made or unregistered shotgun. Fine for 
infringement: Kl 00 or 6 months imprisonment. Fine is paid as follows: K30 
to informer; K70 to MC. 
13'. No-one can buy or sell shotgun cartridges. Fine for infringement: K20 per 
cartridge. Fine is paid as follows: KJO to informer, KJO to MC. 
14. No researcher, tourist or company may remove any forest/river/land 
resource, use any idea, technique or information from the CMWMA without 
the permission of the MC. Any profit made from any products derived from 
the above must be shared with the people of CMWMA. All researchers 
and/or companies entering the CMWMA must sign a legally binding 
document to this effect.4 
15. No-one may consume, transport or grow illicit drugs in the CMWMA. No 
landowner may consume, sell or transport alcohol. Tourists and researchers 
may not supply alcohol to landowners and must consume alcohol in privacy. 
Fine for infringement: alcohol K20, drugs K30. Fine is paid as follows: Kl 0 
(Kl5) to informer, Kl 0 (KJ5) to MC. 
16. No playing cards for money or other gambling is allowed. Fine for 
infringement: KJO per person playing. Fine is paid as follows: K5 to 
informer; K5 to MC. 
17. No wild animal products (except bits of pig) are allowed to be used in the 
manufacture of crafts for sale. 
4 This does not refer to crafts and produce sold for resale [A.J.]. 
CHAPTER19 
BIODIVERSITY ON A TIGHTROPE: 
INCENTIVES FOR RAINFOREST CONSERVATION 
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
NIKHIL SEKHRAN 
Introduction 
Tropical forests cover some 70 percent (or some 34 million hectares) of the land 
area of Papua New Guinea (PNG). These forests are remarkably species rich: 
scientists claim that between 5 percent and 7 percent of the world's flora and 
fauna are contained in them and in the coral reefs that fringe the coastline 
(Miller et al. 1994). All in all, PNG may harbour as many as 20,000 species of 
ferns and flowering plants, some 190 species of mammals, 200,000 to 400,000 
insect species, 750-plus species of birds, and 500 species of reptiles and 
amphibians (ibid.). Many of these species are endemic to the New Guinea area, 
and many of them have a restricted distribution within it. Not surprisingly, then, 
the country's conservation management record is a global concern. This record 
has been poor in recent years. 
Land tenure systems in PNG vest property and use rights amongst a range 
of right-holders living in local communities. Use allocation is dictated by the 
private interests of these communities or, more likely, by power-brokers within 
them. Conservation may yield wider public benefits, but is increasingly 
perceived by local communities as an activity opposed to their private interests. 
The point at issue is that biodiversity management usually requires certain uses 
of the forest to be excluded or restricted in order to provide for the survival 
requirements of flora and fauna. However, an opportunity cost arises if 
landowners must forego the benefits of certain land uses which are incompatible 
with conservation needs. 
As PNG's forest owners are incorporated into the cash economy, their value 
systems are shifting. Many of the benefits that forest owners do obtain from 
conservation 1 are today being discounted in these people's decisions because 
1 
These benefits are substantial. Ecological services, conditioned by species and ecosystem 
diversity, underpin the productivity of subsistence systems. These provide for the sustenance of 
the rural populace and support the formal economy by subsidising the nutrient and energy budget 
of labour (Pernetta and Hill 1981 ). The nation's formal economy is increasingly dependent on 
forest resource extraction, particularly timber harvesting. The farm sector - PNG's long-term 
economic backbone- is also conditioned by ecological services which have a contributory value to 
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they do not take a monetary form. Reinforced by forest owners' high time 
preference for current income rather than future benefits, this calculus tends to 
favour current extractive uses of forests over conservation. Economists have 
argued that this situation, mirrored elsewhere in the world, is unlikely to change 
unless local stakeholders begin to appropriate a greater proportion of the 
economic value ofbiodiversity in money terms (see Sekhran 1994b). 
A commonly held view in conservation circles is that property rights are 
necessary, indeed often sufficient, to provide forest owners with a conservation 
incentive. This view appears reductionist, at least when applied to the PNG 
situation. Here, notwithstanding surety of tenure, a conjunction of socio-
political, economic, and institutional factors combine to foreclose conservation 
options. There are few workable means of regulating private land use in the 
public interest. This is compounded by the fact that the option of establishing 
National Parks on public land is not available -the necessary land alienation is 
simply an untenable prospect. Conditioned by these various factors, forest 
management has a short-term focus. The message from the field appears to be 
that property rights alone provide an insufficient incentive for biodiversity 
conservation. 
The question, therefore, is how to convert non-monetary conservation 
benefits into cash incomes for landowners. How can landowners be 
compensated for the opportunity costs associated with conservation 
management? Many conservationists and economists argue that material 
incentives are essential as a conservation tool, but what form should incentives 
take? This paper searches for answers. 
In order to locate the discussion in the appropriate policy context, the first 
two parts of this paper provide an overview of the threats to forest biodiversity 
and the stakeholder interests that motivate them. The third part then examines 
the leeway for arresting these trends by developing material incentives. Rather 
than weighing in with a lengthy stakeholder analysis, this chapter focuses on the 
forest owners who are the primary stakeholders. Two types of incentives are 
discussed: 
• development support through integrated conservation and development 
(ICAD) initiatives; and 
• transfer arrangements such as conservation management rental schemes. 
It is shown that a number of social, economic and political factors create hurdles 
that will need to be overcome if conservation objectives are to be attained using 
either of these methods. So far as conservation policy is concerned, the jury is 
still out in the search for workable mechanisms. 
final production (Sekhran, Hedemark et al. 1994; Sekhran, Saulei et al. 1994). Moreover, an 
'option' value for species and habitats could potentially be capitalised in the future. 
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The Causes of Papua New Guinea's Conservation Dilemma 
The Short-Term Forest Management Focus 
Many of the processes that underpinned environmental transformation in the 
past continue today. There is a tendency, for instance, for landowners to manage 
forest resources for short-term social and economic purposes rather than for 
long-term objectives. This reflects the situation which existed in the past. As 
Bulmer (1982:63) has argued: 
there is little evidence that Papua New Guineans were or are very 
different from the majority of humanity who have not been greatly 
concerned with the long-term conservation of their natural 
environment. What they were, and still are concerned with, very 
directly ... are the present and immediately foreseeable yields of their 
crops and catches. and the amount of time, effort and care needed to 
produce them. To these we must now add concern for cash. 
In the pre-contact era, given that human lifespans were short, and that 
communities lacked the technological means to control their environment, the 
focus on the short term is not surprising. Since human population densities were 
low and technology was fairly basic, the ability of communities to imprint the 
forest environment was limited.2 Today, however, as these parameters change, 
the management of forest resources to meet short-term needs can cause a severe 
erosion in their quantity and quality. The new-found concern with cash and the 
subsequent commoditisation of the forest resource are having especially 
damaging results. 
Population and Subsistence 
The policy debate on forest management has tended to focus on the political 
economy of the logging industry. There have been few efforts to address 
farming systems and subsistence - the other significant causal factor in forest 
degradation- possibly because their impacts are difficult to mitigate. 
Allen (1993) has described the systemic impacts of subsistence practices on 
the forest environment. 3 In the generic model, population pressures place 
increasing demands on swidden horticultural systems, reducing fallow periods. 
This, in turn, depletes the farming system's nutrient base, impacting on 
vegetational succession. This causes forest conversion, first from high bush to 
2 Nonetheless, this is not to argue that there were no anthropogenic impacts. References to the 
inherent conservationist ethos of pre-contact communities are simplistic, regardless of views often 
articulated by some green groups. As Bulmer (ibid.) attests, conservation outcomes in antiquity 
were most probably the product of circumstance (the conjunction of factors outlined above) rather 
than intention. Throughout PNG, there is considerable evidence of environmental manipulation. 
The deforestation of the central highland valleys is an obvious example (Powell 1982). 
3 It should be noted that the tremendous variation in subsistence systems makes generalisation 
difficult. 
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low bush, and then to tall, and subsequently, in severe cases, short grass. Soil 
erosion, as the cover diminishes, begins to take a mounting toll, accelerating the 
nutrient loss process and increasing the danger of irreversabilities. The problem 
is that the rate of agricultural innovation may be insufficient to compensate for 
this, leading to a vicious cycle of ecological degradation that is difficult to stem. 
Subsistence pressures are, at least in part, fuelled by population growth. 
With an average population growth rate between 2.2 percent and 2.3 percent, the 
PNG population will reach some eight million by the year 2025. This will give a 
mean density of some seventeen people per square kilometre. Although still low 
by global standards, the pressures will not be uniform nationwide. In some 
areas, rural-urban migration will continue to provide a safety valve for 
populations that cannot be supported by local environments. However, 
population growth in marginal highland areas is likely to place additional 
pressures on the highlands fringe as people spill over upland ridges to colonise 
virgin forest. These pressures are a function of growing population densities, 
but the same effect may arise from the concentration of population in the 
vicinity of large-scale developments such as mining projects, or along major 
highways. 
Esther Boserup (1965, 1981 ), in her discussion of the stages of agricultural 
development, suggests a linkage between population growth and farming 
intensification. Her argument is that as populations grow and fixed 
environmental resources diminish on a per capita basis, farming intensification 
is fuelled through technological change. However, this may not hold in areas 
where virgin forest is available for clearance. For the purposes of budgeting 
labour time for work, custom, and leisure, farmers may calculate that it will be 
less burdensome to continue to shift ecological frontiers rather than innovate.4 
The techniques available for farm intensification - ditching, mounding, soil 
conservation, fencing, and mulching - are all labour demanding. As Bulmer 
( 1982) argues, the work effort involved in clearing new forest land for 
agriculture is substantially less than that involved in intensifying agriculture in 
grassland fallows. Farmers may deliberately opt to clear forest for gardens, even 
though they may otherwise value the forest environment. 
This does not mean that farming intensification is not occurring in PNG -
only that, in some areas, the rate of forest clearance exceeds that of innovation. 
The introduction of firearms into remote areas has increased subsistence 
pressures on native fauna (see Majnep 1982; Filer 1994). This has caused the 
extirpation of large fauna in some areas. Pressures on fauna have been 
compounded by the commercialisation of the rural economy, particularly for 
species coveted for food and/or traditional purposes. Other new technologies, 
such as chainsaws, make forest clearance less labour-intensive and less 
dangerous. As these technologies become more accessible, the ability of 
communities to modify their environment increases. 
4 This is hardly unique to PNG (see Harrison I 993). 
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Logging and Land Use Conversion to Permanent Agriculture 
Large-scale logging is a threat to biological diversity in accessible rainforest 
areas. These are mainly lowland forests, which also exhibit the greatest 
biodiversity. The problem, from a biological perspective, is that the methods of 
logging which are employed are often needlessly destructive of ecosystem 
processes. Conventional practices tend to cause unnecessary damage to residual 
trees and leave excessively large forest gaps, particularly along skid trails. 
These gaps tend to be colonised by vines which then smother regeneration. 
The biophysical factors that influence forest regeneration are rarely, if ever, 
accounted for in the decision to allocate timber permits. These include, inter 
alia, topography, temporal rainfall patterns, soil characteristics, and altitude. 
Species protection requirements are not being addressed, partly because of a lack 
of understanding of ecological needs. Without baseline information, ongoing 
monitoring and evaluation and active species management measures, even on a 
pilot basis, there is a considerable danger of logging contributing to the local 
extirpation of species. 5 
Agricultural conversion also contributes to permanent forest conversion. 
Pressures for conversion are often high in areas that have already been logged. 
Local communities typically receive royalty earnings from logging for only a 
short period. During this time, they may become accustomed to the windfall 
income earned and other benefits. The cessation of royalty payments tends to 
create an incentive for them to seek alternative income sources, including those 
derived from permanent agriculture. 
More recently, there has been a spurt of project proposals for the 
establishment of so called 'agro-forestry' projects. These involve clear-felling 
of forest lands and the establishment of tree crop plantations. Many of these 
proposals may be designed to circumvent the Forestry Act in order to gain easier 
access to timber stands. 
Summary 
The actual forest area affected by the above mentioned pressures is open to 
argument. Annually, more than 1 00,000 hectares are probably affected by 
logging operations, some 10,000 hectares cleared for agriculture, and some 
10,000 hectares affected by urban growth and infrastructural development. 
Additionally, perhaps 200,000 hectares (including both primary and secondary 
forest) are affected by subsistence activities (Unisearch 1992; Filer 1994). 
The data on subsistence pressures are especially questionable. Part of the 
problem is that, until recently, these data were extrapolated from a 1961-62 
study on indigenous agriculture that had never been updated (Fereday et al. 
1994 ). The standard errors for study statistics were high - over 25 percent for 
5 For a survey of the problems associated with wildlife management in (timber) production 
forests, see Frumhoff ( 1995). 
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estimates of land areas under cultivation. Thirty years later, these data are yet 
more suspect, particularly as farming systems are undergoing rapid 
transformations. 6 
Other problems in estimating the magnitude of the human impact on forests 
derive from the fact that the national aerial photographic record is outdated, with 
surveys last performed in the early 1970s. Finally, at this time, existing forest 
concession boundaries have not been digitised on the PNG Resource Information 
System (PNGRIS) - hampering efforts to measure conservation trade-offs 
(personal communication, Mike Hedemark 7 ). 
Only 2.8 percent (13,000 square kilometres) of PNG's land mass has any 
conservation status attached to it. This comprises four national parks, four 
provincial parks, and twenty-six wildlife management areas (WMAs). Most are 
'paper parks', subject to a multitude of internal and external pressures. Some 80 
percent of the total protected area network consists of three sites: the Tonda and 
Masa WMAs in Western Province (the latter in the coastal zone), and the Crater 
Mountain WMA at the junction of the Chimbu, Eastern Highlands and Gulf 
Provinces. It is important to note here that the conservation legislation does not 
prevent logging or other ecologically exploitative options from being pursued in 
WMAs (personal communication, Kathy Whimp8 ). 
Conservationists thus face the multiple challenges of expanding the 
protected area system, improving the management and protection of current 
sites, and introducing active landscape management measures to manage species 
and habitats outside protected areas. 
Social and Economic Pressures: A Brief Stakeholder Analysis 
A stakeholder analysis is useful in unravelling the root causes of the 
conservation problem. However, such assessments are complicated by the 
enormous local variation in cultural, social, and economic circumstances 
prevailing in PNG. The following discussion attempts to draw conclusions from 
the overall socio-political landscape - locally specific examples are provided 
elsewhere in this volume. Three stakeholder groups are briefly investigated: 
landowners, the state, and the logging companies. 
Landowners: Differentiated Stakeholder Interests 
Some 97 percent of land in PNG is held by customary landowners. Their 
perceptions of proprietary rights for land holdings, their current and future 
welfare demands, and their sense of broader social responsibility (outside their 
kin groups) are critical to the conservation stakes. But landowners are a difficult 
stakeholder category to write about because there is enormous internal social 
6 The PNG Mapping Agricultural Systems Project is presently plugging data needs in this area. 
7 Project Biologist, PNG Biodiversity Conservation and Resource Management Programme. 
8 Legal Adviser to the AusAID-funded DEC Strengthening Project. 
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differentiation within landowner groups, and because other stakeholder groups 
with different interests (politicians, for example) are also landowners. There is 
an obvious danger of misconstruing landowner interests by treating them as a 
unitary category (Holzknecht 1996a). 
How might we reconcile the considerable variation in custom, forms of 
tenure, and decision-making structures with the need for simplicity in 
constructing a model? In short, although there is tremendous variation in forms 
of land tenure, land is generally controlled by kinship groups with membership 
determined largely through descent (Fingleton 1993). Members are entitled to 
the use of a range of clan resources. An individual's influence over decision 
making is codified by custom and economic standing. Power is conditioned by 
custom, leadership qualities, age, and gender, but also by the ability of an 
individual to build strategic alliances with external players and establish systems 
of patronage and reciprocal obligation (see Standish 1992; Saffu 1996). The 
balance of power tends to be vested in a smaller subset of the kinship group -
traditionally the senior men. 
A key issue for conservation is the ability of vested interest groups to 
dominate the local policy and decision-making process, wielding power to suit 
their own personal agendas. The experience in Bougainville and elsewhere 
shows that this is rarely durable. In time, new interest groups tend to emerge 
and stake a claim to resources (Filer 1990). In the immediate term, however, a 
small group of individuals can hold the balance of power and make decisions 
which are not necessarily in the broader and longer-term social interest of the 
local community. Such 'big men' may make this tenable by exercising 
customary and economic power and/or withholding information from other clan 
members. 
Landowners: Demands for Income and Services 
A key issue is that landowners' demands for income, infrastructural 
development, and services are creating enormous pressures to capitalise on 
forest resources for the purposes of generating income. The inability of many 
rural communities to participate in the formal economy tends to lead to an 
enormous sense of alienation from perceived national and international 
economic processes. This leads to frustration. Many landowners have an 
oversimplified perception of development, and lack an understanding of its 
determinants. 'Development' has increasingly come to mean a capacity for 
capturing rent (or 'cargo'), as if it reflected an inalienable right to goods and 
services delivered from the outside (see Filer 1997a).9 Resource development 
9 Why is this a problem? One issue is that rental income is limited; as populations grow and 
target incomes increase, this return is unlikely to satisfy local needs. The danger is that utilisation 
of the forest resource base beyond its regenerative capacity may erode future welfare potential by 
foreclosing wider sustainable uses. The forest's regenerative capacity may be exceeded either by 
overharvesting a given resource beyond biophysical sustainability thresholds or by managing it to 
sustain a single benefit flow (i.e. timber). Landowners tend also to capture only a fraction of the 
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projects, by making royalty payments to landowners, tend to reinforce this 
ideology. 
Landowners: The Pressing Challenge 
A major challenge for PNG, as a young nation, is to seek workable instruments 
to reconcile private and social cost-benefit equations for forest use. Decisions 
on land use are being made at the local level, based on private costs and benefits, 
regardless of the external social costs. In general, landowners are appropriating 
(in money terms) only a portion of the net value of conservation. Many of the 
benefits obtained, including subsistence-related and indirect use benefits, are 
non-monetary. Given the growing demand for cash incomes, these benefits are 
being discounted. The inability of forest owners to capture (in money terms) a 
greater portion of the total economic value of the forest resource is one of the 
factors that is leading them to commit it to a single use, such as logging, rather 
than broader conservation management. 
The evidence from the field is that landowners are not naive regarding the 
potential social and environmental impacts of logging (personal communication, 
Rob McCallum IO ). Rather, they regard this as an acceptable sacrifice in return 
for infrastructure, services, and cash incomes. 
There are few regulatory instruments currently available to delimit land use 
options on customary land and internalise the external costs of such use. The 
legitimacy of the state and its systems of governance are increasingly being 
questioned by landowners. The argument runs as follows. The state is a remote 
entity to many landowners. In isolated areas not penetrated, or already 
abandoned, by government services, it is not even particularly relevant. The 
ability of the state to regulate land use is constrained by both capacity-related 
and geographical factors. In the colonial era, the state's authority was accepted 
by landowners in return for government services (Alien 1993). Today, however, 
where these services are not forthcoming, or where police actions aimed at 
maintaining law and order have caused local resentment to increase, the role of 
the state is being increasingly questioned (ibid.). The inability of government 
agencies to meet the high expectations of landowners (for goods and services) 
reduces the state's jurisdiction over land use. 
Importantly, the willingness of the state to exercise whatever authority it 
can wield (by excluding areas from logging in the National Forest Plan, for 
instance) is constrained as a result of political imperatives. 
overall returns from extractive development. Owing to their limited skills, experience, and 
management ability, current development models tend to be driven by external agents. In the 
longer term, as capacity and structural constraints are addressed, community-led development 
could potentially offer greater dividends, at the local level, than those which are being harnessed 
today. However, current resource allocation is mitigating against these opportunities being 
realised. 
10 Conservation Area Management Adviser for the Lak ICAD project, United Nations 
Development Programme. 
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It is now obvious that it is very difficult for conservation to compete with 
logging pressures in the short term. This is because the scale of landowners' 
current windfall earnings from logging is so high, even though it is still true that 
they capture only a fraction of gross timber sales. This is illustrated in Table 
19.1, which compares the returns to landowners from various land uses. 
Estimates of annual income derived from sample farm budgets are given. The 
last column discounts cash flows at a rate of ten percent to derive an amount for 
net present value (NPV). 
Table 19.1: Returns from various land uses per hectare, at 1994 prices. 
Activity Volume Output Price Net Income NPV for 10 Years 
Logging 22m 3 Kl80/m3 K334 K304 
Hybrid cocoa 290kg* 90t/kg* Kll7* K567 
Chillies 570kg* 90t/kg* K516* K2,840 
Galip 100kg 1St/kg KIS K90 
Note: Galip nuts are collected from the natural forest. 
Sources: Conservation Resource Centre (logging data); Kandrian-Gloucester Integrated 
Development Project (agricultural data). Statistics marked with an asterisk are to be 
taken as averages. 
An important point to note when analysing these figures is that logging, in 
contrast to the alternatives, requires landowners to make few financial and sweat 
equity inputs. Logging also involves minimal labour drudgery. It imposes few 
opportunity costs in terms of communities' time-budget allocations for leisure 
and customary purposes. However, logging income is, in effect, a 'once off 
payment, while the other activities provide an ongoing flow of income. 
The State: Treasury Needs 
Increasingly in recent years, forest policy has tended to be driven by fiscal 
needs. Budgetary shortfalls have prompted policy makers to increase the scale 
of current forest production in order to meet revenue targets. Export tax yields 
from forestry have grown substantially since 1989, when the proportion of total 
government income earned from log exports was 1.67 percent (Kll.S million). 
In 1994, some K 14 7 million was appropriated, amounting to more than 12 
percent of aggregate income, and in 1995, K138.2 million was earned from this 
source (Internal Revenue Commission, unpublished statistics). 
In the 1996 budget, the government replaced the old taxation system, which 
charged differential rates based on species, to a value-based system. The new 
tax system, imposed ad valorem, is banded, with cumulative marginal rates 
applied based on price. II 
The forest industry, not surprisingly perhaps, has strongly opposed the new 
system. The high marginal tax rate applied on high log prices probably accounts 
11 There are six f.o.b. price increment bands (see Filer, this volume). 
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for much of the criticism. At a price of around Kl80 per cubic metre, the state's 
share of income under the new system is roughly equivalent to that under the old 
one. Long-term log price trends are expected to be strongly positive (Gresham 
1995).12 In the longer term, given this prognosis, the proportion of the absolute 
rent captured by the state may be expected to rise at the expense of developers. 
Why then does the state persist in committing forests to logging at levels 
that cannot be sustained, and condone damaging logging practices that will 
probably reduce harvest opportunities in the future? The projections suggest two 
things: 
• firstly, that the state places very high implicit discount rates on future income 
- opting for current harvesting at the expense of the future; and 
• secondly, that policy makers may lack an understanding of long-term market 
trends and determinants. 
The answer probably lies in a combination of both these factors. 
The major concern is that, as the returns from forest depletion are not being 
capitalised in human and human-made asset formation, but rather are being 
allocated to consumption, it cannot be argued that one form of capital is simply 
being replaced by another. This argument is often used in Southeast Asia to 
justify unsustainable harvest levels. Owing to the dearth of opportunities for 
diversification, PNG's economy will almost certainly continue to depend on its 
natural resource sectors, including the forestry sector. 
The State: Political Cycles 
The role of the state as a custodian of PNG's forests, in the public interest, is 
greatly complicated by political imperatives and cycles. Politicians face 
immense pressures from constituents. The large number of candidates in any 
given race tends to cause electoral promises to be inflated in the campaign 
season (see Domey 1990). The costs of contesting and holding a seat have 
escalated (ibid.). In the 1992 election, of 109 sitting candidates, 59 were not 
returned. Politicians are painfully aware that unless they respond to demands 
from their constituents for material rewards (in return for loyalty), the chances of 
them being unseated are high. The conjunction of these factors provides a 
substantial incentive for current income 'maximisation' and, in some cases, 
malfeasance. To some extent, this explains political antipathy towards radical 
restructuring of the forest sector, and also towards conservation. 
Logging Companies: Rent Seeking 
Logging costs in PNG are notoriously difficult to decipher. The 1991 Forest 
Revenue Study (Shedden Agribusiness 1991) estimated that costs ranged 
12 Preference shifts in European and North American markets towards boreal timber sources will 
be strongly offset by the buoyant demand from emergent markets in the Pacific rim. 
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between K 16 and K60 per cubic metre, at a time when the PNG kina was 
roughly on par with the US dollar. 13 Actual costs are correlated strongly with 
production efficiency, the distance of logging coupes from log ponds, and site 
topography. Given a current harvest cost of K60 per cubic metre, and ignoring 
the possibility of cheating, gross returns to the industry are probably in the order 
of 25-30 percent on f.o.b. sales (see Duncan 1994; Sekhran, Saulei et al. 1994), 
although these statistics are hotly contested by the logging companies. 14 
While these margins may seem high, the very substantial risks in investing 
in PNG need to be taken on board. Frequent political perturbations, abrupt 
changes in tax structures, and landowner disputes all mitigate against the 
industry taking a long-term view of forest management. 
Finally, Asian multinational logging companies, the main industry players, 
have little reason to apply high environmental standards to their operations. This 
is partly because they lack an active, politicised conservation constituency at 
home. 
The amalgam of these factors tends to result in an impetus for short-term 
rent seeking. 
Incentive Mechanisms 
The first two parts of this paper have documented the underlying causes of 
PNG's (forest) biodiversity conservation problems. A conjunction of interests 
and factors is responsible. These are especially acute for 'non-use' options, 
eliminating preservation as an option. Most conservationists accept that 
conservation in PNG must be predicated on a concept of 'use it or lose it'. 
Opportunity costs may best be addressed, they argue, by developing a 
framework of incentives. One aim would be to ensure that forest owners 
receive, in tangible terms, a greater portion of the total economic value of 
biodiversity. 15 
13 Devaluation has since caused a shift in relative prices between imported and domestic inputs. 
Because sales are for the most part dollar-denominated, the effect of the devaluation on the 
industry has probably been slightly positive. 
14 From an economic perspective, we are concerned with the costs of production of an efficient 
operator. This needs to be weighed against the industry's actual costs. 
15 The question arises as to how to define a fair incentive. Given that total economic value is 
largely comprised of non-monetary values, an empirical basis for defining compensation amounts 
based on economic values per se is lacking. Although a number of methods exist by which to 
uncover non-monetary benefits that derive from biodiversity, a number of factors impede their 
application in PNG (Sekhran 1994b ). In defining compensation amounts, it should also be realised 
that a bidding game is being played. Local communities capture a host of direct and indirect use 
benefits from natural environments and they are likely to ascribe at least a minimum value to these. 
But outside interest in conservation tends to provide an inducement for landowners to bid up the 
price for the resource (or fail to disclose their own values) in order to maximise rent capture. 
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Several potential incentive mechanisms exist. Two possible measures are 
detailed in the following discussion. The analysis shows that there are a number 
of hurdles, some of which have already been described in the first two parts of 
this chapter, which have to be crossed first before these measures are likely to 
work. 
Integrated Conservation and Development (!CAD) Projects 
The current strategic approach to the establishment of a protected area system in 
PNG is to promote alternative land use methods and income-generating 
opportunities over ecologically damaging options. The objective is to establish a 
nexus between conservation objectives and the social and economic welfare 
needs of local communities. Material incentives provided to achieve this 
objective.may include: 
• support for the development of income generation schemes consistent with 
conservation; 
• funding for social infrastructure and services; and 
• the payment of access fees (for research or tourism). 
Under this strategy, development support may be provided, as an incentive 
for conservation, through the vehicle of discrete integrated conservation and 
development (ICAD) projects. Several such projects are presently being 
implemented, supported by a range of government, non-government, and donor 
bodies. There is no single ICAD strategy, and these projects cover a wide 
spectrum of approaches to such matters as community entry, engaging 
community participation, definitions of 'development', and education and 
awareness activities. Although it is still too early to draw concrete lessons from 
these implementation efforts, it is clear that a number of factors presently appear 
to hamper the realisation of ICAD objectives. 
Landowner demands, for example, can greatly stretch limited project 
resources, particularly in areas where alternative options, including logging, 
exist. An ICAD project in Lak, New Ireland, was challenged by landowners to 
match income generated from an existing logging project which the ICAD was 
attempting to replace with 'eco-development'. This was imposed as a 
precondition for their participation in the conservation effort. However, the fact 
was that 'eco-development' options, by reducing annual harvests of forest 
products to ecologically sustainable extraction thresholds, resulted in a loss of 
current income. This served as a substantial disincentive for conservation, and 
was exploited to the full by the logging contractor and individuals who stood to 
lose if the logging venture was displaced. Many of these individuals based their 
decision to oppose the conservation initiative on their private cost-benefit 
calculus, ignoring broader long-term community welfare issues. The systems of 
These values need to be factored into the analysis of opportunity costs associated with 
conservation. 
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patronage established to support logging proved especially difficult to compete 
against. The message that 'eco-development' would serve to increase long-term 
income was met with short shrift (personal communication, Rob McCallum). 
A major problem is that community expectations from development, led by 
a small faction of interest groups, are very high. Perceptions of development as 
'cargo' or rent, rather than a long-term process of social change, are widely held. 
Self-help models are poorly understood and seem unattractive when compared to 
the prospect of rent capture. Expectations are being constantly driven upwards 
through exposure to outsiders, including tourists, city dwellers, and the media. 
The welfare gap which exists between urban areas and other enclaves, including 
mining areas, and the forest hinterland is obvious to landowners, and this often 
leads to a sense of frustration on their part. The gap also serves to fuel 
development expectations, as communities strive to close it. 
Developers tend to play to the local landowner gallery by promising 
income, employment, services, and infrastructure in return for resource access 
rights. Though these promises may often be false, they seem attractive, 
especially when immediate rewards (cash, travel perks, and other benefits) are 
provided. The structure of access agreements further reinforces incentives for 
extractive forest use by making provision for the developer to provide social and 
economic infrastructure. The effect is to perpetuate, amongst forest 
communities, a culture of dependency on outsiders. These precepts of 
development, once they have taken hold, are difficult to shift. 
ICAD projects generally have funding to provide technical assistance, 
training, information, and other catalytic support. With this, they aim at 
catalysing community-led development, by placing the onus for development 
initiatives on local stakeholders, rather than externally motivated models. 
However, communities which are accustomed to receiving rents may expect 
ICAD projects to deliver development rather than just providing support for it. 
A substantial change in such attitudes is required if ICAD projects are to work. 
Early Rewards Schemes 
One means of addressing these pressures is to provide early rewards to 
landowners. These are tangible immediate incentives (social infrastructural 
provision and other development support) to reward 'desirable' forest uses. 
The problem is that such schemes may undermine the very long-term 
development process that ICAD projects are attempting to support. By sending 
the inadvertent signal that development is rent capture, they may work as a 
disincentive for work effort, which, in turn, is a prerequisite for successful 
community-led development. The danger is that this may set an unfortunate 
precedent for future project interventions. Furthermore, unless 'rewards' are 
linked to conservation outcomes, future relationships between the community 
and conservation advocates are likely to be damaged. 
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Buyina Time 
As already discussed, pressures that underlie habitat loss are rooted in short-term 
socio-economic and political needs and demands. Long-term planning time 
horizons, essential as they are to resolve these issues, are a luxury for many 
ICAD projects which are wrestling with immediate concerns. Time is a 
commodity in short supply. 
Can the state intervene to foreclose landowners' forest use options? Given 
the dislocation of the state from civil society, and the consequent limited impact 
of state decrees on land use, the answer is probably 'no'. The interests of the 
state in resource development also work against such an option. Technically, 
however, the government is able to foreclose timber extraction as a resource use 
option by insulating areas from timber production under the National Forest 
Plan. Such zoning would not remove other pressures on the forest base, but it 
would serve the purpose of 'buying time' in order to resolve these problems. 
Hiah Costs of Social Services 
Although service provision may be considered as a form of material incentive, 
none of the existing ICAD projects are designed and capitalised to provide for 
services. The costs of providing education and health care in rural PNG are 
high. The government's ability to increase service coverage is limited by fiscal 
factors, and ICAD projects have little leverage capacity to negotiate government 
service provision. Thus far, apart from basic literacy extension, none of the 
existing ICAD projects have included service provision in their programmes. 
Structural Constraints to Micro-Enterprise Development 
If income generation is a landowner priority, then ICAD projects will need to 
provide support for micro-enterprise establishment. A number of structural 
constraints impede viable enterprise establishment. These are reviewed in 
Sekhran ( 1996) and are summarised here: 
• PNG's internal markets are small. This stems partly from the fact that rural 
incomes are low, and partly from the fact that minor forest produce is often 
available for consumptive purposes directly from the wild. 
• The fragmentation of internal markets affects distribution and marketing 
costs. Fragmentation occurs as a result of the spatial distribution of human 
population concentrations and the dearth of economic infrastructure to create 
or access markets. This has implications for minimum scale economies. 
• International markets have quality control requirements, professional service 
expectations and delivery needs that are difficult to service. These require 
extensive discipline, which is difficult to achieve. The lack of understanding 
of market determinants, structural factors, costs, skills, and experience with 
the workings of the formal economy are all constraints. 
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• Information failure causes a lack of understanding amongst rural 
entrepreneurs of the determinants of markets. This is partly a consequence of 
the remoteness of markets from points of production and the lack, or poor 
functioning, of information systems. 
• High input costs, including those for electricity, distribution, marketing, 
-communications, and security, tend to reduce competitiveness and margins. 
• High rural wage rates, skill shortages, and low productivity increase 
overheads and reduce business development opportunities. Successful small 
businesses often have intensive business management inputs; many employ 
expatriates (including volunteers), but this has adverse implications for 
sustainability. 
The conjunction of these factors affects the viability of micro-enterprises, and 
therefore constrains the ability of ICAD projects to meet their central objective. 
Though there are considerable opportunities in terms of potentially saleable 
products (see Sekhran, Saulei et al. 1994), demand-side bottlenecks exist. This 
requires time to address. 
Work Effort Disincentives 
A major factor to be considered is that community-driven small business 
activities require considerable work effort, labour drudgery, and opportunity 
costs in terms of time foregone for customary activities, relative to royalty-
generating options such as large-scale logging. This affects the economic 
calculus of communities and has a bearing on motivation. 
Reconcilini Custom with Enterprise Mana~ement and Capitalisation Needs 
Brooks ( 1996), in a review of lessons learned from the past history of small 
business development in PNG, argues that a principal reason for the failure of 
micro-enterprises is the repeated attempt to apply Western business models to 
the village economy rather than seeking an indigenous paradigm. She makes a 
distinction between Western linear business models, where asset formation fuels 
long-term business growth, and cyclical models of enterprise in Melanesia. In 
the latter case, the catalyst for community mobilisation and work effort is a 
short-term customary objective (an example would be the need to create an 
agricultural surplus for a bride price payment). 
Brooks (ibid.) further argues that it is critical to recognise the customary 
obligations of communities and the need for individual members to budget time 
to meeting these. In other words, time needs to be budgeted for both customary 
activities and business needs. A related issue is the need for community 
entrepreneurs to service their multi-strand relationships with other community 
actors. Sociocultural norms in Melanesia oblige wealth creators to distribute 
assets amongst clan members. These obligations are ignored at the peril of the 
entrepreneur. Yet there is a fundamental trade-off between the necessity of 
servicing business needs, maintaining and building the capital base of the 
enterprise and investing sweat equity, and customary obligations. Demands on 
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wealth may be based on community perceptions of wealth rather than on an 
objective basis taking account of liquidity. 
Brooks' review also found that, for many business projects, community 
involvement in the process of defining project objectives was limited (ibid.). A 
related factor is that few community members are aware of the reasons (for 
example, market factors) which explain why given decisions are made or need to 
be made. A challenge for ICAD projects is to develop methods to perform 
feasibility investigations at the village level - challenging stakeholders to 
broaden their perspectives on the fundamentals of business management. 
The problem, of course, is that businesses, despite their customary 
demands, operate in a 'Western' business environment that emphasises quality, 
reliability of delivery, and credit discipline. Brooks' solution is to build 
community support for the objectives of micro-enterprise establishment through 
awareness raising and dedicated training programmes which aim at developing 
problem-solving, planning, and critical thinking skills. This later needs to be 
followed up with extension support at the field level. She cautions, in the 
process of achieving this, against dissociating business development from the 
broader community development context. 
Conservation and Development Linkages 
An important point is that, ultimately, durable linkages between development 
support and conservation need to be built. Worldwide, the performance of 
ICAD projects on this account has been poor (Wells and Brandon 1992). The 
existing ICAD projects in PNG are all grappling with this challenge. Solutions 
are likely to embody a mixture of community-level checks and balances, partly 
through building and empowering local institutions to be responsible for 
conservation management.I6 
Other Strategies 
A major lesson is that, if community-led development is not an available option 
(for the reasons already outlined), then a strategy of attracting responsible, 
ethically guided companies to operate sustainable development enterprises for 
profit may need to be employed. These could provide a rent to local 
stakeholders. 
However, the climate for business investment in PNG poses challenges to 
this strategy. The returns from the business activity will need to be sufficiently 
high to attract investors and cover risk premiums payable on capital markets. 
There is a problem in providing long-term surety. The interest rates applied by 
financiers to cover risk currently mitigate heavily against the future. The scale 
l6 Holzknecht and Power suggest the establishment of Community Representative Management 
Committees (CRMCs) or Village Development Committees (VDCs) consisting of representatives 
of kinship groups that hold land and forest resources (see Power 1994; Holzknecht 1995a, 1996a). 
This approach aims at reconciling custom and tenure systems with formal management needs. 
Biodiversity on a Tightrope 445 
of operations necessitated to cover premiums would probably be high, and a 
large baseline resource base is necessary to ensure that harvesting is ecologically 
sustainable at these levels. There are thus enormous hurdles to overcome. 
There is a further caveat. The line between the provision of development 
support in this form and the payment of conservation transfers is blurred. One of 
the principal arguments in favour of community-led small business development 
revolves around the idea that, by making sweat equity and capital investments, 
local communities will have a greater responsibility for, and commitment to, 
productive development (as opposed to rent-seeking). The prediction is that 
conservation will be achieved through development only if development is 
feasible. But this requires, in addition to resolving production, marketing and 
other problems, that communities are disciplined, make sacrifices, temper their 
expectations, and take responsibility for development activities. Without such 
responsibility, development is unlikely to be sustainable. 
It is unclear for now, given the peculiar exigencies of PNG's social, 
economic, political, and institutional fabric, whether the ICAD process will 
succeed in meeting conservation imperatives; and yet the process will no doubt 
continue to be the focus of efforts because the alternatives appear even less 
workable at this time. Notably, the alienation of land to form National Parks and 
inviolate areas is not on the agenda. It remains politically and financially 
untenable, especially given the political awakening of landowners' attachments 
to land and the nature of the existing balance of power between them and the 
state. Even if small parcels of land are protected in this fashion, the experience 
with existing parks on state land is that the previous owners of land maintain an 
ongoing interest in the land so alienated, failing in some cases to accept that 
property rights have been transferred. This presents the obvious danger that the 
whole process may later be re-litigated. 
Problems with Accessing Large Areas for Conservation 
The biological sciences suggest that, in order to serve as viable species 
storehouses, protected areas need to be large (see Schafer 1990). Beehler (1993) 
argues that, in PNG, sites need to be at least 8,000 square kilometres in size. 
The problem is that no single landowner parcel is likely to be of sufficient size to 
meet these needs. The larger the area of interest for conservation, the greater the 
number of owner-stakeholders involved. Each of these groups will have a 
bounded resource set - they will seek to meet certain social and economic 
objectives within the constraints which this imposes (Sekhran 1996). Because 
the marginal opportunity costs of foregone uses are high, individual clans may 
be willing to apportion a part of their landholding to conservation, but not the 
entire parcel. Thus we see a situation in PNG today in which a number of 
landowner groups have expressed an interest in conserving a portion of their 
landholdings, but these holdings are generally too small to provide for long-term 
conservation. 
A zoning plan that commits land to production and strict preservation 
within a multiple-use management framework will have significant 
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distributional implications. Opportunity costs would be imposed 
disproportionately on those clan groups which have jurisdiction over inviolate 
zones, while the benefits would be captured by those clans which control zones 
of extraction. Landowners' perceptions of the gains and losses that apply to 
them will determine the degree to which they agree to participate in 
management. 
A transfer mechanism would need to be found to ensure a spread of benefits 
within any conservation management area between all prospective stakeholders. 
Orsak ( 1996b) provides a strong word of caution in this context: 
Rural villagers aren't clamouring to embrace the concept of local 
taxation for the common good. Until they do, using economic benefits 
from one area or group to secure the protection of large, contiguous 
habitat areas is not going to work.... Incentive sharing will have to 
wait until villagers have embraced the kind of macro land use planning 
that is essential for conservation. 
Conservation Rents 
Another option, where stakeholder demand for income is high and the ICAD 
process is unable to catalyse viable small business development, is to establish a 
conservation interest in land through payment of a conservation management 
rent. The aim would be to create a market in the multi-functional characteristics 
of biological diversity, and thus an incentive for broader conservation. In 
essence, conservation rents may be construed as a transfer mechanism to pay 
landowners not to commit land to ecologically destructive land use options. 
Conservation management rents may take several guises. They may take 
the form of annual cash payments, subsidies for service delivery, or a 
combination of these. Some schemes have established conservation trust 
funds. 17 These are conservation endowments, the proceeds of which may be 
used to rent virgin forest. Funds may be generated through national government 
budget appropriations, the private sector, bilateral and multilateral donor bodies, 
and through debt-for-nature swaps, carbon offset initiatives, or other innovative 
financing deals (see Dixon and Sherman 1991 ). Thus there is no single model, 
although the broad objectives ofthe various schemes are similar. 18 
Conservation rents may be calculated from estimates of the consumer 
surplus obtained by beneficiaries of biodiversity conservation who do not face 
the full costs of provision - particularly communities in the developed world. 
Alternatively, the opportunity costs faced by local stakeholders in pursuing 
conservation management options may be used as a proxy. They may also be 
17 For an overview of current environmental funds, see IUCN/NC/WWF ( 1994). 
18 Some schemes, such as the 'Buy an Acre' of rainforest scheme, aim at securing title over land 
(ownership) for conservation purposes. For obvious reasons, this is simply unworkable in PNG. 
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arbitrarily calculated on the basis of a predefined rent. 19 Regardless of the 
modality, the key is to ensure that the linkage between the service (conservation 
management) and the payment is transparent, and to find mechanisms to enforce 
the compact. Herein lies the rub. 
The arguments for and against transfers have been articulated elsewhere 
(Sekhran 1994b) and are summarised here. 
To reiterate, one factor underpinning the biodiversity management problem 
is that local resource stewards are only capturing a portion of the total economic 
value of conservation. Their economic calculus is based on a comparison of 
relative private and social costs and benefits. Cost factors, including opportunity 
costs, bear heavily in this calculus. The benefits are discounted because they are 
not captured by the community, being enjoyed by other actors or by future 
generations. They are also discounted because they are non-monetary, or 
because the systems linkages between ecological health and human welfare are 
poorly understood. One solution to address this is to ensure that communities 
secure money values for benefits not previously capturable. 
Global communities, it could be argued, obtain conservation benefits -
including existence, recreational, and future use benefits - without facing the 
costs of provision, which instead fall disproportionately on the providers of the 
service (Wells 1992). They thus obtain a consumer surplus for conservation 
management. The utility obtained from conservation, however, would be lost if 
conservation values are eroded through ecologically exploitative forms of 
development. This loss would be manifested through a loss of existence values, 
option use benefits, and potential adverse eco-system feedbacks. Ipso facto, 
there are substantial economic and moral justifications for this constituency to 
pay for the provision of conservation services. 
More affluent communities are likely to be more concerned with future 
welfare than poorer communities, PNG's landowners included. Transfers would 
share the burden for natural resource stewardship with those who have the ability 
to pay. Questions arise, however, concerning the willingness of affluent 
communities to pay unless compelled - regardless of their ability to pay. 
Similar uncertainty exists over the amounts that they would be willing to pay. 
Ensuring that funds flow during recessions will be especially problematic. 
PNG concerns are likely to be remote from the interests of affluent 
societies. TV documentaries and other forms of mass media are likely to raise 
public consciousness of conservation issues, but willingness to pay is probably 
subject to what we may term a diminishing cognitive effect. Willingness is 
correlated highly with perceptions of the issues at hand, and perceptions, in turn, 
are likely to become dimmer as time progresses. Conjecturally, as virgin forests 
become more scarce and the costs associated with a loss of biological diversity 
19 A recently negotiated compact between the government of Vanuatu and customary landowners 
in Erramango pays a standard rate of Vatu 100 (approximately US$1) per hectare per year, the set 
rate for 'unimproved' agricultural land in Erramango (see Tacconi and Bennett 1995). 
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become more compelling, willingness to pay for habitat and species protection 
will rise. 
A major problem is that a poorly constructed transfers framework will 
create or reinforce a 'handout mentality' amongst local communities. This 
would serve to increase dependence on outside assistance and reinforce the 
perception that development is an externally driven process. 
Several questions regarding the modality and mechanisms for the 
distribution of funds are likely to arise. The task of ensuring equity and 
inhibiting social stratification will pose a considerable challenge for fund 
managers. 
The greatest challenge, given the current socio-political environment, will 
be to ensure that landowners maintain their end of any compact, and do not 
renege on the deal at some indefinite future period, when other land use options 
may appear more lucrative. 
The incapacity to provide surety for conservation investments also affects 
investment in ICAD projects. The inability to secure the given service for which 
the payment is scheduled makes investment very risky. Without surety, and 
appropriate institutions to guarantee agreements and uphold contracts, it is 
questionable whether PNG will be able to attract sufficient financial resources 
for conservation management deals. In short, given the nature of the global 
marketplace, funds will flow to those countries that can guarantee the requisite 
conservation outcome. 
Conclusions 
Despite a property rights regime for forest resources that should theoretically 
provide an incentive for conservation management, PNG faces compelling 
constraints to the achievement of biodiversity management aims. This paper has 
documented a plethora of contra-conservation factors. It has also shown that 
strategies to address opportunity costs are hampered by a combination of factors. 
Thus, material incentives alone, regardless of the method employed, are unlikely 
to deliver the desired long-term conservation outcome. 
Many conservation practitioners have recognised these problems and are 
seeking to address them through a process of education and advocacy at the 
community level. The idea is that a degree of attitudinal change is necessary at 
the local level in order for conservation to work. This process is deemed 
necessary prior to providing development support. 
Such a strategy would require that a relationship of trust first be established 
with local communities. Careful attention needs to be paid to community entry 
processes, conflict resolution, awareness, and advocacy. Projects must directly 
tackle the problem of high expectations and challenge communities to rethink 
their development strategies. The basis of responsibility needs to be taught and 
reinforced at the local level. There is no short cut here. Unless communities 
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take the lead in organising themselves, and mobilising human and financial 
resources for development, conservation is unlikely to be achieved. 
This strategy has intuitive appeal, although the jury has yet to reach a 
verdict on its efficacy. This can only be tested by the passage of time. 
At the same time, the conjunction of contra-conservation factors implies 
that some areas of high biodiversity value will not be conserved using the 
vehicle of ICAD projects, but will rather be committed to extractive 
development. Social feasibility studies must form part and parcel of the design 
stage of conservation projects. Such studies may serve to alert conservation 
practitioners to both existing and emergent problems in the area of interest 
proposed for conservation management so that interventions may be 
appropriately designed. It makes sense to target assistance only at those areas 
and communities where the chances of successful outcomes appear likely. 
The problem is, however, that contra-conservation factors are often most 
compelling in merchantable lowland tropical rainforest. One solution would be 
to recruit more ethical industry players into commercial logging ventures in such 
areas, who could then apply active species management areas in logging coupes. 
Despite their shortcomings, it is likely that, at least on an experimental 
basis, conservation management rental arrangements may need to be tried in 
selected areas as an alternative to ICAD strategies. The policy lesson here is that 
conservation practitioners will need to be inventive in designing and applying 
interventions, and will need to be open to a broader range of strategies than 
currently appears to be the case. At the same time, every effort needs to be 
made to identify the likely weaknesses of given strategies and devise, as far as 
practicable, appropriate mitigation measures. 
The process of effecting a given intervention, whether an ICAD project or a 
covenant agreement, will, to a large extent, define the outcome. Given the short-
term exigencies that plague conservation efforts, there is often a tendency to 
short-stop this process. This is a mistake. 
In the final analysis, the present raft of conservation initiatives will flounder 
unless at least some of the perverse conservation incentives that currently hold 
are neutralised. Without strong support from the executive and regulatory arms 
of the state, discrete conservation-focused actions will continue to be frustrated. 
Although the compelling task of addressing landowners' private objectives 
remains, at least the complexity of the task of finding a mutual concession 
between stakeholders will be somewhat eased. Such a strategy would, at the 
very least, buy time. 
CHAPTER20 
NATURE CONSERVATION IN IRIAN JAY A: 
A COUNTERPOINT TO PAPUA NEW GUINEA?* 
JOHN M. LEEDOM 
Introduction 
In an assessment of conservation policy and practice in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), it seemed timely to include a comparative chapter on the Indonesian 
province of Irian Jay a. The 141 st meridian artificially divides a single 
biogeographic and cultural region into two political territories which are almost 
equivalent in size. 1 On either side of this border, the governments of PNG and 
Indonesia have pursued contrasting polices on the establishment of conservation 
areas on customary land. In PNG, the establishment of conservation areas 
legally requires the participation and consent of local landowners. In Irian Jaya, 
on the other hand, the state has the legal authority to allocate customary land to 
nature conservation regardless of the wishes of its traditional owners. Has 
nature conservation been easier to achieve in Irian Jaya because of these 
differences in national systems of land tenure? 
At first glance, it appears that it has. Since the late 1970s, the Indonesian 
government has legally declared twenty-three protected areas in Irian Jaya, 
covering some 63,000 square kilometres, or about 15 percent of the province 
(KLH 1992). The PNG government, in comparison, records the existence of 
thirty-four protected areas in its territory, but they encompass a much smaller 
area: 13,000 square kilometres, or about 2.8 percent of its terrestrial area 
(Sekhran, this volume). On paper, then, Indonesia has dedicated about five 
* The idea to do a comparative analysis of conservation programmes in PNG and Irian Jaya arose 
out of conversations between myself and Nikhil Sekhran, and was encouraged by Colin Filer. The 
International Institute for Environment and Development generously funded a field visit to Irian 
Jaya in January 1996, enabling me to gather documents related to the planning and management of 
conservation areas and to make brief visits to Wasur National Park and the Arfak Mountains Strict 
Nature Reserve. I am especially grateful to the staff of the WWF Irian Jay a Programme, especially 
Ron Liley and the staff of the library for providing me with documentation on conservation 
projects. I would also like to acknowledge the assistance of WWF staff in arranging tours of 
Wasur National Park and the Arfak Mountains Strict Nature Reserve. Terima kasih banyak. Many 
thanks are due to Megan Passey for being my pengikut in Irian Jaya and for being a constant 
source of support. Finally, I am also extremely grateful to Peter Redfield for his editorial advice. 
The views that I express in this chapter are my own and do not necessarily express the views of 
liED, WWF, or anyone else cited here. 
1 PNG has an area of 462,243 km2, while Irian Jaya has an area of 421,981 km2 (BPS 1994:42). 
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times more land to nature conservation in the western part of New Guinea than 
PNG has done in the eastern part. 
On the ground, however, there is little evidence that recent conservation 
initiatives in Irian Jaya have been more successful in protecting biological 
diversity than have parallel initiatives in PNG. First of all, there are significant 
differences between the nature reserve system as it was designed by 
conservation biologists and the nature reserve system as it was gazetted by the 
government (FAOIUNDP 1981; Petocz and Raspado 1984, 1989). Secondly, the 
Department of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation (PHPA) is, at present, 
actively managing only four of the twenty-three legally protected areas. The rest 
remain essentially unmanaged. Lastly, the logging, mining, and commercial 
fishing industries have continued to expand, while Indonesian immigrants from 
other islands have continued to arrive in the province. This increase in industry 
and population has not only made increasing demands on land and natural 
resources; it has also led to increasing conflict over access to them. 
In this chapter, then, I provide a review of the accomplishments and 
frustrations of twenty years of conservation initiatives in Irian Jaya.2 I propose 
that conservation has not been - nor will it be - any easier to achieve in Irian 
Jaya than in PNG. Rather than facilitating the orderly establishment of 
conservation areas, the assertion of state control over forests and other natural 
resources has sparked competition between a variety of unequal actors - the 
state, large timber companies, Indonesian migrants, indigenous Irianese - over 
access to land and resources (Barber, Johnson and Hafild 1994: 13). Such 
competition (and conflict) has not only made it difficult to develop effective 
conservation institutions and management strategies in legally declared reserves; 
it has also led to ecological degradation outside of them. 
I begin the chapter with an overview of the national policy context which 
shaped conservation initiatives in Irian Jaya. I then review the history of the 
nature reserve system as it moved from the stage of intensive planning to the 
stage of implementation. In the last section, I examine how contemporary 
conservation initiatives, which adopt the model of Integrated Conservation and 
Development (ICAD) projects, have attempted to establish effective 
conservation management in five high priority reserves. To a certain extent, 
these projects are succeeding, but they leave little cause to be optimistic about 
the future ecology oflrian Jaya as a whole. 
The Legal and Institutional Framework for Nature Conservation 
under Indonesia's New Order 
The contemporary conservation laws and institutions of Indonesia have their 
roots in the Dutch colonial period, but it has only been in the past thirty years 
2 Previous chapters in this volume (by Whimp, Johnson, and Sekhran) have already discussed the 
current status of conservation initiatives in PNG, and I do not propose to add to their discussion 
here. 
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that Indonesia has developed a comprehensive conservation policy. The Dutch 
colonial administration enacted Nature Protection Ordinances and established 
about 100 Nature Reserves in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
(IUCN 1992:49-50). After Indonesia attained independence in 1949, the state 
inherited the reserve system and adopted the colonial conservation legislation. 
For the most part, however, the reserve system remained unmanaged, and the 
nature protection laws unenforced, during the years of President Sukarno's 
'Guided Democracy' (from 1949 to 1966). It was not until after the 
consolidation of Soeharto's New Order regime (instituted in 1967) that the state 
once again elaborated laws and institutions dedicated to nature conservation. 
Conservation Policy under the New Order 
Since the establishment of the New Order regime, policies affecting the 
conservation of biological diversity - especially in forests - have passed through 
three phases. 3 In the first phase, which started in the m id-1960s, the state 
asserted its control over natural resources and used them as a low cost source of 
capital to stimulate economic growth and consolidate its political base. Revenue 
from the export of oil, for example, was used to fund massive investments in 
infrastructure and human resources; revenue from the export of timber, 
meanwhile, helped to reduce the country's dependence on oil (World Bank 
1994:35). While these policies helped Indonesia to attain high rates of economic 
growth in the 1970s,4 most of the benefits of this growth accrued to an urban 
elite while the costs have largely been borne by peasants and tribal peoples in 
the rural areas of the Outer Islands (Bresnan 1993:283-7; Hill 1994; World Bank 
1994; Barber, Affif and Purnomo 1995: 12). In the first phase, then, the 
government showed no overt concern for the environmental impact of its 
development projects, nor did it articulate specific conservation policies 
(GOIIIIED 1985:45; Hardjono 1991, 1994). 
In the second phase, which started in the mid-1970s, the government 
developed a parallel policy framework which emphasised the need to strike a 
balance between socio-economic development and nature conservation. In 
1971, the government established the Department of Nature Conservation and 
Wildlife (PPA) as a subdivision of the Department of Forests. In 1974, it 
reached an agreement with the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAOIUNDP) to undertake a joint-review of the nation's conservation 
needs. The review resulted in the publication of an eight-volume National 
Conservation Plan in 1981. This proposed revisions and additions to the 
national system of nature reserves, identified conservation priorities, and made 
recommendations for the development of conservation management strategies 
3 I have adapted this periodisation from Barber, Affif and Purnomo ( 1995: 17); see also Barber 
( 1989: 122-125). 
4 The economy grew at an annual rate of 7 percent between 1965 and 1980 (Bresnan 1993:283 ). 
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and institutions (F AO/UNDP 1981; Sumardja, Harsono and MacKinnon 
1984:217). 5 
In the second phase, then, the focus of conservation practice lay in making a 
space for nature reserves in the large-scafe land-use planning undertaken by 
other government agencies. The ministries of Transmigration and Agriculture, 
for instance, were pressuring the Department of Forests to yield forest land for 
conversion to other uses (GOIIIIED 1985b:3; Hardjono 1991 :8-9; 
Tjondronegoro 1991 :27). Conservation practice was not yet oriented towards 
the establishment of nature reserves on the ground, although the World Wildlife 
Fund was sponsoring projects in a number of high priority parks (Blower and 
McNeely 1977). 
In the third phase, which started in the mid- to late 1980s, government 
conservation policy came increasingly to focus on the problems of managing 
conservation areas effectively. The 1980 World Conservation Strategy and the 
1982 World Congress of Parks (held in Bali) initiated a profound shift in 
thinking about conservation management in Indonesia. Whereas the approach to 
conservation management in the past had largely relied on protecting reserves 
from peasant encroachment, participants at the World Congress advocated a 
strategy of involving local communities in the management of conservation 
areas and assisting them in making sustainable use of natural resources at a more 
general level (McNeely and Miller 1984). Over time, the ideas expressed at the 
Bal i conference were transformed into a new model of conservation 
management, generally known as 'Integrated Conservation and Development' 
(Wells and Brandon 1992). This model called for the involvement of local 
communities in the management of protected areas instead of their exclusion 
from land which they might well regard as their own. It also called for the 
improvement of community welfare through the promotion of new agricultural 
techniques and the development of sustainable economic activities in 'buffer 
zones' - that is, areas immediately adjacent to reserves. By pursuing these 
activities, ICAD projects aimed to reduce local dependence on land and 
resources in the reserves, and also to provide local communities with a financial 
incentive to comply with the demands of conservation management. In other 
words, they identified poverty as a major constraint to effective conservation 
management, and sought to develop interventions which addressed this 
problem.6 
5 When the F AO/UNDP project began in 197 4, there were about 160 legally established Nature 
and Game Reserves, totalling about 3.8 million hectares, in Indonesia (Blower and McNeely 
1977:89; IUCN 1992:51 ). By 1982, the government had gazetted 133 additional reserves, bringing 
the total area under legal protection to '11,267,540.06 hectares' (Sumardja, Harsono and 
MacKinnon 1984:214 ). Reserves which the government had recently gazetted in Irian Jaya 
accounted for about half of this increase. 
6 A recent article in the flagship magazine of the WWF Indonesia Programme defined the core 
philosophy of the ICAD approach as follows: 'The basis for effective conservation and nature 
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Since the late 1980s, ICAD projects have become the dominant model for 
conservation management in Indonesia. Projects are now under way in a 
number of National Parks and Nature Reserves throughout the archipelago (see 
Barber, Affif and Purnomo 1995). They are being supported by the Asian 
Develop.ment Bank, the World Bank, USAID, the World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), Conservation International, and the Nature Conservancy (BAPPENAS 
1993:25). 
Conservation-oriented Legislation 
There are two main forms of legislation in Indonesia: 
• 'basic laws' (undang-undang), which contain general statements of principle 
on a particular subject; and 
• decrees (keputusan) or regulations (peraturan), by which particular 
government departments or agencies apply these basic laws to their 
respective areas of jursidiction. 
As a result, 'there is always an inevitable time Jag before a basic law begins to 
take effect ... [and] the legal framework on any legal area is open and continually 
developing' (Fox 1994:3). 
For most of the period under consideration, the Basic Forestry Law of 1967 
has provided the substantive legal framework for conservation policy, although 
its main intention was to open the forests of the Outer Islands to commercial 
logging. The law asserted the state's control over all forests in its territory, as 
well as the resources which could be found in them. It directed the Department 
of Forests, under the authority of the Minister of Agriculture, to define official 
forest areas in Indonesia and then to prepare a General Plan specifying the 
location, availability, and prescribed use of these forests throughout the 
country.7 The forest estate was then to be divided into four categories of use: 
'Production Forests', 'Protection Forests', 'Nature Conservation Forests', and 
'Recreation Forests' (see Table 20.1). These categories largely prescribed where 
and how forests could be used. The undocumented property rights (adat) of 
peasant and tribal communities were recognised only to the extent that they did 
not conflict with the uses mandated by the state. The law stated that 'traditional 
rights as well as individual rights to obtain advantage from the forests must not 
interfere with the goals stated in this law'. 
protection is no longer merely the management of nature. Instead, it is the management of people 
in their interactions with nature.' (Conservation Indonesia, 8(2): 10, 1992) 
7 Article I defined 'forest' as 'an area grown with trees, forming one unity with nature and its 
surroundings, and determined by the Government as forest' (cited in GIIIIED 1985). 
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Table 20.1: The national system of forest classification mandated by Indonesia's 
Basic Forestry Law of 1967. 
Forest type 
1. Production Forests 
(Hut an Produks i) 
2. Protection Forests 
(Hutan Lindung) 
3. Nature Conservation Forests 
(Hut an Suaka A/am) 
Prescribed use 
Forest designated for the exploitation of 
forest products to meet the needs of the 
community in general, and especially 
the needs of development, industry, and 
export. 
Forest designated for the protection of 
watersheds and the prevention of soil 
erosion. 
Forest designated for the protection of 
native flora and fauna in their natural 
state . 
......... ca:)··strict.Nai'lire .. Re.se.i-ve ............................ _ .. N.o .. mailaieilie.iii' .. of''iiliiliail .. iilierrereilce··;:h'ai·· 
( Cagar A lam) changes the character of the soil, flora, or 
fauna in any way, or affects its pristine 
condition, is permitted. Access is for 
scientific purposes only subject to written 
permission from the PHPA. 
·········ciJ)''G"ailie .. Rese·i-·ve··········································-··N·a··acii'vrires .. are .. p.eim.iiteCi .. ii1ai'··aain·ag·e··ii1e··· 
(Suaka Margawatwa) flora, fauna, or landscape that could detract 
from the value of the reserve. Provision is 
made, however, for hunting, subject to 
written permission from the Ministry of 
Forestry, and also for the development of 
forest-based industries, such as the 
collection of forest products, grazing of 
livestock, or fishing, subject to a permit 
issued by the provincial governor. 
4. Recreation Forests Forests for the use of domestic and 
(Hutan Wisata) foreign tourists . 
......... (a) .. tiliii'iiili.Fo.re·s·is ....................................... -.. ~iaiiage·a··speC'ificaiiy··rc;r··c;·riailise.d"tiiiili'iii·g··· 
(Taman Buru) and fishing. 
·········ci1)'.Re.creailoii .. P"ari<s·····································-··r¥i'aii1iaiii.e(i'.ror.oii.id'oor.recrea:iroil:························ 
(Taman Wisata) 
Sources: GOI/IIED 1985; IUCN 1992. 
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This scheme was apparently modified by Basic Law No. 5 of 1990, on The 
Conservation of Living Resources and Their Ecosystems, which revoked the 
Nature Protection Ordinances dating from the Dutch colonial administration and 
revised the categories of protected areas that had been established by the Basic 
Forestry Law.8 Significantly, the new Act defined the meaning of 
'conservation' (konservasi) largely in terms of wise management and sustainable 
use rather than protection. Article 2, for example, stated that 'conservation of 
living resources and their ecosystems shall be based on the principle of 
harmonious and balanced sustainable utilisation of living resources and their 
ecosystems' .9 
In keeping with this principle, Basic Law No. 5 revised the types of 
protected areas as they were defined by the Basic Forestry Law to allow for 
greater flexibility in conservation management (see Table 20.2). The class of 
'Sanctuary Reserves' included the earlier categories of 'Nature Re~erves' and 
'Game Reserves'. These areas were designated for the preservation of plant and 
animal species, and prohibit any and all activities that would lead to a change in 
their natural integrity. The class of 'Nature Conservation Areas', on the other 
hand, included three types of area whose function was both 'to preserve the 
diversity of plant and animal species' and 'to provide a sustainable utilisation of 
living resources and ecosystems'. 'National Parks', for example, were to be 
managed through a multi-use zoning system which comprised a 'core zone', a 
'utilisation zone', and other zones as required (Article 32). 10 
The passage of Basic Law No. 5 marked a shift in conservation policy 
which reflected the shift that had been taking place in conservation practice 
since the mid-1980s. In the third phase, as previously described, the focus of 
conservation practice shifted from reconciling conservation needs with the land 
use demands of other government agencies to reconciling the requirements of 
conservation management with local community patterns of land and resource 
use. Basic Law No. 5, in other words, was enacted to create a legal framework 
for the establishment of ICAD projects. 
8 This was the second basic law to deal specifically with environmental matters. Basic Law No. 4 
of 1982, on Basic Provisions for the Management of the Living Environment, established the 
general goal of achieving a 'harmonious balance' between human beings and their natural 
environment, and called for further legislation on the protection of 'organic natural resources' (see 
Fox 1994). 
9 Fox (1994:2) notes that the new law contained a concept of 'sustainable utilisation' 
(pemanfaatan secara lestari) which was radically different from the idea of 'utilisation' 
(pengusahaan) contained in the Basic Forestry Law. The latter was primarily concerned with 
asserting the government's rights to control the commercial exploitation of the forest. 
1° Core zones (zona inti) were defined as areas that were strictly protected, where activities which 
would modify their natural integrity were prohibited. Utilisation zones (zona pemanfaatan) were 
defined as areas which could be developed for recreation and tourism. Other possible zones 
included wilderness zones, traditional use zones, rehabilitation zones, and so forth. 
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Table 20.2: Types of protected areas according to Indonesia's Basic Law No. 5, 
1990. 
Area type 
1. Nature Sanctuary Areas 
(Kawasan Suaka A/am) 
Prescribed use 
A specific terrestrial or aquatic area 
having sanctuary as its main function in 
order to preserve the biological 
diversity of plants and animals as well 
as the ecosystem that supports them. 
·········(a:)··s!ric!.J\iailire .. R:eserve····························-··A'·····j:.fililire·····sailciliai-'Y·····wil.ere·····iile······ani'y··· 
(Cagar A/am) permitted activities are research and the 
development of science, education, and 
management to protect the breeding stock. 
Management shall be by the government in 
an effort to preserve the species diversity of 
plants and animals. 
········ciJ) .. G"a:m:e··R:e.serve··········································-··A'·Naiii.re···sa:ilc.iii'aiY··iilai··il·a:s··a:··il·ig·il··siJedes··· 
(Suaka Margawatwa) diversity and/or unique animal species, in 
which the habitat is managed by the 
government to ensure the continued 
························································································-··~~~~~.~~.~~ .. ?.~.~.~:.~.~.~P..~~.i.~~: ......................................... . (c) Biosphere Reserve A Nature Sanctuary of native, unique, 
(Cagar Biosfer) and/or degraded ecosystems, where all 
natural components need to be protected 
and sustained for research and education. 
2. Nature Conservation Area 
(Kawasan Pelestarian A/am) 
A terrestrial or aquatic area whose main 
function is to preserve the diversity of 
plants and animals as well as to provide 
a sustainable utilisation of living 
resources and ecosystems. 
·········(a:)··-Na:irc;n:a:r·P"a:rk············································-··f..:······j:.fililire······c·c;n:serv.a:iioil······A:rea······~ilic'h··· 
(Taman Nasional) possesses native ecosystems and which the 
government manages through a zoning 
system for research, science, supporting 
cultivation, recreation, and tourism. 
·········(iJ)'.G'r.a:ilCi.'For.esi .. I>a:i-·k··································-··A'····~ra:ilire····coilserv·a:i'io·~····A:rea·····w'hi'C'ii·····is··· 
(Taman Hutan Raya) intended to preserve a collection of a variety 
of indigenous and/or introduced plants and 
animals for research, science, education, 
breeding enhancement, recreation, and 
tourism. 
·········(c).Natur·e·R:ecrea!ion .. P'ark························-··A'······N·a:iui-·e······c:·c;n·~:ervati·c;n·······area······iila:r~ry··· 
(Taman Wisata A/am) intended for the purposes of outdoor 
recreation and tourism. 
Sources: Translation of original law; IUCN 1992. 
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A third scheme of spatial classification has more recently been enunciated 
in Basic Law No. 24 of 1992, known as the Spatial Use Management Law. This 
law divides all land into two general categories- 'Protection Areas' and 'Human 
Utilisation (or Cultivation) Areas' - and distinguishes four types of 'Protection 
Area': 'Protection Forests', 'National Forests', 'Wildlife Sanctuaries', and 
'Headwater Areas'. However, the significance of this law rests primarily in the 
classificatory powers which it grants to the governors of individual provinces, 
and the rights of consultation and compensation which it grants to local 
communities. 11 
In the remaining sections of this chapter, I suggest that the shifts in 
government policy and legislation described here are concretely reflected in the 
evolution of the conservation effort iri Irian Jaya. Whereas conservation 
practitioners once focussed on their competition with other government 
departments for control of forested land, they are now increasingly concerned 
with the competition for land and resources which is taking place within reserves 
and adjacent areas. 
A Note on Conservation Institutions 
As previously mentioned, the Indonesian government first established the 
Department of Nature Conservation and Wildlife in 1971, as a subdivision of the 
Department of Forests, which itself was under the authority of the Minister of 
Agriculture. In 1983, the Department of Forests was elevated to a separate 
ministry, and the Department of Nature Conservation and Wildlife was renamed 
the Department of Forest Protection and Nature Conservation (PHPA). Most, if 
not all, of its functions and responsibilities remained the same. 
In the provinces, the PHP A operates through a regional structure of district 
offices called Balai Konservasi Sumber Daya A/am, or KSDA. KSDA officers 
in Irian Jaya are under the authority of the regional office in Ambon, and are 
assigned to one of two subregions - Jayapura and Sorong. 
The PHPA first established an office in Irian Jaya in 1980. Since then, 
KSDA officers have devoted most of their time and energy to monitoring the 
illegal trade in wildlife at the airports and seaports. There are only a few who 
are assigned to posts in the field or who make regular patrols. At present, there 
are just over one hundred KSDA staff in lrian Jaya (Petocz and Raspado 1989; 
personal communication, Ron Liley, 1996). 
11 According to Fox ( 1994: 15), certain provisions of Basic Law No. 24 represent a potentially 
significant departure from the Basic Agrarian Law of 1950, which has generally been taken to 
deny the validity of customary land rights, because they allow for compensation to be paid 'not 
just for loss of land rights (hak atas tanah) but also for the loss of management rights over natural 
resources such as forest (hak pengelolaan sumber daya alam).' 
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Conservation Planning in Irian Jaya, 1976-1984: Getting the 
Government to Recognise a Boundary 
Nature conservation began on a unique footing in Irian Jaya. It did not start as a 
popular movement against the environmental excesses of industry, nor as a 
project to halt and reverse a process of ecological degradation. Instead, nature 
conservation began as a voice in government planning for the large-scale 
development of Irian Jaya's terrestrial resources. Between 1976 and 1984, a 
group of conservation biologists associated with the FAOIUNDP Nature 
Conservation and Wildlife Management Project and the WWF Indonesia 
Programme helped the government to design a system of nature reserves for 
Irian Jaya. In this role, they carried out a quiet but vigorous debate with other 
government departments over the location of large-scale development projects. 
'Irreversible decisions,' one of the consultants wrote, 'about the location of 
reserves in unknown or poorly known terrain had to be made in the early 1980s 
so that land not set aside for reserves could be made available to timber leases 
and other development projects' (Diamond 1986:501 ). 
Biological Diversity 
The conservation biologists who worked in Irian Jaya in this period were awed 
by the province's ecological variety and biological richness. Thomas Schultze-
Westrum, who led the first WWF mission to Irian Jaya in 1978, described it as 
'the largest stronghold of virgin tropical rainforest in Southeast Asia [whose] 
surrounding sea harbours the richest marine life on earth' (1978a:86). Ronald 
Petocz, who established the WWF office in Jayapura in 1980, described Irian 
Jaya as 'one of the world's last real storehouses of pristine nature'. It was 'a 
land ... with a multitude of spectacular, diverse, endemic and exotic forms of 
plant and animal life' ( 1982:429). 
· The range of habitats and the diversity of plant and animal species in Irian 
Jaya- as in the rest of the New Guinea region- is indeed staggering. The island 
of New Guinea is sufficiently large and topographically varied to have 
functioned as a 'miniature continent' in recent evolutionary history. In Irian 
Jaya, the Central Dividing Range, which reaches altitudes high enough to 
support glaciers, carves the province into three distinct lowland districts: the 
northern coastal plains and foothills, the southern coastal plains, and the western 
lowlands and mountains of the Bird's Head Peninsula. Within these lowland 
districts, moreover, there are several isolated mountain ranges: the Cyclops, 
Foja, and Van Rees ranges rise out of the northern coastal plains, while the 
Kumawa, Fakfak, Tamrau, Arfak, and Wandamen ranges cover much of the 
Bird's Head Peninsula. There are also many offshore islands, some of which are 
situated on the Sahul Shelf, and were thus connected to the New Guinea 
mainland during glacial periods, while others were not. Such a rugged and 
varied landscape has encouraged the speciation of plants, birds, and mammals 
entirely within its own boundaries (Gressitt 1982; Diamond 1986:331 ). Out of a 
total of 643 recorded bird species in Irian Jaya, 269 are endemic to the New 
Guinea region. Similarly, of the 174 mammal species which have been 
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recorded, there are 4 7 endemic marsupials and monotremes, and 53 endemic 
bats and rats (Petocz and Raspado 1989:31 ). 
The conservation biologists believed that the combination of Irian Jaya's 
ecological richness and lack of economic development presented them with a 
unique role to play in the future of the province. 'For once,' Ronald Petocz 
emphatically stated, 'conservationists are here in time to help secure this 
[biological] diversity rather than play the all too common role of reclaiming and 
rehabilitating what is left over from exhaustive resource utilization' (WWF 
1982:429). As the same author remarked in a subsequent publication: 
Few places remain where a planner can select the most important 
biogeographic elements and structure a comprehensive protected area 
design without having to compromise with the development that has 
arrived there first (Petocz 1984:8). 
If the biologists could persuade the government to set aside areas for a provincial 
system of nature reserves, they could prevent ecological degradation before it 
occurred. In so doing, they would also demonstrate the value of nature 
conservation as an alternative form of land use. If they succeeded, they felt that 
Irian Jaya could become Southeast Asia's most important arena for conservation 
initiatives (Schultze-Westrum 1978; Petocz 1982, 1984a; Diamond 1986). 
Ecology, Economy, and Demography in Irian Jaya in the 1970s 
In the early 1970s, the biota of Irian Jaya had indeed remained intact. This was 
because population densities had remained low while the extent of the cash 
economy was still small and highly localised. In 1971, the provincial census 
enumerated about 923,000 individuals. Indigenous Irianese accounted for about 
96 percent of this population, and the vast majority lived in rural areas where 
production was oriented towards subsistence and ceremonial exchange, and 
where trade was carried out by barter. Monetised economic activity was mostly 
confined to the coastal towns and their immediate hinterlands, where recent 
Indonesian immigrants were dominant (Garnaut and Manning 1974:1 05-6). On 
the north coast there were three major towns: Jayapura with a population of 
14,500, Manokwari with 11,500, and Sorong with 5,900. Of the other two major 
towns, Merauke (6,100) was situated in the southeastern corner and Biak 
(10,600) on the island ofthe same name in the northwest (ibid:64). 
Even in the towns in the early 1970s, there were few commercial 
enterprises engaged in the export of goods. The transfer of government from the 
Netherlands to Indonesia in 1963 had provoked the withdrawal of the major 
banking and trading companies, while the coastal shipping service ceased to 
operate effectively (ibid:32). The skeleton of roads, airstrips, and ports which 
the Dutch had left behind also deteriorated as a result of pilferage and removal to 
other parts of Indonesia. The decline in trade, capital, infrastructure, and 
transport provoked a significant drop in the smallholder production of tropical 
tree crops by indigenous Irianese (ibid:86). 
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Similarly, there were only a few resource-based industries which were well-
established in the early 1970s. Oil production by Petromer Trend was taking 
place in the Manokwari-Sorong region. A handful of Japanese fishing boats, 
meanwhile, were trawling for prawns in the Arafura Sea and fishing for tuna off 
the coast of Sorong. The only significant new development at this time was the 
Freeport copper mine, located just below the equatorial glaciers of the Carstensz 
Range. Construction of the mine, town site, and port facilities to support the 
operation began in late 1967, while the first exports of copper concentrate took 
place in 1972 (Wilson 1981 ). The timber industry had not yet made inroads into 
the province, despite the recommendations of the United Nations Development 
Programme (Richardson 1968; UNDP 1968) that forestry held great promise. 
The problems posed by the diversity of local tree species, and the continuing 
accessibility of the rich dipterocarp forests of Kalimantan, kept Indonesian 
logging companies away until the mid to late 1970s (Garnaut and Manning 
1974:71-81; Manning and Rumbiak 1989a:31-35). 
The late 1970s were, however, a time of significant demographic and 
economic transition in Irian Jaya, stemming largely from the increasing political 
and economic integration of the province with the rest of Indonesia after the UN 
mandated Act of Free Choice took place in August of 1969.12 Irian Jaya was 
formally declared to be a province, and a governor was appointed. In 1971, the 
Indonesian rupiah became legal tender. The government also embarked on an 
ambitious development programme with the assistance of the United Nations 
Fund for the Development of West Irian- FUNDWI (UNDP 1968; Garnaut and 
Manning 1974:20-31; Manning and Rumbiak 1989a: 1-16). 
The development effort initially focused on the rehabilitation of physical 
infrastructure and telecommunications. Marine port facilities and airstrips were 
improved, while regular shipping services connecting the towns to other major 
ports in Indonesia were established. The Department of Public Works and the 
military began to construct the Trans-Irian Highway and extend the road 
networks in urban areas. The government also placed a high priority on 
extending primary schooling into the rural areas, where the vast majority of 
Irianese lived (Manning and Rumbiak 1989a: 1 0-16). 
In the late 1970s, following this development of Irian Jaya's physical 
infrastructure, the government became increasingly concerned to open the 
province to large-scale resource exploitation and to the resettlement of landless 
peasants, most of whom were to be brought from Java under the Transmigration 
Programme. Thus, if conservationists saw Irian Jaya as one of the world's last 
great wilderness areas, the Indonesian government saw the land and resources of 
the province as assets to be exploited for Indonesia's future economic 
development. National and provincial planners alike saw the province as a large, 
12 In August 1969, the Indonesian government organised assemblies in each district of Irian Jaya 
and asked them to vote on the question of whether or not they wished to remain a part of 
Indonesia. Their decision was unanimous, but whether it truthfully reflected the opinion of the 
majority of the indigenous population has been a matter of significant controversy (see UN 1969). 
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sparsely populated land mass, with extensive and largely unexploited natural 
resources, and with a great deal of vacant land which had considerable 
agricultural potential. On the one hand, its natural resources could make an 
important contribution to national economic growth; on the other hand, its 
unoccupied lands could help relieve overcrowding on Java and Bali (Manning 
and Rumbiak 1989a:45-6; see also PIJ 1987). 
Planning the System of Nature Reserves 
It was in this shifting political and economic context that expatriate conservation 
biologists associated with the F AOIUNDP project and the WWF programme 
began, in 1976, to collaborate with the Department of Nature Conservation and 
Wildlife (PPA). Their role in the government's larger planning effort was to 
recommend which areas of Irian Jaya should be closed to development for 
ecological reasons. Over the following eight years, they submitted a series of 
reports to the Indonesian government with detailed recommendations for the 
establishment of nature reserves in Irian Jaya. The initial proposals were vague 
and sketchy in their delineation of boundaries, but these were gradually refined 
on the basis of new reports from field biologists and increasingly accurate maps. 
While the conservation biologists submitted a number of different proposals 
over the years, they all basically built on the pioneering work of Schodde (1973). 
Schodde established three important principles of reserve design through his 
analysis of the distribution of vegetation types and bird species in New Guinea. 
First, he noted that the lowland rainforests, which held the core of the island's 
terrestrial fauna, were 'a complex of biotypes', depending on the altitude of the 
forest, the age of its trees, and its structure. Second, he noted that altitudinal 
transects, from the north and south coasts into the Central Dividing Range, 
contained a much broader spectrum of plant and animal communities than 
latitudinal ones. Thirdly, he noted that there were a great number of 
biogeographical sub-communities in the isolated mountain ranges of the 
northern coast. Thus, an ecologically representative system of nature reserves 
would include cross-sections of the biotic communities on the northern and 
southern escarpment of the Central Dividing Range, and portions of the outlying 
mountain ranges and offshore islands (Schodde 1973: 142; see also Diamond 
1984; Petocz and Raspado 1989). 
The subsequent designs for nature reserves in Irian Jaya incorporated and 
built on these insights. 13 In 1977, after a brief visit to Irian Jaya, John Blower 
made the first recommendations for such designs, largely drawing on Schodde's 
observations. Rather than proposing potential nature reserves, however, Blower 
simply recommended that eleven areas be surveyed for consideration as nature 
reserves (FAOIUNDP 1977). The following year, the team of Van der Zorn 
(FAO) and Mulyani (PPA) surveyed two of the areas, proposed that they be 
declared as nature reserves, and recommended twelve additional areas for further 
l3 This chronology is based principally on Petocz and Raspado (1989:44-53), and also on reports 
collected in The World Wildlife Fund Yearbook, 1978-1984. 
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consideration (F AOIUNDP 1978). A short time later, Thomas Schultze-
Westrum, acting as a consultant to the WWF Indonesia programme, presented a 
plan for a system of eighteen nature reserves, covering an area of about 48,000 
square kilometres ( 1978a, 1978b ). Then, in 1980, Ronald Petocz (WWF) and 
John MacKinnon (F AOIUNDP) collaborated in the production of a plan which 
included thirty-seven protected areas with a total area of about 70,000 square 
kilometres (F AOIUNDP 1981 ). Petocz then restudied the boundaries of the 
proposed reserves in 1981 and 1982, using aerial photographs and satellite 
imagery. He recommended changes to the boundaries of a number of areas in a 
report on thirty-one reserves, which he submitted to the government in 1983 
(Petocz 1983 ). These proposals were then included in a comprehensive volume 
which described the biogeographical reasoning behind the reserve design and 
further recommendations for coordinating 'the integration of conservation and 
development' in Irian Jaya's planned future. The volume was published in an 
English edition (Petocz and Raspado 1984) and an Indonesian edition (Petocz 
and Raspado 1987). The most recent nature reserve design is composed of a 
total of fifty-nine protected areas of different types and encompasses some 
82,000 square kilometres, or about 20 percent of the land area of Irian Jaya 
(Mitchell 1987; Petocz and Raspado 1989:51 ). 
How then did the government respond to these proposals? According to 
Petocz, two documents have made a particular impact on government decisions 
(Petocz and Raspado 1989:44-52). The first document was a map produced by 
the Department of Forests' planning (bina) programme in late 1977 and early, 
1978. It depicted fifteen conservation areas that were based partly on the 
recommendations of Blower (UNDP/F AO 1977) and partly on limited fieldwork 
carried out by PPA teams. This became the key planning document from the 
perspective of the Minister, who proceeded to legally declare eleven out of the 
fifteen listed areas between 1978 and 1982 (see Table 20.1 ). 
The second document which directly influenced government planning was a 
map which John MacKinnon and Ronald Petocz prepared in the last six months 
of 1980 'to meet a government planning deadline' (ibid.). MacKinnon and 
Petocz based the plan on a reassessment of previous proposals, new reports from 
recent field surveys (Diamond 1980, 1981 ), and existing maps of Irian Jaya 
which Petocz considered to be inadequate. This plan was subsequently 
published as Volume Eight of the National Conservation Plan for Indonesia 
(FAO/UNDP 1981 ). It was also incorporated into the Consensus Forestry Land 
Use Plan for lrian Jaya (TGHK). 
The TGHK maps were produced by provincial planners throughout 
Indonesia in the early 1980s. Government Regulation Number 33 of Forestry 
Policy Planning, which was passed in 1970, had instructed the Department of 
Forests to prepare Forest Land Use Plans in accordance with the functional 
categories mandated by the Basic Forestry Law (Barber 1989: 134-6). The law 
was not immediately implemented. By the late 1970s, however, a central 
planning document was urgently needed because of the growing competition 
between government departments for new project sites (GOIIIIED 1985b:3; 
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Hardjono 1991 :8-9; Tjondronegoro 1991 :27). Thus, in the early 1980s, the 
Minister of Agriculture issued instructions to provincial administrations to 
prepare Consensus Forestry Land Use Plans (TGHK), under the direction of the 
Department of Forests, in order to establish a standard reference point for 
government planners.14 
During that period, provincial planners met to compare the land 
requirements of different government agencies. For this purpose, they drew on 
the available information, including 'very generalized topographic maps' 
(RePPProt 1990: 167) and their own personal experience, to allocate forests to 
the categories of 'Nature Conservation Forest', 'Protection Forest', 'Limited 
Production Forest', 'Normal Production Forest', and 'Conversion Forest' )5 
The Department of Forest Inventory and Land Use Planning (INTAG) then drew 
a series of maps, at a scale of 1:500,000, which depicted the distribution of forest 
types, intending that these would subsequently inform the large-scale land use 
planning of all government departments. By the time the planners completed 
this exercise in Jayapura, INTAG had mapped about 406,000 square kilometres 
of state forest areas in Irian Jaya. This meant that about 96 percent of its 
terrestrial area was thus placed under the legal jurisdiction of the Department of 
Forests (Barber, Johnson and Hafild 1994). 
By the end of 1982, then, the Minister of Agriculture had completed 
gazettal procedures for sixteen conservation areas in Irian Jaya, with a combined 
area of 46,034 square kilometres (see Table 20.3). 16 He had also approved the 
TGHK, which included an additional eighteen conservation areas with a 
combined area of 33,038 square kilometres (see Table 20.4).1 7 However, it is 
not clear whether the reserves included in the TGHK have any binding legal 
status. Some reserves, such as the Bintuni Bay Nature Reserve, were 
subsequently included in logging concessions granted by the Forestry 
Department. A substantial proportion of the areas listed in Tables 20.3 and 20.4 
would have to be regarded as marine parks, rather than forest parks, but existing 
legislation does not allow for effective restirctions to be placed on the 
commercial exploitation of marine resources. It should also be noted that the 
TGHK allocated most of the remaining terrestrial area of Irian Jaya (about 
322,797 square kilometres, or 78.6 percent of the province) to 'Conversion 
Forest' (28. 7 percent), 'Protection Forest' (21.1 percent), 'Normal Production 
Forest' (17.3 percent), and 'Limited Production Forest' (11.5 percent). 
14 For a general account of the TGHK process in Indonesia, see Ross (1984). For an account of 
the TGHK process in Kalimantan, see Potter ( 1991 ). 
15 'Limited production forests' are those in which timber production is constrained by the 
requirement to prevent erosion, and therefore represent an overlap between 'normal production 
forests' and 'protection forests'. 'Conversion forests' are those available for conversion to other 
uses. 
l6 This figure does not include the 32 square kilometres covered by the four Taman Wisata 
('Recreation Parks'), which are not regarded here as 'conservation areas' in the strict sense. 
17 This total also excludes the 259 square kilometres covered by another five Taman Wisata. 
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Table 20.3: List of reserves in Irian Jaya gazetted by proclamation, 1978-1992. 
Name Type* Area (ha) Date 
Lorentz CA 2,150,000 25 January 1978 
Pegunungan Cyclops CA 22,500 26 January 1978 
Wasur SM 210,000 2 May 1978 
Rawa Biru CA 4,000 2 May 1978 
Pulau Dolok/Kimaam SM 600,000 13 July 1978 
Teluk Yotefa TW 1,650 12 August 1978 
Nab ire TW 100 11 January 1980 
Gunung Meja TW 500 12 January 1980 
Enarotali CA 300,000 11 February 1980 
Pulau Sabuda/Tataruga SM 450 11 February 1980 
Pulau W aigeo CA 153,000 7 May 1981 
Sorong TW 945 7 May 1981 
Pulau Anggremeos SM 2,500 30June1981 
Pulau Batanta Barat CA 10,000 30 October 1981 
Jayawijaya CA 800,000 30 October 1981 
Pulau Salawati Utara CA 57,000 4 January 1982 
Wasur (extension) SM 98,000 4 January 1982 
Pulau Biak Utara CA 11,000 8 April 1982 
Pulau Supiori CA 42,000 21 July 1982 
Pulau Yapen Tengah CA 59,000 12 October 1982 
Pulau Misool Selatan CA 84,000 12 October 1982 
W asur (status change) TN 423,810 24 March 1990 
Teluk Cenderawasih TN 1,453,500 24 March 1990 
Pegunungan Arfak CA 68,325 11 August 1992 
TOTAL 6,328,280 
* CA = Cagar A/am ('Strict Nature Reserves'); SM = Suaka Margasatwa ('Game 
Reserves'); TW = Taman Wisata ('Recreation Parks'); TN = Taman Nasional ('National 
Parks'). 
t The area for Wasur is not counted twice in the total. 
Sources: Petocz 1983; Petocz and Raspado 1989; PHPA 1995. 
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Table 20.4: Additional protected areas included in Irian Jaya's Forestry Land 
Use Plan (TGHK), 1982. 
Name Type Area (ha) 
Cenderawasih SM 1,898 
Mamberam/ Pegunungan Foja TN 1,442,500 
Sungai Rouffer SM 310,000 
Pegunungan Wandamen/Wondiwoi CA 79,500 
Pegunungan. Tamrau Utara/Selatan CA 441,500 
Pegunungan Arfak CA 45,000 
Pulau Pombo CA 100 
Pegunungan Kumawa CA 118,000 
Pegunungan Fakfak CA 51,000 
Sungai Kais CA 122,000 
Danau Bian SM 50,000 
Parieri TW 2,000 
Pulau Superiori CA 44,500 
Pulau Numfor CA 1,500 
Pulau Turtle/Mapia/Sayang SM 1,547 
Raja Empat CA 2,976 
Beriat TW 12,350 
Klamono TW 10,000 
Teluk Bintuni CA 450,000 
Wagura-Kote CA 15,000 
Kumbe Merauke CA 126,810 
Sungai Seram TW 1,000 
Gunung Meja TW 500 
TOTAL 3,329,681 
Source: RePPProt 1986. 
Reappraisals 
Since the gazettal of the sixteen nature reserves and production of the Forestry 
Land Use Plan, there have been two major reviews of the protected area system 
which have revealed some fundamental flaws in the location of several reserves 
and problems in the delineation of boundaries for many of the others. The first 
was carried out by Petocz in 1981 and 1982, and the second was carried out by 
RePPProt (the Regional Physical Planning Programme for Transmigration) 
between 1984 and 1986. 
Petocz restudied the boundaries of thirty-one reserves on the basis of aerial 
photographs and satellite images which were made available to him at the 
Geological Mapping Unit in Bandung. He subsequently redelineated the 
boundaries of thirty-one reserves at a scale of I :250,000 and 1:500,000, and 
submitted them as a report (Petocz 1983 ). Petocz proposed major boundary 
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revisions for five of the reserves which had already been fully gazetted. First, he 
recommended that the area of the Lorentz Strict Nature Reserve be decreased 
from 2,150,000 hectares to 1,560,250 hectares. The boundaries of the reserve 
then included densely populated highland villages and the mine, town, and other 
sites associated with the huge Freeport copper mine. He also recommended that 
its status be changed to that of a National Park (ibid: 1 ). Second, he suggested 
that the present Enarotali Strict Nature Reserve (300,000 hectares) should be 
replaced with a new reserve in the Weyland Mountains in the western extremity 
of the Central Dividing Range. He pointed out that the Enarotali Strict Nature 
Reserve had been gazetted to protect the Paniai Lakes, but they were 
subsequently found to support few, if any, endemic fish and water plant species. 
Furthermore, he argued, the area adjacent to the lakes was densely populated, 
while the ecology around them had been extensively modified. As a result, the 
Enarotali Reserve was of little or no significance for nature conservation 
(ibid:6). Third, he also recommended that the Pulau Biak Utara Strict Nature 
Reserve be relocated and reduced in size, from 11 ,000 to 6,690 hectares. The 
established reserve, he noted, was 'located outside the limits of the only primary 
forest left on Biak Island which houses a unique endemic fauna' (ibid:26). 
Fourth, he recommended that the size of the Pulau Waigeo Barat Strict Nature 
Reserve be reduced from 153,000 hectares to 116,950 hectares in order to 
exclude settlements along the coast. Finally, he proposed that the Yapen Tengah 
Strict Nature Reserve be increased in size from 59,000 to 83,000 hectares to 
include coverage of lowland and coastal habitats, the latter of which included 
important leatherback turtle nesting grounds. However, the Department of 
Forests has not taken any further action since Petocz submitted these 
recommendations (PHPA 1995). 
The second major review of the protected area system was carried out 
between 1984 and 1986 by the Regional Physical Planning Programme for 
Transmigration (RePPProt) in association with advisers from the UK Overseas 
Development Administration (Petocz and Raspado 1989:52). RePPProt 
undertook a major study of the land resources of Irian Jaya in order to establish a 
firm basis for the planning of future transmigration sites (RePPProt 1986, 1990). 
Utilising the most recent information from aerial photography ( 1976, 1977) and 
remote sensing, RePPProt produced a more accurate set of topographic base 
maps, which included visible land use and vegetation types. IS RePPProt then 
replotted the boundaries, and remeasured the areas, of the agreed forest use 
categories which had appeared on the 1982 TGHK map, and found that the new 
sums differed from those in the original plan. They also found that the TGHK 
had misallocated some forests to the 'Production', 'Protection', and 'Limited 
Production' categories because of incomplete and inaccurate data on rainfall, 
slope, and soils. 
18 RePPProt reported that the maps, for the most part, 'have a planimetric accuracy not worse 
than 500 m' ( 1986: 19). 
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The results of these revisions are shown in Table 20.5. The difference 
between the areas shown in the final two columns reflects the difference 
between: 
• the process of recalculating the areas enclosed within the original TGHK 
boundaries; and 
• the process of revising the 'site index' which was used to distinguish between 
forest types, and then using the revised site index to redraw the boundaries 
themselves. 19 
Table 20.5: TGHK forest classification for lrian Jaya, 1983-86. 
TGHK category 
Nature Reserves 
Protection Forests 
Limited Production Forests 
Normal Production Forests 
Conversion Forests 
Total Classified Areas 
Unclassified Areas 
Total Area of Province 
Source: RePPProt 1986, 1990. 
TGHK 1983 
km2 ( 0/o) 
83,118 (20.2) 
86,485 (21.]) 
47,323 (11.5) 
71,235 (17.3) 
117,754 (28.7) 
405,915 (98.8) 
4,745 (1.2) 
410,660 (1 00.0) 
RePPProt 1 
km 2 ( 0/o) 
73,027 (17.6) 
109,169 (26.3) 
45,893 (11.1) 
77,242 (18.6) 
96,401 (23 .2) 
401,732 (96.8) 
13,068 (3.2) 
414,800 (1 00.0) 
RePPProt 2 
km2 ( 0/o) 
80,237 (19.3) 
156,808 (37.8) 
20,598 (5.0) 
60,291 (14.5) 
88,631 (21.4) 
406,565 (98.0) 
8,235 (2.0) 
414,800 (100.0) 
The government has also failed to take action on RePPProt' s proposals for 
revision of the existing TGHK categories. Many discrepancies therefore remain 
between the protected area system as it was planned and the protected area 
system as it exists in law and on paper. 
Ecological, Economic and Demographic Change in the 1980s 
While the government only partially acted on the recommendations of its 
consultants in the early 1980s, there have been many other processes of change 
which have profoundly affected the ecology of Irian Jaya over the same period. 
First of all, other government departments have proceeded with their plans to 
establish new projects on lands outside, and in some cases even inside, the 
nature reserve system. In 1989, Petocz noted that eleven of the twelve approved 
logging concessions included areas which overlapped with gazetted and 
proposed reserves (Petocz and Raspado 1989:77-78). Logging was also being 
undertaken in reserves which had been approved in the TGHK, such as the 
19 The 'site index' was a simple formula which took account of slope, rainfall intensity, and the 
porential for soil erosion in a given area. Thus 'production' and 'conversion' forest was to be 
located on land with a site index less than 175, while 'protection' forest' was to be located on land 
with a site index greater than 175 or on slopes greater than 45 degrees (Ross 1984). 
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Bintuni Bay Strict Nature Reserve.20 Similarly, the government continued to 
grant concessions for oil and mineral exploration. A large part of the lowland 
area of the proposed Lorentz National Park (now a Nature Reserve) has been 
designated as available for petroleum exploration, and the Phillips oil company 
has established a number of exploration camps in its southern plains and swamps 
(PHPA 1995). Petroleum concessions also overlap with the proposed 
Mamberamo-Foja National Park, the Bintuni Bay Nature Reserve, and the 
Danau Bian Game Reserve. The government has also recently awarded a 26,300 
square kilometre exploration concession in the Central Dividing Range to 
Freeport Indonesia for possible extensions of its mining operations (PHPA 
1995).21 Much of the concession area falls within the boundaries of the Lorentz 
Nature Reserve. There is also a nickel prospect in the Cyclops Nature Reserve 
and a mining concession which overlaps with the Waigeo Island Nature Reserve. 
Meanwhile, the Department of Public Works has continued to plan roads that 
would traverse the proposed Lorentz and Mamberamo National Parks (Petocz 
and Raspado 1989:82; PIJ 1993:39). There are also reports that the Research 
and Technology Minister, B.J. Habibie, has 'an ambitious plan to dam the 
Mamberamo river and create industrial areas in an enormous swath of 
swampland to the west of Jayapura' (Loveard 1996:45; see also PIJ 1993: 50-1 ). 
The demography of Irian Jaya has also changed dramatically since the early 
1970s. In 1971, the national census enumerated about 923,000 individuals. 
Only 4 percent of these people had been born outside the province, and 84 
percent resided in the countryside (Manning and Rumbiak 1989a:24). By 1990, 
the population had increased to about 1,649,000 (BPS 1994:41 ). Out of this 
population, about 21 percent had been born outside the province, and 25 percent 
were living in the coastal towns and their immediate hinterlands. The population 
of Irian Jaya, in other words, has become increasingly urban and increasingly 
composed of recent Indonesian immigrants. Since 1964, the government has 
officially settled about 180,000 transmigrants, mainly in close proximity to the 
towns of Merauke, Jayapura, and Manokwari (Manning and Rumbiak 1989a:54; 
BPS 1994:51 ). In addition, large numbers of immigrants have come to Irian 
Jaya, under their own initiative, from Sulawesi, Java, and the Moluccas. On the 
basis of the net numbers of passengers who have arrived at various ports, 
Manning and Rumbiak estimate that the number of 'spontaneous' migrants has 
steadily increased during the 1980s. In 1980 and 1981, 3,500 persons were 
arriving annually. In 1983 and 1984, the figure had increased to between 4,500 
and 5,000, and by 1985, had reached over 8,500 new arrivals per annum. In 
1985, the Imsini passenger liner service established a regular route from Java to 
Jayapura via Eastern Indonesia and Sorong (Manning and Rumbiak 1989b:23). 
20 See the reports entitled 'Revealing Marubeni Operations in Bintuni Bay' (Setiakwan, 3:28-9, 
1989) and 'The Tragedy ofBintuni Bay' (Setiakwan, 4/5:62-3, 1990). 
21 A recent article by Thomas O'Neill in National Geographic (Vol. 189(2):29, 1996) has 
reported that geologists have identified seventy-five 'target areas' for potential mine sites. 
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Government spending on the salaries of civil servants and development 
projects has also spurred an extended phase of 'remarkably rapid' economic 
growth in Irian Jaya since the early 1970s (Manning and Rumbiak 1989a:2-7; 
PIJ 1993).22 Both directly and indirectly, government spending has 
underwritten the growth of trade and markets in the towns, and has also 
increased employment in the construction, transportation, and service sectors. 
Migrants from other parts of Indonesia have, for the most part, monopolised 
stalls in the urban markets, retail stores, and the privately owned buses which are 
the primary means of transport for most people. They have also filled the 
majority of jobs created by the construction and service industries. At the same 
time, the economic linkages between the urban centres and the rural areas have 
remained weak, with subsistence production still the predominant activity of the 
vast majority of indigenous Irianese. 
Finally, industries focussed on the extraction of natural resources, 
especially minerals, timber, and fish, have grown tremendously in Irian Jaya 
since the mid-1970s. The Freeport mine, for example, steadily increased its 
production after the slump in copper prices ended in the mid-1970s. Between 
1986 and 1990, the Freeport company exported copper, gold, and silver worth an 
average of about US$269 million each year. In 1995, the figure reached 
US$1.76 billion, approximately 1 percent of Indonesia's total GNP (Bohane 
1996). 
The production of timber products has also rapidly risen after falling off 
briefly in the mid-1980s. Between 1980 and 1984, annual log production 
averaged 427,479 cubic metres; then log production dropped to 244,035 cubic 
meters per year between 1985 and 1989, as the Indonesian government instituted 
a ban on log exports. By 1989, however, annual production began to increase 
again, and reached a level of 1.2 million cubic metres (from thirty-two active 
logging projects) in 1991 (PIJ 1993: 114 ). The provincial Forestry Department 
has recently approved twelve more additional concessions, bringing the total 
number of concessions to forty-four, and the area committed to timber 
production to 107,152 square kilometres, which is slightly more than one quarter 
of the terrestrial area of the province (YPMD 1994 ). 
The timber industry has also been actively gearing up to move into the 
production of finished timber products in Irian Jaya. In the early 1990s, PT 
Kayu Lapis, one of the ten largest producers of plywood in Indonesia, 
constructed one of Asia's largest plywood factories in Sarong with the assistance 
of loans from the Asian Development Bank and the Canadian Development 
22 The National Statistical Bureau recorded a total of 67,757 civil servants in Irian Jaya as of 
March 1994 (BPS 1994:79). The number of military personnel is unknown. The central 
government was able to fund development programmes and pay for a large civil service in Irian 
Jaya, in part as a result of the oil boom which began in other parts of Indonesia in 1973 or 1974 
(see Mackie and Maclntyre 1994: 14) and in part by foreign aid and loans, which had reached a 
peak of 25 to 30 percent of government revenues in the late 1960s (Hill 1994:93-97). 
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Agency.23 The national government is also offering generous financial 
incentives to investors to develop an additional ten sawmills, thirteen plywood 
factories, two mangrove chip mills, one sago processing mill, and four pulp mills 
capable of producing 2 million tonnes of pulp per year (PIJ 1993: 115). 
Lastly, the scale of commercial fisheries has also increased substantially. 
Between 1986 and 1991, catches of saltwater fish off the northern shore of Irian 
Jaya increased from 39,243 tonnes to 93,000 tonnes (PIJ 1993 :96). Meanwhile, 
the haul from prawn trawling in the Arafura Sea increased more modestly from 
3,110 tonnes in 1986 to 3,470 tonnes in 1990. 
Thus, if little action has been taken since 1983 to establish new protected 
areas in Irian Jaya, the general conservation situation has significantly changed. 
The growth in population and the expansion of extractive industries have begun 
to profoundly alter the landscape and ecology of the province. In addition, these 
two processes have also precipitated increasing conflicts between the state, 
indigenous Irianese, and Indonesian migrants over land and access to resources. 
So the demographic and economic context was changing rapidly as conservation 
practitioners began to formulate and implement management plans for high-
priority reserves in the mid-1980s. In the next section, I examine the way that 
conservation practitioners are grappling with the social and economic changes 
which have taken place in Irian Jaya over the past thirty years. 
Conservation Management, 1984-1996: Getting the Local People to 
Recognise a Boundary 
The introduction of management strategies and institutions into protected areas 
in Irian Jaya has lagged far behind the pace of natural resource exploitation, the 
establishment of new settlements, and the conversion of forest to agricultural 
uses. While many reserves were gazetted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
WWF and the PHPA did not begin to establish permanent offices in the province 
until 1980. In addition, the design and legal recognition of nature reserves had 
taken place without the knowledge and participation of most of the indigenous 
communities in the region (Petocz and Raspado 1989:43,57, 75). Thus, in many 
ways, conservation practitioners were starting from scratch in their attempts to 
build up local conservation institutions and encourage conservation practices. 
23 Reported in Environesia, 4(3/4):16. 
Table 20.6: WWF/PHPA conservation projects in particular parts of Irian Jaya, 1984-1996. ~ -.) 
N 
Area Status Key habitats Flagship fauna Coop. inst. Year Mng. Perm. 
in it. plan post ~ ('\) 
Cyclops CA Rainforest, moss forest, grassland 273 species of birds, 86 species of PHPA, WWF, 1985 Yes Yes ~ c 
Mountains and swamps mammals YPMD, Ford ::::::-
-Foundation r;· 
Arfak CA Lowland rainforest, montane moss 333 bird species, incl. 5 endemics; PHPA, WWF, 1986 Yes Yes ~ 
-Mountains forest 69 mammalian species; birdwing YBLMD ~ 
butterflies c ::s 
Cenderawasih NMP Exceptional coral reef systems, Dugong, giant clams, hawksbill and PHPA, WWF, 1986 Yes Yes c 
Bay turtle nesting beaches, bird nesting green turtles, saltwater crocodiles World Bank ~ 
islands ~ 
Wasur and TN Eucalypt grassland and savannah; 400 species of birds, incl. migratory PHPA, WWF, 1990 Yes Yes ~ Rawa Biru lowland rainforest, swamps, and waders and waterfowl; large pop'ns World Bank, ""'t 
tidal mud flats of wallabies and rusa deer local NGO ('\) t.o] 
-Lorentz CA Complete spectrum of habitats, from 123 species of mammals, 411 PHPA, WWF, 1990 No No ~ prop. TN alpine equatorial glaciers to coastal species of birds, including many GTZ 
mangroves of Arafura Sea endemics ::s ~ Jauraba Medi prop. CA Coastline, turtle nesting beaches Leatherback turtles PHPA, WWF 1993 Yes? Yes? ('\) 
Turtle Beach :s ('\) 
Yapen Tengah CA Lowland, hill, and lower montane 143 bird species, incl. two endemic PHPA, WWF 1993 Yes? No ::s 
-Island rainforest species of birds of paradise, s· 
leatherback turtle nesting beaches ~ 
Biak Supiori & CA Lowland and hill rainforest Unique avifauna, incl. 82 bird PHPA, WWF 1993 Yes? No .g 
Biak Utara Is. species, with nine endemics ~ ~ 
Sources: Petocz 1983; Petocz and Raspado 1989; WWF 1996. ~ 
~ 
C) 
~ 
s· 
('\) 
~ 
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Once the overall design of the nature reserve system was completed in the 
mid-1980s (Petocz and Raspado 1984), the WWF/PHPA programme in Irian 
Jaya shifted its attention to developing management strategies for a handful of 
high priority reserves.24 Table 20.6 provides a list of all the reserves where the 
WWF, in conjunction with the PHPA, have been active in conservation 
management. It should be noted that the nine reserves listed in this table are the 
only ones where there has been an attempt to introduce some form of active 
protection and management. All the other reserves in the protected area system 
remain essentially unmanaged. They are, in other words, paper parks.25 
In this section of the chapter, I provide brief case studies of the types of 
management strategy which conservationists have used in their attempts to 
establish nature reserves on the ground. We shall see that conservation 
strategies have called for 'participatory' approaches to conservation 
management, and for the development of local alternative industries which are 
compatible with the goals of biodiversity conservation. In this way, 
conservation area management in Irian Jaya has been related to the increasing 
popularity of ICAD projects in international circles. 
'The Fastest Disappearing Habitat in Irian Jaya '26 
The joint WWF /PHP A programme produced the first management plan for a 
protected area in Irian Jaya in 1985. It was for the Cyclops Mountains Nature 
Reserve, which was legally established in 1978 (see Table 20.4). The official 
boundaries of the nature reserve encompass some 22,500 hectares of rugged 
terrain which culminate in three peaks over 1,500 metres in elevation just a short 
distance from the coast. As a result, the reserve includes a variety of habitats, 
from grasslands and swamps to lowland rainforest and moss forest. Biologists 
have recorded 273 species ofbirds and 86 species of mammals in the reserve. 
The Cyclops Mountains are the site of a wilderness area that is surrounded 
by a rapidly growing city. Since 1980, the population of Jayapura and its two 
suburbs, Abepura and Sentani, has increased at an annual rate of about 5.5 
percent, and now numbers around 200,000 (Manning and Rumbiak 1989a:22). 
While most of the increase in population can be attributed to the arrival of new 
migrants from elsewhere in Indonesia, some of it can also be attributed to 
circular migration from the central highlands, particularly the area around 
Sentani. There are members of both migrant groups expanding the area under 
shifting cultivation adjacent to the reserve. Residents of the town enter the 
reserve to poach for game, to collect firewood and rattan, to make charcoal, and 
24 In 1986, Ronald Petocz left his post as the director of the programme and was replaced by 
Arthur Mitchell. In 1987, the World Wide Fund for Nature inaugurated a new project, No. 3770: 
'Implementation of Conservation in Irian Jay a'. 
25 The Indonesian government itself recognises that its national system of nature reserves exists 
largely on paper. See the statements in KLH (1992:25) and BAPPENAS (1993:22). 
26 This description is based on Ratcliffe ( 1985); Mitchell, de Fretes and Poffenberger ( 1990). 
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to raise pigs. Commercial collectors enter the reserve to gather exotic orchids 
and to net birds for the domestic and international wildlife trade. 
The goal of the management strategy was to stabilise the boundary of the 
reserve in order to prevent any further clearance of forest from taking place. The 
plan recommended that the boundaries of the reserve be moved, increasing the 
total area to about 36,800 hectares. But it also recommended that the precise 
locations of the boundaries needed to be determined in consultation with local 
communities, especially by the traditional owners of land which had been 
enclosed by these boundaries. 
A secondary goal was to promote alternative, ecologically friendly sources 
of cash income. Thus, it prescribed the establishment of 'buffer zones' adjacent 
to the boundary of the nature reserve where tree crops, such as cocoa, could be 
cultivated more intensively for sale in town. These buffer zones were thus to act 
as a buffer between agricultural land and primary forest. 
In 1986, the WWF/PHPA programme, in conjunction with the provincial 
Forestry Service, the Ford Foundation's Social Forestry Programme, and the 
Irian Jaya Rural Development Foundation (YPMD), began implementing the 
management plan. The project staff identified the land transfers taking place 
between customary landowners and immigrants from the highlands as the 
greatest potential threat to the reserve. They observed that, when land was sold 
to outsiders, or where a clan had sold land through unorthodox procedures, 
rightful ownership became a matter of dispute. They believed that the lack of 
clear boundaries between the land of each tribe or clan made it 'difficult to 
determine community responsibilities for management'. So they reasoned that 
legitimising traditional land tenure - giving 'clear title' to 'communal lands' -
was the key to improving forest management in the areas in and near the reserve. 
The first phase of the project began when the project staff selected a ten-
member forestry field team - mainly comprised of young men - from the three 
villages that were chosen to participate in the pilot project. This group then 
underwent a period of training aimed at enabling them to act as effective 
community organisers for the social forestry project. Their training emphasised 
the use of discussion group methods and practical field exercises such as rapid 
sketch mapping techniques. After their training, the field staff returned to their 
home villages, where they began discussions with the leaders and clan members 
of their community about their patterns of forest use and their land requirements. 
It was expected that they would then help their communities to formulate forest 
management plans which they would subsequently formalise in consultation 
with government agencies (Mitchell, de Fretes and Poffenberger 1990:244). 
In 1990, Mitchell, de Fretes and Poffenberger reported that the field staff on 
the social forestry project had made substantial progress since 1986 with 
'community organizing, nursery and agroforestry plot establishment, and reserve 
boundary identification' (ibid:249). Nonetheless, they also noted that the project 
had experienced a difficult first year because 'heavy bureaucratic involvement' 
had made the task of managing the project 'cumbersome and unnecessarily 
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complicated'. In addition, the lack of adequate coordinated supervision and 
follow-up training had led to apathy among their field staff. As a result of this 
experience, the social forestry programme then sought to stabilise the boundary 
by somewhat different methods. In the early 1990s, conservation management 
increasingly relied on the direct control of encroachment, land sales, and illegal 
hunting and logging in the reserve. 
According to Ron Liley (personal communication, 1996), the WWF/PHPA 
programme in the Cyclops has yet to secure the boundary of the reserve. 
Indonesian and highland migrants continue to acquire land adjacent to the 
reserve and clear it for cultivation. Other forms of encroachment have also 
occurred. There are reports that the military has built a golf course in the 
reserve, and that illegal logging and quarrying for rock continues to take place. 
For these reasons, Liley also believes that the Cyclops Mountains may represent 
the fastest disappearing habitat in Irian Jaya. 
'The Most Unique Marine Area in Indonesia '27 
In the early 1980s, the WWF Irian Jaya Programme proposed the southwest 
corner of Cenderawasih Bay as Irian Jaya's first marine reserve (Salm, Petocz 
and Soehartono 1982; Petocz 1983). The proposed reserve was to include about 
500 kilometres of shoreline around the Kwatisore Peninsula, 2,500 hectares of 
islands (including those in the Kepulauan Auri chain), 80,000 hectares of coral 
reef, and over 1 million hectares of open ocean. 
The reefs and the islands are the chief justification for the reserve. The 
reefs are composed of a remarkably diverse collection of over 145 species of 
coral (67 genera), where relatively abundant populations of endangered species 
such as giant clams, horse hoof clams, and Triton's trumpet can be found. 
Hawks bill and green turtles nest on the beaches of the islands in the Kepulauan 
Auri chain, as do many species of marine birds. The surrounding marine area, 
meanwhile, supports diverse and abundant populations of estuarine, mangrove, 
reef, and pelagic fish. There are also significant areas of seagrass beds which 
are home to dugongs, and estuarine areas populated by saltwater crocodiles. 
In 1985, the WWF Irian Jaya programme sent two marine biologists, Lucy 
Gilkes and Eve Adipati, to the adjacent town of Nabire to design a management 
plan for the proposed marine reserve. Although the area had been approved 'in 
principle' by the Forestry Department in the 1982 TGHK, it had not yet been 
formally declared in the government's gazette. It was not until 1990 that the 
Minister of Forests declared the Teluk Cenderawasih National Marine Park in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1990 Conservation Act. There remains 
some confusion, however, over the actual legal status of the Marine Park (PHPA 
1995). 
27 The title is taken from Petocz and Raspado (1989:64). This description is based on Gilkes and 
Adipati (1987), Petocz and Raspado ( 1989:44), and Ron Liley (personal communication, 1996). 
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Gilkes and Adipati framed the management strategy for Teluk 
Cenderawasih in terms of what they called 'community participatory resource 
management'. In 1986, there were about 10,300 people living alongside the 
boundaries of the reserve. The vast majority were indigenous Irianese belonging 
to three main tribal groups. The exploitation of marine resources constituted a 
vital component of the local subsistence and cash economy. Gilkes and Adipati 
(1987:2) therefore proposed that the management strategy should respect their 
customary resource rights and subsistence practices, but ensure that their usage 
of marine resources remained ecologically sustainable. 
Gilkes and Adipati identified the activities of non-local fishermen as posing 
the greatest threat to the proposed reserve. Some of them came from other 
islands in Cenderawasih Bay, such as Yapen and Serui. Most, however, were 
from Southern Sulawesi. While local people would not allow them to harvest 
resources in close proximity to their villages, they were not able to exercise 
control over their activities in areas further away. Furthermore, local people 
were harvesting resources themselves in order to sell to the non-local fishermen, 
who then resold them in the market. In brief, Gilkes and Adipati suggested, 
there was open access to the resources of Cenderawasih Bay, and in the absence 
of regulation, the resources would soon be exhausted.28 In this regard, the 
conservation situation in Teluk Cenderawasih resembled that in the Cyclops 
Mountains. 
The management plan therefore proposed three main interventions. Firstly, 
it proposed that the state should entirely prohibit outside fishermen from 
entering the Marine Park, this being viewed as an essential first step towards 
introducing sound resource management. Secondly, it proposed that the PHPA 
develop a system of multiple use zones in the park which would regulate the 
access of local villagers to marine resources. The proposed zoning system 
included a 'sanctuary' zone and a 'wilderness' zone, where access would be 
limited to the requirements of rest and safety while at sea, a 'limited-use' zone, 
and a 'traditional-use' zone, where local villagers could continue to harvest 
resources in a way that complied with their 'traditional' fishing techniques. 
Finally, it suggested that WWF/PHPA take action to increase local control over 
the sale of marine produce in the regional markets. While the plan offered few 
specific suggestions about such measures, it nonetheless assumed that itinerant 
traders were promoting unsustainable rates of harvest by underpaying local 
villagers for fish, giant clams, sea cucumbers, and other marine produce. If the 
local communities could capture more of the actual market price for such 
produce, they would limit their harvests to more sustainable levels. 
However, the recommendations of the management plan were not 
implemented immediately after its completion in 1987. Between 1988 and 1992, 
neither the WWF nor the PHPA maintained a presence in the area. As a result, 
28 They also noted that there was often conflict between outside fishermen and local villagers 
over access to islands, reefs, and fishing areas in Cenderwasih Bay. 
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the local communities largely 'forgot' about the proposed marine reserve 
(personal communication, Gayatri Liley, 1996). 
In 1992, the WWF re-established an office in Nabire with a small staff. At 
that time, they attempted to start up a cooperative to market salted fish to urban 
areas in Irian Jaya as a way of cutting out the immigrant merchants. However, 
this venture failed after a short time because of poor business management and 
the return of local fisherman to the illegal exploitation of giant clams. One 
unfortunate consequence of the failure of the cooperative is that villagers in the 
area have come to believe that the WWF is just another business which wants to 
profit from their resources (ibid.). 
In 1993, a team of consultants visited Teluk Cenderawasih briefly to 
propose revisions to the management strategy. The consultants were part of a 
national project, financed through a loan by the World Bank, to devise twenty-
five year management plans for seven national parks in Indonesia.29 The 
consultants' plan suggested that the proposed multiple-use zoning system be 
replaced by a two-zone system: a 'sanctuary zone' running north to south down 
the middle of the bay; and a 'use zone' near the coast for local communities to 
use for fishing. Once the plan was tabled, the PHP A asked the WWF to revise 
the plan and adjust it to a more flexible system of zones. 
In 1995, the WWF/PHPA secured a significant grant from the Dutch branch 
of the WWF to proceed with the implementation of the zoning system and to 
make a renewed effort to gain the support of local communities for the reserve. 
However, implementation of the zoning system proposed by the WWF continues 
to be delayed. While the national government has approved the status of Teluk 
Cenderawasih as a National Marine Park, and regards it as a high priority area 
for conservation planning and management (BAPPENAS 1993), it has not 
formally recognised the legitimacy of a particular zoning system. As a result, 
conservation management was still (in January 1996) largely confined to joint 
patrols by the PHPA and the Fisheries Department to check the permits of 
vessels fishing in the park. The PHP A has the legal authority to prosecute those 
who harvest species which are either protected or not listed on the fishing 
permit, but they do not have the authority to prosecute fishermen for fishing in 
the proposed 'sanctuary zones' (personal communication, Gayatri Liley, 1996). 
The gains that have been achieved, since 1992, in protecting the National 
Marine Park can be attributed more to the enhancement of the PHPA's ability to 
enforce restrictions on resource use by outsiders and local villagers than on the 
success of 'community participatory resource management' in winning the 
support of local villagers for sustainable fishing practices. In the case of Teluk 
Cenderawasih, unlike the Cyclops Mountains and other reserves discussed in the 
following sections, local communities have played little part in defining the 
boundaries of the marine park or its various zones. 
29 Wasur National Park was also included in the consultancy. 
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'The Place We Guard '30 
The third nature reserve in which the WWF Irian Jaya programme has been 
actively involved is the Arfak Mountains Nature Conservation Area. It is 
located in the district of Manokwari in the Bird's Head region, on a rugged, 
isolated mountain block. 
The conservation area encompasses some 64,000 hectares of lowland, 
foothill and lower montane forest. The highest peak in the range, Mount 
Huiembou, attains an altitude of 2,820 metres, just twelve kilometres from the 
coast. Biologists consider the Arfak Mountains to be of exceptional 
conservation importance because of the presence of a wide variety of bird 
species, including endemic birds of paradise and parrots, and sixty-nine species 
of mammals. The mountains are also the centre of diversity for the giant 
birdwing butterflies (Ornithoptera spp.) as well as the site where the first 
zoological expedition to New Guinea was undertaken by d' Albertis and Beccara 
between 1872 and 1873 (Petocz and Raspado 1989:60). 
The history of the legal status of this area is complex. The Dutch colonial 
administration had originally declared a 1 0,000 hectare reserve in the Arfak 
Mountains in 1957. In 1982, the reserve was included in the Consensus Forest 
Land Use Plan (TGHK), but the status of the reserve remained ambiguous. In 
1992, the Minister of Forests declared it a Kawasan Konservasi ('Nature 
Conservation Area') under the 1990 Conservation Act. 
In 1986, the WWF began a joint project with the PHP A subsection office in 
Manokwari -or KSDA - to develop a management system for the proposed 
reserve. After about eighteen months of fieldwork, Ian Craven and Yance de 
Fretes completed work on a management plan in 1987 (Craven and de Fretes 
1987). Implementation of the plan began the next year, and by January 1996 it 
had arguably become the most successful conservation project in Irian Jaya. 
The Arfak Mountains, like the Cyclops, are increasingly an island in a sea 
of settlements and cocoa or rubber plantations. In 1987, Craven and de Fretes 
(1987:30-1) reported that the five subdistricts immediately adjacent to the 
reserve contained a population of some 74,816. The population of Manokwari 
District as a whole reached 135,643 in 1991, and was growing at an annual rate 
of 4.3 7 percent (PIJ 1993 :23). In addition, there are three indigenous tribes who 
traditionally lived within, or in close proximity to, the conservation area, both in 
the mountains themselves and on the coastal slopes. These are the Hatam, 
Meyah, and Soub. Apart from two Soub clans, however, only the Hatam are 
reported as traditionally controlling land in the reserve (Craven and de Fretes 
1987:33-34). In 1988, there were about 14,708 Hatam who lived in settlements 
near the reserve boundaries. 
30 This account is based on descriptions contained in the management plans, and also personal 
communications (1996) from Yopie Muskita and Jenny Foster-Smith. 
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Hatam settlement patterns in the mountains have changed dramatically 
since the early 1960s. Traditionally, Hatam lived in small isolated hamlets on 
the spurs and ridges of the range. Some thirty years ago, American missionaries 
from TEAM (The Evangelical Alliance Mission) established a small mission 
station in an upland valley known as Minyambou. Since that time, Hatam have 
moved down from the hamlets in the mountains into the surrounding valley, 
where there is now also an airstrip. In 1987, World Vision International 
completed a six-year development project in the valley which resulted in the 
construction of a small hydroelectric dam, a water supply system, a Bible school, 
and a modern health centre. The current settlement of Minyambou, with its 
ordered rows of houses clustered around an airstrip, bears more resemblance to a 
country town in the United States than it does to a pre-colonial Hatam 
settlement. While it is not representative of all settlements in the Hatam area, 
missionary and government influence have nonetheless resulted in the 
amalgamation of settlements throughout the mountains. 
Over the past three decades, the flora and fauna of the Arfak Mountains 
have been threatened by three patterns of activity: the expansion of 
transmigration settlements and agricultural plantations in the coastal lowlands; 
the extensification of shifting cultivation in the highland valleys; and the 
collection of birds and butterflies for the illegal wildlife trade. While the 
expansion of shifting cultivation was not considered to be a major threat in 1987, 
Craven and de Fretes (1987:46) still thought that it could become so if it 
continued without regulation. In 1991, Craven observed (1991: 12) that 
vegetable gardens established on recently cleared plots were the principal source 
of cash income for people in the western area of the reserve,31 and were 
therefore consuming an ever-increasing area of land. The people of Minyambou 
and Makwam, for example, were expanding the area under cultivation to grow 
vegetables for sale to shops, restaurants, and markets in Manokwari. By the 
beginning of the 1990s, shifting cultivation, alongside the illegal trade of birds 
of paradise, parrots, and butterflies, constituted the greatest threat to the 
conservation area. 
The objective of the Arfak management strategy was to establish a 
boundary 'chosen, recognised, and respected by indigenous peoples and the 
government' (ibid:3). The first step involved organising committees composed 
of local, indigenous leaders in all of the Hatam communities located within, or 
adjacent to, the conservation area. These committees, which were organised for 
the most part by indigenous church leaders, were made up of influential people 
who could exercise some authority over the community of customary 
landowners. The WWF/KSDA team organised a total of fifteen committees in 
the conservation area, each of which represented the physical and social 
boundaries of a group of traditional landowners who were willing to work 
together. In such a way, the WWF/KSDA team was able to divide the 
conservation area into fifteen territorial units, which Craven named 'nature 
3l The produce is sold to markets and restaurants in Manokwari. 
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reserve management areas' (NRMAs). The aim of organising the committees 
was for them 'to use the traditional tribal system to defend the conservation area 
as they would their own tribal land' (Craven 1990:2). In a publication intended 
for a Canadian audience, Craven and Nash claimed that 'the Hatam word for 
conservation area translates as "the place we guard"' (1989:43). 
Between 1988 and 1992, these committees worked with the WWF /KSDA 
team to define a boundary between land for gardening and land for conservation 
(Craven 1989:5). This process was a protracted one, and involved some 
compromises between the boundary proposed by the WWF/KSDA on 
altitudinal, habitat, and species considerations, and the committee's own 
assessments of the present and future needs of their communities. The 
negotiation and marking of the western boundary was largely complete by 1991. 
Meanwhile, the official government department charged with delineating 
boundaries on the ground, BIPHUT (the Department of Forest Inventory and 
Mapping), proceeded to erect posts along the eastern boundary, as it had been 
defined by Petocz (1983), without any community input. According to Craven 
( 1991 ), the delineation of this boundary alienated local Hatam communities and 
has contributed to their lack of support for the conservation area. They have 
largely ignored the boundary and have even removed the boundary markers. By 
1992, however, the WWF/KSDA had renegotiated the location of boundaries in 
the eastern segment of the reserve. In early 1996, the WWF /KSDA were 
claiming that the location of the conservation area boundaries had been finalised 
by using this participatory method (personal communication, Yopie Muskita, 
1996). 
The next step in the management strategy called for the WWF /KSDA team 
to negotiate a set of land and resource use restrictions with the Hatam through 
the Nature Reserve Management Committees. The original management plan 
had prescribed a system of five zones in the conservation area, each representing 
a different level of restriction on access and use: 'sanctuary zones', where no 
disturbance or appropriation of wildlife would be permitted; 'traditional use 
zones', where the Hatam could continue to hunt using 'traditional' methods; 
'rehabilitation zones', which had already been degraded but were now included 
in the conservation area; 'rights of way', which comprised the paths traditionally 
used by indigenous people to travel from the mountains to the coast; and finally 
'community development zones', located on the boundaries of the reserve and to 
be used for the establishment of small-scale sustainable industries and 
agroforestry. However, shortly after the implementation of the management 
plan had begun, the WWF /KSDA team was compelled to acknowledge that the 
zoning system was too complex, and even impolitic, because the whole area of 
the reserve consisted 'in reality and in practice' of traditional Hatam hunting 
lands. Thus, the entire conservation area has come to be viewed as a 'traditional 
use zone' where hunting by Hatam people using bows and arrows is not 
restricted. The WWF /PHP A secured agreements with the nature reserve 
management committees to recognise and enforce other restrictions in the 
traditional use zone, but the only ones which are actively enforced are those 
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which deal with the t(l.king of resources from another village's land, with the 
building of houses and establishment of gardens, and with collecting birds of 
paradise and butterflies (Craven 1991 :5). 
Another problem which developed during the implementation of the 
management plan was the lack of legal authority which the nature reserve 
management committees exercised over outsiders. While members of their own 
communities might respect the rules which the committees established for their 
areas, outsiders had little reason for doing so. In order to address this problem, 
the WWF /KSDA team worked to secure local government support for the 
committees and the management system. To a certain extent they have 
succeeded. Under present arrangements, the committees can report 
infringements of reserve regulations by outsiders to the KSDA office in 
Manokwari, or to the District Head (Bupati), and expect that they will receive 
assistance in stopping and prosecuting trespassers. 
The Arfak Mountains management strategy also advocated the development 
of alternative sources of cash income for the Hatam who customarily owned land 
in the conservation area. The most important initiative has been the promotion 
of 'butterfly ranching'32 in the 'community development zones' adjacent to the 
conservation area.33 The WWF/KSDA team believed that butterfly ranching 
could provide the Hatam with an important financial incentive to support the 
conservation area: 'by ranching forest dependent species the economy becomes 
dependent on the presence ofthe forest' (Craven and Nash 1989). 
The WWF initiated the butterfly ranching scheme in the western areas of 
the reserve in 1989, and later, in December 1992, helped to establish a local non-
governmental organisation, Yayasan Bina Lestari Bumi Cenderawasih 
(YBLBC), to manage the farming and marketing of the birdwing butterflies. In 
early 1993, YBLBC began to purchase pupae from Hatam ranchers and sell them 
to international collectors through a semi-state owned forestry company. 
However, YBLBC hopes to manage marketing and exports on its own 
eventually. 
Several problems have afflicted the butterfly project. First of all, YBLBC 
has faced problems of over-production. In its first two years of operation, the 
business sustained a large loss when it felt compelled to purchase large numbers 
of pupae from enthusiastic ranchers. A second problem is that YBLBC has 
faced long delays in obtaining the necessary CITES34 permits to export the 
32 Butterfly ranching involves cultivating the vines on which the caterpillars feed and pupate. 
When the pupae are close to maturity, they are removed and transported to town, where they 
emerge under controlled conditions. The butterflies are then promptly killed and mounted for sale. 
33 This industry was already well-established in the Manokwari area. Chinese and Indonesian 
merchants in Manokwari have paid Hatam to collect butterflies for domestic and international 
markets since 1971. 
34 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species. It takes many months to obtain 
export clearance under the conditions of the convention. 
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butterflies overseas. This has added to the cash flow problem, since YBLBC 
purchases pupae well before it is able to export them. In April 1995, however, 
the Arfak butterfly project received a three-year grant of US$179,000 from the 
Biodiversity Support Program35 to establish the trading agency on a firm basis. 
Since the project started, 1,185 families have earned about US$48,000 from 
sales of pupae to the agency. 
The WWF/KSDA Arfak project has also facilitated the establishment of a 
wholesale cooperative in Manokwari to supply small trade stores in the Hatam 
area. The trade stores developed out of community organisation and information 
centres which were established by the leaders of the nature reserve management 
committees. The cooperative was named ACEMO, which is an acronym of the 
names of all the Hatam subtribes. It sells such items as rice, cooking oil, 
kerosene, salt, soap, and soft drinks to its members for resale. By January 1996, 
there were a total of 3 70 trade stores registered with the cooperative. The 
YBLBC reports that about 70 percent of the income from the sale of pupae has 
been reinvested in the purchase of trade store goods from the cooperative. The 
profit that is being earned by the cooperative is being saved in the bank, and will 
be used as a source of funds for Hatam children who gain entry to high school. 
Individual trade store owners keep their own profits (personal communication, 
Jenny Foster-Smith and Yopie Muskita, 1996). 
On the whole, the management strategy for the Arfak conservation area has 
achieved some tangible results over the past decade. A reserve boundary was 
delimited in consultation with the local committees, regulations were drawn up 
and agreed upon, and the committees have some juridical authority to enforce 
the regulations. In addition, the butterfly ranching scheme has succeeded in 
generating modest levels of income for local families, while the cooperative has 
so far been a major success. 
lrian Jaya 's First National Park36 
Wasur National Park is located in the southeast corner of Irian Jaya and borders 
the Tonda Wildlife Management Area in neighbouring PNG. It encompasses 
over 400,000 hectares37 of extremely flat terrain and includes large areas of 
eucalypt-clad savannahs which are unique to this part ofNew Guinea. There are 
also significant stretches of lowland forest, swamps and tidal mud flats. Over 
400 species of birds can be found in the park, including important populations of 
migratory waders and waterfowl. The park also shelters significant numbers of 
wallabies and rusa deer. 
35 The Biodiversity Support Program is a consortium of the Worldwide Fund for Nature, the 
Nature Conservancy, and the World Resources Institute, with funding from the United States 
Agency of International Development. 
36 This description is drawn from PHPA/WWF (1992); Barber, Affif and Purnomo (1995:38-45); 
and Zulfira Warta (personal communication, 1996). 
37 The WWF remeasured the official boundary maps for the park with an electric planimeter and 
calculated the area to be 413,810 hectares. 
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The forests of the W asur and Maro River areas were first declared as a 
Game Reserve by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1978. The permanent lake in 
the centre, Rawa Biru, which is the major source of water for the town of 
Merauke, was declared as a Nature Reserve at the same time. In 1982, the 
Minister of Agriculture increased the size of the reserve by about 98,000 
hectares, and in 1990, the Minister of Forests reclassified the area as a National 
Park. 
The main source of threats to the ecological integrity of the park stem from 
the rapid expansion of the town of Merauke and the chain of transmigration 
settlements along its western border. Merauke itself contains a population of 
some 44,000 people, while more than 19,000 people live in transmigration 
settlements across the Maro River. The growth of the town has also stimulated 
organised poaching of rusa deer and wallabies by outsiders who come equipped 
with jeeps, motorcycles, and guns. It has been estimated that deer meat sold in 
the Merauke markets (coming from adjacent areas as well as Wasur itself) 
constitutes about 80 percent of urban meat consumption (PHPA/WWF 1992). 
Until 1990, moreover, the game reserve remained essentially unmanaged. 
There are also about 2,500 people who live within the boundaries of the 
national park, approximately 1, 700 of whom are indigenous Marind, Kanum, 
Marori, and Yei. The government has recognised that the Marind and Kanum 
peoples continue to have the right to live in the park. 
In January 1991, the WWF Irian Jaya programme, in conjunction with the 
subdistrict office (KSDA) of the PHPA, initiated a project to develop a 
management plan for the national park.38 Over the next two years, project staff 
carried out research in the park, including habitat and biological surveys, land 
tenure studies, a demographic and economic census, and feasibility studies of 
tourism and eucalypt oil as small-scale industries (PHPA/WWF 1992:65). This 
research formed the basis of the management plan, completed at the end of 1992. 
A team of consultants funded by a World Bank loan were then commissioned to 
draft a twenty-five year management plan. The draft was completed in March 
1994, and revisions are still being made by the KSDA/WWF staff. 
Like the management plans for other reserves in Irian Jaya, the Wasur 
prescription focussed on delineating boundaries that will be recognised and 
respected by the government, migrant settlers, and indigenous people. However, 
Wasur is unique in having indigenous communities actually residing in the park 
- small villages on the frontier of a rapidly growing city. But rather than 
identifying the expansion of the town and its economy as the major source of 
threats to the park, the management plan identified the poverty of its residents as 
the single greatest threat. The plan stated that the motivation behind hunting and 
38 The current local management authority is the Subseksi Konservasi Sumber Daya Alam 
(KSDA) Merauke which comes under the authority of the KSDA Irian Jaya. Funding came from 
the Dutch government until 1992, when the Dutch branch of the WWF stepped in and assumed 
financial responsibility for the project. 
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logging, the wildlife trade and land sales is 'the continual search for cash to buy 
food, clothes, education, housing and medication' (ibid.). 
The plan proposed a four-part strategy to address both the need for 
conservation management and the need for improving the welfare of park 
residents. The initial move involved the establishment of institutional 
mechanisms for boundary control, through which park residents and local 
authorities could restrict access to the park by outsiders. The aim was to provide 
the customary landowners with a monopoly over the game (rusa deer and 
wallabies) in the park, thereby increasing their incomes and making the hunting 
more manageable. The second step involved the WWF/KSDA negotiating a 
multiple-use zoning system with park residents. Then, to administer the park, 
the plan proposed a three-tiered structure of management authorities, comprising 
the local KSDA office, Village Park Councils, and a Park Resident Advisory 
Body. Village park councils were to be composed of influential park residents 
who could act as intermediaries between their communities, the KSDA, and the 
local government. The councils would negotiate the location of zone 
boundaries, provide input into framing regulations, and keep the KSDA and 
local government authorities informed about any infringements. The fourth and 
final step involved the establishment of small-scale industries in 'utilisation 
zones' to provide park residents with an alternative and ecologically sustainable 
source of cash income. 
How, then, have these initiatives fared? 
Since 1992, there has been some progress in implementing boundary 
control. The WWF/KSDA established a guard post on the Trans-Irian Highway, 
which cuts through the middle of the park. There has been a slight increase in 
the numbers of park staff (funded by the WWF). Experiments have been made 
in allowing park residents to use traditional methods for hunting deer and pigs. 
These have involved the issue of tickets to park residents at the guard posts in 
order to allow the transport of deer and pig meat to town. Park authorities have 
also been involved in organising local transport for this purpose. The plan noted 
that, in the first stage of implementation, this assertion of control over a key park 
resource for the exclusive use of residents was the single most important factor 
in increasing community support for the national park. 
Progress with regard to the establishment of a three-tiered structure of 
management authorities beyond the guard force has been slow. In 1995, the 
WWF staff still thought that the concept was workable but might take a decade 
to achieve (Barber, Affif and Purnomo 1995:44). 
Evaluation of the success of the proposed zoning system would also be 
premature. The plan and subsequent documents (PHP A 1994) mapped a system 
of five different zones, including a 'village zone', a 'utilisation zone', a 
'traditional use zone', a 'low-intensity use zone', and a 'core zone'. The 
establishment of the boundaries of these zones, and the restrictions on activities 
within them, were negotiated by the KSDA/WWF and park residents between 
1992 and 1994. The 'traditional use' zone covers the entire park, and permits 
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the indigenous residents to continue their 'traditional activities' within it. The 
definition of 'traditional activities' was one focus of the research conducted in 
1992, and came to include the establishment of small garden plots and hunting 
by pre-contact methods (such as fire), wh-ich is now seen as a key practice in 
maintaining biological diversity. 
In conjunction with local partners, the WWF has also begun to implement 
the plans for two small-scale industries in several of the villages in the park area. 
The WWF team has established aromatic oil distilleries in a few villages, as well 
as a marketing cooperative in Merauke which sells oil to buyers in Java. This 
has succeeded in generating a modest amount of income for park residents. 
However, some trees have also been cut down and some areas over-harvested. 
Like the butterfly project in Arfak, the enterprise as a whole is running at a loss. 
Efforts have also been directed at promoting tourism in the park. Three 
guesthouses have been built in different village locations, and itineraries are 
being established for travellers. The project has also tried to establish 
safeguards to ensure that income goes directly to park residents rather than 
outside entrepreneurs. As tourists are required to hire transport and guides 
through the WWF office in Merauke, the trips are relatively expensive, but 
profits over costs are channelled back through the village management councils 
to pay for community needs.39 Although the number of park visitors since 1992 
has been small (perhaps 600), WWF staff are actively seeking to expand the 
enterprise. 
Since the WWF Wasur programme began in 1991, it has accomplished a 
great deal in terms of establishing beneficial relationships between park 
residents and park authorities. The project has strengthened the boundary 
protecting the park from encroachment by residents of the neighbouring town 
and transmigration settlements. It remains to be seen, however, if small-scale 
businesses will succeed sufficiently to function as a substitute for more 
destructive efforts to generate cash income. More troubling, however, are the 
effects of national development policies which continue to promote the Merauke 
area as a site for new transmigration settlements, forestry projects, and the 
expansion of rice cultivation. As the town of Merauke grows, the stress on the 
resources of the park must correspondingly increase. In this setting, it would not 
be surprising if the indigenous communities continued to ally themselves with 
conservation practitioners in an effort to protect their land and resources in a 
region where they have already become marginal players. 
The Troubled History of the Proposed Lorentz National Park10 
Since the late 1970s, a section of the southern escarpment of the Carstensz 
Mountains in the Central Dividing Range has been a high priority area for 
39 In January 1996, the price for tours ranged from about US$72 to US$300 per person per day. 
Most of the income derived thus far has been spent on secondary school fees. 
40 This account is based on Jim Schweithelm (personal communication, 1996). 
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conservationists. This is because the region includes the highest peak in 
southeast Asia, Mount Jaya (4,884 metres), the permanent snowfields below it, 
and a 'complete spectrum of alpine, subalpine, montane, lowland and swamp 
forests [extending down] to the coastal mangroves of the Arafura Sea' (Petocz 
and Raspado 1989:58). In other words, the region comprised a complete 
altitudinal transect of all of the major habitats of the southern region, which are 
home to a substantial proportion of all the known species of Irian Jaya. In this 
area, biologists have identified 123 of the 1 72 mammal species, and 411 of the 
643 bird species, within the proposed boundaries of the reserve. 
The Dutch are credited with making the first attempt to create a nature 
reserve in this area. In 1919, they legally declared a 300,000 hectare area from 
the equatorial icefields to the southern coast, bracketed by the Noord West and 
Lorentz rivers. In 1956, however, the Dutch colonial administration abolished 
the reserve because of the unresolved land rights of indigenous people who lived 
within it (Petocz 1989:44; Smith 1993: 17-18). 
In 1978, the Indonesian government re-established the Lorentz Strict Nature 
Reserve following the recommendations of the F AO/UNDP report ( 1977). The 
boundaries of the reserve encompassed some 2.15 million hectares. They 
enclosed not only the entire Freeport mine and Timika township, but also some 
of the densely populated communities of the highlands. The tribal lands of five 
tribal groups were included in the reserve, as well as a number of settlements 
with a population numbering well over 10,000 people (Manembu 1991 ). In 
1980, a joint WWF /PHP A team recommended that the boundaries be changed to 
exclude the mine site and associated operations, as well as most of the highland 
villages, thus reducing the size of the reserve to 1.48 million hectares (Petocz 
1983). They also recommended that the status of the reserve be changed to that 
of a National Park to allow for a more flexible approach to conservation 
management. In 1992, the Forestry Department and the Department of Mines 
submitted another proposal for boundary changes which repeated those that had 
been recommended in 1980, along with a few modifications along the southwest 
boundary (Smith 1993: 18). However, the government has not yet officially 
recognised the proposed changes. The Lorentz legally remains a Nature Reserve 
with the same boundaries as those that were drawn in 1978. 
In the mid-1980s, the Lorentz area was considered a high-priority reserve 
for development as a National Park (Petocz and Raspado 1989:58). The 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature even proposed that the 
Lorentz be included on its list of World Heritage sites. But, despite the interest 
amongst the .. international conservation community in the fate of this large 
'pristine area', the WWF Irian Jaya programme had difficulty raising funds to 
start an active project. 
The reasons for the lack of international donor interest in the Lorentz are 
unclear, but can probably be attributed to two major issues which affect the 
reserve. Firstly, the Indonesian government does not seem to be particularly 
committed to the reserve, because there are large prospects of subsurface 
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minerals in the central mountains and oil in the coastal lowlands. The Basic 
Mining Act of 1968 clearly states that these natural resources are the property of 
the state, and that their exploitation takes precedence over all other forms of land 
use. When Freeport finished mining the Ertsberg cap in 1989, the Indonesian 
government granted it a second concession of 2.6 million hectares, much of 
which falls within the boundaries of the reserve (see McBeth 1994). 
Secondly, the central highlands have historically been the scene of a great 
deal of social unrest since the Indonesian takeover in 1963, and more recently, 
since the construction of the Freeport mine in the early 1970s. The construction 
of the mine displaced a number of indigenous communities, while the direct 
disposal of tailings from the mine into the Ajkwe and Minanjeri rivers has 
greatly increased sedimentation rates and forced the rivers back into a network 
of shallow braided channels.41 Lowland vegetation in the vicinity of these 
channels has died back- in some places for 30 kilometres from the source of the 
river (PHP A 1995). Traditional landowners do not receive any direct royalty 
payments from Freeport, while compensation for the loss of land and resources 
over the past thirty years has been extremely limited.42 It is therefore no 
surprise that the highland area around the mine has been a major centre of OPM 
activity and of repeated military reprisals since the mid-1970s (see Osborne 
1985). The prospects for the development of new mining and oil ventures in the 
region, and the threat of continuing social unrest and violence, have probably 
helped to dissuade international agencies from investing in the management of 
the nature reserve. 
In 1990, however, the WWF secured funding to launch a pilot project in the 
reserve which resulted in the production of two reports. The first report 
provided an ethnographic overview of four of the tribal groups whose traditional 
lands were included in the reserve, and offered a partial assessment of their 
attitudes towards the establishment of the national park (Manembu 1991; see 
also Cook 1995). The second report explored the tourism potential of the 
Lorentz Reserve (Smith 1993). It took the WWF another four years to secure 
additional funding for the next phase of the project. The Asian Development 
Bank deferred a request for funding, while there were repeated breakdowns in 
negotiations with the Freeport mine to establish a 'Friends of the Lorentz' 
committee which would have involved Freeport, the PHPA, the WWF and other 
NGOs, and which would have included joint financial support. In 1995, the 
WWF finally secured funding from the Dutch branch of the WWF, the German 
aid agency GTZ,43 and the Biodiversity Conservation Fund. The goal of the 
project was to develop a draft management plan by the end of a two-year period, 
and then to line up additional funding for its implementation. 
41 On average, the mine has discharged between 100,000 and 160,000 tonnes each day since the 
beginning of the decade (PHPA 1995). 
42 See also the reports in The Ecologist, 25(6), 1996; Tapol Bulletin, No. 132, December 1995; 
and Indonesia Reports, No. 325, April 1996. 
43 Gemeinschaft fiir Technische Zusammenarbeit ('Technical Cooperation Agency'). 
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The project started in mid-1995, with the aim of devising strategies to 
increase the interest of indigenous communities in the idea of a national park. 
As in the case of Cyclops and Arfak nature reserves, the core strategy to win 
such support was 'participatory mapping'. In the second half of 1995, 
conservation practitioners were involved in locating customary land boundaries. 
They also began to consult with local communities, to collect oral histories, and 
to make sketch maps. Again, the collaboration between conservation 
practitioners and indigenous groups in the participatory mapping process had a 
number of goals. These included the acceptance of reserve area boundaries, 
developing a mutually agreed zoning system, and raising awareness for nature 
conservation (Momberg 1994). More significantly, however, 'participatory 
mapping' was also aimed at strengthening customary land rights. 
In January 1996, two staff members of the WWF Lorentz project, along 
with members of a Cambridge University biological expedition to the reserve, 
were taken hostage by a faction of the OPM. The leader of the faction, Kelly 
Kwalik, had long been organising acts of sabotage against the Freeport mine.44 
Kwalik believed that, by taking Western hostages, the rebels would draw 
international attention both to the activities of Freeport and to the OPM's quest 
for independence from Indonesia.45 The hostage crisis dragged on until the 
middle of May, when an elite Indonesian military unit under the command of 
Prabowo Subianto, Soeharto's son-in-law, freed the hostages in a military raid. 
Two of the Indonesian hostages were murdered, but the Western hostages 
escaped unharmed. 
The OPM action in this case did not succeed in raising sympathetic 
international attention to their cause. Instead, it was either condemned by 
governments or passed unnoticed in the world's major media. The Indonesian 
government responded by stepping up the presence of the military in the Timika 
area. The OPM action also dealt a severe, if not irreversible, setback to the 
WWF Lorentz project. 
Conclusion: Drawing and Enforcing Boundaries 
In this chapter, I have provided evidence that conservation initiatives have not 
been easier to achieve in Irian Jaya than in PNG, despite the differences in 
national systems of land tenure. I have pointed out that the Indonesian 
government has only partially acted on the recommendations of its consultants, 
and has only just begun to implement conservation management in a handful of 
44 Kwalik reportedly participated in the sabotaging of the pipeline that carried copper and gold 
sluice down to Timika in 1977 (the incident is described in Osborne 1985:69). An Australian 
journalist who interviewed Kwalik in the interior of Irian Jaya in 1995 reported that 'the issue of 
compensation and equity seems central to Kwalik and the tribes he represents' (Bohane 1996:34). 
45 It is ironic that the OPM took this particular group hostage. In November 1995, nineteen 
environmental groups signed a petition which charged Freeport with 'massively altering the 
landscape, irreparably damaging the rich biodiversity of the area, and harming the health and 
sustenance of local indigenous communities' (McBeth 1996:28). 
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high priority areas. Even in the areas where conservation management is being 
implemented, conservation practitioners are finding that they must first address 
the competition for land and resources which is taking place between the state, 
indigenous Irianese, and recent Indonesian· immigrants. 
From the perspective of conservation practitioners in PNG, the strategies 
that their couq.terparts in Irian Jaya have developed to manage conservation 
areas are liable to present something of a paradox. From their perspective, the 
legal protection of customary land rights in PNG has created numerous, 
seemingly intractable obstacles to nature conservation. In Irian Jaya, on the 
other hand, conservation practitioners have viewed state recognition of 
customary land tenure as an essential precondition for successful nature 
conservation.46 
The paradox disappears, however, when we recognise the obvious: that the 
status of ethnic Melanesians in the political economy of these two nation-states 
is fundamentally different. 'Melanesians' in Irian Jaya comprise a small, 
marginal ethnic minority in a nation of over 200 million people, where the state 
controls the allocation of permits for, and the revenue from, the exploitation of 
timber, subsurface 111inerals, and oil. The Irianese, in other words, are not in a 
position to negotiate a 'rent' for 'their' natural resources. Their material interest 
in land and resources is more likely to correspond with the conservationist's 
interest in the protection of nature. In PNG, on the other hand, the 
'Melanesians' are an indigenous citizenry divided into numerous customary 
landholding groups which can negotiate rental incomes and demand 
compensation or royalty payments for the exploitation of natural resources. 
Their material interest in conservation or exploitation varies in accordance with 
their ability to command local resources. We may therefore say that 
'Melanesians' in Irian Jaya constitute an ethnic 'class', while 'Melanesians' in 
PNG do not. 
Nevertheless, the differences in the 'class positions' ofMelanesians in PNG 
and Irian Jaya, and the differences in national systems of forest tenure, have not 
led to predictable differences in the outcomes of conservation projects. In Irian 
Jaya, putative state control of forests has facilitated proposals for the 
establishment of conservation areas. It has also, to some extent, facilitated their 
legal declaration. But it has not meant that either the state or indigenous 
communities have found it easier to recognise the boundaries of nature reserves 
on the ground. 
46 
'The key to conservation area management in Irian Jaya is a boundary chosen, recognized and 
respected by the indigenous people and the Government' (Craven 1991 :3). 
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